LOOSE CANNONS

PC WORLDS

Political Correctness and Rising Elites at the End of Hegemony

Jonathan Friedman

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Loose Can(n)ons

Editor: Bruce Kapferer, Professor Emeritus of Anthropology, University of Bergen, and Honorary Professor, University College London

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Jonathan Friedman

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Introduction

Why Political Correctness?

Oh no! Not another book on political correctness! The past decades have seen massive output on this subject, primarily from the United States but increasingly in Europe as well. Isn't the issue exhausted by now? The many people who hate the concept would like to think so. But this is not just another book taking sides for or against a particular manifestation of PC, as almost all publications have done until now. Nor is it about the American campus issues of feminist, post-feminist, and anti-racist politics, although the content of those debates is very much a focus of the analysis to follow. Written from a perspective on Sweden, it concerns incidents that occurred there in the late 1990s. At the time the notion of political correctness was hardly understood in Sweden, even in its American trappings, but it has since become a problem arousing the passions of many.

Although I take a clear position against what I define as political correctness, I emphatically do not define it in terms of its particular contemporary content, be it feminist or multiculturalist. Rather, I define it in structural terms, arguing that multiculturalism is part of a rising elite identity and that the discourse of political correctness has played a significant role in its establishment. The structural relation between the content of PC discourse and its formal properties is significant, but it is not an analytical relation—the one cannot be deduced from the other. Instead, the relation is one that connects the insecure identity of rising or falling elites with the need to establish or maintain dominant ideologies and a clear moral order. The moralization of the social world derives from this anxious situation, but the particular content of the ideology imposed can vary greatly, very much more so than envisioned by most of those who have participated in the PC debates.

The literature on PC has tended to conflate the content of PC with its form, so that the issues have been reduced to conservatives versus liberals, right versus left.[1] Even a sociolinguist, D. Cameron (1994), has simply assumed

the political content of political correctness, perhaps influenced by her own engagement in the concrete issues. Her analysis, however, does focus on the general issue of the political nature of language, a point that is made more vociferously by those directly inspired by Foucault (Choi and Murphy 1992). Cameron uses the expression "I am not politically incorrect" to show how the notion itself has changed, how it once was internal to the left and meant simply, "I am committed to leftist/feminist causes, but not humorless or doctrinaire about it" (15) but has now been refigured to mean that one was party to a new dichotomy defined by conservatives.

> To say yes was to claim for yourself a definition constructed by conservatives for the express purpose of discrediting you; to say no was to place yourself among those conservatives. (16)

This change was orchestrated by the right itself, in an example of "the politics of definition" (16). While Cameron does not consider this to be part of the PC phenomenon itself, in our analysis the politics of definition is the very core of politically correct thinking. Her focus is on the politics of linguistic usage—its role in political action—and from this perspective, it is progressives who are trying to change society for the better by attacking older, accepted categories and arguing for a political intervention into language itself. Since language influences thinking and action, its transformation can help bring forth new political realities. Thus the word African-American is an improvement over Black.

> Someone who claims African American is a euphemism because it makes no reference to skin colour is implicitly asserting that a description of people by skin color is a value-neutral description. (28)

In associating PC with a particular political strategy, she falls into the same kinds of arguments that are used in the defense of PC. The above example is truly exemplary in this respect. The preference for the term African American assumes that reference to skin color is intrinsically less value-neutral than reference to geographical origin. And why should this be the case? As another chapter in the same collection (Appignanesi 2005) makes clear, in France the use of skin color terminology is not understood as demeaning (although a PC argument might tend to attribute this to unconscious racism). Any anthropologist ought to grasp that if there is anything that is relative, it is the connotations of semantic categories. The argument ends in a statement of the need to democratize language, to break down categories in a general strategy of giving voice to the formerly silenced. PC is primarily about a politics of semantic and thus political deconstruction.

The most general statements of PC claim to represent a politics of pluralism in all senses. Western rationality, national identity, monoculturalism,

essentialism are all seen as conservative or even reactionary, destined for deconstruction and dissolution, ultimately to be replaced by a truly pluralist world. A philosophical version of PC identifies conservative ideology as the entire edifice of modernist Western science and philosophy, objectivism, and foundationalism (Choi and Murphy 1992). The position that Choi and Murphy associate with PC is simply "the postmodern alternative." Their text is heavily influenced by Stanley Fish and radical constructivism. The notion that the categories of language, like those of the rest of social life, are products of human creative action and have to be practiced to exist is not necessarily postmodern, but it has become an identifying characteristic of the position. Thus even such a diehard modernist figure as Bourdieu is incorporated into the project, although he himself was very critical of postmodernism. The reason is simply that his approach to social practice, a variant of a certain Marxist tradition, treats social categories and structures of language as socially constituted in practice. What is perhaps more specific in their work is the proposition that there are no autonomous properties of reality that are not reducible to language, which implies the further crucial proposition that rational argument in which statements are compared to, or tested against, "reality" is impossible. In the end the establishment of "regimes of truth" is entirely a matter of power, the power of imposition.

For Stanley Fish, one of the key figures of the political correctness movement, the politics of definition is a major instrument in the establishment of the good and true. No arguments are necessary nor even interesting. Being thoroughly interwoven with postmodernist categorizations, multiculturalism and post-feminism form the basis of the new ideology, so they may indeed seem inseparable from the need for a politics of definition and the ensuing moral categorization that divides the world into good guys and bad.

My aim in the following is not to enter into these discussions and to take a stand for or against the above positions. It is rather to analyze the PC phenomenon as a particular social reality—a reality that is a diagnostic of a particular state of social existence that harbors serious dangers (in the factual, not the moral sense) for the maintenance of the critical rational arena that is the core of much of modern existence.

Why Me?

This book was inspired by a series of incidents in my own life. It might and will be said that this fact distorts the entire content of a study that should never have seen the light of day. Some of my colleagues have said as much. But of course that content did see the light of day in the Swedish media and spread

via academic gossip to other parts of the world. The events at the core of my discussion occurred in Sweden, a country that became my home and the place where my children grew up. Sweden was indeed something of the ideal that so many American intellectuals chalked it up to be. It was very easy for Americans to inhabit this society, with its luxurious daycare centers, easy relations with most public institutions, high degree of acceptance of people, and willingness to engage in very serious discussion about almost all subjects. Olof Palme had certainly made the country attractive to those on the left with his Third World, pro-Vietnam politics, his and others' tolerant socialist rhetoric, and an activist left movement tolerated by officialdom as well as the police. It wasn't simply the welfare and the world's mother-in-law syndrome—all made possible by the exceptional growth of an intact industrial-based export economy after World War II—that seemed utopian to many foreigners; it was the atmosphere of experimentation, of a cult of the future. But Sweden in the 1970s was not only a country of high ideals in which many intellectuals could take radical positions yet remain in the mainstream; it was also a country dominated by a moral discourse, a discourse of "the good," that often made it difficult to question and criticize just what it was that was being so defined.

In the 1970s this made little difference for people who, like myself, were engaged on the Left. Here there was little control. The numerous student movements were never subjected to police violence as in other European countries. The sense of experiment was not merely localized to student movements—it resonated in broader segments of society and had the sanction of the state. There were, of course, ideologies, most of them very critical of social democracy, which was hardly considered leftist at the time, even if the party's ranks were subsequently filled by "radicals." For many left-leaning thinkers from other countries in Europe and the United States, Swedish social democracy appeared to be a successful alternative. Here, after all, was a society that was really trying to reconstruct itself in more egalitarian terms. It was saturated with a strong idealism that was put into practice. The social world I lived in contrasted with that in the United States I had left, initially for France and England. It was a social world based on the maximization of social security, where everyone in principle was to be taken care of—like it or not. The paradox of the 1970s is that even as they marked the beginning of the dis-integration of the Swedish model, they were also the consummation of welfare politics.

For many like myself this was a period of exhilaration, not just in Sweden but in large parts of the West. There was a certain freedom of expression in the air, even if we were unknowingly living to some degree in an ideological cage. Our cage was clearly free from onslaught by state power, at least in Sweden. Others were not free in this period. Some retreated to their offices and homes. These were not people who had been engaged in conservative politics, but

people who were not engaged at all and found engagement something strange and distasteful. For some of these academics, the situation was indeed tragic, but they would have their revenge in the years to come. The vision of those years as a dictatorship of radical students is overdrawn, as most descriptions of the period reveal that it was characterized by internal debates and struggles. Within Marxism, for instance, intellectual debates contributed substantially to that ideology's demise, though there were also stronger, more global reasons for its decline. In France the Althusserians (structural Marxists) were very divided and often exercised exclusionary tactics, party-style, but the debate on conceptual issues was vigorous enough to considerably weaken the received understanding of Marxist explanation. Similar debates in England led to a dismembering of structural Marxism (Hindess and Hirst 1975). All this marked the start of a broader transformation that I have alluded to as the decline of modernism, or in concrete terms, a decline in belief in the future and development, along with an increasing focus on self-identity or a more general cynicism. Thus, although the debates were quintessentially modernist, a larger disintegration of modernist identity loomed.

Out of this arose, seemingly, new ways of making sense of the world—but of course they were not new. There was a shift from class to culture in leftist circles, but more fundamentally a shift from a project of social reconstruction to a project of self-identification. This was the age of roots, of genealogical politics and a skyrocketing number of cultural movements that varied greatly in their particular goals but were always and everywhere rooted in fixed cultural characteristics upon which identity could be pinned (Friedman 1994). It was this massive displacement of perspectives within my own social world that attracted my interest to the relations between global process and cultural identity. In the United States, the cultural politics that developed as of the early 1970s took such forms as Black Power and Red Power and then proliferated into an explosive movement against a formerly hegemonic Western culture with all its epithets: male, heterosexual, white, middle-aged. This was primarily a campus phenomenon, but it reflected more powerful transformations in our civilization. In Western Europe it was soon paralleled by the re-emergence of ethnic regionalism, the culturalization of national identity, the emergence of indigenous movements, and the ethnification of immigrant minorities. All these shifts occurred within the same time frame in large parts of the Western-dominated world.

The academic world, as that of other cultural elites, became fractioned. One of the major rising elites identified itself as culturally radical and postcolonial (Dirlik 1997). This elite was at first multicultural but soon struggled with the apparent essentialism of cultural identity and sought something higher and more encompassing for itself. This took the form of a cosmopolitanism that celebrated the combination of diverse elements into hybrid fusions

associated with world citizenry as the only morally acceptable future for the world. The locus of this kind of discourse is multiple yet related, I suggest, to a changing experience of the world. This is the world described for Reich's (1991) "symbolic analysists"—the new, fast-moving, fast-thinking managerial class, the yuppies, the media elite who played an important role in the establishment of this new regime of legitimacy. In most Western countries this elite has been one among many, and I would add that there is plenty of internal variation. In Sweden, which has a remarkably centralized elite, this particular "progressive" worldview became the dominant one. And in Sweden, where national identity was simply taken for granted and the social democratic welfare state was predicated on a basic unity of values and a specific culture of representativity, the emergence of this new ideology entailed a radical rupture with respect to the previous state of social affairs.

In this reconfiguration of positions, the state moved toward a strategy that can readily be recognized in the European Third Way and the Neue Mitte: a consolidation of political power, including rapidly increasing salaries for politicians; a strong pro-globalization politics; and, most markedly in Sweden, a redefinition of the nation-state as a multicultural state in which Swedish nationals are redefined in principle as just another ethnic group. It is sometimes suggested that massive immigration in the 1980s and 1990s caused this particular change, but I would argue that it is only one part of the story. In fact, the redefinition of Swedish society by its elites produced a situation that institutionalized migration into a social category. Integration could only fail in a society with high unemployment and downward mobility, and even when the economy picked up again, briefly, the segregation persisted, becoming more aggravated. Yet the dominant, unchallenged ideology was that Sweden was now the world, that it had become culturally enriched and even creolized. Anyone seeking to take up the real situation—increasing conflicts, segregation, ethnically based criminality, and the like—was immediately branded an enemy of society, that is, the state and its elites. Academics and journalists shared this view, though they were known to say the most outrageous things in private. The head of the program on immigration and ethnic studies at a university college in Malmö stated in a seminar that it was important that researchers take up only the bright side of multicultural Sweden, so as not to ignite conflicts.

In this atmosphere in which a rising elite was propagating a new ideology, it became important to avoid issues that might puncture the images of the new world to be achieved. Either be silent or say the right thing—and silence might as well prevail, since it can never be known just how "right" one is. This is a very general issue that has been extensively discussed in the United States, though with little attempt to provide a general account. Thus Hughes, in his *Culture of Complaint* (1993) writes,

> We want to create a sort of linguistic Lourdes, where evil and misfortune are dispelled by a dip in the waters of euphemism. Does the cripple rise from his wheelchair, or feel better about being stuck in it, because someone decided that, for official purposes, he was "physically challenged"? (1992: 18–19)

In the United States, thousands of people ended up in court for saying the wrong thing and some were even relieved of their jobs, not least in universities, but the field within which control over language use was exercised was limited to specific institutions and only rarely became a larger problem. The Swedish situation is different in this respect, first because of the lack of real intellectual opposition to the reform called multiculturalism, and second due to the centralized nature of the control of language. This is implemented by immediately classifying wrongdoers as racists, fascists, and Nazis. Meanwhile, the growing semantic field of dangerous propositions has been extraordinary. If, say, Danes vote against the European monetary union, then Swedish commentators and politicians might (and did) account for this in terms of xenophobia and a troubling tendency to racism. The Swedish prime minister even suggested that the Left Party, which is also somewhat anti–European Union, was a fellow-traveler in this dangerously fascistic tendency. The "logic" is not unique, of course, and is rampant among many intellectuals, but in Sweden it is official state ideology and strongly entrenched in all "respectable" parties.

This book, then, is an exploration of a family of phenomena that I feel it is crucial to understand, not simply because it has affected my own life but because having lived though it, I have discovered that it is indeed a general phenomenon worthy of investigation. But there is something more important here. The core of any intellectual environment and of intellectual creativity is the existence of an intellectual public sphere, one that requires the confrontation of different interpretations of reality—not their juxtaposition, but their real confrontation. Of course one might retreat from this assertion, claiming in postmodern fashion that all interpretations are equal and that an "edifying conversation" will do just fine. But this leads to an accumulation of interpretations, models, and theories that are no longer subjected to argument, falsification, and the like. One might of course contend that this leads to an enriching cornucopia of possible understandings of the world, but I maintain that more powerful forces are at work. Not all interpretations of reality are acceptable, and many are discarded for reasons of academic power, failure to make it in the market, or, in this particular case, failure to conform "morally" to the currently accepted interpretation of the world. Karl Popper's vision of science may be dead, even as an ideal type, but what has replaced it in the human sciences is a moral politics that, I shall argue, is a product of an ideological struggle linked to the establishment of new elites.

In what follows I attempt to come to grips with two related phenomena. One is the formal or structural nature of political correctness as a form of

communication and categorization. The other is the transformation of the social context that, in my view, lays the ground for the implementation of this form of communication. PC discourse consists in the "moralization" of the social universe and its dichotomization into what can be said and what cannot. It can occur in quite trivial situations within groups where social control depends on avoidance of sensitive issues. In its most basic form it is part of the discourse of "respect," in which a look, a remark, a movement, can be experienced as a threat by a gang leader. The object of my analysis is the massive transformation that has reordered the social reality of many European welfare states and particularly Sweden, where the transformation is most glaring. The first half of the book focuses on incidents that occurred in Sweden in the 1990s. It refers to real people, since this is not a mere ethnography but also a statement about the world that I and many others inhabit. All statements are documented. Many of the people I discuss will undoubtedly see all kinds of implicit motives that they may piece together via various associations, which will simply illustrate and even amplify my analysis of politically correct discourse. This part of the book also ventures a comparison with similar phenomena in other countries in order to arrive at a general understanding of the deeper structures involved. The second half of the book examines more closely the transformation of the social context, the restructuring of class relations and elites in the West, and their relation to the emergence of a new hegemonic discourse. While it is indeed important to engage this discourse, it is even more important to lay bare its social foundations—not because this in any way vitiates the discourse, but because its interlocutors have not seen fit to do so, and this lack of self-reflection is a reflex of the project of hegemony itself, the generalization of positioned interpretations into self-evident truths.

This is not, as I have stressed, a book about the pros and cons of any particular form of political correctness, the focus of so many recent books. But it is certainly a general critique of all forms of political correctness as a means of suppressing debate. It is about the nature of a specific mode of communication, one that is part of everyday verbal interaction but becomes dominant in certain kinds of situations. It is primarily about the real historical conditions that have led to the contemporary issue of political correctness. These global transformations have produced major ideological reconfigurations and new elites, or at least the re- identification of already established elites. In the end, this is a book that suggests, via the discussion of the PC phenomenon, that the decreasing capacity for rational critique by intellectuals is part of the urgent problems confronting us. Zygmunt Bauman has suggested that there is a new totalitarianism on the horizon that is not imposed by dictators but, increasingly, produced by a self-willed adaptation to new social conditions of power. Intellectuals, among other cultural elites, have led the way to this adaptation. Following a curious displacement of a well-known global economic policy,

cultural elites, as major beneficiaries of the new globalized stratification, have actively engaged in their own intellectual structural adjustment. What follows is thus politically engaged against the emergence of the enthusiastic passivity that has inundated a public arena once characterized by real social critique, argument, and confrontation.

Since 2002, when this was first written, the sense of urgency has increased. In the intervening years, while the manuscript was on the back burner, the new material streaming in has only increased the dismay that prompted the original project. Political correctness has spread to ever more sectors of social life. Though it has been criticized and discussed in a number of publications, PC has not yet been dealt with as an anthropological issue, a situation I hope to remedy in the following chapters.

Note

1. It is important to note here that left and liberal are also terms that mean very different things in Europe and in the United States. Liberal in the U.S. is often equated with left, whereas in Europe it represents the political midpoint and sometimes a position somewhat to the right of center. There is also a common confusion of "cultural" versus "political" positions. Multiculturalism and feminism are often designated as leftist, but in fact their distribution among and within political parties traverses the entire right-left spectrum.

Chapter 1

PC Worlds

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

Public Ethics or the Politics of Research?

One might well ask why ethics has become such a central issue in Swedish anthropological discussions. The question of ethics arose primarily in the 1970s in the United States. It is true that the American Anthropological Association (AAA) produced a set of rules concerning ethics, but this was largely born of the relation between anthropologists and government agencies during the wars in Southeast Asia.[1] The extremely general AAA Statements on Ethics of 1971 presented rules to protect informants from intentional and non-intentional effects of fieldwork. They emphasized questions of anonymity and the protection of individuals. Though the moral high ground was well established by a clear stance on the use of ethnographic data in military strategies, it has seldom been noted that some victims of the intellectual purges of this period were not really guilty of what they were accused of. But all of these concrete political issues are a far cry from the discussion in Sweden, which is couched in far more general terms. The problem with the ethics of fieldwork, ethnography, and anthropological writing is partly the problem of the ethical component of any representation of an "other." But in such encompassing terms, it becomes a question of a collectivity's control of its members in ways that can prove gratuitous if seriously enforced. The question of fieldwork ethics can be and has been imbued with an air of political correctness. That the moralizing is not consistent makes perfect sense, as the anthropologists who produced it were pursuing a political agenda. In the 1970s the agenda was explicit, and its moral position was an obvious product of political ideology. Today the agenda is hidden and the moralizing consequently vague, so ethics has itself become an issue. Instead of ideology dictating moral values, moral values are being con-

structed around relations of academic hegemony. The introverted, confused lack of direction of the moral discussion has led to an intellectually paralyzing quagmire of ifs and buts. It involves two kinds of problems, which I shall try to illustrate below.

Politics as Morality

Consider the following episode and some of its potential ramifications:

I. Anthropologist X does fieldwork in Southeast Asia during the U.S. Vietnam War, in an area not controlled by either the U.S. or the North Vietnamese military. The Americans, though it could just as well have been the other side, get hold of this well-known ethnography and decide on its basis that the people of that area are allied with the communists. They proceed to bomb and annihilate the population.
   a. The dominant military power could have decided on another strategy in which infrastructure was introduced to enable this group to maintain its way of life.
   b. The dominant military power could decide to introduce infrastructure and capital to enable the population to "develop," leading to social differentiation and the loss of "traditional culture."

This episode, which actually occurred, was condemned by the ethnographer who worked there. This individual was deeply involved personally with those people and experienced the disaster as personal loss. The left condemned the act of atrocity, as did the American Anthropological Association, though not for the same reasons. For some leftists, other groups who were allied with the United States and the Kuomintang deserved what they got, since they were on the wrong side. For some anthropologists it was obvious that had it been members of certain other groups—say, urban workers or middle-class groups allied with the enemy—who were killed, the bombing would not have been a serious issue. No clear morality is involved here, and certainly not one that is generalizable. The point is that the anthropological stance is a political choice, in this case, to defend the subjects of its ethnography.

As for Ia and Ib, they can elicit the same kinds of responses, even if they are more ambivalent because no death is involved. Some would have found Ia laudable, but one might object that "there goes an imperial power creating yet another human zoo." Anthropologists in the 1960s and 1970s would presumably have seen Ib as acceptable, although the Marxists would have complained; but by the 1980s Ib would have been stamped as immoral and imperialistic, the imposition of the West on the Rest.

My point here is that these are questions of political positioning, and that constructions of moral interpretations of the world are reflexes of political identities. Strikingly, throughout this period and even more so today, there is no discussion of the political ideologies themselves. Today the entire discussion is couched in terms of universal ethics, a sure sign of a hidden agenda of political correctness and academic/political hegemony.

The Indeterminacy of Ethical Discourse and Ethnographic Paralysis

This can be illustrated by some actual problems that have arisen in the Swedish discussion, where one "if" leads to another until ethnography becomes so restricted and so "respectful" it must satisfy itself with the ever more trivial. Severing the moral discussion from its political moorings sets the former adrift in a sea of infinite regress. A couple of issues suffice to illustrate this point.

I. Question: Should the anthropologist engage in activity that might be dangerous to the people he works with?
   a. This is a narrow question, as it would seem to be directed only at those anthropologists who consciously aim to harm those they study. But the implications are of another order if the question is interpreted another way: Should an anthropologist engage in activities that might lead to danger for people with whom he or she works? The answer here is indeterminate, but since there is no knowing beforehand whether or not fieldwork can lead to danger, I would argue that the "might" is enough to eliminate all of ethnography. It implies that the anthropologist referred to in the episode discussed above, for example, can be accused of being unethical, since his monograph was used against the people he had studied.
      1. Note that this is a central argument of political correctness in some quarters (see below), that is, the meaning of a statement lies not in the intention of the subject who produces the statement, but in the sum total of uses the statement is put to in the larger social context.

II. Question: Should the ethnographer support the people with whom he or she works, protecting their anonymity, supporting their political projects, and making sure the outside world does not change their conditions of existence or way of life?
   a. Are oppressed minorities equivalent to crack gangs? Bourgois (1996: 11–12) argues that whereas negative stereotyping is a serious problem, "countering traditional moralistic biases and middle-class hostility toward the poor should not come at the cost of sanitizing the suffering and destruction that exists on inner city streets." If some individuals in a given group want to "modernize" while others do not, what are

> we to do? Turning reality into a moral issue for ethnography becomes absurd in such cases. On the other hand, the anthropologist's general engagement in the world is what dictates how he or she answers such questions. And such engagement is political. Political engagement is motivated by moral identification, of course, but to replace the political with the moral at best turns the latter into a hidden agenda, and at worst leads to the end of all independent investigation of reality. Without a political position, the solutions to the moralization of ethnographic practice become infinite. I can interpret crack gangs as true revolutionaries, as victims of modern society, or as self-interested criminals, and those implicit interpretations may determine my ethnographic ethics.

If the moral issues of ethnography—not those concerning basic issues of honesty and of good intentions, but those exemplified above—are in fact political issues, then the more interesting problem is how politics becomes transmuted into ethics. I suggest that the production of ethical rules of ethnographic practice is related to a snowballing of political-cum-moral control, the formation of academic hegemonies in a world devoid of theoretical practice. This is most notable in the burning issues of political correctness. To make things worse, one might suggest that in any case, moral codes are no more than hegemonically successful forms of political correctness that survive because they become doxa.

Political Correctness as a General Phenomenon

What is political correctness? It has been described as something new, but it is clearly a fundamental aspect of most social behavior. It is not to be confused with the simple equation of power and knowledge. In fact it is precisely this equation aimed at the enemy which is the core of PC discourse. Furthermore, I suggest, any survey of intellectual activity is replete with acts of exclusion consisting in the formation of in-groups and hierarchies of dominance based on the "correct" view of the world, or at least of the object of academic/intellectual discourse. This type of power has taken various forms in the past. In an interesting dissertation from the University of British Columbia (Fuller 1995), an analysis of the liberal economist Frederich Hayek's attempt to infiltrate and subvert (London School of Economics) Keynsian economics by means of forming cadres of agents true to the cause of the unfettered market economy, is pictured as a success story in political subversion which accounts for the current dominance of the liberal/neoliberal paradigm in economic circles and all the way to the top of the political hierarchy. It might be countered, of course, that other factors played a crucial role here; that the Hayek groups

didn't exist everywhere, that there was debate throughout the period so that the liberal paradigm had to struggle, and most of all, that the Western world and its cosmology was significantly transformed: i.e., the apparent bankruptcy of the welfare state and its ideology, the rapid commodification of the Western life world as a product of the movement of capital out of industry and into a proliferation of hyper-speculative activities, including everything from the markets for international loans and securities, i.e., the transformation of finance into casino capitalism, to the vast capitalization of "culture." All of this jolted state controlled capitalism (itself a myth) off its moorings.

But such politicization of intellectual life is viewed with cynicism in the West, where a distinction is always drawn between political strategies and the content of ideological agendas. Power and knowledge are not, pace Foucault, or were not, the same thing. Academic politics in the United States, especially in the face of increasing professionalization, of course became a battleground invoking a fear of Marxists, or even left-liberals, as dangerous characters and poor researchers (i.e., ideological), but it was an open struggle. Hegemonic intellectual structures need not use moral arguments. They can make claims to obvious and absolute truth. These tendencies to hegemony bear a resemblance to political correctness, but the moral element is primary in the latter and secondary in the former. Moreover, the specificity of political correctness is not merely morality as such, as the phenomenon is also embedded in the emergence of a culture of shame (see this volume's conclusion). This shame is rooted in the assumption that there exist certain self-evident moral truths about the world, which makes transgressors into objects of ridicule as well as fear, depending on their attributes. I would go so far to suggest a relation between the emergence of such shame and a weakening of the intellectual public sphere. The culture of shame in political correctness is an outcome of the withering away of reflexivity, which is the premise upon which intellectual public spheres are built. Its absence gives rise to extreme forms of righteousness that elude serious debate and discussion because the Truth is self-evident to those who adhere to it. This accounts for a common reaction among people whose ideas are criticized. Rather than seeing a good debate, they are personally offended because their ideas are an extension of themselves. This necessitates a moral attack that places the other party under suspicion of pursuing evil agendas and connections to dangerous characters and categories of people. I will now illustrate this with some general examples.

Outrage and the Politics of Inversion

In a recent collection, bell hooks recounts an incident in which she and a friend confronted the structure of White Male Chauvinist behavior. While introducing a tale of revolt against oppression in *Killing Rage*, hooks (1995: 8) dis-

closes that she was "writing this essay sitting beside an anonymous white male that I long to murder." The discourse is worth a close look:

> We have just been involved in an incident on an airplane where K, my friend and traveling companion, has been called to the front of the plane and publicly attacked by white female stewardesses who accuse her of trying to occupy a seat in first class that is not assigned to her. Although she had been assigned the seat, she was not given the appropriate boarding pass. When she tries to explain they ignore her. They keep explaining to her in loud voices as though she is a foreigner who does not speak airline English, that she must take another seat. . . . Realizing our powerlessness to alter the moment we take our seats. K moves to coach. And I take my seat next to the anonymous white man who quickly apologizes to K as she moves her bag from the seat he has comfortably settled in. I stare him down with rage, tell him that I do not want to hear his liberal apologies, his repeated insistence that "it was not his fault." I am shouting at him that it is not a question of blame, that the mistake is understandable, but that it reflected both racism and sexism. (8–9)

What does hooks demand of the poor white fellow who has stolen her friend's seat?

> It was not a question of your giving up the seat, it was an occasion for you to intervene in the harassment of a black woman and you chose your own comfort and tried to deflect away from your complicity in that choice by offering an insincere, face-saving apology. (9)

What Are the Incidents?

1. White female stewardesses accuse a person of "cheating" and try to force her into an economy-class seat. They are intolerant and treat her as a child as well, in their style of talk
2. Furious at the white man who takes the place of her companion, hooks attacks him for "complicity" in the ousting of her friend. He says he is sorry, but he does nothing to intervene. Thus he is a fellow traveler of racists at the very least.

What Do They Mean?

1. The attitude of the employees here is likely familiar to any ordinary person who has flown any considerable number of miles. The nonchalance, the treatment of the passenger as a dumb child, the brooking of no argument: this is common fare for the common traveler. How does it get interpreted as sexist and racist?
2. The white man who expresses sympathy but takes his seat regardless is seen as complicit in the racist, sexist plot. But how can one know, watching him confront the immediate situation that he cannot and

does not intend to enter into debate? And why is his complicity is assumed to be sexist and racist?

The subsequent passages contain numerous examples of this kind of interpretive practice. White males' unwillingness to be disturbed by (in this interpretation) black women with queries is all filled out with statements like, "I suggested to K that I never see white males receiving such treatment in the first-class line" (10), or the claim that a white female attendant "looked at me with a gleam of hatred in her eye that startled, it was so intense" (10).

What Remains Unsaid

1. bell hooks retains her seat. She herself does not intervene in the conflict about her friend, but allows K to sit in the back while she stays up front in first class. Is this necessary? Or does hooks need to maintain her seat at all costs?
2. How is the behavior of the white males and females interpreted? What is the basis of the interpretation with respect to racism and sexism? Is this mere literary license or is it tongue-in-cheek? In formal terms, the structure of the relation is metonymic—guilt by association, a formal structure of PC. Someone who is white, male, and middle-aged is by definition an enemy.

But bell hooks is not where PC discourse comes to rest. On the contrary, hooks expresses only the initial turning of the tables, a true subaltern politics of inversion. However, her apparent strong black nationalist position is not sophisticated enough for the total deconstruction of Western hegemony, which requires the end of all essentialisms, including black ones (Gilroy 1993).[2]

The Inversion of Hegemonic Ideology

A striking characteristic of the PC debate and its affiliates is an increasingly clear inversion of Western self-representation, wrought by a confluence of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, occidentalism, and anti-modernism (from both left and right). This ideology is not one of national liberation, local autonomy, and self-determination, but one that attacks the homogeneity of modernism and its instruments: rationality, the state, and all centralized authority. In its place cultural liberation becomes more satisfying than political autonomy. Liberalism becomes progressive because it is liberating from the worst of modernity—its monolithic structures of power. Former leftists, many of whom have attacked PC (Jacoby 1994; Gitlin 1995), are now, as we shall see, reclassified as

conservatives and reactionaries. Suddenly, what is progressive is multiculturalism, along with diasporas, hybridity, and all forms of cultural creativity.

Several decades back, nationalism was interpreted as progressive—the liberation of people from the yoke of imperialism. Today nationalism is a frightening identity often classified as fascist. According to the cannon of cultural studies, nationalism is the cause of racism in that it transforms heterogeneity into homogeneity in the construction of national identity, a form of essentialism that is both false and dangerous. Essentialism is the great horror of this age. Today even the Palestinian Liberation Organization can be supported, if it is linked to the anti-imperialist cultural studies discourse that claims the Arab world was truly multicultural before the introduction of Western "nationalism."

The fundamental traits of the cosmological shift are as follows:

1. The decline of Western hegemony;
2. The rise of the subaltern within Western self-representations;
3. The redefinition of the Third World as the good, whereby it represents the true alternative, the relative, and the acceptance of heterogeneity;
4. Resistance against the imperial centers, capitalism, rationality, modernity;
5. A view of all fixed identities as the work of power, especially the power inscribed in *discourse* in Focauldian terms.[3] Resistance is the tearing down of this hegemony and the liberation of the heterogeneity of the subaltern.
6. A view of the subaltern as primitive, holistic, kinesthetic, horizontal and even nomadic/rhizomic as opposed to modern, rationalist, abstract, and vertical.

The shift can be described in terms of its manifestations in the intellectual life of the cultural studies venture. In a collection responding to the anti-PC attack on cultural studies (Newfield and Strickland 1995), one of the contributors summed up the situation as follows:

> The present stage of poststructuralist cultural studies theory seems to boil down to something like the following: The tradition of the Enlightenment rationalism and humanism, including Marxist versions thereof, has either been wholly complicit in capitalist and phallocentric modes of political-cultural domination or else, in spite of its oppositional intentions, resulted in futile efforts to humanize an irremediably inhumane power structure. Thus rational, humanist thought, language and culture are themselves the enemy, and they must be undermined through "valorizing" different cognitive modes, such as those of women, the working class, gays and nonwhite and non-Western cultures. A variant on this position is that the key problem may be not rational humanism itself but only the political-cultural-linguistic hegemony of capitalism and white patriarchy, which should be resisted through multicultural pluralism—heteroglossia in literature,

> composition, and media studies as well as in the larger culture—that can drown out the dominant, monologic voice. Both variants have contributed to the study of "transgressive" and "counterhegemonial" cultural practices, modes or popular resistance to or of appropriation of commercial culture—hence the proliferation of celebratory studies on Madonna, punk style, rap, Harlequin romances, Star Trek, drag queens, etc. (Lazere 1995)

Historical Synopsis

Politicians can and have attacked intellectuals because of what they say. That is, the content of intellectual discourse can be inimical to the value system or even the political stability of the nation. This was the situation in the McCarthy period. The infamous senator represented a position based on a threatening situation of warfare with a demonized enemy. In strategic terms this is perfectly normal and happens all the time in all international conflicts. The problem here was the incomplete mobilization of national sentiment, which failed to encompass a significant portion of the educated population of the country, from the media to the universities. McCarthy settled on the solution of witch-hunting, and many intellectuals lost their jobs because of an equating of the nation with a political ideology. The communism of the period was anti-American. It was not, as in Europe, a potential or alternative ideology within a nation and representative of a class, but an international issue. Communists were Russians.

In the 1960s, a new and emergent American student movement campaigned on the basis of the First Amendment right of free speech, and was opposed by the state, which challenged free speech in campus public spaces on the grounds of an expectation of loyalty on the part of youth. The latter, in turn, were angered by what they saw as an immoral government and an immoral society. Their vision was one of freedom from authority or authoritarian control; of a liberation of desire and belief in the goodness of a mankind liberated from the shackles of power; and of difference, understood as racism and discrimination. The flower power movement and its leftist successors were bent on a world of love and righteousness. This came to encompass socialist ideology as well, insofar as the root of all evil was understood as capitalism itself.

In the above periods of the free speech movement and the New Left, students, youth, and others were the powerless who saw themselves as resisting, and their resistance was localized to the university and focused on social reform or even revolution. It eventually disappeared due to a combination of oppression, self-destruction, and social mobility.

In the 1980s, a gradual shift away from issues of class and utopian social transformation followed the disintegration of leftist ideology and politics. Postmodernism took off in this period. In this decade the Soviet empire collapsed and the ideology of the left appeared bankrupt. Former leftists became liberals

and sometimes libertarians or anarchists. A new generation moved into the university, where it joined a converted former generation. Liberal ideals such as individualism, freedom, human rights, and minority rights became the vanguard issues. The nation-state, once idealized as the outcome of peoples' struggles for sovereignty, became anathema and was relegated to the right. Instead, cosmopolitanism became the order of the day. Christopher Lasch, formerly regarded as a leftist, was now on the right, as were a number of other onetime leftists. They were so branded because of their old-fashioned notions of society as an institution of solidarity.

Today the elite have become self-consciously cosmopolitan and multicultural—or even post-multicultural (hybrid)—and think of the working class as nationalists rather than workers. The Western social orders have become divisive and polarized. We ought to have solidarity with the Other, that is, the We is simultaneously opposed to the internal Other in class terms. The refugee has become the new hero. We live in a world of victims, it has been said. "It's not my fault!" is the refrain, no matter what the issue. An inversion of the terms has recast liberal as progressive, socialist as reactionary. One "leftist," now the editor of a major conservative newspaper, said, "I haven't changed, but everyone else has." A series of articles and remarks by multiculturalists referred for a brief period from the late 1990s to the United States as the land of the future in a truly positive sense—a land of opportunity, multiculturalism, and creativity. Europe was just too old-fashioned. This trend has certainly continued (e.g., Mbembe 2005, who is most explicit on this point). But now that the culture wars have gotten the upper hand in the United States, things have again been reversed.

But there is a reaction. In PC terms, it is classified as conservative. Hence Christopher Lasch and Russell Jacoby are classified together with Dinesh D'Souza.[4] Lasch, in his *Revolt of the Elites*, links the elites' abandonment of the nation to a major transformation and decline of Western civilization. This has become one of the major conflicts of the contemporary period.

Postcolonial Discourse and the Right-Left Inversion

Hey, hey, ho, ho, Western culture's gotta go![5]

Culturally, the clearest indicator of the decline of hegemony is the rise of the postcolonial intellectual framework: a complex of key words in phrases that reorder the cultural reality of world systemic relations. The politicization of intellectual argument is central to this project, as is evident in Stuart Hall's (1996) reply to Arif Dirlik's (1994) critique of postcolonial discourse. Hall's response is part of an attempt to situate the concept of the "postcolonial," which he does

by claiming it is both temporal and critical, referring not only to the historical moment of a process of decolonization, but also to the incessant internal decolonization that goes on both in colonial situations and long after them, in "traces" that remain in the decolonized world. Thus the postcolonial refers to a kind of final yet continuous critique of the colonial in all of its forms, from the economic to the cultural. It involves a rethinking of the colonial as well:

> It follows that the term "postcolonial" is not merely descriptive of "this" society rather than "that," or of "then" and "now." It re-reads "colonization" as part of an essentially transnational and transcultural "global" process—and it produces a decentered, diasporic or "global" rewriting of earlier, nation-centered imperial grand narratives. (Hall 1996: 247).

This leads to an argument against what I understand to be the units of the colonial vision, that is, nation-states and the discrete territorial domains of empire. The postcolonial is about the diasporic consciousness.

> Understood in its global and transcultural context, colonization has made ethnic absolutism an increasingly untenable cultural strategy. It made the "colonies" themselves and even more, large tracts of the "postcolonial" world, always-already "diasporic" in relation to what might be thought of as their cultures of origin. (250)

Following the argument literally, we arrive at an acceptance of the displacements of colonial expansion—a world of dispersal, of the transnational, which harbors its own intellectual critique of the past.

> Hybridity, syncretism, multidimensional temporalities, the double inscriptions of colonial and metropolitan times, the two-way cultural traffic characteristic of the contact zones of the cities of the "colonized" long before they have become the characteristic tropes of the cities of the "colonizing," the forms of translation and transculturation which have characterized the "colonial relation" from its earliest stages, the disavowals and in-betweeness, the here-and-there's, mark the aporias and re-doublings whose interstices colonial discourses have always negotiated and about which Homi Bhabha has written with such profound insight. (251)

This language, though comprehensible, is increasingly vague and evocative and therefore open to numerous interpretations. But the text also has an implicit agenda that runs as follows: a voice from the periphery, now in the center—that is, the diaspora intellectual—says, "First you colonized Me and I was dispersed and became transnational, and now I take on that identity which was bestowed upon me and use it as a weapon against the essentializing discourses that were the core of the colonial era." This is interesting to hear but hardly convincing in its logic. After all, for decades the rationale has been "First you colonized Me and I was dispersed and became transnational, and now I want to re-establish my former connection to my origins, that is, to turn my former pre-national space into a nation." Now this argument makes just as much sense, and indeed it has been a real agenda and the actual scenario of much of the decolonization

process. Assertions that postcolonial discourse has made ethnic absolutism "untenable" flies in the [face of the ethnic wars raging in parts of the decolonized world.

One might ask whether or not the colonial ought to be understood in the same terms as the post-colonial. Is it a state of being? Is it the colonized of Fanon's writings? Aren't there a lot of assumptions here, along with an inordinate amount of the very essentializing that postcolonials are trying to avoid? Whether there was anything before the colonial world, and if so, whether it lived on in various ways in that world can, I think, be easily demonstrated. The terms colonial and postcolonial are used as terms of identity, in categorical fashion. They have more sign value than empirical referential content. Could it be that postcolonial discourse, replete with its special vocabulary, is more a form of sociality for its practitioners than an attempt to understand the world? Hall's description belies such a possibility.

> What, in their different ways these theoretical descriptions are attempting to construct is a notion of a shift or a transition conceptualized as the reconfiguration of a field, rather than as a movement of linear transcendence between two mutually exclusive states. (254)

What Hall describes is a change in terms of reference—not the introduction of a new paradigm as such, but the rise of a new language, a new field of discourse, reconfigured from the old. In order to accommodate this, the writing itself becomes increasingly contorted:

> To put this another way, all the key concepts in the "postcolonial," as in the general discourse of the "posts," are operating, as Derrida would put it, "under erasure." They have been subjected to a deep and thoroughgoing critique, exposing their assumptions as a set of foundational effects. But his deconstruction does not abolish them, in the classic movement of supersession, an Aufghebung. It leaves them as the only conceptual instruments and tools with which to think about the present—but only if they are deployed in their deconstructed form. They are, to use another, more Heideggerean, formulation, which Iain Chambers, for example, prefers, "a presence that exists in abeyance" (Chambers 1994). (255)

Dirlik, who attacks what he sees as an elite project of adaptation to world capitalism, is complimented as a "distinguished scholar of modern China" by Hall, who then criticizes his polemical ferocity. But this again turns into a compliment via an almost total agreement with Dirlik's description of the world today in political economic terms, including the national "decentering" of capital, the rebirth of native cultures, the weakening of boundaries, and the Confucian revival in East Asia. The combination of all these homogenizing and heterogenizing processes, according to Hall, is what the postcolonial is about. Even Dirlik's critique that the postcolonial critics seem totally blind to its economic conditions is accepted, only to be explained away as a reaction

to the old-fashioned vulgar materialism of an earlier, reductionist Marxism. But of course the point—that the two things, the postcolonial and the global economic, cannot be separated if one is to come to grips with the problem, and here attempts to explain a theoretical lacuna are somewhat less than satisfying. So what, then, is the problem with this apparently irritated scholar? After all, "Dirlik has therefore put his finger squarely, and convincingly, on a serious lacuna in the postcolonial episteme" (258). Hall seems to be disappointed—damn it, we could have used this guy in developing our 'episteme,' but then Dirlik goes and blows it by making the class connection. Postcolonial discourse serves the "cultural requirements" of global capitalism. The postcolonial critics are "unwitting spokespersons for the new global capitalist order" (259). And suddenly the author is accused of "stunning (and, one is obliged to say, banal) reductionism, a functionalism of a kind which one thought had disappeared from scholarly debate as a serious explanation of anything, that it reads like a echo from a distant, primeval era" (259). Dirlik is arguing by association only, by the suitability of a certain discourse to a certain state of affairs.

This is a strange argument. Hall states his agreement with, or rather, approval of statement X but not the position Y[6] that is implied by statement X. No argument is summoned—only opinion and what might be interpreted as moral judgment. Hall's way of discussing the issue is extraordinarily paternalistic in this respect. If only Dirlik were on our side, he implies, on the side of the good, the postcolonial episteme, then all could be forgiven, but then again,

> We always knew that the dismantling of the colonial paradigm would release strange demons from the deep, and that these monsters might come trailing all sorts of subterranean material. (259)

Who are the "we" in this, and what does "always knew" refer to? It all sounds strikingly elitist.

I would agree with one aspect of Hall's implications. It is true that Dirlik falls back on functionalism by assuming a necessary relation between postcolonialism and the new global capitalist order. I have argued that the global order is not new, but that its social composition is changing. I have argued that the postcolonial discourse of hybridity is not a function of global capitalism, since the latter has been around all the time. Rather, I have contended that this discourse has become identified with the cosmopolitan space of the global system and has vied for a hegemonic position within that space. This is not functionalism but, on the contrary, a hypothesis about competition within the higher echelons of the political order. It is about factions of the elite and the formation of an intellectual hegemony. Hall's style of presentation does much to verify such a hypothesis. I might add that this hypothesis corresponds largely to Dirlik's proposals, which do interpret the new elite developments in terms of a transformation of global capitalism.

Confrontations?

Suppose one were to suggest, not an uncommon suggestion, that the African state is in very many cases a state class Frimpong-Ansah(1992) Ekholm Friedman 1992, 1994) that engages in (1) reproducing itself via a flow of international funds, aid of various forms, and profits from exploitation of natural resources, often the work of foreign capital; and (2) shifting such funds directly into private bank accounts and property in Europe. This is what is meant by the term "flight capital": the immediate transfer to the West of funds or aid invested in such societies. Suppose also that that I maintained that (3) the cutoff of the international financing of this class via aid monies and so forth has caused the state class structure to fragment in a feudalization that has virtually nothing to do with the global development elite's much touted "democratization." (Ekholm Friedman 2002) This was once a description of the type of fragmentation that usually led to ethnic warfare. Today, though, it has finally receded in development discourse.

In England, France, and other old colonial countries, this description would be understandable to most, although a small number of culturalists might deny its validity on the grounds of racism. In Sweden, what small resistance there was to such a suggestion has begun to wither into shameful silence as the results of "democratization" become increasingly and painfully evident.

Should (Ekholm Friedman 1992) someone suggest that sexual desires in Central Africa are very much organized around specific hierarchical strategies of selfhood, and that such specificities may account for the way AIDS is spread in Africa or in other parts of the world, a certain self-identified establishment cringes and seeks to dissociate itself from such abhorrently racist statements, even when they are, in fact, the statements of informants. And even as official spokespersons of African organizations and anthropologists complain in Sweden, those who work with the problem in Central Africa as well as other parts of Africa, not least Africans themselves, increasingly confirm the reality of this description. Homosexuals have taken to describing the relation between their sexuality and the spread of AIDS in an entirely open fashion and are interested in adapting their behavior to avoid its consequences. But when such descriptions become cultural politics, as they have today, then any statement, analysis, or description that might in any way bring harm—in this case, prejudice—upon those described must be condemned and eradicated.

If someone suggests that female infibulation is a particularly painful form of mutilation in East Africa, a group of (mostly female) anthropologists raise a unified voice of indignation about this racist treatment of the question, as if bad things could not occur systematically anywhere other than in the West. Of course, it may be argued that there exist societies in which gender dominance is manifested in female infibulation, but that it is all a question of culture, and

that in any case the girls participate in it willingly. The empirical situation, of course, is more ambivalent. There is a certain bravery syndrome in which the pain of infibulation must be endured in order to achieve the status of a real woman, but there is also plenty of fear, which is not merely a fear of pain but of power itself. Now, the infliction of pain in life-cycle rituals of is common fare in the ethnographic literature, and not, in fact, something to either defend or condemn from within ethnography itself. But on the grounds of culturally relative morality, the fact that people react to a given form of permanent maiming cannot be discredited; it can only be opposed by a politics of moral relativism, which is no more than a politics of cultural relativism: different strokes for different folks. But take note: this is politics and not ethics.

If one were to suggest that the current elite multicultural attitude to mass migration during a period of serious economic and social decline in the host countries is a tragic phenomenon that is bound to lead to increased disintegration and ethnic conflict, it would be, and has been described as, a racist proposition. The dominant discourse is that immigration factors into cultural enrichment, and that the existence of ethnic enclaves of unemployment is the fault of Swedish society, that is, of its racism. The suggestion that some of these enclaves may also include diasporas of illegal trade in arms, people, and drugs is taboo: it is racism produced by racists.

If one were to further suggest that, if we are to be truly global in our politics, we ought to consider the necessity of creating an international order that enabled people to stay in their home countries, it would, and indeed has been, received with utmost distaste.

If Michael Alonzo, a self-identified immigrant and child of an Italian father and Swedish mother, sings *fy fan svenska flicka* (goddamn Swedish girl) and exclaims that "we immigrants will get respect in one way or another" or that "we don't mind if Swedes live here, as long as they leave us alone" and I say that this is racist, then the response is that it is I who am racist. A racist in its new trappings is someone who opposes the self-defined moral correctness of the anti-racist (see Taguieff 1988; Wieviorka interview 1999). How simple!

Narcissism, Shame, and the Culture of PC

The narcissistic culture accompanying the decline of Western hegemony is an issue to which we shall return. It implies a decline in the kind of security of the self-motivating individual that has been both celebrated and castigated over the past two hundred years. The notion that one can no longer be sure of what one stands for, what one says, that everything seems somehow dangerous, that it is crucial to be accepted in the eyes of others—all of this indicates that

the "gaze of the other" has overtaken the self-gaze of the subject in personal experience. The experience of shame is closely related to this kind of constitution of the self. Shame is a kind of group control based not on argument but on classification: it relies on the fear of one's self being categorized in unacceptable terms. Political correctness can be understood as general expression of the culture of shame. It becomes spectacular when the field in which it is applied is not homogeneously narcissistic, for when individuals do not accept the classifications imposed upon them, they cannot be easily made to conform. Exclusion is the only solution, but the discourse of exclusion is itself a discourse of shame. "How could you say such a thing?" "How could you associate with such a person or group?" "There must be something wrong with you!" "You are an X!" No further arguments are necessary, in this kind of language.

Ontological Structures of PC

The taken for granted, the implicitly obvious, is a salient quality of PC rationality. Bourdieu's notion of doxa is the incontestable ground upon which contestable discourses are built. Doxa is implicit knowledge that cannot be confronted or challenged since it enables all other social discourses to take their usual conflictual course. For example, rights of ownership, crimes against property, and unfair and unjust results of unequal distribution and control of property are abundantly contested, but by and large the question of property itself is not a political issue, since it is the foundation of the other discourses. Political discourse sets up similar premises that become sanctified as self-evident and thus, the foundation of a political identity. This is the basis of the guilt-by-association discourse of political correctness. Instead of confronting the contentions of opponents head-on, one discovers the alliances, the funding agencies, and even the uses to which the discourses are put in order to discredit them. This is possible because "everyone knows that Rush Limbaugh[7] is a fascist." In the current discussions, intellectuals who oppose cultural studies and are not brownshirts are classified as "conservative," even if they are Marxists. Conservatives are the witting and unwitting fellow travelers of the right-wing agenda, whose goal is essentially to destroy cultural studies, destroy multiculturalism, and halt the progress of the deconstruction of science and of the West in general. This is classificatory discourse and not argumentative discourse, which is to be expected, given the situation in which rational argument is itself part of imperialism, if not its core. In the end, PC is about what cannot be true because it is just too awful or evil, and what must be true because it is just so wonderful and good, an understanding in which both the awful and the wonderful are conveniently self-evident.

Cultures of Political Correctness

Some societies are more susceptible to PC than others. Societies like Sweden and perhaps Germany look quite interesting in this respect. Without developing a hypothesis, I would suggest that at least in the Swedish case, the constitution of political experience is dynamically contradictory. Even as it features a strong individualism that is aggressively pitted against external intervention, there is also a longing for and engagement in group identity, in being part of a larger social project. The two tendencies exist simultaneously, but the collective engagement has basically contained and encompassed the individual agenda. This is because Swedish interpersonal relations are invested with a strong sociality, belonging-ness, equality, and openness that require strong mutual surveillance. On numerous occasions I have encountered cases of shame/fear among customers leaving the Systembolaget (state liquor and wine store) with their bottles jangling in one of the stores plastic bags. One described the feeling of eyes focused on her from behind as if to burn a hole in her head, as she left the store and walked down the street.

Shame is also a common experience in other societies. In the United States and England, however, I would claim that it lacks any social consistency. A usual characteristic of sociality in Anglo-Saxon countries is that the individual subject is essentially uninteresting for his or her surroundings. This lack of attention is socially validated in these societies, where PC occurs as a struggle for control in particular milieus and situations. In Sweden, on the other hand, it is a more generalized form of communication, especially among the middle classes. PC in Sweden is structured on a statewide basis and expressed through a cultural elite framework. It is also a form of control that is popular among those in powerful positions, since it transforms power into authority, and propositions about the world into descriptive or implicit truths. In the United States, PC exists in a self-annihilating way: it is decentralized, even fragmented, so that no real hegemony can be established. Without hegemony, the entire edifice of political correctness crumbles and becomes the subject of irreverent comedy shows like *Saturday Night Live*. These tendencies reveal the degree to which certain forms of social control are institutionalized. Meanwhile, any individual subject is susceptible to such forms of control, insofar as his or her ego is significantly weakened. This weakness in communicative control, however, is countered by the far more elaborate legal control over expression, so that political correctness is reduced very much to legal correctness. In the past couple of decades the power of PC has greatly increased in those social domains where is was already established.

Ethnography as the Opposite of Political Correctness

The importance of ethnography lies in its potential to delve into life processes and discover the underlying motivating forces, desires, and constructions in their broadest social contexts. Understanding and struggling to understand what other people are "up to" and why is an obligation of an anthropology that truly wishes to contribute to understanding the predicament of human existence. A global understanding of the concrete-specific assumes that (1) cultural specificity is grounded in the historical articulation of a socially constituted existential world and the global context within which it is embedded. Here "global" refers to the successive levels of encompassment within which a world of social experience is formed and framed. Such an understanding also accepts that (2) the understanding achieved in this kind of research process constitutes a kind of knowledge that never makes use of ultimate essentializing categories or reduces any specificity to statements that "they do what they do because they are what they are."

However, it is well known that certain kinds of assumptions in anthropology are quite incompatible with the above demands. Some forms of inventionist anthropology and constructivism tend to deny the material quality of existence. They are strongly critical toward what might be called existential authenticity (Sartre, Sapir) and transform cultural creation into an intellectual exercise in which certain social identities and practices are suspected of manipulating and falsely representing reality, or else reduced to just another "construction." Thus contemporary Hawaiian identity is declared inauthentic because it does not conform to the anthropological knowledge of Hawaii that dates back to the voyages of Cook.

Hybridist and creolist anthropology, though certainly not identical to inventionism, is still quite similar, though less sophisticated. Hybridity is always based on the implicit assumption that the once pure and local is now globalized and either adulterated or enriched, depending on the point of view.[8] The hybrid is the modern and cosmopolitan, and objectively so, despite protests by those who believe in the homogeneity or integrity of their cultures. Here again we have the potential insinuation of false representations by the "natives."

Both of these approaches tend to downgrade the indigenous on the grounds that it is either false and invented or, in reality, hopelessly hybrid and therefore an ideological fantasy. But there is more to this, for the new self-identified hybrids are increasingly held up as the New People: border-crossers, as opposed to the redneck country bumpkins and backward fools who reject the cosmopolitan reality represented by the New "Researchers" artists and large media networks.[9] The bad guys here are nationalists, indigenous movements, and local or regional ethnic groups.

A certain politicized, cultural-relativist anthropology harbors a moral scheme that is primarily concerned with demonstrating that all "others" should be a source of knowledge and edification, and should not be described or discussed in ways that might soil their idealized status. This perspective tends to hinder analysis of the exploitation, violence, and slavery that are rampant in many parts of the world, not least the Third World, because it translates these problems into questions of postcoloniality, silencing the concrete issues while making Western guilt ever more salient (regarding postcolonial states, prostitution, slavery, etc.). This is indeed a far cry from the cultural relativism of, for example, Ruth Benedict, who when presenting the problem of cannibalism to her students did not assume that it must be an evil fantasy perpetrated by Western colonialists, but instead questioned our innate fear of such phenomena.

For an example of politicized relativism, consider the "alternative development" discourse in anthropology. A large corpus of such discourse correctly attacks the notion of development as a Western ideology and tries to locate folk models of such processes to serve in development's stead. The latter are often summed up in terms that are saturated with ecological holism, social solidarity, and equality—which in fact are Western representations of "otherness" that are false abstractions from the real world. This discussion, which was dominant in the 1980s, tends to treat populations as distinct cultures, ignoring how extensively they are already integrated into the global system and how such integration affects the way in which they represent the world. In my experience there are no integral "alternative" folk models of development, primarily because development itself is a Western folk model. The strategies and representations in question instead concern entirely different matters, such as consumption of Western goods, prestige ranking, or, as among many fourth-world peoples, just being left alone. To call all of this "development" is to simply abolish the meaning of the word. Many African and Melanesian models of social existence are not based on re-production but on consumption—the appropriation of life force or wealth from the social/natural environment. Such models are actually the opposite of what is to be expected from any model of development, since they represent completely different modes of change. If we assume that they are simply alternative, then why not posit drug trafficking, prostitution, war, or cannibalism as "alternative development models"? Calling all possibilities alternative developments is absurd. On the other hand, though, it does provide an avenue to careers in the development sector, in the name of traditional ethnography.

PC Discourse in Battle with the Evil Empire

A major controversy in cultural studies arose with the scandalous Sokal affair. A New York University physicist and leftist who was apparently fed up with cultural studies approaches to science studies authored an article for the well-known journal *Social Text* titled "Transgressing Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity." The article, which appeared in a special issue devoted precisely "science studies," celebrated deconstructionism, anti-rationalism, and the like in a way that presumably sought to lend credence to a cultural studies interpretation of physical reality. After it was published, Sokal revealed it was a hoax, creating a major academic scandal. This caused great consternation among many academics, not least because Sokal was not just a right-wing anti-intellectual. "That's the left attacking the left over these issues. . . . I don't like it. I don't like practical jokes" (Clifford 1996). But cultural studies adepts know how to handle such problems, as we shall see below. Their technique depends on the formal properties of PC discourse.

Formal Properties and Conditions of PC Discourse in Cultural Studies

PC tends to work by means of classification and associative chains of classifications, that is, good and bad are predefined by a set of associations. Nowadays, a left-wing intellectual who critiques cultural studies for its jargon and superficiality is defined as conservative. Often, such critics face attempts to show they have links to the right via funding or some other form of association. Argument, understood as confrontation with the content of the opponent's propositions, is not part of this discourse.

One of the conditions of PC's presence in the cultural studies context is the premise that reality is a product of representation and that there is no reality independent of representation. This means that interpretation is always a matter of politics—establishment of hegemonic representations. Truth is Power, the slogan goes. Or is it the other way around? This principle is applied in a discussion of the Sokal affair (Slack and Semati 1997) that places Sokal's credentials at the core of the attempt to discredit him. Sokal sees cultural studies as part of an intellectual decline, or even as "anti-intellectualism." Sokal also identifies as a leftist, a sore point for those who need to classify "realism" as conservative.

> Presumably, then, Sokal et al. are the defenders of intellectualism. However, declaring oneself anti-intellectual does not render the effect of one's work anti-intellectual. But Sokal et al. never do understand one of the most basic insights of communication and cultural studies: that the uses to which messages are put (their meanings) are not limited by—or even necessarily related to—a communicator's intentions. Sokal et al.'s attack on the humanities feeds a profound

> anti-intellectualism in the United States, regardless of any anti-intellectual intentions that Sokal may have. How else could one explain that a self-declared leftist could become a poster boy for *The Rush Limbaugh Show*? (Ibid. 35, note 12)

Intentionality here is not the meaning of a statement, but rather the uses to which it can be put. And of course we must assume that "Rush Limbaugh" is a classificatory term for "right-wing."

Reaction:

> The Right is fighting a broad-based campaign to demonize those sectors of the academic community that encourage critical thinking and offer an alternative perspective on the status quo. (Schrecker 1996: 61)

The argument in the Slack and Semanti article continues into another set of associations by defining the university as the seat of opposition: "the site of the proliferation of the so-called 'new social movements' (feminism, multiculturalism, Afrocentrism, environmentalism, etc.)" (Slack and Semati 1997: 25).

There is a quite fantastic defense of Yale University's celebrated literary theorist Paul de Man[10] against charges of Nazi collaboration. During World War II, de Man had written for the Belgian *Le soir*, a Nazi-controlled paper, and even published an article that has since been called anti-Semitic. What is most interesting about the defense is that no principles are invoked.

> De Man was young, without a university degree, with a wife and child to support, and living in an oppressive time when it appeared that to live and work in Belgium meant some form of coexisting with the Nazis. Colinet writes, for example, that regarding the article (with its anti-Semitic flavor) on the influence of Jewish authors on present-day French literature, "all witnesses agree that he did it reluctantly, fearing to lose his livelihood. He also, however, hid Jewish friends in his home (Colinet 1989: 431), kept counsel with resisters and helped resisters publish a banned journal (see Hamacher et al 1989). (27)

Here it is worth noting their own argument, in which political principles play no role in survival in Nazi-occupied Belgium and De Man's cowardice might at most be characterized as "slight" (28). They go on in an elaborate attempt to de-essentialize the scholar: De Man could change and grow, even if he had been a Nazi. Interestingly, he has just essentialized Sokal and his colleagues as conservatives and right-wingers. In fact, they relate all of this to the Sokal affair and the conservative attack on progressive cultural theory and cultural studies. It is true that guilt by association, which may have been practiced by those out to get deconstructionism off the curriculum, should be criticized, but on the same grounds as Sokal? Sokal does not condemn the whole cultural studies project but merely discusses an aspect of it. He attacks its content, not its practitioners. But no defense is forthcoming. Sokal, finally, is associated with a trend toward a new totalitarianism that would crush the critical thinking of cultural studies. Sokal is referred to consistently as a "so-called" leftist (33) to

imply that he is really a conservative. Cultural Studies associates itself with democracy, defined in its special way.

> Democracy requires ambiguity, indeterminacy, undecidiblilty. (33)

This interesting set of requisites is difficult to interpret, but several lines later we are told,

> In democracy there is no point in the social fabric that is at once the locus of power and knowledge: not government, not science, and not some abstract conception of a universal and incontestable truth. The Sokal Affair, like the de Man scandal, is useful to us in pointing to the very real power of our work to provide dignified, diverse, multicultural, challenging and fundamentally democratic options to totalitarian structures. (33)

The words of this paragraph are arranged in oppositions: dignified, diverse, multicultural, challenging and fundamentally democratic are opposed to abstract, universal, uncontestable truth. This is the showdown with modernist rationality. It states, but does not make the case for diversity of thinking and even for contestation, as it cannot explain on what grounds contestation should occur because there is no ground, nothing to compare. Fayerabend, and for other reasons entirely, was at least consistent in referring to incommensurability. If the latter is accepted, then there is nothing to contest. All interpretations of the world are equal. There is no such thing as knowledge since propositions about the world create the world. They cannot be adopted in the world, nor can they have truth value in relation to the world, since there is no world to which they can refer. What this implies is that the successful diffusion of schemes of thought has nothing to do with their content. Discourse is hegemonic because of something exterior to discourse, and in practice that something is usually power and authority. The externality of the authority of discourse is a necessity where the content of discourse is insignificant in itself due to its anything-goes relativity. And if such is the case, then why not embrace totalitarianism, or why not simply hybridize it with cultural diversity (as many historical empires have done). Democracy is simply the discourse of cultural studies, or at least the diverse, multicultural, challenging aspect of it. Is this self-negation? Is it "anything goes," except argument, the attempt to understand (tiring and old-fashioned), to arrive at some truth—not *the* truth, of course, but some understanding of a reality outside of discourse. Why not fascism? What are we all afraid of? How can we have any enemies in our total relativism? Why defend de Man on the grounds that he wasn't really a Nazi instead of defending Nazism and finding some other explanation for genocide? The latter acts cannot even be attempted, because what is defended and what is attacked are preordained by the new canon, which like most canons tends to merge Truth and Authority in a social context of shame and fear. Orwell (1968), in his premonitions about the relation between politics and language, understood this kind of thinking.

The Dangerous Racism of Pensioners

During a Danish TV call-in program where people discuss problems and express opinions, a woman calls to say that she is worried she is becoming a racist. Once a worker for organizations that helped immigrants, she now lives on a very small pension and has economic difficulties. She thinks the state must take care of its own retirees but fears this might be experienced as racist.

"No! Of course it isn't!" retorts the host.

She says she has a number of immigrant friends who live nearby, and it really bothers her (so she is calling) that a couple from two different ethnic groups have manipulated the welfare system for their own economic benefit, as they themselves openly recount. She feels this is unfair and adds that they also complain that Denmark is an awful place. She would like to tell them to go home but is afraid doing so would make her a racist. The host (who is notoriously politically incorrect) opines that she should tell them to go home if that is what she means, and that being angry at people who come to a place and complain about it even as they exploit its welfare system has nothing to do with racism.[11]

What is interesting here is the situation. This is PC, in the formal sense that a morally defined interpretation of a situation instills fear of expressing one's opinion in an individual, who is thus in a situation of being controlled by others. The least painful way of adapting to this is to accept the moral judgments involved and make them one's own. This is how PC spreads throughout a population. But unless the assimilation of the values is total, the situation remains one of fear, fear of the *gaze of the other*. This is the essential property of shame.

Acts of Consolidation: Decentralized vs. Centralized

As ordinary people are coerced into the shame and fear that could ultimately lead to revolt or withdrawal, the elite make ever greater strides toward equating truth and power. One of the deans of PC, Stanley Fish, says of the idea of anonymous reviews of manuscripts by journals:

> I am against blind submission because the fact that my name is attached to an article greatly increases its chance of being accepted. (Fish 1988)

His explanation for this attitude is entirely consistent with the following equation:

> Merit is inseparable from the structure of the profession and therefore the fact that someone occupies a certain position in that structure cannot be irrelevant to the assessment of what he or she produces. (Fish 1988)

This is the emergent voice of cultural elitism, one that is often hidden away in the back rooms of editorial boards and grant committees and rarely comes into the open, since it drives a deep wedge through the core of democratic ideology.

In the United States, where innumerable power structures are constantly in flux, there are also innumerable political correctnesses. There are PCs that might appear to move from the bottom up as PC adherents legalistically await the slightest remark by a teacher or politician or policeman that might be interpreted as racist, sexist, or homophobic. But the bottom-up appearance is an illusion. The source of both its content and its power is the faculty, lawyers, and well-established intellectuals who for various reasons adopt it as their own position.

Then there is the PC peculiar to the university, which is entirely orchestrated by well-placed faculty and directed at other faculty members who deviate from a given set of moral principles. PC is a salient issue in U.S. universities and several other domains because it doesn't work in the wider context. The country's cultural fragmentation is so extreme that almost anything does go. Those ostracized in one place can always find some "other " PC to turn to. There was no stopping the TV program *Saturday Night Live* from running sketches on Black Culture Week that would land the average academic in court, if not on the street. The multiplication of PCs is the ultimate dialectical negation of PC.

The situation in Scandinavia, as in Germany, is quite different in that the social structures and forms of sociality of intellectual life are very much more centralized. Paradoxically, this collectivization by individuals—the offering of oneself for the greater good established by an elite—seems to be self-imposed. Key journalists from major newspapers, along with certain writers, artists, and political commentators, play a central role in establishing what it is right to think (while Norway appears to have a more open culture of public debate, Sweden is probably the most closed, but see Skirbekk 1996). Is it unethical to criticize African state classes and the violent turf wars of the "feudalization" process officially referred to as democratization? The answer would seem to depend on whether such an attack is accepted at the time. Though many French and African researchers earlier used terms like "politics of the belly," "vampire state," and so on, such terms were not yet sanitized for use in the moral discourse of otherness. This may no longer be the case, possibly because too many internationally respected researchers have made the issue unavoidable. Have the politically correct been forced or intellectually shamed into a new position? Is it shame, the "gaze of the other," that directs the moral discourse? If the multiculturalist ideology that has prevailed in Sweden is simply defined as "the good" and "the true," then any disagreement is classified as racism and thus evil. Cultural elitists who sometimes are totally ignorant of the facts—and who may now see, in the late Nineties, the United States as the pluralist paradise of the future, despite having been anti-American some

years ago (written before Trump)—make their public pronouncements with utmost authority, not having grown up on the South Side of Chicago or in Los Angeles or Miami, and are certainly unacquainted with the relevant research. I suggest that the defining of this new combination of economic liberalism and multiculturalism as "progressive" is part of a significant ideological inversion that has affected much of the Western world. The specificity of the Swedish variant of the situation is that it has, like previous moral paradigms, tended to become canonic.

I am suggesting here that PC is a form of communication in which the sign value, that is, the category value of utterances and texts, is considerably more significant than their semantic content. PC identifies political positions rather than propositional content. It bears close resemblance to situations in which shame is a dominant control mechanism and might easily be associated with classical descriptions of witchcraft accusations. The conditions in which PC functions are shaped by institutional arrangements. In fragmented societies, PC is decentralized, anarchic, and ultimately self-destructive. In more centralized societies, it can be quite compact and homogeneous. PC can also occur in response to historical transformations. I have suggested that the decline of modernist identity in the West has led to an increase in narcissism (Friedman 1992), other-directedness, and other-dependency. Narcissists can find themselves only in the eyes of the other. This situation is a condition for the emergence of what some have called tribalism (Maffésoli 1988): the decline of individualism even as, paradoxically, the individual as a person or body gains prominence. Group dependency increases, paradoxically, simultaneously with individualization.

It goes without saying that if there is any truth to this, it is no coincidence that PC has become an issue at this particular historical conjuncture. In that case, then, it should surprise no one that the new acronym for the Swedish Anthropology Association is SANT (TRUTH).

Notes

This chapter is revised from "PC Worlds: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly" *Antropologiska Studier*, no. 56–57 (1997): 79–100.

1. There was, of course, a prior questioning of relations between anthropologists and supposed CIA projects in Latin America (i.e., Project Camelot).
2. Hooks was also critical of Black Nationalism for its essentialism and promotion of an exclusively masculine point of view, but these were described as aberrations that needed to be corrected (Hooks 1992).
3. The Foucauldian aspect of this discourse is more than a simplification of Foucault's work. It is a decontextualization in which his work is abstracted into a polemic against the "wrong" discourses of domination. This is enormously empowering for those whose subject matter is discourse itself, i.e., cultural studies.

4. Dinesh d'Souza is the prominent conservative author of *Illiberal Education* (1991), a sustained attack on the U.S. liberal-left establishment.
5. This was chanted during the Stanford University march against the standard course in Western Civilization.
6. Statement X refers to the critiques that Hall agrees with, position Y to his negative stance on postcolonial discourse as a new elitism.
7. Rush Limbaugh is a celebrated and infamous radio and occasional TV show host who represents a populist and conservative position in blatant terms and has launched powerful attacks on political correctness, liberal politics, multiculturalism, and many of the public personages who represent such positions.
8. Hannerz (1996: 176n) has suggested that I am mistaken in assuming that creolization assumes prior purity. If this is not the case, then "the world in creolization" is not a result of the recent phenomenon of globalization as he proclaims, but a historical constant, in which case all cultures are and always have been creole and creolizing. This would mean a whole new ball game: creole would no longer be a distinctive term since there would be no other kinds of culture. Here we can hearken back to Boas, who suggested that it is not where it comes from but what you do with it that gives culture its distinctiveness. It should be noted that others have apparently mistaken Hannerz's suggestions in the same way I have (Pietersee 1995: 62). Hybridity (and its cognates) is, I suggest, only meaningful when used to describe acts of identification. The origin of cultural elements is only significant when socially recognized as such.
9. In a CNN self-advertisement of 2011, its journalists talk about how they "go beyond borders," an expression that has become a slogan for the network.
10. Paul de Man, a Belgian literary scholar and a key figure in the French Department at Yale University known for his association with the diffusion of the work of Derrida, was accused some years ago of having written articles for Nazi publications during World War II. A lengthy scandal ensued.
11. As I reread this text in 2016, Sweden is in the midst of a quasi-epidemic of immigrant "welfare fraud" cases (20,000 reports this year alone) that are hidden with respect to ethnicity; meanwhile, the public is shocked to hear of it, not least because the welfare system is already in economic crisis.

Chapter 2

The Rhinoceros II

Introduction

In a review of a book I published in 1994 based on articles, some written ten years earlier, my friend Richard Wilk wrote:

> It is dangerous to depict the rise of new forms of nationalism, ethnic identification, and aspirations for local cultural autonomy as symptoms of decline and disorder. While Friedman is neutral about these changes, seeing them as symptoms of an inevitable global development of capitalism, his conclusions are uncomfortably close to the ideas of reactionary cultural purists who blame minorities and immigrants for the destruction of Western society. (1998)

This chapter is about how a vast network of associations might have led to Wilk's suggestion, which no previous reviewers of the book or any discussion of its separate chapters had ever expressed. Surprised by the remark, I contacted the author, who, it turned out, had not meant to imply I was reactionary or racist in any way. On the contrary, he explained that he had meant to highlight the dangers of language, underlining that he had himself been involved in such accusations. Below I recount a history of happenings in Sweden in 1997 in an attempt to gain insight into how my words, written so many years before, could be implicated in such an accusation. This account is a commentary on the state of academic elites and their clients in the contemporary world and also, by implication, on political correctness and its relation to social instability and ideological transformation. It is also a plea for research into a phenomenon that is as fascinating as it is frightening.

Ionesco's play *Rhinoceros* is not often performed nowadays, and especially not in Sweden, the arena for much of the following discussion. Its plot revolves around one man who attempts to warn an entire society of an impending catastrophe but fails, as even his closest friends are gradually transformed into rhinoceroses. The play is about the emergence of totalitarian regimes in

Europe and how conformity and fear of being different figured in that process. The difference referred to here is not cultural difference, of course, but difference of opinion. I say this to emphasize that all differences are not equal, and since associative thinking is the problem I address below, it is important to be clear about this from the start. Differing points of view, no matter what their source, define a certain arena of discussion and debate among their representatives. This is not the same as being ethnically different, and it implies that total conformity in thinking is perfectly compatible with any political or cultural political regime, including one that stresses cultural plurality. This statement may sound trivial to many, but I find it necessary to make it because I have constantly been confronted with this kind of extraordinarily loose associative thinking. The following describes an actually occurring situation that I have been analyzing for the past year, not least because I was so shocked by it. Besides its impact as a personal attack and witch hunt, this shock held elements of what Michael Agar calls "breakdown," in which cultural schemes collide.

The issue is of critical importance for both doing and comprehending, what we refer to as the practice of understanding—of science, or of its intellectual equivalent for those who would refrain from such modernist terminology. This discussion is first and mainly predicated on a distinction between what I refer to as associationism, and rational argument or rational critique. Rational argument is based on the content of statements, their semantic and logical properties, and their intentionality. Associationism is based on the indexicality—the social sign value—of statements, that is, on properties that can be used to classify statements or the subjects of statements into pre-existing categories. Critical rationality focuses on what is meant by a statement. Associationism is based on what that which is meant *means* in the wider social field. It refers to the way statements can be linked by means of semantic overlap and spatial contiguity. Associationism as an intellectual practice is incompatible with rational argument because the two practices focus on different sets of properties. However, they can and certainly do coexist in the larger communicative processes of social life. We always classify interlocutors into categories in the social worlds in which we move, and there is some degree of congruence among different classifiers. But this classification or identification process can interfere with more rational and critical practices if the public sphere of rational critique becomes weakened. The latter occurs in conditions of social instability of a particularly critical nature, in which the subject begins to lose his or her footing and self-identity. The decline of modernism creates conditions of insecurity that lead to increasing dependence on other people's recognition of one's self—in other words, to increasing narcissism.[1] In a situation where the individual subject loses his or her ontological security, relative identification becomes more important than the content of communication. Social sign value increases in power over semantic content. Being on the right side and doing

the right thing become ever more powerful means of intellectual control. In these same situations, new ideologies can rise to dominance and old ideologies come under threat.

Such situations are dangerous for the practice of science, whether or not one believes science is a good thing. And as rational critical thinking declines, it is replaced by moral, religious discourse, which is a form of moral politics insofar as it is practiced against people. I would suggest that associationism flourishes in contexts of social fear and insecurity, in which identification becomes the major form of social maneuvering.

Events and Happenings

Since 1993 I have periodically, together with my wife, Kajsa Ekholm Friedman, done research in an area that is considered perilous in Sweden: that of immigration, immigration politics, and what I politely refer to in terms of the "transformation" of the nation-state. The argument developed in the original project linked downward mobility in conditions of large-scale immigration to a situation of conflict and ethnicization within the nation-state. This project was not financed by Swedish government agencies, which turned it down on two occasions, but by the H.S. Guggenheim Foundation. The empirical basis of the project was interviewing and fieldwork, augmented by study of media documents and political policies. The work concentrated especially on Swedes representing different positions, from liberal and anarchist to nationalist.

The affair chronicled here began when a group called Folkviljan och massinvandring (The People's Will and Mass Immigration) invited my wife and colleague, Kajsa Ekholm Friedman (*KEF* in following references), to give a talk in Stockholm. The audience was made up primarily of elderly people who were concerned about what they thought was happening to Sweden as the result of what was experienced as mass immigration. Such concerns were not altogether wild fantasies. The population of Sweden, formerly considered very homogeneous, has changed drastically. When this text was written (1999), first-generation immigrants comprised 11 percent of the population and first and second-generation immigrants together made up 18 percent of the population. In urban areas these percentages are much higher. In the southern city of Malmö, for example, 28 percent of the population are foreign-affiliated persons.[2] The worried Swedes were people who had experienced Sweden's successful development from poverty to unparalleled wealth and equality but were now experiencing the rapid disintegration of a social project they believed in, and whose deterioration profoundly disturbed them. These people experienced a number of related phenomena: the rise of ethnic politics, immigrant over-representation in increasing criminality, and the formation of ethnic en-

claves of largely unemployed immigrants living on welfare payments even as pensions were in relative decline and other welfare institutions were in crisis.[3] People who feel threatened often associate the threat with the foreign (Bauman 1998, 2000, 2016), but they are not, according to our interviews, simply frightened people. They are aware of and worried about the rise in conflicts and violence and more generally concerned about the breakup of the political public sphere as they have known it. KEF's talk was very much about the relation between immigration, ethnicization, and the potential disintegration of the nation-state as a welfare project and suggested that the problem should be taken seriously by politicians. There is no evidence that any journalist ever investigated Folkviljan och massinvandring, but the group was immediately stamped as anti-immigrant by the media.

Following the very sparse media coverage of the talk, I sought information about the group and found its homepage on the Internet. In its official statement, Folkviljan was critical of the government's immigration policy. I will take up its specific demands below; here it suffices to say that it wanted Sweden to instate a policy more in line with those of neighbors like Denmark and Norway, as well as other countries of Europe—a policy that has hardly been implemented. Folkviljan was forthrightly anti-racist and dissociated itself from claims that it collaborates with racist or right-wing political groups.[4] The media, for their part, did not seem to have been interested in the available material nor the members of the organization. It was and is assumed that the categorizations were self-evident, as I will show below.

The Media Attack

The evening before KEF was to speak for Folkviljan och massinvandring, the TV2 national news report declared KEF to be a leader of the above group, describing it as anti-immigrant, which implied that it was racist as well. *Dagens Nyheter*, the largest national newspaper, published a brief notice in which the group was labeled as anti-immigrant (Hernbäck 1997). Although KEF presented a more substantial paper (reproduced in the newspaper article below), she was only quoted as saying, in a following discussion, that it was very easy to buy a diploma in Africa (ibid.).

Following the news reports, three Ph.D. students from the social anthropology department at the University of Lund[5] went to the major newspaper in southern Sweden and attacked KEF for inciting and supporting racism (*Sydsvenska Dagbladet* 05-04; 05-16). They based their charges on the "fact" that she had spoken to a group that was anti-immigrant and in the previous year had said certain things on TV that they interpreted as anti-immigrant. What she had said was that based on interview material she had collected, Swedes

were not interested in integration and tended to withdraw instead, and immigrants behaved similarly—that is, that integration was not happening.[6] This was received as an explosive provocation rather than a lead-in to constructive discussion, but as I will argue here, "constructive discussion" could only mean depicting multiculturalism as both progressive and successful. Recent statistics indicated that a majority of nationals in Sweden[7], as in other countries of Europe, viewed large-scale immigration unfavorably. Evidence in Sweden and other countries showed that integration was not occurring and that enclavization and conflict were serious and growing problems. A collection edited by the well-known sociologist Michel Wieviorka, *Une société fragmentée? Le multiculturalisme en débat* (1996), would presumably have been prohibited in Sweden on the grounds that its very title was inflammatory.

KEF made a formal complaint to TV2. The channel responded somewhat clandestinely on a late-night news edition, reporting that they had talked to her by phone and she had "claimed that she wasn't even a member" of Folkviljan as they had asserted. They did not see fit to say they had made a mistake or apologize. Some days later, and after consulting with one of her four children who was worried about the coverage, KEF issued a public statement saying she had made a mistake by participating in the meeting. She had thought she could make a contribution, and the audience had not seemed to be racist at all, she explained, but if they truly were a racist or anti-immigrant organization, then she had truly erred. As noted above, the press did not investigate, and my own investigation led me to believe that she had not, in fact, erred. An interview with two Folkviljan leaders revealed that both had been engaged in Third World aid and working-class politics. Furthermore, one of them, was a sponsor parent to several African children. Could this be a mere cover-up operation?

In an attempt to redress the situation, KEF published the core of her presentation in *Dagens Nyheter*, addressing the serious problems of ethnicization and ethnic politics in a period of increasing unemployment and economic decline. The headline for the article, which was set by an editor at *Dagens Nyheter*, was "Indvandringen leder till sönderfall" ("Immigration Leads to Disintegration"). This wording suggested that immigration, and even immigrants themselves, were the cause of decline, rather than a part of the process of decline as the article quite clearly stated. Thus the headline could be interpreted as saying that immigration causes disintegration, even though the article stated clearly that it the main problem was the incapacity to integrate immigrants in periods of economic decline. To top it off, the headline was in quotation marks, implying that KEF actually wrote it. When I called the editor and told him that had we been in the States we could have sued the newspaper for libel, he replied, "Not in Sweden!"

I have heard about a discussion in schools of journalism concerning a decision that gives journalists the "right" to interpret what other people say and

place the interpretation in quotes atop another person's article, thereby contradicting the usual grammatical implication that quotation marks in a headline refer to statements by the piece's author. This certainly influenced the way people read the article: indeed, many referred to the headline alone as if it were the content of the article. The editorial interpretation was further enforced with a photo of "boat people" to illustrate the article's purported meaning. Many readers were taken aback by the image and immediately associated it with the headline so that the real content of the article was refigured.

This article, via its headline and photo, triggered a series of collective acts of distancing from KEF. No one discussed the content of her article or her presentation at the meeting; instead they were content to associate the headline with a number of key words, such as "tentacles," a word that was used in reference to the formation of transnational enclaves in place of the term "rhizomes," used by Deleuze and Guattari to denote horizontal links that transcend boundaries (as opposed to vertical arboreal structures that make boundaries). These acts of distancing included everything from charges of defamation to a move originating within the university to have KEF disbarred from her duties and her professorial title rescinded.

The producer of the evening news, presumably thinking that he could create a real scandal, took it upon himself to contact the Guggenheim Foundation, which had funded our project. He had the article hurriedly translated, and faxed it to them, and made inquiries concerning how much money we had received and whether the foundation knew what we were up to. The Guggenheim looked at the article and, wondering what all the fuss was about, asked if Swedes were unaware that such issues had been discussed in these kinds of terms for several years already. A whole issue of the *Atlantic Monthly* devoted to the subject featured much tougher articles. Even *Der Spiegel* had recently published a feature number titled "Zeitbomben in den Vorstädten" (vol 16: 1997) after years of relative silence on the matter. On receiving the Guggenheim's reply, the news producer apparently got nervous. He called KEF and talked to her for almost an hour, telling her he had been in touch with the Guggenheim but offering no explanation for his actions. He finally admitted, in a more modest tone than he had used earlier, that he may have misjudged her and would have to read more about the issue.

The events spelled out here are encompassed in a larger set of representations organized, but not produced, by the media. The media have a certain kind of power: when they describe reality by labeling and defining relations, they produce that reality for those who consume their texts, whether visual or printed. In a recent scathing critique of television talk shows, Bourdieu referred to the way "fast think" in the media reorganizes reality so that intellectual insights are eliminated. The power he ascribes to the media is not a creative but a catalytic power. The ideological framework in which fast think works already

pervades the intellectual world, the academy, publishers, and much of the cultural elite. The media aid this development by holding a virtual (in all senses) monopoly on all reality that is not immediately accessible to the senses.

Even here, though, there are contradictions that relate to the degree of trust in the media and its journalists. Whereas the media are rarely trusted in totalitarian regimes—"if it's not in the papers, then it must be true" goes a Polish saying from the communist era—in democracies the relative transparency of media representations of reality is usually trusted implicitly. This is because the representatives of the media are assumed to be disinterested and to honestly care about finding out what actually happens in the world. [8] However, in periods of increasing crisis and ideological polarization, the media can easily become tools, and central tools at that, in misrepresenting reality.

Politically Correct "Intellectuals"?

The media are not, of course, the cause of the categorization process described here. Rather, a process of reaction formation transforms the statement that ethnicization is a serious problem into an expression of racism. How can this occur, one might ask? Why does stating that multiculturalism as a political strategy is dangerous, and that a nation-state's decision to organize itself in such terms is bound to generate serious conflict, make one a racist? A discussion in a government publication suggests that the meaning of racism should be extended to cover a broader range of phenomena judged dangerous by the author of the discussion. Racist convictions now include "extremely positive attitudes towards one's own cultural identity" (Sander 1995). Thus is has become officially possible to equate questioning of multiculturalism with racism, just as others maintain that to remain unconvinced of the positive inevitability of a transnational world is to be a reactionary.

When it came to KEF's article, the intellectual reaction zeroed in on the headline and the associations elicited by the headline and photo. Several articles voiced praise for Californian multiethnicity, contrary to most descriptions from the United States. One article tried to argue that it was the nation-state and not ethnicity that was the problem in the former Yugoslavia, and that talk of a problematic multiethnicity was a throwback to the 1930s. Another implied that multiethnic society was unproblematic, as demonstrated, they said, by literature dealing with such conflicts in both political science and philosophy. All of these reactions were peppered with salient associations, most of them relating to the potentially conflictual nature of large-scale immigration in periods of crisis: multiculturalism is no problem (despite the U.S. debate and the French debate); homogeneity means racial purity (thus turning Gellner's interpretation of national unity into crass racism); the nation-state

is the source of all problems and should be superseded by a multicultural or hybrid polity.

Not everyone agreed with this onslaught. KEF received upwards of six hundred letters thanking her for breaking the imposed silence in these issues. Two letters did come from nationalists, and several attacked and even threatened her, but the majority seemed to come from normal, rational people—another dangerous category for any elite. In the following months, there appeared a series of newspaper articles that were critical of the state's multicultural policy and expressed concern about increased segregation, increasing violence, and similar issues. One prominent foreign correspondent and editorialist chastised Swedish intellectuals' incapacity to seriously discuss problems the country faced that had already been addressed in most other countries. A professor of history wrote that the reaction to KEF's presentation and article was due primarily to her having wounded Swedish official intellectuals' moral self-identity by problematizing the taken-for-granted utopian vision of multiculturalism. A politically active journalist married to a former Social Democratic finance minister had already written a potentially explosive attack on the contemporary politics of difference in Sweden, arguing for a strong assimilationist line. This continued for several months, during which one politically correct social psychologist warned of a potentially explosive situation in the increasingly ethnicized suburbs. When KEF had said that multiethnicity was a real social and potentially explosive problem that must be taken seriously, and had attempted to account for the mechanisms involved, she was attacked and threatened by various organizations, individuals, and colleagues, while other academics supported her ostracism. But once she had opened that door, others seemed to be able to write things that would previously have been unthinkable—and to make all kinds policy statements that would have been unthinkable for KEF.

My interest in PC increased enormously during this period. I was offered materials from other places where related events could have occurred, which are discussed below. On this basis I decided to run a seminar on the subject. It dealt in part with the "events of May" 1997. The participants in the course had various standpoints: some were multiculturalists, some not, and some were indifferent. The course was an interesting experience for those involved. It aimed to advance understanding of communicative mechanisms involved in PC (such as the associative mode), and of the circumstances in which PC appears in different kinds of societies and historical situations. It also stressed, as I do here, that the content of any particular PC is irrelevant to its form. After a month I got a phone call from the local student newspaper, which requested a phone interview (even though their office was just across the street). The journalist first asked, then badgered me about whether I could rightly teach such a course if I was married to the person who had caused all the trouble, or

whether it really ought to be taught by a neutral person who could be objective. She acknowledged that she thought I was only holding the course to prove my wife's innocence. I answered by saying that her approach to the interview was exactly what the course was about: she knew the truth about it all from the start and was simply documenting by association what she already knew. She began to accept my reasoning about my right to teach the seminar. The article she wrote contained several insinuations, but I had demanded to see it first and forced some corrections—a step that was not obviously necessary to the journalist in question.

Some months later the main national newspaper, *Dagens Nyheter*, also wanted to do an interview. A journalist came to my home and we talked for several hours, after which her attitude to what I was trying to say was far more positive than it had been at the start. She wrote an article confirming the need to address these issues, not least in Sweden. The culture section editors at the newspaper came out against it and even discussed running a parallel column to counter or deny everything I said. After a round of argument it was decided that the interview could go in with some modifications, probably intended to keep it from drawing attention to the issue.

Then things suddenly began to change. Another newspaper called to do an interview, and I received a large number of requests for copies of the seminar, which was repeated in the spring term. I was also invited to give a talk for a press organ called the "opinion council," which takes on all complaints and cases against the press (in the United States these would normally be handled by the courts). Many might find the very name of this organ foreboding, since it conveys a sense of opinion control, but in Sweden journalists openly discussed the degree to which their function should be to build or construct public opinion. In any case I was invited specifically to discuss the issue of political correctness, and several of the members of this group were very positively inclined to take up the issue. Others, of course, were upset at what I had to say. But from my perspective, the tables were now turned and it was possible to discuss these issues seriously—though not with certain anthropologists, and definitely with a certain anguish.

The severe and increasing conflicts resulting from the situation of non-integration were also discussed more openly. A book appeared, *PC på Svenska* (PC in Swedish), in which a number of journalists and academics treated the problem—rather superficially, unfortunately, but more important was that the issue was now being aired openly, even if the book's authors could be said to belong to an iconoclastic minority. One review of the book assumed that being politically incorrect means to be against "multiculture, antifascism, feminism and leftism" (Forser 1998), which of course misses the point entirely. The situation had moved from a compact onslaught by the morally virtuous to something closer to a debate of the issues, however nervous.

The Moral Anthropologists Defend Their Field

In the early stages of the ruckus, a group of four anthropologists—professors, whose titles held clear symbolic significance in the situation—signed an article published in *Dagens Nyheter*, where KEF's article had appeared.[9] Their text is worth analyzing, as it conveys a symbolic meta-message that overshadows its virtual lack of content. In it, the four professors express their dismay at KEF's behavior and her article. They claim she is not being constructive and certainly does not represent her colleagues. Readers are then reminded that culture is not the same as ethnicity and should not be confused with it! They do not clarify who is responsible for this confusion—certainly it is not KEF, who explicitly distinguishes multiculturalism as a phenomenon based on choice from "multiculturalism in the sense of multiethnicity."

This would appear, then, to be a lesson for the uninitiated, as the anthropology professors then go on to define terms for the innocent reader: "culture is thought and behavior that we develop together with others whom we live with or meet [*sic*], . . . Ethnicity is something different, a way of fastening labels on ourselves and others, a way of differentiating between 'us' and 'them.'" But is this not cultural as well?[10] Readers are reminded that Sweden was "born as a country in relation to enriching long distance contacts," and told about the many different cultural imports, things, ideas, and peoples that have made their way to Sweden. The mindset is simple to diagnose. A central feature is *enrichment* by the many things, ideas, and people one can accumulate from different cultures. This is the cute, cozy, consumerist view of culture. Some take it to mean that the United States is a much richer place than the countries of Europe, and that accumulation of multicultural wealth should be some kind of a goal—a strange stance indeed, as it would seem to lead one to wonder why all those North Americans would visit Europe to get some "culture" if they already had it all.

This is the mentality of the collector, not the anthropologist. Indeed, there has been an art-collector turn in anthropology over the past years, one that is reflected in the diffusionism and museological perspectives of this kind of language.[11] The largely poor immigrants who inhabit the megacities of the world do not think in such terms, but wealthy elites may easily enjoy this variety by collecting objects and concepts and consuming ethnic foods. Many immigrants have also contributed to the Swedish economy over the years, as our professors state with alacrity. Yet they have not done so in their capacity as bearers of cultures or even of ethnic identities. They say that they are for a multiculturalism that doesn't "build walls" but one that is culturally open. What a nice thought! The only problem is that reality has not conformed, as is clearly reflected in the enormous literature concerning precisely the problems of enclavization, conflict, vertical mosaics and the like. Our anthropologists have overlooked the

fact that ethnicity, as a cultural practice of social bounding, leads to the social reality of multiculturalism as a politics of difference, an ethnic politics. KEF distinguished between multiculturalism as a plurality of influences, recipes, styles, and objects, and multiculturalism as a social phenomenon.

Having defined the social content out of multiculturalism, the professors can safely move on to ethnicity as such. Ethnicity, we are told, can be a form of solidarity but can also display "darker sides" in the form of racism, competition, and ethnic cleansing. They state that the import of ethnic identity depends on those involved and "the situations that they find themselves in" (as though it could be otherwise). Just as their discussion begins to disappear into its own ambiguities, the authors announce a caveat: we "should not aid in the spreading of prejudice," which they accuse KEF of doing by putting the following words in her mouth: "It is typical for 'Africans' to be in possession of false degrees" KEF never said such a thing, of course; nor was she reported as saying such a thing. Assuming that the professors were not simply lying with intent to malign, we may, I think, attribute this misrepresentation to the way they, with surprising lack of reflection, are able to perfectly exemplify the associationism that is my object.

In a discussion following the publication of her article, KEF was asked about numerous reports that many immigrants had higher degrees even as other reports claimed they had limited education. She said that in her experience of Central Africa, it was not difficult to buy a university degree. The experience she was referring to here was in fact the experience of African friends at universities who had complained bitterly about the phenomenon. They and she and I understand this literally and, her statement concerned a political and structural situation, not a cultural one. Just as this debate was occurring, a major university in Spain expelled several students from South America who had false secondary degrees. There are, of course, plenty of places throughout the world where degrees can be obtained by illegal means. Associationism leads to cultural reductionism. Here, saying that one can buy a degree in Africa without difficulty is reduced to culture—that is, to saying that it is typical for Africans to have false degrees.

KEF is accused of hopping from antiquity to Los Angeles to Sweden to show that ethnicity always causes problems and then, worst of all, that Western Europe is in decline and is being dismembered by tentacles from outside. Here we return to one of our popular associations. If there are tentacles, there must be a body—"of which kind of monster?" they ask. As a result of this apparent misunderstanding, KEF went to some length, as we have indicated above, to explain how she had meant the word, taken from Deleuze and Guattari's "rhizomes," for which no Swedish translation was adequate in the context of a newspaper article.[12] Rhizomes, of course, have no source, but transnational ethnic groups do! But it is not the content of thought that is at issue, which is

obvious at a mere glance in similar statements made by Arjun Appadurai, who clearly shares much of the globalist approach with Hannerz. In his evolutionary reductionism he refers, for example, to a situation where

> we are in the process of moving to a global order in which the nation-state has become obsolete and other formations for allegiance and identity have taken its place. (1996: 169)

And where this process is not smooth but bloody,

> It is certainly (the nation-state) in crisis, and part of the crisis is an *increasingly violent relationship between the nation-state and its postnational Others* [my italics]. (169)

Relying, as he often does, on films, he emphasizes an urban scene

> where a general desolation of the national and global landscape has transposed many bizarre racial, religious, and linguistic enmities into scenarios of unrelieved urban terror. (193)

Here the diaspora is depicted as an international social space that at once exists within the nation-state and opposes it. This is the same kind of language that our anthropological professors' claim contributes to "demagogy and the propaganda of fear," yet it is spoken by someone who would never be accused of any such thing. What are we to make of it, then? Well, there is a difference, perhaps, in the fact that Appadurai sees this violence as a transition to a triumphant diasporic world in which we will finally find, "free of the constraints of the nation form . . . that cultural freedom and sustainable justice in the world do not presuppose the uniform and general existence of the nation-state" (1996: 23). Here, perhaps, is the ideological core of their reaction. The nation-state is obsolete, and we should not defend it, by pointing out the fact that its decline is likely to be violent and that it has everything to do with the ethnic conflict that has emerged in this process, which KEF refers to in writing of the decline of Western hegemony. KEF is not trying to defend the nation-state. Her goal is more descriptive; she is merely pointing out the structural advantages of maintaining a common project within a given territory. One may disagree with all of this, but to dismiss it as demagogic propaganda is merely a tactic of evasion. This ideological core,[13] I would claim, may be the core of a new cosmopolitan identity among certain intellectuals, but it is no excuse for a lack of intellectual integrity. This is evident in the multiple self-contradictory assertions: "We cannot go back to the 'people's home'" (Dahl et. al. op. cit.), meaning the homogeneous welfare state. "The Swedish debate has not adequately accounted for the rights and obligations related to citizenship" (ibid.). "When Sweden changed policy from continued cultural homogeneity to organized cultural diversity, the new politics was not, perhaps, based on adequate insights into the problematic of integration" (ibid.).

But wait, now!—were we not informed that immigration is a question of cultural enrichment? Are we not contradicting ourselves? "Immigration is a wonderful cultural project, but let's not overdo it." Is this the message? Yes the liberal message. Immigration is fine as long as it doesn't lead to social problems—as long, perhaps, as it doesn't involve ethnicity. Here, they say, we need a "deeper discussion, in which the last decade's experiences are taken account of" (ibid.). Now what is the meaning of this? Might it refer to such facts as that ghettoization is extreme, and that unemployment among the ghettoized runs many times higher (commonly at a rate of over 50%) than the national average, which is also very high (almost 12% as I wrote this).[14] Ethnic violence has increased, in fact, in the form of gang fights between various immigrant groups and, much more rarely, between such groups and Swedish gangs; the proliferation of gang rape, most often interethnic and commonly with Swedish victims; and an increasingly aggressive ethnic politics. But these are not, we are told, the issues we should be discussing; rather, we should discuss the rights and obligations of citizens.

"But the question of good citizenship can hardly been understood merely within the framework of the state." What is a citizen without a political unit of some sort? In what does a citizen have membership? What does it mean to be a "citizen of the world"? Does such a phrase not imply the existence of a global state? For wealthy people trying to avoid the Swedish national tax system, it means, "I have the right to take my money and live somewhere else." For people escaping the ravages of Central Africa it means, "I want to get out of this place, and I expect you to give me refuge and the means to survive." Where do the "means to survive" come from? Are we begging the question? There must, of course, be a political instance that can distribute such means and therefore can also accumulate such means! Isn't this obvious? And what are the political conditions under which this can occur? But rather than address such issues they obliquely proclaim that "in today's world, should it be enough to have rights and obligations with respect to people who speak the same language and are born in the same place?"

Unfortunately, no matter how we cut it, membership is always in reference to a collectivity, whether or not its members speak the same language, and no matter where they were born. Pierre Clastres, in a scathing critique of functionalist Marxism's assumption that kinship is a product of economic cooperation, once asked, "But with whom then should one cooperate? One's enemies?" The Swedish welfare state as all welfare states is predicated on a circular structure in which taxes, primarily from the working and middle classes, are used to maintain a system of state-financed health care, schools, universities, and general welfare. The underlying notion is that a population should take care of itself, and that solidarity is related to the shared life of the inhabitants of a place. It is simply a question of a common social project. If this project is dismembered

because of a multicultural politics aimed at fragmenting that nostalgic, homogeneous, and even racist project, can one expect people to agree to the redistribution of wealth, especially when the tax base is shrinking? Nation-state solidarity is based on a contract of sorts between the people who live within the bounds of a state territory and the state itself. It has to do with the reallocation of wealth within that territory. This does not imply that the territory is self-sufficient, but that the income generated in or imported into that place is the source of the general public wealth of that place.

Our four professors complain that it is of no use to be nostalgic about the welfare state and its homogeneity. They assume, as do some other Swedish intellectuals, that this homogeneity refers to Swedish ethnicity, but of course, it is not about that at all. On the contrary, it is about integration into a state-level or national project. The disintegration of this project has resulted not from immigration, but from a collapse of integrative processes that has led to a multiplication and reinforcement of projects, not just migrant ethnic, but regional, class, and indigenous as well.[15]

A more serious take on world migration is that it is part of a massive increase in exploitation (sometimes called the "race to the bottom") in most of the West and part of a segregation machine in welfare states like Sweden. The multicultural politics that prevail today might even be seen as instrumental in the formation of a new "structural pluralism," in M. G. Smith's (1974) words. But according to our professors, this must be seen as dangerously racist because it implies that migration is not a good idea at all, and not the formation of a cultural cornucopia, but part of a nefarious reconfiguration of global exploitation. Their contention that people fleeing oppression and war should have a right to seek asylum in Sweden is something that older members of the "people's home" did not all fully understand. "At the same time," our anthropologists warn, "it is no solution to the world's problems to invite all citizens from states that don't function to Sweden. But we should not distribute mental blinders to maintain an ageing Swedishness."

"Swedes are special in their fear of saying what they think," wrote KEF: this too is held to be a poorly conceived generalization. And yet our anthropologists' article is an excellent example of precisely that phenomenon. The authors say virtually nothing—or should I say everything, simultaneously. Immigration is advantageous / Immigration is a problem. We have to take in refugees / It does not help the world to take in refugees. Sweden should work to guarantee that people don't have to leave their countries of origin (which is precisely the policy of the evil group that sponsored KEF's presentation) / Immigration is the source of our cultural enrichment. One might say that the article is quite confused, and thus conveniently avoids taking an unambiguous position. Its only clear assertion is that there is something wrong with what KEF did and said; even so, it is unclear what it might be, since there is no discussion of

her actual arguments. Is this not a remarkable example of unthinking liberals unsure where the right side is located but scrambling to be on it without showing the least interest in understanding what is going on in the world?

There is a revealing statement about the Swedish situation at the end of our professors' article. KEF is labeled an agitator for saying that we are in a serious crisis and that large-scale immigration combined with downward economic mobility can lead to an explosive situation. This is the kind of view that "foments anxiety and conflict." But it is precisely this fear of confronting reality that is now finally being attacked in Sweden, where intellectuals have been shocked out of their slumber by waves of so-called revelations concerning Sweden's exploits in World War II, its forced sterilization campaign in the 1930s, and the apparent misrepresentation of Swedish hero Folke Bernadotte, who did not, as the advertising would have it, take his Red Cross buses to Germany to save Jews (see chapter 6). Much of this history has always been public but never discussed, not really dangerous except for an elite who in its fear of association would simply repress the past. These issues ought not to be too difficult to discuss, or bring on moral crisis, yet they are explosive in a society whose elites have made "keeping the lid on" into an ideology of what they call rationality. I have referred to this elsewhere as the "Freudian State."

The article's authors say that whereas silence should not bury the problems of multiculturalism, the discussion must be carried out in a "sensible way"—apparently, in statements of the type listed above: "On the one hand X is good, but on the other hand X is not so good." In *PC på svenska* (1998), the abovementioned book of short essays that touch on the issue discussed here, one well-known philosopher states that he doesn't understand why people were so hysterical about assertions that multiculturalism harbors serious problems involving ethnic conflict.

Since the "events of May," the intensity of racist conflict both in the street and in politics has risen so much that the issues taken up by KEF have become common fare. I suggest that our politically correct critics were wrong in that they underestimated the seriousness of the problem. That is, they were wrong in their understanding of the social situation, and wrong in their confused assumptions about whether one can speak and write openly about such problems. Such an anthropology can offer only innocuous and safely vague commentary on real-world situations.

Comparative Correctness

In the contemporary Western world, PC thinking like that elaborated above has become a pervasive phenomenon and is a key issue in the courses that I have

given on the subject of political correctness in both Europe and the United States.[16] The following accounts reinforce the argument of this chapter.

Scientology and Witches' Brew

The issue of scientology, absurd as it might appear, is only one in a growing epidemic of associative thinking in the West. Josef Joffe, in an excellent article in the *New York Review of Books* (24 April 1997), writes about the hysteria surrounding the growth of Scientology in Germany:

> Even going about your normal business might brand you as part of this subversive group, especially in Bavaria where the feeling against Scientology is strongest. Take Guy Count von Moy, who runs a smallish brewery, the Hofbraühaus, in the smallish town of Freising just north of Munich. Like all local brewers in Germany's shrinking market, the count has had to fend off giants like Beck's or Löwenbräu. And so he launched an advertising campaign. Maybe he was trying too hard to push his suds, especially when he resorted to such mysterious slogans as "Feeling Inner Strength" or "Relying on Your Own Power."
>
> Sounds like Scientology, doesn't it? So on the whispers started (perhaps set off by the competition), and not long afterward the count's workers were harassed as Scientologists, and so were his children. His wife, Varena, was only for sure, the voices in the dark murmured, and look, wasn't she actually running the brewery? What better way to corrupt Bahamians than by using their favorite beverage as the devil's tool?"
>
> It did not matter that the Moys were devout Catholics, nor that the count was a member of the Order of Malta, into which only noblemen with the strictest Catholic credentials are inducted. In desperation, he took out an ad in the local paper: "Neither I nor any of my employees at the Hofbräuhäus Freising nor any member of my family has anything to do with the Scientology sect."
>
> By their very nature, witch hunts are not concerned with the truth. A favorite means of detection of medieval witches was to throw a suspect, bound hand and foot, into the river. If she floated, she was possessed of unnatural powers and thus destined for the stake. If she drowned, she was innocent. Either way she was dispatched from this world, which was presumably the result intended in the first place. As the count and others like him may yet discover, it is impossible to prove a negative. (Joffe 1997: 16)

The Bundestag set up a Commission of Inquiry on So-Called Sects and Psychogroups that was visited by Antje Vollmer, a member of the Green Party and vice president of the Parliament. She was not allowed to be present when the Domestic Security Service was testifying because she was "friends with an artist who has been accused of being a Scientologist" (ibid.). This is the same logic again. X is associated with Evil via words that can be interpreted as originating in that Evil, or by having a friend or being socially, in time and space, associated with someone or people who are accused of Evil. This is the logic of

contagious thinking, the logic (or non-logic) of metonymy. It is not concerned with content and the intentions of those accused, but with their classification by means of temporal and spatial relations.

Paris: Darkness in the City of Light

P. A. Taguieff is generally recognized as a major contributor to the theoretical understanding of racism and multiethnic relations. One of his books, *La Force du préjugé* (1987), is a ground-breaking study of the structure of racism, and of the mirror-image construction of anti-racism. Taguieff's work is a critical attack on the dominant forms of anti-racism that developed in France and Europe in the 1980s. The attack is based on the argument that anti-racism simply reproduces the structures of racism as a mirror image and thereby reinforces its existence. But his work also explores the varieties of racism, both biological and cultural, in a very sophisticated way and has had a great deal of influence on other researchers. Taguieff himself served as head of the French Committee on Anti-Semitism, and his critique of anti-racist movements was part of a concerted effort to develop a truly effective way of combating racism.

Part of his strategy consisted of direct confrontation of one of the most elaborate versions of the French right, the so-called New Right associated with philosopher Alain de Benoist. Entering into discussions with de Benoist, Taguieff considered it necessary to respect his opponent, even as he argued against him. It is important to note that de Benoist represents many of the kinds of ideas found in the world's indigenous movements. His position is anti-imperialist, anti-American, anti-universalist. He is strongly multiculturalist and supports most movements for cultural identity, from indigenous movements to those of Islamic fundamentalists. Much of his argument is based on the notion of communitarian solidarity, which is where his exclusionism becomes evident. As a self-identified rightist, he is associated with Evil in the thinking of liberals, conservatives, the left in general, and especially multiculturalists (both left and right).

In the midst of this engagement, he was suddenly attacked in *Le Monde*. A call to vigilance against racism, signed by forty internationally well-known intellectuals, appeared in one column, while an article next to it accused Taguieff of tacitly supporting the New Right by engaging it in discussion. The anti-racist movement would never deem it possible to discuss issues with the New Right because it was clearly the embodiment of evil. It might appear civil "on the surface," but this could only be a lie, a manipulation, a cover-up of their real ideals and purposes. Engaging in discussion with people who are already defined as evil can only help them gain respectability. The logic is simple: any form of con-

tact with Evil is contagious. Thus Taguieff comes across as dangerously stupid in his politics at best, and at worst as a racist right-winger.

The explosive attack began with the latter association, a kind of collaboration between Taguieff and de Benoist. The latter did have his journal, *La Grèce*, where Taguieff had published alongside others such as Régis Debray, Jean Baudrillard, and Max Gallo, but de Benoist is also associated with ideologues such as Le Pen, which proves that all the seeming breadth and openness to engage in arguing with opponents is a snare for intellectuals from the left, a massive propaganda campaign to legitimize the Extreme Right. The intellectual riot was sparked by a 13 July 1993 *Le Monde* article in which Roger-Pol Droit attacks what he calls "the confusion of ideas" that is the strategy of the extreme right. He discusses Taguieff's career, arguing that the very fact that he has been engaged in research on racism and anti-Semitism makes him just the kind of dangerous character who might well enter into strange associations with the likes of de Benoist and friends. What is interesting here is the way his critique depicts the problem. Droit singles out the neurobiologist André Béjin for his participation in a collection to which Taguieff also contributed, for having argued that a strong sense of national and European identity is needed for there to be any cultural enrichment, and that SOS was wrong to stress that it is necessary to disrupt the unity of the nation-state.

Here, then, we have the argument that opposition to the nation-state's transformation into a multicultural state is the equivalent of racism, even though Droit omits to demonstrate whether or not such a position is in fact associated with racism. By this logic, assimilationism can also be labeled racism. The homogenization implied in assimilationism is, strictly speaking, quite un-racist insofar as it assumes that ethnicity can be changed—that it is merely cultural and therefore malleable. Here, though, it is off-handedly associated with being against difference. And Taguieff had stated clearly that multiculturalism as a form of politics is premised on the dis-integration of national unity, meaning that of a larger and formerly dominant culturally shared unity.

The debate continued sporadically for several months without ever becoming a national issue. Some who supported Taguieff, such as the noted Classical Greek scholar of Jewish origin Pierre Vidal-Naquet, were still upset at the hazards that one could become involved in by having a dialogue with the right. Vidal-Naquet was undoubtedly correct to assume that intellectuals on the right have not changed significantly, but this raises a larger question that requires understanding of the differences between Ernst Jünger and the Nazis, and between intellectuals such as Schmidt and Heidegger, and the National Bolsheviks. Two aspects of this discussion are crystal clear. First, the issue revolves around attitudes toward multiculturalism, which are conflated with issues of racism. Second, the associationism of being there, of debating the enemy, is

the key to the classification of persons, much more than what they actually say and write.

"X is not a Nazi, but . . ." is a common phrase. Swedish Minister of Education C. Tham has written that "to understand is to condone" (quoted from chapter 4). In other words, it is apparently better not to understand. A typical trait of this kind of discourse is its suppressive nature. It is, in structural terms, identical to racism in that it identifies an "other" as being of a different, unacceptable order that is stamped as evil incarnate. The implication is that ordinary citizens who vote for the right are not to be understood but simply eliminated:

> Le raisonnement sommaire des puristes intransigeants est du type: puisque le people vote Front national, il faut dissoudre le Front national, en espérant par là supprimer magiquement le people qui vote Front national. Bref, si le people "vote mal," il faut interdire le people.
>
> The reasoning of intransigent purists is of the following type: since the people vote for the National Front, it is necessary to eliminate the National Front, hoping magically that by suppressing the party one can suppress the people who vote for them. In other words, if the people vote incorrectly we must prohibit the people. (Taguieff 1996: 50)

As I write this I feel that I am treading on dangerous ground as has been stated several times about my behavior. Taguieff's defender Vidal-Naquet, famed as a historian of Ancient Greece, stated a similar fear:

> J'ai toujours pensé que Pierre André Taguieff jouait un jeu dangereux en dialoguant avec des intellectuels venus de la Nouvelle Droite et dont rien n'indique qu'ils aient changé en profondeur. Je lui ai dit, je le redis aujourd'hui estimant qu'il s'est fait "piéger."
>
> I have always thought that Pierre André Taguieff played a dangerous game in engaging in dialog with the New Right and that nothing indicates that they have changed significantly. I have told him and I repeat today that he has been trapped. (*Le Monde*, 27 July 1993)

A familiar complex of characterizations ensued. How could Taguieff have been so naive as to engage with such people? He has helped the extreme right by showing interest in the content of what they say and write. He is a fellow traveler. He is a racist. This array of associations tends to be organized in a single chain that ultimately links any form of contact to overt racism. Taguieff's position is clear: he believes a strong integration policy is needed. He is a republican who sees no other solution to the possible fragmentation of society. It is this position that now becomes suspect. Republicanism becomes the equivalent of racism. Different commentators may stop at different links along the chain, but the whole chain is always implicit. Here again, the events, statements, and contiguities coagulate into a single essence or set of basically

racist characteristics. The continuum would seem to stretch from fool and naïve to fellow traveler, to suspect, to racist. It is slippery, as the terms can fade into one another.

Compared to the Swedish situation, on the other hand, the French discursive field has been substantially broader. There, the issue has been the subject of far more thoroughgoing research and theoretical debate. One *can* refer to the dangers of ethnicization without risk of being classified as a racist. There are strong assimilationist trends (e.g., Todd 1994) as well as multicultural trends, and the latter are by no means strongest. This may account for the weakness of the attack on Taguieff. PC requires a situation of elite power, but the latter is absent in Paris, where multiculturalism is but one of several competing ideologies.

The Life of Gossip

Gossip takes on a life of its own as it circulates around the world. Global gossip is an ideal site for even looser associations than those that develop in the critical hot zones in which PC epidemics emerge. I was soon implicated in the scourge, not so much by anything I had written, done, or said, which was largely unknown in this case, but by my marriage. At a meeting in Stockholm, one sociologist from Holland said he had heard there was an anthropologist in Sweden, presumably KEF, who thought all immigrants should go home and all Africans should stay in Africa. Another anthropologist in Paris claimed that I, in a paper I wrote about a social phenomenon called *la sape*, had stated that Congolese did not distinguish between appearance and reality, that I had been attacked by the Congolese in Sweden for this awful text, and that I was therefore looking for a job in Paris. This free fantasizing is worthy of structuralist analysis.

The paper in question, presented in Brazzaville, was based in large part on research by an African scholar that had never previously been considered controversial (Gandoulou 1984), and its topic was not cognition but the interpretation of appearance. In any case gossip thinks itself outside of individual minds, as Lévi-Strauss would have it. And now that I am on to Lévi-Strauss, we might consider whether or not we have a full-blown conspiracy here. After all, Lévi-Strauss's famous second speech on racism could easily be attacked for the same kinds of things. UNESCO officials did try to stop its politically incorrect message and the great structuralist himself, whose views are certainly no paragon of multiculturalism. He says such awful things as "cultures, each of which is attached to a lifestyle and value system of its own, foster their own peculiarities, and . . . this tendency is a healthy and not—as people would like to have us think—pathological" (Lévi-Strauss 1994: 423). He also severely

criticizes UNESCO for putting all its millions into education programs that are ineffective (Lévi-Strauss 1985: 20), and for being upset by his challenge to their "catechism" (xiii). Worst of all, he writes,

> Humanity, however, if not resigned to becoming the sterile consumer of the values that it managed to create in the past, is capable only of giving birth to bastard works, to gross and puerile inventions, and must learn once again that all true creation implies a certain deafness to the appeal of other values, even going so far as to reject them if not denying them altogether. (24)

Might all of this be part of a larger "racist," nostalgic, even Jewish conspiracy? In the discourse of free associational moralism, any connection will do. To various degrees, the reaction to dangerous propositions about reality combines moral outrage with an attempt to make debating points. However, these are often confused. One Swedish sociologist visiting Denmark referred to our whole department as racist. How such an idea spreads is an interesting epidemiological problem in itself. Meanwhile, still other factors are involved in the confrontation.

The web spins on. I invited Arjun Appadurai to a workshop organized by the Guggenheim Foundation in September. After a lecture and a party that evening, he asked to speak before the workshop began the next morning. Reading from a small piece of paper, he said he did not think he could participate under the circumstances: he felt that he was being used, and that he had been unfairly criticized in KEF's paper and not given a chance to respond.[17] He then walked out. Quite shocked by this behavior, I spoke to him at length, and later we had lunch. He told me that prior to the workshop he had been in Stockholm, where he heard that KEF had been involved in racist-like activities, though he was not sure what they were. I tried to give him a full account and he seemed surprised, but he left immediately after our discussion, saying he hoped we could take it up sometime in the future. Some months later, another anthropologist, Liisa Malkki, whom I had also invited to a Guggenheim workshop, told the program director of the H.F. Guggenheim Foundation that she didn't think it was a good idea that I lead the project I was charged with: no good could ever come of it because, she had heard, I was a racist. The extensions had now led to accusations about my work, referred to in the introduction.[18] The logic of global gossip, it turns out, is no different from that of any other gossip.

The Logic of Witch-Hunting

The logic of accusation is not related to the logic of rational argument. In periods of crisis when individual identities are threatened, associative thinking increases in power. Rather than ask what X says, one asks who X is and how X can be identified. And the identification proceeds by means of associations.

X was with Y, X had a connection with Y, and therefore X is a Y. Y is predefined in this system, or defined afterward as possessing certain qualities. KEF spoke for an organization that later was marked as anti-immigrant. Therefore KEF is anti-immigrant herself.

"How did you know that this organization is anti-immigrant?" I asked people. Because, they answered, the organization is named "Folkviljan" och massinvandring. Two associations are at work here. Folkviljan, the will of the people, is suspect as a concept. Signifying "the people," the *folk* in *Folkhemmet* ("people's home") is okay because it is old and established and perhaps has no meaning (even if it was a core tenet of social democracy, it was borrowed from the conservatives). But new constructions using the word *folk* are suspect. Opposition to the state, that is, the opposition of "the people" and the state, is likewise suspect. This may be the root of many elitists' fear of the use of a *folkomröstning* (plebiscite) to decide an issue.[19] Then the *och massinvandring* or "and mass immigration" obviously questions the entire phenomenon of immigration. This position clearly goes against current immigration policy, but it has unfairly been branded as anti-immigrant on the unreflective grounds that opposition to immigration policy is anti-immigrant, which is racist and even Nazi. Extending a word's definition to include the most unlikely associations (see Sander 1995) leads to a devaluation of its conceptual content. The meaning of the word racism has come to incorporate ever growing numbers of terms and phenomena moving outward from the core meaning.

Thus a chain can stretch from xenophobia, isolationism, nationalism, and immigration quotas to concern about ethnic conflict and concern about the maintenance of the welfare system, and then to being Swedish, and ultimately to being white. To take an example from one of the editors of *Expo*,[20] a self-identified anti-racist newspaper whose "information" was the basis for the original chain reaction,

> Enligt min uppfattning är alla vita människor, oavsett kön och samhällsklass per definition rasister i egenskap av socialiserade kulturbärare.
>
> In my opinion, all White people, no matter what their sex or class, are racists insofar as they are socialized bearers of culture. (Hubinette 1996: 10, note 1)

And he continues:

> Låt den vita rasens västerland gå under i blod och lidande.
>
> Let the White Race's West collapse in blood and suffering. (Op. cit. 4)

The "white race" is the "racist race" that should be eliminated. It is the seat and cause of racism, so any decent anti-racist should support a policy of extermination. Am I exaggerating here? Perhaps it is all hype. Perhaps Swedes should tolerate this kind of language, which after all may merely be an attempt to *épater le bourgeois*. On the other hand, it might itself be described as blatant racism![21]

The politics of associative thinking has come to dominate not just in the press and the other media, but the sheepish, or rather, "rhinoceros-like" style to which so many intellectuals are drawn. Ionescu's classic play *Rhinoceros* deals with the way free thought is obliterated in a society where social fear and the ensuing conformism strike down attempts to understand a frightening change in society. The condition spreads like an epidemic, and its results become classic world history. This phenomenon, as I have shown above, has two central aspects that are combined in what is called political correctness. First, there is a logic of association; second, there is a relation of power to be maintained by this logic. This relation is always top-down in nature and is, I suggest, triggered by actions and statements that jeopardize an emergent order that is not clearly established in the larger population. We need a sense of humor to understand the sensitive nature of phenomena that are not meant to be discussed, especially when they are part of a past that has been repressed.

In discussions with K. G. Izikowitz, a founding figure in the development of social anthropology in Sweden, I came to know something about the murky past of the relation between certain well-established anthropologists and Nazism in the 1930s and 1940s. Izikowitz was very explicit about his encounters with anti-Semitism in his own field, something I had known nothing about. A major French-German project on the subject explored how in those two countries, everyday pro-Nazi anti-Semitism was common as well as open. There are numerous publications on the subject of anthropology in the Third Reich, by both French and German Researchers (Conte and Essner 1995; Pützstück and Hauschild 1995). The documentary, "Le chagrin et la pitié," was banned in France for a time, but it remained readily available and very much discussed. To my knowledge, no such film had ever been made in Sweden, and the topic was blatantly absent. When I proposed, at a meeting to establish a Swedish anthropology association, that such a project on the past of anthropology would be an interesting complement to the work already under way in France and Germany, Ulf Hannerz, who chaired the meeting, declared that he did not consider it an interesting topic, so nothing became of it. Interesting or amusing in this connection is the acronym that was adopted as the name of the association: SANT, which means "truth."

The point here is that the fear of or denial of certain realities, past or present, is a core aspect of a repressive scheme of avoiding difficult issues that can become a true cultural mechanism, a phenomenon that I explore in chapter 6. If in Germany the fact that Habermas, Grass, Dahrendorf, Luhman were all Nazis in their youths is not a subject that inspires anguish but part of an important learning process.

When I first came to Sweden, biology and especially biological anthropology were closely associated with racism, as they still are for many, alongside all the other terms of the debates, on topics from sociobiology to assimilation-

ism that have been combined in the larger complex of tabooed categories by "right-thinking" people. Can biological anthropology, which lent major impetus to the struggle against racism in the United States; socio-biology, which stresses universalism in its genetic reductionism; and the ideology of assimilationism, which relies on the assumption that people can change their cultures, all be examples of racism? Such wild associations are reminiscent of Freud's discussion of dream work. I have suggested that PC is illuminating in this respect. Witchcraft concerns the order of the body—the integrity of the subject, ultimately, in a physical sense. PC concerns the identity of those engaged in a moral order that is external to the body. It is not about life force and the devouring of souls and flesh; rather, it attacks an active identification in a collective definition of the world. The two phenomena are related not by their content, but by the fact that the lifeworld is disordered by particular actions. In both cases this disorder is expressed as a personal disorder, and it is this experience that gives PC and witchcraft accusations their potency (see Conclusion for a fuller discussion).

Political Correctness as an Anthropological Problem

The heightening of the significance of language is one of PC's principal characteristics. Acts of naming, of classifying, of differentiating self from other are highly emotional practices in situations of PC. This is why, as I have suggested, the indexical and identifying functions of communication can override its content. This is not unlike the Freudian notion of "dreamwork" in which *displacement* and *condensation* combine to create universes of associations that are driven by anxiety and fear. The conditions under which this occurs are, I suggest, related to conditions of sociality. The signaling function of language provides metalinguistic information as to the interlocutors' nature and intentions—indexes of position. Indexicality becomes all-important in situations of insecurity, but it can also be a normal situation in social organizations based on mutual social control. On a continuum of such control, many so-called traditional societies might be found at one pole, whereas Sweden would, I think, be closer to the traditional control than to the relative absence of control in a society like the United States, where verbal communication does not play the same kind of strategic social role, and where there are strategies to "take back" what one has said: "nothing personal," "I didn't mean it," even if what one refers to as the increasing emergence of narcissistic culture has significantly increased the level of verbal-sensitivity and social control over communication which would appear to converge with countries like Sweden.[22] It might be that PC is recognized as a phenomenon only in socially heterogeneous situations, and that it went unrecognized in Sweden because there was only one, rather centrally organized, political discourse—a national doxa.

As a discursive process, PC categorization is a form of essentialism that links numerous categories by means of spatial or semantic association into a complex whole that enables a moral order to be maintained in conditions of the threat of disorder (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Any anthropology of PC therefore needs to deal not only with PC as a form of communication and control of meaning, but also with the conditions of its emergence. I have ventured that PC comes into play in periods of instability in which new ideologies emerge and hegemony is not clearly established. New potential elites must engage in establishing ideological dominance. When threatened, old elites may invoke PC to attempt to preserve such dominance. The results, in terms of communication, are similar even where the conditions are very different.

The particular ideology I have dealt with here is linked to globalizing elites and a global restructuring of elite consciousness. It projects the transnational, multicultural, culturally enriched world as "the only road" to the future. Any questioning of this ideology can be perceived as threatening, evoking fear and even hatred. For example, those who would be local and love their "place," whether indigenous territory or nation, are classified as dangerous, reactionary, and evil. This core schema generates a vast array of associations that are used to classify the concrete world into the good, the bad, and the ugly, the latter presumably being the fellow travelers (X is not a communist, but . . .). As a philosopher and political scientist, Taguieff presumably made many enemies with his brilliant analysis of anti-racism as a part of the structure of racism, rather than a solution to it (Taguieff 1988).

In a previous publication (1997), I suggested that much anti-racism in Sweden is simply repressed racism, since the latter cannot be dealt with adequately in intellectual terms. It is invested with fear and hysteria because it is experienced as a "natural" phenomenon, which multiplies its valence, its ability to infect its surroundings. This hypothesis has been strengthened over the past few years of research. Social issues become heated because they and their implications are repressed. They become dangerous and can easily evoke frantic reactions, simply because they are taboo and have never been dealt with openly.

I find it extraordinarily interesting that whereas associationism seems to be rampant in all horizontal and contemporaneous relations, in semantic space and in physical space, the temporal dimension seems to have been repressed. In Germany, the descendants of Nazis have discussed their family histories and grappled with the past, which has been part of their personal lives, but in Sweden this emotional and intellectual activity has all been displaced onto the present. The historical link ought to carry much more weight. After all, the experiences of socialization are more powerful than simple co-presence in a meeting or even a communication (Taguieff, supposed Scientologists). These are not mere associations; generational relations can be quite substantial. A Swedish historian of Nazism has demonstrated the degree to which family

histories play a role in the continuity of the ideology (Lööv 2004). It might be that the new ideology is itself an inversion of a former modernism. Globalization, multiculturalism, hybridity, border-crossing migration: all are seen as revolutionary forces, but they seem to embody a more class-bound vision for the new mobile cultural elite and the revolted elites of the political, media, and capitalist classes whose aura they reflect. This statement is explored later, at a point where it can be discussed in depth (see also Friedman 1998; Dirlik 1997). Here I merely point to significant variations in this area, which, as I observed above, might well lead to the kind of repressed racism that characterizes much current anti-racism.

It is significant, as we noted above, that associationism seems to proliferate in a purely contemporary sense, but rarely across generations. Yet if any associationism can be developed into a hypothesis of real connections of socialization and cultural continuity, it will certainly focus on that very intergenerational relation. I am not, of course, suggesting there is any truth value in this kind of associationism, but its absence is noteworthy and may well be guided by precisely a fear of being associated with what is defined as Evil. This repression of associations has nothing to do with the actual meaning of such associations. Whether one is repressing a real racist tendency or merely repressing a temporal connection to an ancestor, the reaction is fear and avoidance, rather than understanding and analysis. Association is to be feared because in this mode of communication, it implies identity.

So, what have we got here? Are the multiculturalists the avant-garde, the new radicals of anthropology? If so, it is strange that they should be peddling a combination of neoliberal ideology and culturalism. It would appear that this new progressivism, is merely the *structural adjustment* of the intellectuals.

Discussions of the emergence of PC has strongly emphasized the importance of language as a political mechanism. It is not language as such but acts of naming that are seen as creating realities rather than referring to them. Not only does this make language use a risky activity; it also means that the organizations that do the naming, such as the media, have an inordinate power to establish realities. The political force involved is translated into a moral force for reasons that I suggest have to do with the decline of the role of argument in assessing reality. This is an extremely important and interesting phenomenon to probe. It is close to our immediate realities and certainly an anthropological issue, one that in its lived everyday existence is accessible to a truly thick description.

The specific valence of language in social relations varies among different societies. It is a crucial constituent of the organization of sociality. As we stated above in Sweden language is a very serious business compared to the "usual" situation in the United States. In the latter, the distinction between what one says and what one says really means at a deeper level is much stronger, and it is also an escape hatch, allowing for spontaneous and sloppy use of language.

Communication is not as serious a social sphere, although it may be becoming so. Kidding, joking and saying things off the top of one's head are normal in many American environments, not least urban environments, whereas they are much less common in Swedish situations other than those marked as "not serious." Communication is more loaded and sensitive, and thus more strained and socially fragile, in Sweden. The increasing importance of language in so-called PC situations is an interesting expression of a nascent state of affairs that is more normal in Sweden.

Communication in the PC setting is highly charged. What one says is immediately classifiable into a series of already determinate categories. Associations and metonymic relations dominate this classification procedure. Any and all connections with an object, expression, or idea that inspires fear (*berührungsangst*) is immediate cause for ostracism, distancing, or isolation. Interestingly, it is in the United States that PC has been elaborated as an issue, while in Sweden it was absent until very recently. PC is only recognized in situations of saliency, that is, where there is a comparative experience. Specific to the American situation is the presence of many PCs that are quite localized and can be implemented only in restricted localities; moreover, I contend, these are apparent only in situations in which PC is a *modus operandum i.e., that* permeates sociality and structures social interaction. In Sweden PC was largely unrecognized because it is or has become a national doxa maintained by a hierarchical structure of correctness and adaptation to a normative order. It appears now precisely because this order is threatened.

The critical discourse that becomes the subject for outbreaks of PC is a discourse that destroys the security of those who hold, often quite passively, certain ideological positions that they assume are natural. The security is very much a kind of collective identification that protects the individual from the kinds of questions that might displace the doxa on which life is founded. The radical in modernism has always consisted in destroying normalcy, and political correctness is a major defense mechanism against this. This normalcy can consist in virtually anything, from radical feminism and Marxism-Leninism to neoliberalism and globalism. The content is entirely irrelevant—what is central is the way the subject is incorporated into that identity and the role that identity plays in the person's self-image, his or her psychic stability. If we have entered into a period of increasing narcissism, as I have suggested (Friedman 1994), developing the arguments of Christopher Lasch (1979), and if we are also entering "the era of tribalism" (Maffésoli 1988), as I have also suggested, then identity politics can easily lead us to replace argument with associationism—a language of identification, rather than one that fundamentally separates who one is from what one thinks. PC finds fertile ground in eras of declining modernism because it is a mechanism for protecting identities that need not acknowledge rational argument.

For the same reason, PC has a strong tendency to create and defend mediocrity for those who have become incapable of argument or are afraid or otherwise troubled about making statements that are clear enough to be refuted (this is developed in the next chapter). The fear, or avoidance, of refutation is particularly problematic for those who associate their selves with their ideas, the opposite of the modernist situation. Any intellectual situation that begins to move in the direction of PC is one that also tends toward mediocratization. When insight is replaced by moral considerations, rational enquiry is in deep trouble. The morality is rarely analyzed as such. Merely assumed, it easily becomes a weapon for self-promotion in the name of a self- evident Good. This is not the usual totalitarianism, but one closer to what appears in religious movements. There is no room here for cynical reflection or any form of distancing from the relation between events, expressions, and their interpretation. There is no difference between official discourse and private discourse. This is a universe of a-rational control.

Though the circumstances in which PC appears might be complex, the structure of political correctness is quite simple. First, there is a twofold tendency to link overlapping categories: metonymic overlap, and the performative overlap that occurs in practice (i.e., being in the wrong place at the wrong time). The overlap, in turn, is forced into a central category—racism, for example—which then essentializes all the connections into a broader overlapping set (Figure 2.1).



Figure 2.1. The force field of essentialization

The set is a hierarchical structure of classification (Figure 2.2), which, however, is not a semantic hierarchy because the subsets are not related by inclusion to the superordinate categories. The result is an artificial structure, the kind of structure that is typical of essentialism: the reduction of clearly different categories to a single category by means of metonymy and other forms of displacement.

There is something notable about situations in which thought control of this kind becomes pervasive. I suggested above that such situations are characterized by a threat to social order as it is experienced by subjects engaged in that order. It might be further specified that this is not necessarily a state of real social disorder but disorder in the organization of social categorization. This is an order based on hegemony and the doxa, which it projects onto the social world. PC is a way of re-establishing or maintaining an order that is under threat of subversion. This is not a question of the content of the categories, but of their fragility. Current conditions for the practice of PC are related to efforts to establish a new ideology, one that combines basic liberal notions, multiculturalism, and globalization. I have argued elsewhere (Friedman 1997) that this ideology is itself the product of a significant inversion of a formerly dominant modernism that was based on unification around a common project, a social democratic or socialist collectivism, and an ideology of self-control



Figure 2.2. Essentialist production of the category "racism"

and control over one's social conditions of existence, that is, sovereignty. Inversions of ideological parameters produce illusions of the progressive. In this way neoliberalism today appears as progressive in relation to a backward-looking and conservative socialism. The progressive is, quite simply, identified with the inevitable future.

Notes

This chapter is a based on an article published in Current Anthropology in 1999. I have chosen to maintain the temporal framework of the text which is based on events contemporary to the article.

1. Narcissism is in formal terms a condition of dependence on the "gaze of the other"—quite the opposite of the strong ego of classical capitalist individualism. It is increasingly prevalent in situations of social crisis and disintegration; however, such an assertion is an area of psychoanalytic and psychological research that cannot be developed here.
2. The statistics are always complex, but the breakdown in 1999 was as follows: foreign citizens, 11%; foreign-born citizens, 12%; children under eighteen with at least one foreign-born parent, 4%. Foreign-affiliated persons numbered 70,657 out of a total population of 251,408 or 28%.
3. Such situations generate associative thinking, of course, and have been the subject of some major studies (e.g., Van Dijk 1987).
4. Of course this can be denied by those who wish to suppose the group is concealing its true motives behind a front of purported democratic and anti-racist national positions.
5. The students in question, named here at the request of a reader were Malin Ericson, Sara Johnsdotter and Aje Carlbom
6. To say that "Swedes are X" was itself explosive because of its associative potential. It can be grammatically correct to interpret it as "Some Swedes are X," but it is more readily associated with the stronger "All Swedes are X." This is, of course, what makes such statements dangerous.
7. According to SOM Institute those negative to increased migration declined from over 60% to 52% between 1990 and 1999, but was still above 50% when the current article was first published in 1999 (https://www.som.gu.se/digitalAssets/1505/1505750_flyktingopinion---som-institutet.pdf)
8. By 2002, this had begun to change quite rapidly, and news media were often ranked at the bottom of the public trust even in Sweden, where the media had formerly enjoyed a very high level of trust.
9. The professors in question are Gudrun Dahl and Ulf Hannerz from the University of Stockholm, Kaj Århem from the University of Gothenburg, and Karl Erik Knutsson of UNICEF, formerly from the University of Stockholm.
10. Even when trying not to ask too much from a newspaper article, this is an astonishingly vulgar distinction (see Handleman 1977). The reason ethnicity is not the same as culture is that it is more specific (i.e., a subset of it)—not, of course, that it is less cultural.
11. This is a far cry from the notion, more common in anthropology, that culture is not where you get things from, but the way you put them together. I have already criticized this implicit diffusionism in an earlier publication (Friedman 1994).

12. The book in question is the popular A Thousand Plateaus (1987), in which they discuss the complex relation between rhizomic and tree like structures in the constitution of state/nomads and violence. See also Kapferer (1997). As the horizontal and the vertical are said to constitute one another it is difficult to see how the one can simply replace the other, as implied by Appadurai (1996).
13. At least for those who partake of it, this is a truly encompassing ideology, as is clear in some of the writings of Appadurai, Malkki and others, where the post-national is not merely a state, but a goal, and where cosmopolitans are sought after in shantytowns and opposed to redneck nationalists who, for example, inhabit refugee camps. This trend has an older history in writers such as Chambers (1994) and even Hall (1996).
14. It has since declined to less than 7 percent in 2016, but this does not include those who have dropped out of employment or those who have never entered the job market, especially immigrant women. How unemployment should be measured is an issue that has sparked heated debate.
15. Discussing the emergence of postnational models of citizenship, Soysal (1994: 161) writes, "The multiplication of particularisms and subsequent fragmentation disrupt the presumed contiguities of nationness and undermine the territorial sanctity of nation-states."
16. I gave courses following this article first published in1999, in Paris at the EHESS from 2005–2010 and at the University of California San Diego from 2009–2014.
17. In a rather short side discussion, KEF had taken issue with the notion that the post-national diasporic world would give rise to a new freedom.
18. It should be noted that Rick Wilk and I had discussed the "events" in Lund earlier, and that he is a colleague of other Swedish anthropologists.
19. Some of my interviewees revealed that among former "left" academics and professions, the word folk, which was once connected to progressive politics in general, has become increasingly associated with a dangerous "populism" associated with the redneck, racist, and generally nationalist masses who, statistically, as noted, view multiculturalism unfavorably.
20. Expo has since expanded, as we say, into the "Researchgruppen," The government current in 2016, or at least some of its ministers, along with major newspapers like Expressen, have consulted it for information on racism and racists in Sweden.
21. In student interviews in an immigrant-dense neighborhood in Malmö where ethnic opposition and conflict was particularly marked, and where particularly negative terms were used of "others," the reply to the question "But isn't that racism?" was "Oh no, the racists, they live in Limhamn," that is, the other, Swedish, side of town. "Racist" thus becomes an ethnic term.
22. Jacoby (1994) elaborated on the increasing danger and sensitivity of language in the United States in relation to political correctness.

Chapter 3

Rhinoceros II

Proof of the Pudding

It might seem odd to continue to return to an issue which one reader of this chapter thought was an "old debate." That may be true, and I certainly don't want to seem obsessed with Ulf Hannerz et al.'s behavior with respect to my wife, or with his comment on my 1999 article in *Current Anthropology* reproduced here with some alterations as chapter 2. The comment on my comment is a central part of the following discussion which is meant to highlight the the main issues involved in PC language in academic action. I also note that, of course, I may and have been accused of writing this as a defense of my wife, like Berenger in Ionesco's play who supports Daisy's claim to have seen a Rhinoceros, partly because he is in love with her. It is of course true in one obvious sense, but it should be noted that my wife's work in this area was part of a joint project with the HF Guggenheim Foundation, so my defense was in large part about the results of that joint work. On the other hand, the issue of political correctness would never have arisen if not for the personal circumstances in which I found myself.

As I argue in the first chapter, and even more so, in the last chapters, the issue of political correctness is very much about the moralization of the political, which effaces debate in translating it into questions of good and evil. This moral judgement is most often entirely based on the dominant moral categorizations of particular phenomena without ever subjecting them to more serious scrutiny.

The use of associational strategies of thinking is precisely the way in which the content of argument can be eluded by focusing exclusively on the indexical properties of discourse. The proliferation of associations like, "who did she talk to?," "what did she say resemble?," how can it be exploited by xenophobes, and "such remarks can lead to increasing fear" is the kind of discursive material that is the focus of this analysis. Rather than disagreeing on the basis of argument, the moralization of one's opponent systematically

undermines the need to intellectually engage. This should be easy to spot for anyone familiar with the way political debates have turned into moral castigation at best, and warfare at worst. The following then, is an illustration of the major theme of this book.

The publication (chapter 2) of my "commentary" in *Current Anthropology* was an interesting series of events in itself. Now "Commentaries" as I understood it at the time, are pieces which are published without further discussion as in standard *Current Anthropology* articles which include both comments by other anthropologists and replies by the author. At one point the editor informed me that a professor of Anthropology at Stockholm had called him and asked to see what I had written. He had also demanded to be allowed to reply to the piece, but the editor insisted that it was not the normal praxis with this kind of article. In the end the situation was quite reversed. I was notified that although there would indeed be comments as with a normal article, I would not be allowed to reply, which is certainly not the praxis for *CA* articles, or "commentaries." I was never given an explanation for this, although it appears that there was some pressure exerted on the editor. I take this opportunity to present my reply to some of those comments, these pages being the only available venue at this point. I do so primarily because the comments are so perfectly illustrative of the problem of PC discourse that I took up in the article, even though a different strategy, normal in academic circumstances—real refutation—was available to the authors of the comments. I am aware that those commentators will undoubtedly interpret what follows as unfair polemic from my side. Such a reaction, as one reader seemed to express, would be a typical PC misconstrual, as my aim is to grasp the nature of a phenomenon of which such reactions are quintessential. Obviously, I find this phenomenon both dangerous and frightening, but that does not, I maintain, divert my analysis. On the contrary, the need for clear argument is all the more important in a situation in which discourse is so infected.[1]

Hannerz's reply to "Rhinoceros II" is, ironically, a perfect example of the model of associative thinking that I propose in order to understand the logic of political correctness. He begins his comment by suggesting that I insinuate that he and his colleagues are fascists.

> I am one of the four Swedish anthropologists whom Friedman seems to want to depict, by way of his Ionesco allegory, as prominent rhinoceroses and perhaps fascists. Readers of *Current Anthropology* who know me may judge for themselves how apt they find this. (Hannerz 1999: 689)

How does one arrive at such a suggestion? Ionesco's play is certainly allegorical, but my use of it does not replicate the allegory. I use it as the play that it was, one that deals with the epidemic quality of mental conformity that closes public

arenas to discussion and debate. The play itself is certainly not about fascists as such, but about how apparently ordinary people, and especially intellectuals, can be swept into acceptance of fascism, communism, or for that matter any regime, not by fear or terror but by personal adjustment to authority. *Rhinoceros* is not about fascist dictators, but about the weak, don't-rock-the-boat well-educated who peacefully empower fascist dictators. It is conformity itself, or what Bourdieu called "sheepish enthusiasm" (*enthousiasme moutonnier*) (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2000: 3), that breeds dread and even panic in the face of critique and becomes a virtual fountain of memory blackouts and I'm-all-right-Jack platitudes.

In the "comment," different domains referred to in my article are simply associated with what appears to be an anxiety of being associated with the F-word which, of course, was not the intent of my argument. These domains include my short note on Ionesco's play. The latter drew equal inspiration from the rise of fascism as of communist, or any dictatorships, and the major themes of the article, which are about *the logics of politically correct thinking, not who is or is not a fascist.* I make it very clear that such logics can appear within any political or even non-political organization, and that they are a fundamental aspect of all sociality. To identify Ionesco's depiction of mental conformity with fascism itself is perfectly indicative of the PC mentality. Following in the footsteps of one of Ionesco's famous characters, "the philosopher," the kind of associational logic that I presented was as follows:

All cats are mortal		All fascists are politically correct
Socrates is mortal	Or, by extension,	Professor X is politically correct
: Socrates is a cat		: professor X is a fascist

This elementary error of logic was noted by Aristotle and would seem to be a triviality . . .

Or perhaps not. To invert the subject and predicate of the second term of a syllogism is to conflate the set with its member, thus generating an inconsequentially open field of associations. This is the foundation of associational logic, if the term logic can be applied. In psychoanalytic-linguistic jargon it is a case of *contiguity disorder* (Jakobson 1956: 55–82; Lacan 1966: 622). Now one might be tempted as a hard-headed and demanding editor to ask for revisions of such statements, since they can easily draw any intellectual arena into chaos. This straightforward error, the inversion of subject and predicate, opens the way to a vast if not infinite network of indexical associations. When the old man, student to the philosopher, replies, "but my dog is also mortal!" the automatic and (il)logical reply is, "well then he is also a cat." This can be carried to great lengths of course, and in our model, in the previous chapter, of the way in which associationism creates essentialized categories, the power of this indexical process is certainly evident.

This is one of the core problems that associational thinking clearly generates. Concerning the emergence of PC, I argue that intellectual debate is mediocritized by becoming subject to thought control by means of indexical associations grounded in moral categorizations, as we suggested above. And it is the arena that is the major problem, not those who participate in it.[2]

Hannerz affirms, in denying an associative charge *of which he, not I*, is the author, that I have accused him, "perhaps" (just in case he is wrong, perhaps), of fascism, and that "Readers of *Current Anthropology* who know me may judge for themselves how apt they find this" (689). The strength of associative thinking is obvious here in the assumption—which he makes and then defends himself against—that to be PC is to be fascist. Let us continue, then, into a morass of highly motivated associations.

Hannerz does not wish to engage in "any point-by-point discussion of Friedman's claims about Swedish society." Isn't discussion what an academic forum like *Current Anthropology* is all about? One of the major arguments I attempted to convey in the commentary is thus dismissed, as he finds it all so "bizarre." My discussion concerns a set of events that occurred in Sweden, of course, but my discussion of the events as well as of PC concerns a phenomenon that occurs in Sweden as well as in other places as evidenced throughout this book. If there is any claim about Swedish society it is related to what I say about the nature of sociality, a phenomenon that has been discussed my many other researchers (Arnstberg 1989, 2005; Berggren and Trädgårdh 2015), so it is somewhat bizarre that this appears so bizarre. But we can accept this, for now, since his "arguments" are to concern the events and how to interpret them. He begins with KEF's appearance before the organization, *Folkviljan och massinvandring* "The People's Will and Mass Immigration," stating that "many of my compatriots will immediately be suspicious, as am I, of an organization with such a name, which in the context of current Swedish debate sounds xenophobic" (689).

This is precisely the point that my article discussed in some detail in order to explicate the nature of associative thought. Here the association of the name of the organization is enough to convey its inherently evil intentions. Nothing is said of my argument, which was based on a series of interviews and a brief statement on a political discourse that emerged after World War II. I suggested that the concepts involved have changed in content, so that many academics and intellectuals now associate the "people's will" with the 1930s, which was not the case in the 1950s (to say nothing of the nineteenth century), when the phrase was "progressive." This ideological inversion is the subject of chapter 8. Hannerz would not, I presume, have suggested similar propositions in the 1950s when "the will of the people" was associated with social democracy as with socialism. If we accept the "associative" interpretation then Rousseau, who is most famous for the expression, is also suspect. As for the combination of "people's will" with mass immigration, it will become evident later on in this

book that anti-immigration does not imply anti-immigrant since the person who was instrumental in founding the group was part of a family that had hosted a Jewish refugee in the 1940s and had in the 1970s taken care of a young African student of Indian descent and was an engaged development researcher in Africa. It was a shock for her to discover that she was a racist after publishing a newspaper article with the title "Peoples' apprehension concerning immigration must be taken seriously" (Björkman 1993). The reaction to this article and the letters she received led to the informal network Folkviljan.

As for PC thinking, my critic follows my argument to the letter, continuing to affiliate KEF to an organization for which she was merely invited to speak.[3] The leader of the organization is cited as "apparently Ekholm Friedman's closest connection within it" (not *with* it). Where does this interpretation come from, one might ask? Nowhere in any of the information that was available. KEF had once interviewed the person in question, just as I had interviewed apparently suspect individuals. This was essential to our project. Meanwhile, what purpose could there be for saying "within" instead of "in," if not to suggest that KEF was also somehow an insider in the organization? This is not insinuation on my part, for the two prepositions in fact convey quite different meanings. In the commentary I described not only the homepage of *Folkviljan och massinvandring*, but also the results of interviews with several of its members in order to provide a divergent picture, but Hannerz does not discuss this. The person in question, a parliamentary candidate for the Sweden Democrats, is also pigeonholed as a racist—a classification based on his association with that party, despite his having also been a member of the Green Party and the Left Party (former communist party). Thus, I would insist here that first, *Folkviljan*, which never had a real leader, being a loose network, was not a racist or even anti-immigrant network (it was not an organization), and second that KEF was definitely an outsider in relaton to that network. The problem with associative language is that it is full of assumptions based on expressions like "we all know that X must be suspect" instead of presenting a rational argument. Secondly, the supposed leader of the group, Kenneth Sandberg, suspected of the worst (see below), had no role at all in the group.

As I argue in much of this book, and as was embarrassingly demonstrated by hidden camera interviews with major party officials in 2002 (Swedish Television, Uppdrag Granskning 2002), there are plenty of racists in all parties. At the same time, it is of utmost importance to be able to demonstrate just *how things are connected*. But in the PC world it is useless to discuss these facts, since expressions like "few are gullible enough to believe it" end it all. This is a common, vulgar Freudian way of eliminating the need to confront a difficult issue: "No matter what you say, I know what you really mean!"

Hannerz himself is aware of his own proliferating rhizomes as he progresses to the crescendo—a link to Le Pen. In his discussion of KEF's relation

to the group to which she lectured, Folkviljan, Hannerz implied she was close to a certain Kenneth Sandberg.

> Kenneth Sandberg, was a parliamentary candidate for the Sweden Democrats in the 1998 national election. That party, too, perhaps claims not to be xenophobic, but few are gullible enough to believe it. It is a fringe group which has never been anywhere close to getting a seat in the parliament, but according to newspaper reports (e.g., *Dagens Nyheter*, 30 October 1998) it had financial support from the National Front in France, Jean-Marie Le Pen's party, in the 1998 election. (Hannerz 1999 689).

We note here that the "fringe group" in 1998 has become the third and sometimes second largest party in Sweden (see the postscript). Be that as it may, he continues,

> Perhaps it could be argued that pointing this out is more "guilt by association." Nonetheless, most people would probably recognize that it is wise to be a bit careful with the groups one chooses to get involved with. (Hannerz 1999: 689)

Thus a virtual climax of innuendo ends with an open declaration of the correctness of associationism. We should be careful, it suggests, as merely to have an association is converted into "to get involved with." The word "involved" appears to imply that speaking to a group is equivalent to being involved with it. This initial statement licenses Hannerz to continue with precisely the kind of associations that I analyze in the article, but without himself discussing them and thus again rehearsing precisely what I depict as the problem. While accepting that newspaper headlines and rubrics, placed in quotes, may not reflect the content of articles, in the case of KEF, the rubric "was hardly entirely misleading." This last remark is another form of politically correct language, which linguist George Lakoff calls "hedging" (1973) (see below): qualifying statements in such a way that they become fuzzy enough to be unassailable, but also, and to the same extent, meaningless. He goes on to imply what the subtitle contained, that is, that KEF "lined up" for. With this locution he explicitly states that KEF was an engaged supporter of the organization she was addressing. Thus the associational chain emerges: to speak to organization X → to get involved with organization X → to "line up for" organization X. And we can take this further by linking the assumptions: questioning immigration policy implies xenophobia, so that speaking to such an organization implies that one is within a xenophobic organization that is linked to a xenophobic party. Now it is probably the case that the critical language aimed at KEF is actually experienced as true by its authors, but whether they experience it as true does not mean that it makes sense, which is why I critique associationism in general. If I interview and even have a talk for Anti-Fascist Action, which actually was part of our research as well, does it imply that I am a member?

This kind of associating is perfectly compatible with the explicit correctness of "guilt by association" stated above. If Y writes a theoretical critique of anti-racism and this is used by racists in order to strengthen their own position, then Y is also a racist. Therefore P. A. Taguieff, former head of the French Committee on Anti-Semitism and one of the most important and activist researchers on racism in Europe, is wrong to have written in the journal *Grèce*, run by New Right philosopher Alain de Benoist, because doing so associates him with the journal and therefore makes him a racist at most, and a fellow traveler at least. Granted, many of Taguieff's colleagues said he should have never written an article for a journal associated with the New Right, no matter what its content, but most of them came to his defense! They may have thought that Taguieff had made a stupid political move, but it was not a question of morality. Hannerz's vigilant hedging on such issues when he observes that "it is wise to be a bit careful" or hyper-qualifies a straightforward argument as "hardly entirely misleading" might seem to protect him from critique by avoiding categorical affirmations, but it only further reinforces their character as mere innuendo. Yet it's all okay, because the paramount consideration is whether one is associated with the correct people. Clearly, intellectual honesty is not highly valued when the only question is "What will the neighbors say?" This accounts for the admonishments concerning whom we should associate with. It is why this kind of text is so interesting in the context of political correctness. It states clearly that it is the *indexical properties,* not only of language but even of acts, in the sense of *speaking before* a particular group, that are of paramount importance. The content of what one says is not at all interesting in such cases, so there is no discussion of that content.

Hannerz moves on to what he may imagine as the final proof: decontextualized excerpts from the KEF newspaper article that demonstrate its treachery. Not a word about the argument; rather, he presents an exercise in associative identification: is the excerpt likely to inspire racism or not?

1. "Multiethnicity is disastrous for social solidarity . . ." This statement is nothing particularly new. It would, some will say, imply that researchers such as Arthur Schlesinger, Todd Gitlin, Pierre-André Taguieff, and others are dangerous anti-immigrant ideologues. But the argument is simply that multiethnicity, in the standard sense of a society divided into separate culturally defined units, is contradictory to broader forms of solidarity, although it could well be argued that it all depends on the circumstances, i.e., that one can both be ethnic and loyal to a larger political entity, but no such argument is even attempted. Whether one agrees with this or not, it is certainly not sufficient to elicit the kind of fear and marginalization tactics engaged in by my anthropologist colleagues. Reacting this way is further evidence of a particularly strong fear, or at least avoidance, of discussion. There is nothing anti-anyone

in the above statement. Rather, it offers a critique of official state policy and cultural elite ideology.

2. "Is multiculturalism the opposite of ethnicity and the ethnically pure?" What is the problem here? Multiculturalism in its standard usage assumes differentiation into separate culturally defined groups. Ethnic cleansing is and has been carried out by such smaller ethnic units. Is this astounding and dangerous? Who is being protected here?

3. "Western Europe is 'going downhill', and apart from that our earlier homogeneity is being 'broken up' by tentacles from the outside . . ." Here, "going downhill," a rather crass translation from the Swedish, should be "on the ropes," "in decline," or even "in free fall," not "going downhill." This quote is taken out of a larger but very compact argument in which it is stated that

> The homogenizing nation state in Western Europe, which reached its climax during the period from 1750–1920, was a product of economic development. Note that Western Europe in the same period created multiethnicity in other parts of the world by extending its tentacles in various directions. Where these tentacles penetrated, earlier homogeneities were broken up.

This, then, is an argument for hegemonic expansion and contraction in which "tentacles" is used metaphorically to refer to transnational enclaves and projects formed within larger societies. It is not a moral statement: one might well be an anarchist and support the fragmentation of state units. Appadurai would certainly agree here, as he says something equivalent in the quotes above. What is important is the argument itself, not whether it is dangerous to say such things. Any historical perspective on the octopus metaphor should make it clear that tentacles have been used on all sides of the political spectrum since the 1870s. To characterize anything thought to be imperialistic. In fact the Collins English dictionary writes: "if you talk about the tentacles of a political, commercial, or social organization, you are referring to the power and influence that it has in the outside community." https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/tentacle. Now this is pretty general to say the least. The critique of KEF makes use of only one *connotation* of the term and thus says more about their associating than about the actual use of the word by KEF. But then, perhaps it is a dangerous word in all contexts, and then a more developed argument needs to be made. Since nothing explicit is said we can only assume that this is an association to fascist or Nazi depictions of, for example, Jewish world conspiracy although tentacles have been used to depict communist expansion, American imperialism, and lots more. But, surely, that is not enough to ignore its more widespread usage for all the other forms of world power referred to above (Keane, E. 2005; Winther, T. and Wilhite 2015).

And certainly, KEF is not the first person to characterize the negative aspects of plural multiethnic society. The major early twentieth-century work

on *pluralism* by J. S. Furnivall, used the concept to describe multi-ethnically fragmented colonial polities. I do not recall Furnivall—a colonial consultant but also a prominent critic of colonial regimes—ever being described as a dangerous person who could ignite the worst kinds of racist violence. Yet he did write the following:

> It is significant that, in Canada and the United States, and also in Australia, when the influx of alien elements threatened national life and common social standards, barriers were raised against free immigration. In tropical dependencies there was no common social will to set a bar to immigration, which has been left to the play of the economic forces. The plural society arises where economic forces are exempt from control by social will. (Furnivall 1948: 306)

The argument is that expansion of imperial centers entails the penetration via colonialization of the periphery and its subsequent social fragmentation, even if the fragments are ordered by a colonial government. By extension, the decline period can be said to reverse these processes, although of course in a much-transformed way, since migrants do not come from strong, expanding states but from zones of chaos and disintegration. However, tendencies to colonize, if not colonial strategies, have been documented by serious scholars (e.g., Tibi 2002).

Some people, as are our professors, might be disturbed at KEF's assertion that Europe might be in decline. One need only refer to any of numerous major works such as Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), Wallerstein (2003), Arrighi and Silver (1999), and many others, to find support for KEF's argument. That mass immigration is systemically related to this decline appears even more disturbing. It's much safer to believe that what is happening is not really of any consequence, and that it implies no dislocations, crises, or other serious problems. This is the same attitude to reality that generates politically correct hedging.

Predictably, then, Hannerz does not commit himself to an opposing intellectual stance, stating merely that KEF's position is "much too one-sided and partly erroneous" (Hannerz et al.1999: 689) without, of course, saying why or how. What shocked his colleagues was that the article predicted increasing ethnic conflict, an expectation that Hannerz feels a need to hyperbolize into a "forecast of 'ethnic-war-coming-soon-to-a-neighborhood-near-you' . . . we were concerned with the influence of KEF's public statements on the social climate in Sweden and with the apparent scholarly authority she lent them by being described as a 'professor of social anthropology'" (690). That was why they decided, as they say, "to distance ourselves as soon as possible from Ekholm Friedman's views" (690).[4] After all, as we noted, the important question is "What will our colleagues say"? Even before my *CA* article went to press, attitudes had changed, even in the government. And in the following years

it was becoming increasingly clear that Sweden is home to some of the most severe ethnic segregation in Europe (Andersson 1998; Andersson et. al. 2010) and that the level of ethnic violence, expressed very much in rising rates of gang rape (http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Crime/Rape-rate) and petty gang violence, is now recognized as a major problem (http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19592372).

But, some may ask, could it be that this is KEF's fault, and if she hadn't written the article, these troubling trends might never have emerged? On the contrary: KEF's research findings were paralleled in other parts of Europe, and the statements in her article were already becoming standard fare in Sweden, which has been rather special insofar as its cultural elites have chosen to ignore the problem. Perhaps the correct strategy would simply have been to accept the state ideology of multiculturalism and its division of the world into multiculturalists and racists. But our research revealed a very different reality, one much closer to what was common in other countries. But what can appear in *der Spiegel* (1997) and the *Atlantic Monthly* (Schwartz 1995) was apparently unfit for Sweden, since it engaged in "fear mongering" (690). This reflects not simply the reaction to KEF's article, but also a general fear of stating anything clearly enough that it might be criticized or cause any sort of reaction. This is the root of the incredible language of hyper-qualification, or hedging, referred to above, which means it can be said that "of course there are some problems, but they're all just part of the daily round of the more-or-less and for-the-most-part, relatively normal." Then someone from another country publishes a book that blasts a hole through this suddenly embarrassed fear of facing reality (Pred 2000).[5]

At several junctures Hannerz states that KEF's arguments are "dubious" and it is "hardly difficult to criticize Ekholm Friedman's miscellany of facts" (690) but no such criticism is offered, not a single argument, and *Current Anthropology* is not a newspaper! One excellent example of the dominance of indexicality over semantics is a statement concerning KEF's second article, in which she said that in her research she had used Deleuze and Guattari's word "rhizomes" and not "tentacles" and could not find an adequate translation suited for a newspaper article. "Well," Hannerz claims, "in terms of rhetorical impact, these are not exactly equivalent" (690). For whom, we might ask—academics in Stockholm? Or perhaps other politically correct academics mentioned in the original *CA* article? Deleuze and Guattari used the term to explore the dialectical conflict between vertical and horizontal relations, and even discussed the question of violence in such terms. I suggest in the article that tentacles are actually an even better term to describe the processes referred to, but no notice is taken of this. If I go so far as to argue *for* that monstrous word, "tentacles," then why is it not important to argue against it? Rhizomes,

it can be noted, are purely parasitical and have no "origins" being nomadic in nature. If the meaning of the word were taken seriously one might decide that the term is even more "dangerous." What if KEF had written that foreign rhizomes were destroying the integrity of the country, or even tearing the nation apart? Would that have been more acceptable?

In the end, no substantive argument can be found in Hannerz's comment. On the contrary, he demonstrates only his disapproval, and that "we" (apparently, the four professors) are worried about the dubious nature of KEF's statements. Does this not express a wish for social control in which the "what" is never mentioned or discussed openly? Here the frightening aspect of this kind of academic discourse is on display. We should not forget that many of the parents and grandparents of the present generation of academics would have applied the same lack of substantive thinking to Sweden's conveniently and officially forgotten close relation to Germany in World War II.[6] The real issue here is that this avoidance of real discussion of the content of what other people say appears to express a total lack of interest in engagement with those people.

Paradoxically, this episode occurred amidst a complaint that I was intolerant, even though I was defending his right to present another view that I would not be permitted to comment upon in *CA*. He says "we found it incumbent to state our view" (690). But no view is stated. If "it is hardly difficult to criticize KEF's miscellany of 'facts,'" well then, why not do so? Wouldn't this be the best way of countering what she said? But this was not done, and instead the professors resorted to what appears to be fuzzy "moral politics." Some ambivalence sneaks into his justification of the attack on KEF when he writes,

> The reason for her Swedish colleagues' dismay was indeed not only that her line of argument was intellectually dubious (and would have been treated as such at the seminar table) but that in the context of the wider social climate it in effect constituted fearmongering. (690)

What, then, is this "wider social climate"? Could it be that the climate was already quite conflictual, even if discussions of the conflicts were suppressed? And as for fearmongering, there is no evidence of such. On the contrary, the reaction, apparently imbued with fear, consisted of a rabid attack by the media and certain academics on the author of these supposedly treacherous remarks. And if this was a serious intellectual problem, why was it never taken up at the seminar table? This is, unfortunately, standard fare in contemporary research, as evidenced by this remark by a member of the Swedish national research agency,

> It is important that people are made to know that what they may say in their kitchens cannot be taken up on the radio, television or in the newspapers. This is part of the process of civilization. That which can be said in public is therefore

> that which is legitimate, and what is essential for a society is what is legitimate and what is not. *A certain amount of hypocrisy is a good thing*. (Demker *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, 22 February 2004, C7)

Two themes emerge from Hannerz's comments. First, you should be careful about the people you can be associated with (by other people). Second, you should be careful to say things that do not rock the boat in the sense of endangering the stability of public opinion. No opposing intellectual position is offered—only admonishment for getting us all into trouble. As he writes at the end of his comment:

> I would much have preferred to keep this entire sordid intermezzo in public anthropology within limits, in time as well as space. (Hannerz 1998: 691)

In my interpretation, this is the core of the PC mentality. The atmosphere of fear—fear of saying the wrong thing—was palpable throughout the fray. So it was not KEF who was the fear monger, for fear was already in the air in a society in serious crisis. Hopefully, an attempt to understand the fear is more important than attempts to negate its existence. The fact that KEF was attacked on the grounds that her words were suspect and dangerous, and that the attackers offered no substantial critique but merely called for silence, are clear expressions of this fear. In other chapters of this volume, especially chapter 8 and the Concluion, I discuss the way in which this fear has developed in the contemporary period.

Equivocation as Scientific Habitus

One of the striking aspects of PC language is what appears to be a fear of saying anything that might be susceptible to critique. I say "appears," but it may just be a way of being overly cautious. This need not, as exemplified below, be a product of political correctness as such. Such fear can find expression in the extreme caution into which a pre-emptive strategy of avoiding criticism is translated, it can be understood as a more general form of the PC situation. One way of avoiding critique is to over-qualify one's own language, thus making it impossible to reproach an author for any clearly defined position: "You can't attack me for what I have said, because if you look closely at it you will see that I didn't really say that at all." It might be suggested that this kind of discourse is the product of a social milieu imbued with anxiety about potentially agonistic interlocutors, a specific kind of academic and also political culture. There is a superlative example of this kind of language in a morally neutral context, dealing with the nature of culture in relation to subcultures. In a concluding discussion of what are designated as two approaches to "depicting contemporary cultures" (Hannerz 1992: 98)—one stressing the isolation of subcultures;

the other, global homogenization—he suggests that the two need to be brought together as well as taken apart internally and reassembled into "another whole" (99). And what do we get?

> Here we see the institutions of the cultural apparatus (a term one may want to retain, as the collective label for those *various* agencies—*in principle* of *uncertain* connections to one another—which have in common their operating along *certain* dimensions of asymmetry) as tied in their production to *particular* perspectives, and reaching *variously* far, toward people with *either similar or other perspectives*. And we see subcultures as clusterings of perspectives, *variously clearly bounded*, sometimes nesting in one another, sometimes crosscutting; in some places rich in content and form, in other places poor in the same respects; basically defined in terms of symmetries of cultural process, but *at times* including *a certain* asymmetry as well. (99; italics added)

One might question whether this text has any content. I have italicized the signs of uncertainty here; phrases such as "various," "uncertain connections," "certain dimensions," "either similar or other," and then all the "sometimes" qualifiers. The net result is so indeterminate as to be uninterpretable. The content being communicated is not particularly sophisticated or overly complex, but it is so replete with caveats and qualifiers that the propositions contained in the sentences self-neutralize. "The world is fairly round, somewhat pear-shaped, perhaps with fairly flat surfaces," one could similarly opine, meriting the approval expressed in the typical phrase "it was hardly entirely misleading." This seems to be a predominant form of expression or even a style of writing, a habitus. Another article (1999b) offers a similar kind of critique of Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*. The problem, then with Huntington, as with KEF, is what is called "cultural fundamentalism" (Stolcke 1995) which is a term that has been used to designate the new racism, not biological but cultural and which is best characterized by its essentialist quality. Huntington's thesis concerns the transition from the Cold War to a conflict of regional cultures, not the West vs. Islam. Huntington is not so interested in culture as such, but in the politics of culture, and here no substantial critique is forthcoming. Instead it is claimed that viewing the world in such oppositional terms is dangerous and might lead to fomenting real conflict (Hannerz 1999: 405). Concentrating on culture and the way it is distributed is his solution to fundamentalism and is contained in the following:

> It may well be that some considerable number of people really live encapsulated among others who share most of the same experiences, ideas, beliefs, values, habits, and tastes. Nonetheless, it appears increasingly likely that many people have biographies entailing various cross-cutting allegiances—they share different parts of their personal cultural repertoires with different collections of people. And if there is an "integrated whole," it may be a quite individual thing. Under such circumstances, people may well value some parts of these personal repertoires

> more highly than others, identify themselves particularly in terms of them, and identify in collective terms more strongly with those other people with whom they share them. It could also be, on the other hand, that they may resist attempts to categorize them uni-dimensionally in terms of any single cultural characteristic. (Op. cit. 402)

This would seem to mean that cultural sharing in this globalized world is so multiple that it can hardly be applied to groups since homogeneity is on the wane. The problem is that this cannot account for the actual cultural conflicts that abound in the world, unless we should simply downplay them since they would consist in "fear mongering." Bin Laden led a very "westernized" jet setting life before starting Al Qaeda. And this was apparently more than a mere individual choice. Large numbers of Muslims in Europe have said that they would prefer Sharia to western law. Whether Huntington's thesis is right or wrong would require a detailed analysis of his argument, and not merely countering that cultures are no longer homogeneous. Were they ever homogeneous? And isn't the issue one of political identification in what is called cultural politics? It would be difficult to deny that the world has become more polarized in cultural terms, something that would be quite impossible if the "integrated whole" were purely individual.

It is argued that neither the cosmopolitan, celebrationist, multiculturalist elites nor the fundamentalists can be allowed to simply battle among themselves. Rather an interactionist approach is needed which is outlined in the following way.

> Such an interactionist stance might also lead to some nuanced consideration of the room for cultural diversity in a society. We may sympathize with the idea that each human being has a right to his/her 'own culture', and on this idea policies of multiculturalism may be based. Yet such rights tend to face certain limits in those social contexts where for reasons not least of effectiveness and justice there must be shared rules of the game (and where the rules can hardly be negotiated anew in each relationship). What situations are necessarily of this sort, and which are not? Where do the rules come from, and how can they be made readily accessible to everyone affected, instead of being rooted in layers of implicit assumptions? Multiculturalism can hardly be an either/or thing, but to define its reasonable place, one has to work on such questions. (Hannerz 1999: 405)

This solution does not really address the faults in either so-called fundamentalist or celebrationist approaches but simply expresses dissatisfaction, i.e., fundamentalists don't understand that culture is always changing and celebrationists have no understanding of the on-the-ground realities of the situation, but there is no analysis of either. And the "interactionist" approach is simply a statement that we have to adapt to the multicultural situation, as do most European governments, with an understanding of difference and the limits of the shared rules of the game in which we all have to compromise. But most important

is not to contribute to an atmosphere in which "xenophobic desperados" can shoot one of his immigrant students! Apparently, then, it is the fundamentalists who are the real problem and that people like Huntington and KEF are contributing to the violent conflicts that we see.

Referring to Huntington's main thesis, he writes, "It seems reasonable to be somewhat concerned about what series of echoes they may produce." The combination of reasonable + somewhat + concerned reinforces the fuzziness of his position while also reproducing the moral authority expressed in the generalized "we" that he uses in criticizing KEF.

Orwell attacked this kind of thinking in his famous essay, "Politics and the English Language" (1956), where he castigated what he saw as the debasement of language by the politics of fear. He provided a repertoire of usual phrases: "a not unjustifiable assumption, leaves much to be desired, would serve no good purpose, a consideration which we should do well to bear in mind . . . (364) These are the kinds of turn-of-phrase . . . of which there is a readily accessible list that enable one to avoid clarity. Referring to the kind of writing discussed above, Orwell proposed the following cure:

> One can cure oneself of the not un-formation by memorizing this sentence: A not unblack dog was chasing a not unsmall rabbit across a not ungreen field." (363, note)

But he goes further, attempting to link this kind of language to an almost instinctive use of obfuscation when the issues seem politicized or dangerous in some way:

> "When there is a gap between one's real and one's declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish squirting out ink . . . When the general atmosphere is bad, language must suffer." (363–364)

Here is the linkage to political correctness. The latter is the "bad atmosphere" Orwell refers to, one in which there are certain correct opinions and ways of expressing them. But one might also say that this language can be of use in any kind of generally insecure situation, whether political or intellectual. It is simply a form of pre-emptive defense against criticism.

The Importance of Cultural Globalization

There is a curious moment in Hannerz's comment that enlists the pervasive moral discourse in a defense of a particular "brand" of cultural globalization discourse, and here, perhaps, something identifiable as a position may be said to lurk, however evasively. This is interesting since when we first presented our global systemic perspective in the 70s it was opposed by a number of historical

materialists who claimed it was what they referred to as "circulationism" and in Sweden as materialist reductionism by those who were engaged in the new anthropology of globalization that emerged in the mid-Eighties. The only place where any position emerges is where Hannerz refers to the *good* anthropologists' appeal to the "compassion and sense of solidarity" (op. cit. 690) of elderly people who called them after their newspaper article had been published, and those scholars' invocation of the "prevalence of cultural exchanges in human history" (ibid.), in order to assure the callers that there was no reason to be upset about the current situation. I'm sure they were very convincing! Is this a solution for those who are genuinely worried about what is happening in Sweden? And isn't the sense of compassion they hope to elicit an instance of compassion at a distance, so well analyzed in Luc Boltanski's *La souffrance à distance*?

But how does this contribute to our understanding of the actual issues? Regarding the prevalence of cultural exchange in history, the global systemic anthropology that we have espoused has always assumed that this was the case, even in the 1970s, when the approach was unpopular. But in a global systemic anthropology, the fact of cultural exchange is as trivial as it is ubiquitous.[7] That it is used to shore up multicultural elitism is evident in the assumption that the problem is that some Swedes, who are on the receiving end of multi-cultural wealth, are opposed to all the Others who have offered themselves up to this vast process of cultural enrichment. As a social issue, this is not simply about Swedes and others. On the contrary, most research highlights the existence of substantial interethnic conflict in ethnically rich suburbs, not between Swedes and Others, but primarily between Others and Others. Still, concentrating on his own notion of culture while ignoring my original arguments, Hannerz makes a plea for the value of diffusionism, not as some "antiquated school" but as a contemporary accepted phenomenon, the very heart of globalization. In this way he introduces a defense of his own cultural globalization, criticizing my "position that 'culture is not where you get things from but the way you put them together'" (690). Hannerz must recognize this not as my idea but a basic tenet of Boas, Kroeber, and others (Sahlins 1999). Otherwise, of course, culture is just a bunch of things—which, of course, greatly simplifies the task of anthropological research.

Let us return to the attempt to convince Swedes, who may live in areas where they have experienced immigrant youth crime, that all this can be dealt with by understanding that Sweden is a historical product of cultural exchanges. Is this an adequate response? Does it change our understanding to know that our cultural identities are really just collections of differences imported from all over the world? As I once asked rhetorically (Friedman 1994: 2000), does an Italian cease to be fully Italian when he is taught that his pasta originally came from China?[8] To suggest that Italians should give up their false consciousness fundamentally confuses the origin of objects with the way they

are organized into people's lives. Of course it is always possible to identify in terms of the global genealogies of the objects in one's world, but people seldom do so, unless they are identified(as cosmopolitans) with the globe itself and not with the society in which they live. If one insists that the contemporary situation is one combining "long distance cultural flows with integrative processes," which is, of course, a truism that no anthropologist has ever denied, then I, following Boas, would add that cultural flows can exist as culture and not just as things, symbols etc., only when they are *integrated into meaningful social worlds*. In other words, it is not the movement of things in itself that is cultural, but the meaningful worlds within which it occurs. The integrative process is the locus of cultural production.

Therefore, if wine is exported from A to B and used by B as a brick cleaner and so identified, the movement of the object tells us nothing in itself. The spread of McDonald's around the world in Ritzer's famous thesis (Ritzer 1996) is not a flow of culture; it is primarily a flow of capital investment and the extension of a particular economic activity, and secondarily an organization of identifications that either replicates original identifications (i.e., from the place or country of origin, via advertising) or does not. It's not the chopped meat and meat glue, the rolls, the ketchup, the plastic decor as such that constitute culture, but the way they are contextualized by the company and construed by the consuming parties. Thus, culture is, as always, about integration, the formation of a world and the making sense of the things that belong to that world. And the "making sense" is always situated, i.e., local, even if it is on an airplane. And even there, if it lasts no longer than the flight, it is hardly worth registering, unless one is interested in fleeting constructions of culture.

Fuzzy Arguments for Fuzzy Politics

In our research we take up the following scenario, simplified here for reasons of space: Within what we describe as a crisis of Western hegemony that begins in the late 70s, there is an economic decline related to the export of industrial capital primarily to East and South Asia, a crumbling of former peripheries leading to internal violence and large scale migration toward the declining centers creating a situation of potential confrontation and violence. The weakening of the nation state takes the form of a polarization into an increasingly cosmopolitan set of elites and larger scale downwardly mobile former working classes. In this process emerges a state-based policy of multiculturalism in a situation in which segregation increases rapidly, as well as the usual consequences, i.e., increasing crime and violence. Now this might be either right or wrong, partially or completely but it is *clear* and for that reason easy to criticize. Hannerz' position from what he has written here and elsewhere is that to say

such things is dangerous, that cultural exchanges are part of the history of Sweden, as of other countries, I presume, and that while not celebrating multiculturalism, for reasons that remain obscure, the position seemingly implied in the kind of statement I made above is closer to some antiquated nationalism. But he takes no clear position on the issues themselves. This is what I refer to as "fuzzy." To demonstrate support for his fuzzy position without having to indulge in real argument, Hannerz states that it was not just the four professors who jointly attacked KEF. Other anthropologists also attacked her, something I never denied. "So and so said that you were wrong, so it must be true!" But can this be a substitute for real argument? Quite the opposite: my survey of the material stresses that reactions were both numerous and varied. But I have also argued that the variation was variation on one kind of theme: the dominant moral classification of the author. Hannerz (690) duly exemplifies it here, thus further confirming my original argument. One amusing accusation is very enlightening: ". . . he [Friedman] generally has an unfortunate predilection for trying to impose his own either-or constructions on audiences and adversaries." This was in reference to my vicious proposal about culture, i.e., "culture is not where to get things from but the way to put them together," which I discuss with references and examples. Apparently my efforts to argue are reduced to my predilection to impose either-or constructions. It would be interesting to know the reasoning behind this assertion.

More generally, I would seem to be, unfortunately, a partisan of an intellectual arena in which ideas are presented in terms of clear, dialectical argument in which one has to accept error and falsification, which is how we actually progress. If one maintains the super-qualified discourse preferred by Hannerz, then no argument is possible since *nothing falsifiable is ever proposed*. This is why he can claim that his own work does not celebrate multiculturalism. I do not cite his work at all in the article in question, although I do so above, and his entire comment is reprinted here with short comments for those interested in a brief summary; Instead I refer to Appadurai's more forthright celebration of a diasporic world future. Indeed, one might surmise from my collection of examples, that Hannerz's general strategy is to never produce a statement clear enough to be opposed. This is perhaps a wise choice, for the unqualified statements he does make can be quite astonishing, as illustrated by his statement that my portrayal of political correctness is a "way of avoiding debate and uncomfortable moral issues" (691). But of course uncomfortable moral issues are best avoided by simply branding them as dangerous and inflammatory and therefore not to be published or discussed. Is this not an absurd inversion of the actual situation? Whatever one might think of the debates surrounding PC, no one can claim that those accusing others of PC are trying to avoid debate. Hannerz also claims that I am trying to turn "'political correctness' into a powerful analytical concept" (691). Where does this assertion come from? What I wrote was that

political correctness could be an interesting anthropological *object of study*, not an analytical tool. His response is proof of precisely that.

Political correctness is a parochial concept, "a notion, of course, originating in the United States" (691). Again, finally a clear statement and a descriptive one at that, *though it is, quite simply, wrong*. The notion is much older. Its roots are in the nineteenth century if not earlier, but in more recent times it actually comes from the Soviet Union, more specifically the Stalinist era, when *politicheskaya pravil'nost'*—literally, "political correctness"—was used with positive connotations within the party as essential for the control of citizens. It was used in the same way in Maoist China and later emerged on the left as a joking, cynical internal criticism of orthodoxy, a notion that partly identified the New Left as opposed to the Old. Thus, in one of the few instances in which Hannerz unequivocally asserts a point of fact, he is quite mistaken. Can this be generalized? Qualifiers such as "somewhat," "perhaps," "fairly" and so on do not add precision or even detail. But they are ways of guarding against having said anything falsifiable.

More Lessons from Professors

Another reply to my article came from Gudrun Dahl, of the same department as Hannerz, who was also a party to the official distancing (*avståndstagandet*) from KEF. Again, the issues are limited to words and expressions like "tentacles," which I discussed at some length and which might have been addressed in relation to my own remarks. But no! She, too, reiterates the opinion that rhizomes are definitely the preferred term for describing the formation of transnational enclaves, because they are associated with "positive growth and resilience" (692). But surely this growth is known to come at the expense of surrounding environments, from which rhizomes parasitically take their nutrients. Perhaps if this aspect were stressed more often, that term would also become taboo. Dahl is not as consistent as Hannerz in her avoidance of the issues, which leads her into significant falsehoods. Research had led KEF to rather alarming results concerning the rates of immigrant-related crime. They were based not just on numbers but on analysis of legal case material, and they concurred with the findings of other researchers. Dahl simply denied these results by adding the completely irrelevant dimension of whether or not I suggest that ethnic violence is a question of particular ethnic groups such as Palestinians, Iranians, or Somalis: "Ethnically marked sex crimes are the exception rather than the rule" (ibid.).

Here let me briefly cite the material that we had at our disposal. In the 1990s there was a statistically significant increase in the percentage of violent crimes committed by immigrants, according to national statistics. In the

mid-1990s, 29 percent of all murders and manslaughter cases were attributed to non-citizens, as were 38 percent of all rapes. The rate of non-citizen perpetration of gang rapes was much higher. In a qualitative study of gang rapes between 1989 and 1991, twenty-one of the twenty-four sentenced rapists were non-citizens (Klette 1996: 205). Their average age was 23, and in most of these cases the violence was interethnic, the victims most often being ethnic Swedes. Even national crime statistics, where there has been a concerted effort to minimize the problem, have confirmed these tendencies.

Now, it may be true, as Dahl states with reference to the work of criminologist J. Sarnecki (629), that gangs are more multiethnic in Sweden (an issue that is entirely irrelevant to the argument) than in the United States, but this is simply a way of avoiding the facts that these gangs come from immigrant-dense suburban zones and that their targets are explicitly *svenne*, that is, ethnic Swedes. This is a case of what we have so often discussed as ethnicization. Ethnic identity, like all identity, is of course constructed, and in Sweden, corporatist politics and segregation have ethnicized the very category "immigrant," even extending it over several generations (discussed below).[9] The common reaction among the intellectuals referred to here is to consistently avoid facing the issues, and always to deny, in part (so as not to make claims that are categorical and thus subject to falsification), their significance. It is unclear what "ethnically marked" is meant to refer to, but most research into this area reveals a continuous increase in immigrant-related crime.

> . . . the percentage of male offenders with an immigrant background increased from 13.6% in the 1950's to 40.7% in the 1980's. This is because offenders among first generation immigrants increased from 10.6% percent of the total in the 1950's to 33.9% in the 1980's. (Martens 1997: 231)[10]

In my work and in that of colleagues and researchers, the findings consistently show that immigrant residential areas are characterized by internal ethnic segregation and hierarchical classifications, such as European/non-European/African, and Christian/Muslim, that are themselves a source of real conflict and even violence. But these zones, as I have stressed, are also marginalized and ethnicized. Thus they are fertile ground for conflict with the larger society and the growth of criminality, not least because of the vast increase in diaspora, or at least transnationally based, illegal trade. When criminality increases by a factor of three, it is clear that something serious has happened. And although I do not argue that crime has an ethnic basis, it is also clear that there has been an ethnicization of crime, which might be accounted for by precisely the models of social fragmentation and class polarization for which I have argued.

It might be argued that the built in fear of many culturally oriented anthropologists is that they assume implicitly that if ethnic crime exists or increases

that this has something to do with the ethnicity of those in question, as if it were a product of some fixed culture. This ignites acute anxiety and fear of taking the issue seriously, and leads instead to denial of the empirical realities of the situation. I have argued consistently that ethnic crime is about the social structuring of people's lives and not cultural traits, even though cultures of crime clearly tend to develop around such life situations. There is a strong tendency toward the formation of segregated zones in the society, zones characterized by immigrant density, social marginalization, high rates of unemployment, and low levels of social and cultural integration.

Rates of various immigrant groups' overrepresentation in crime is high, a result found in many other countries. And the rates are different for different groups. In Sweden in 1996, the rate of participation in all crime of North Africans, Chileans, Iraqis, and Iranians was four times higher than that of Swedes, while rates for Poles and Turks were three times higher. The rate for East Asians, however, was equal to, or even lower than, that of Swedes. Similar reports have come from all over Europe. If Dahl sees all of this as dangerous media hype, she ought to come up with some evidence. I find it important to stress that the statement made above, that youth gangs in Sweden are more multiethnic than in the United States, has nothing to do with my argument and reveals an underlying misunderstanding of the nature of practiced ethnicity. When a mixed group of immigrant youth gang-rape a Swedish girl and legitimate their behavior by accusing their victim of being a Swedish whore, it makes little difference whether their origins are from one or from seven different countries. Of course social segregation is the root of the problem. Yet the fact is that there is also a process of antagonistic ethnicization. The category "immigrant," as I said, has been ethnicized in the Swedish situation, and though there are plenty of ethnic conflicts within the larger category "immigrant," the latter category has also become part of a politics of youth identification in which the enemy is the Swede and the children of "rich" Swedes, and all Swedes are rich.

Maybe things aren't so bad. Maybe, as Dahl says, the increase in ethnic violence to which I refer "still refers to no more than a handful of cases" (692). But I am not the creator of the very significant statistics referred to above. Logically extending the initial statement, maybe even war isn't that bad. After all, it concerns only a small part of any population, and most people survive even the bloodiest of wars. Look on the bright side! It's good for pop culture! One journalist wrote at the time that she had just returned from Los Angeles where she visited theater groups and galleries, and they were Asians and Latin Americans and very few Whites, all marvelously creative. A journalist caught in the war in ex-Yugoslavia described how life went on: concerts, poetry readings, even café life was quite lively. Life does go on, even in the midst of major wars. And in the West, to most intellectuals—not least academics who have seen their living standards increase, live in safe havens, and increasingly send their

children to private schools—any suggestion that such problems are significant might seem like an affront. The tolerance for social violence varies a great deal from place to place, usually as a result of adaptation. Americans may be more tolerant of violence than Europeans, judging by the past history of that country. But when French researchers worry about the "Los Angelization" of Paris, they are not just scoring a debating point, celebrating cultural diversity, or grossly exaggerating the problems of that society.

Dahl's remarks end with exactly the kind of discourse that can only be meant to curtail discussion: "Contributions to the social construction of ethnic crime as a major problem are therefore likely to create the very problem in the fashion of a self-fulfilling prophecy" (ibid.).

Well, then we had better be silent about it all! In fact, we might even choose to reverse our results and claim that there is no crime![11] This perverted Foucauldian language (which Foucault would never have accepted, of course) is absurd. All the false descriptions of a wonderful world that have been central to Western political discourse have not, to my knowledge, eliminated any problems, except that certain elites gain comfort from evading them: "If I don't say it happens, it won't happen!" In a larger context of social instability and fear, a magical relation to the world tends to become stronger, even dominant.

Looking Back in 2005

The capacity for denial is an important aspect of PC mentality. In their replies to the original article, Hannerz and Dahl were at great pains to tone down if not deny the problems that were said to have developed in Sweden. As indicated above, much of what was denied here was also denied in many of their earlier attacks. The problem with Sweden, they implied, was primarily that of Swedish racism, defined as all opposition to the creation of a multicultural society. One critic of KEF's articles in *Dagens Nyheter*, Professor Charles Westin, today heads (2005) the Multicultural Center at the University of Stockholm. His quite authoritarian and condescending reply, titled "Vad vet Kajsa Ekholm Friedman om invandring" ("What does KEF know about immigration?") (Invandrerer och minoriteter, 3, 1997), he stated bluntly that "Vi har inte och har aldrig haft någon massinvandring till Sverige" (1997): "We do not have, nor have we ever had, any mass immigration in Sweden."

This was in response to the assertion that Sweden had indeed been faced with mass immigration in the 1990s. This supposed specialist might still rely on his position, and the definition of terms is always an issue, but the facts speak otherwise. In Sweden in 2005, approximately 12–15 percent of the population were first-generation immigrants, an increasing proportion of whom were from outside Europe. In the cities, especially the southern city of Malmö,

the percentage of first-generation immigrants was closer to 25 percent, which includes almost half of all schoolchildren there, and the percentage of Muslims is between 15 and 20 percent. The United States at the turn of the twentieth century is usually described as a locus of mass migration, and the statistical profile of that period is certainly comparable to Sweden's today. The United States never had more than a 15 percent level of immigration. These statistics were known when Westin penned his polemic, if that is the correct word for a strictly PC product. It is also noteworthy that the same author sees the maintenance of high levels of immigration as a goal to be achieved for both cultural and economic reasons.

One doctoral student, Aje Carlbom, who was strongly opposed to what KEF said and wrote did his thesis on Rosengård, the immigrant-dense enclave in Malmö referred to above. Contrary to his own point of departure, his results were completely compatible with what he had himself criticized earlier. He found a high degree of segregation and cultural politics, which I described as a general phenomenon in contemporary immigrant Europe; a high degree of enclavization and endosociality, including endogamy, especially in the Muslim population that he studied; an aggressive attitude toward the larger national arena; and the virtually total failure of multiculturalism in Sweden. His courage has not, of course won him the kind of recognition that he deserves (Carlbom 2003).

It is now common to describe Sweden in terms that were impossible just a few years ago, despite continuing strong opposition to the language used in such descriptions. The institutionalization of multicultural ideology in state organizations, including universities, has come much further. It now includes the proliferation of anti-discrimination bureaus, which have handled increasing numbers of complaints of discrimination. Discrimination has apparently become a lucrative activity for some newly specialized lawyers. A number of school districts in Sweden have forbidden their cafeterias to serve pork, on the grounds that it might offend the Muslim population. Other schools have forbidden the traditional songs at school graduations and at Christmas for the same reasons.

In 2004 (see the conclusion) a group of sociologists of immigrant origin (self-defined) succeeded, with the necessary support of the minister of integration, in taking over a major government enquiry into "power, integration and structural discrimination," expelling the project's original leaders on the grounds that the latter had a basically racist perspective on the issues. This verdict of racism was based primarily on the fact that the accused were themselves Swedish and therefore incapable of understanding the situation of the immigrants. Their enquiry sought to prove that Sweden is a structurally racist society, above all because it is imbued with Swedishness in educational, legal and other institutions, something that must be radically changed, in their view.

The reports of this commission were met with significant skepticism, to say the least, in large part because of significant intellectual weaknesses and empirical insufficiencies in the research.

Today Sweden, more divided than ever, is one of the most ethnically segregated societies in the OECD, according to reports from 2001 (and later; see Anderson et al. 2010). Now, though, its major political parties are also divided into various political factions, as are its immigrant, ethnic, and Swedish organizations. All of this is discussed in more detail in the conclusion, but here it is necessary to point out the degree to which PC assumptions have been falsified by developing realities. If a doctoral student had the courage to reverse his position on our interpretation of the situation after doing significant field research, one might expect the oppositional professors to follow suit. However, they have not done any research, nor sought to. In a recent study of what is called "Preference Falsification" (Kuran 1995; http://www.demoskop.se/vem-vagar-prata), a major Swedish polling firm studied the degree to which people thought they could discuss a number of political issues openly. For most people, immigration was basically taboo.

So when Hannerz referred to KEF in the following terms,

> . . . those who know anything about our (the four professors who wrote the original attack on KEF) combined research experience with regard to issues of globalization, ethnicity, and development might well have a different opinion, and they might not be impressed with the intellectual cogency of Ekholm Friedman's shrill globe galloping catastrophism either. (Hannerz 1999: 691)

It might be noted that none of the four professors have done any empirical research on the issues involved unlike KEF and myself who had a 2 year HF Guggenheim project, and that, as I take up later in this book, the accusation of "globe galloping catastrophism," has turned out to be a quite adequate description.

Notes

1. The reader in question (anonymous) of these two chapters asked why it was necessary to take up this old debate: "The author rehashes an old debate he has had with Hannerz dating from, in some instances, 1999." The problem, of course, is that there was no debate as I argue in this chapter and that the issues are at least as relevant today as in 1999. This is not the evening news!
2. Indexicality also involves the protection of position. Thus if I am a professor then my academic authority is incorporated into everything that I write or say. This is an old story, one that has been subject of many a joke in the past: "How can I possibly be wrong? After all, I am professor such-and-such."

3. It is worth noting that Folkviljan och massínvandring was hardly an organization. It was more accurately a spontaneous network that emerged as a reaction to the massive attack on one person, Ingrid Björkman, who suggested in print that we ought to take seriously the axiety expressed by many concerning mass immigration and its consequences. The group dissipated soon after its appearance, partly because of the enormous pressure brought to bear by forces convinced of the shamefulness of its existence.
4. See the postscript for a discussion of the predictive value of KEF's assertions.
5. Pred's *Even in Sweden* (2000), while exclusively focused on Swedish racism, does at least highlight the radical and explosive nature of the problem.
6. However, that generation, or at least some of its members, would certainly have defended its own actions and attitudes more forthrightly .
7. Cultural exchange is itself a totally misleading metaphor that assumes that people (reified actors) actually exchange culture, meaning that if I obtain some of your culture in such a transaction, I become more like you. This is absurd in any anthropology that takes the organization of experience and knowledge seriously.
8. The Chinese origins of pasta have been challenged by archaeology and this is itself an interesting story (La Cecla 1998).
9. One reason for the multiethnic composition of youth gangs in Sweden is that immigrant "ghettos" are made up people of enormously diverse origins even if ethically related, often in relatively small quantities. Meanwhile, many so-called multiethnic gangs are ethnically hierarchical. This is so even among the largest and most powerful gangs in the United States.
10. The situation has certainly not improved since this text was originally written. Sweden stopped publishing statistics on immigrant-related crime in 2005. The official crime prevention bureau (BRÅ) report for that year clearly documents the same kind of overrepresentation.
11. The BRÅ explicitly tries to reduce rates of such crimes in order to dampen potential reactions.

Chapter 4

Umeå

Nazism in the Far North

Some months after the storm of controversy in Lund in May 1997, a new crisis exploded in the north of Sweden. This time the issue was complicated by a proliferation of interventions on both sides. Karolina Matti, a doctoral student in sociology at the University of Umeå who was doing research on Nazism in Sweden, invited a member of the National Socialist network responsible for the publication *Nordland* to come and present his views at the university that year. The meeting was held within the framework of the youth research program in sociology for which Matti was responsible. It was not properly advertised. The announcement stated that the subject was "what Nazis really want" but the guest was not clearly identified. The presentation was held at three o'clock on a Friday afternoon, when most people had already gone home for the weekend, and was attended by only eight people. But it quickly became a national scandal. The vice chancellor of the university, who found out about the event only when a major newspaper asked him to comment on it, said he was shocked, and that this act was both dangerous and despicable (*Dagens Nyheter* Sept. 12 97) The university investigated Matti's situation and immediately barred her from teaching at the university. She claimed she had done nothing wrong and complained that she was suddenly shunned by all of her former colleagues at the university (DN 97 12 10). When persistently questioned about her own political position, she contended that it was totally irrelevant, since the only question concerned the object of her research. A researcher must not divulge his or her opinion of the subject matter under study, as Matti argued clearly, stating that students in her course needed to confront a real Nazi to be able to understand a Nazi's position, since it could not be conveyed in the same way via secondhand, often biased information.

On television, where the debate had accumulated steam, she was again asked if she wasn't ashamed of being associated with Nazism. When asked whether she was for or against, she refused to answer, explaining that this was

part of the same process of registration of opinions that she refused to accept. She was attacked on the grounds that we already know what Nazism is all about. But no one asked why such a party or group was (unlike in many other European countries) allowed to exist legally in Sweden but not allowed to present itself at a public university, not for legal reasons but because Nazi language often expresses anti-semitic and/or racist thoughts. And the prohibition is a rule rather than a law since it is only expressions classified as hate speech that are subject to prosecution. Formally speaking, this is simply hypocrisy. Nazis were allowed to exist and even to grow—but they had to do it in silence (and this is not really the case since they have always demonstrated, even if not in "repectable" venues)? They were never to be allowed a public forum? Why?

> The holocaust, the Nazi organized elimination of 6 million Jews in WWII, is such an overwhelming experience for the West's self understanding that it forces a compromise with what we value as another core question: the right of free expression. (Larsson in *Västerbottens-Kuriren*, 11 December 1997)

Larsson went on to stress the necessity of a prohibition against the public expression of Nazi ideology. That is, such talk must be silenced, out of fear of repeating the Holocaust: "It is sometimes said that taboos are phenomena typical of primitive societies. This is incorrect. No society can function without taboos, without axiomatic prohibitions" (ibid.).

Minister of Education Carl Tham, in an official statement on 16 December, said that Nazis should not be allowed to present their views on university campuses (see Vinterhed, K. 12-17-1997 DN).

> Nazism, he explained, was an ideology of violence and as such was unacceptable. The vice chancellor of the university agreed and observed also that students were too poorly prepared to be able to listen to such dangerous ideology, implying that they would fall for it if it were allowed to circulate freely. This was but one expression of the colossal fear of this ideology and the insecurity concerning a body of students who were not to be trusted to think for themselves.

Jan Myrdal of Maoist fame, writing in the evening newspaper *Aftonbladet*, criticized the cowardly style of university academics in no uncertain terms. Matti is a Törnedal Swede, a member of an official minority in Sweden of Finnish origin that has suffered a history of discrimination, which, Myrdal argued, was still the case: had she had had a finer name, the scandal would never have occurred. At the same time, he argued that everything she had done was correct. Her research on neo-Nazis was yet unfinished, so she had no need to say anything about her results; and of course she was not required to position herself politically.

The former editor-in-chief of the major newspaper *Dagens Nyheter*, a liberal, attacked the university for relieving Matti of her duties, given that her explanation of her behavior was clearly within the bounds of acceptable practice

for a researcher. He also criticized the minister of education for indulging his hysterical fear of the wrong opinion being aired and thereby crushing freedom of expression. Furthermore, he stressed that freedom of thought was necessarily the basis of a democratic society, with reference to Voltaire's dictum that no matter how awful an opponent's ideas may seem, we must defend his right to express them (*Nycander Västerbottens Kuriren*, 16 December 1997).

I learned from another source that Matti had been writing under a pseudonym for *Nordland*, the neo-Nazi newspaper that was an organ of the people whom she invited to the campus. My source stressed that the act that had brought her downfall with respect to her teaching position was apparently that she never openly advertised the visit of the Nazi. The attendees had included an Eastern European Jew who said he was too afraid to ask any questions. It was an African who called the shots; the guest had apparently said something racist about black intelligence.

The media, of course, had a field day. The scandal received several months of coverage in newspapers, radio, and television. While some of the cultural elite, such as Myrdal (even if a black sheep) and the former *DN* chief editor, defended Matti's right to invite a Nazi to speak on campus, others, as we have seen, argued for silencing and punishment. Some of the discussions concentrated on legal or moral technical issues. The Swedish constitution certainly upholds the right of free speech in all arenas, but it also states that expressions that contravene or criticize the values of democracy are unacceptable. This implies that making Nazism illegal would be the logical strategy here, as in many European countries where Nazi parties and organizations are indeed illegal insofar as they espouse anti-democratic values. Yet they are not illegal in Sweden. This lack of clarity on the issues leaves a great deal of room for moralizing in all directions. One journalist wrote that it is not compatible with intellectual freedom to assume that the holocaust was not a fact but a debatable issue. Here is one of the core problems of confusion. I may think that historical revisionism is nonsense and heavily ideological, but I cannot assume that some intellectuals or even pseudo-intellectuals holding such a position is incompatible with intellectual freedom. The journalist's way of thinking would and does conclude that democracy is about what one believes in and not the structure within which those beliefs are meant to confront one another. To insinuate, as is common in Sweden, that conservatives are not democratic because they want to lower taxes is a simple error of misplaced concreteness.[1]

This was clearly established in one negative position (Rothstein *Aftonbladet* 28 12 97) that argued that the lecture contradicted the constitution, which forbids activities that are not compatible with democratic ideas. If this is the case, how can Nazi parties be legal in Sweden? The same argument might even be used to justify citing ideas from Nazi documents or other anti-democratic documents, left or right.

The Umeå affair, as the media termed it, was explosive, but this time opinion seemed to be mobilized on both sides, unlike the situation involving KEF, in which there was little reaction until long afterwards. A clarification of the issues might start with an analysis of the neo-Nazi's words, as spoken in his presentation and interviews. Dan Berner claimed to have become interested in Nazism on the Internet, where he discovered the revisionist history of WWII and Nazi thinking about race and genes. He expressed a number of important themes that can be combined in different ways, some of which are typical of neo-Nazi ideology:

1. There is a white race, an Aryan race, that has been losing ground, partly because of the ideological onslaught against white identity and partly because the birth rate of this race has declined drastically.
2. It is necessary to struggle for the maintenance of this race, now that it is dwindling to a small minority among the other, rapidly reproducing races.
3. Other races are not to be destroyed. This is Western propaganda of the same type that misrepresents the concentration camps as death camps. On the contrary, what is important is the maintenance of the white race.
4. Immigration is dangerous precisely because it poses a threat to the white race.
5. Races are not equal, but different from one another. Some are definitely better than others in some respects. East Asians may well be more intelligent than Western Europeans, who are in their turn more intelligent than Africans.

This appears to be a typical case of racist ideology. On the continuum between what Wieviorka (1993) calls differential racism and universal racism, it is closer to differential racism than, say, colonialist ideology. This was also typical of earlier Nazi ideology, which combined a universalist ranking of all races with a fear of national contamination. What is the relation between Dan Berner's thinking and nationalist ideologies more generally? The latter, being communitarian ideologies, are also committed to the maintenance of collective homogeneity, but this homogeneity need not be defined in terms of biological or even of cultural properties. Republicanism of the French variety is based on political homogeneity, that is, commitment to a set of political norms, social rules, and goals. However, the latter tends to spill over into cultural issues, to the extent that any political order is culturally specific. This raises a number of problems, of course, but it is clearly not racist insofar as it makes no assumptions concerning the relation between geographic or cultural origins and the permanence or nature of those associated with such origins. Republicanism, in its French variety, is assimilationist, a position many have shared, from

philosophers such as Alain Finkelkraut to political scientists like Emmanuel Todd. All of these intellectuals are profoundly anti-racist, but they are also skeptical of multiculturalism. Yet diehard multiculturalists, or those who see multiculturalism as a solution to the world's problems, insist such people ought to be classified, if not as racists then at least as fellow travelers. The intellectual atmosphere within which such differences exist or can exist varies. In Sweden there have been no such voices of any stature, and all protests against multiculturalism have been quickly marginalized by being categorized as dangerous.

Karolina Matti was previously an anarchist, or "anarcho-feminist . . . struggling against racism, sexism and class oppression" (Nygren 25-01 1998). She was in fact a member of AFA (Anti-fascist Action), the most militant and even violent of the anti-fascist groups. As an anarchist at the University of Uppsala, she wrote in 1994:

> Reality is neither black nor white. As I sit here and wonder about it in my rather bourgeois student apartment after having put my child to bed, I feel bourgeois myself, even though I call myself an anarchist. I have a foot in each world, not capable of feeling at home in either. My belief is therefore that we must build a bridge between reality and utopia, between ordinary people and anarchists. We are all, after all, the products of the same awful society. We all have to adapt to its norms. (Nygren 25-01 1998)

She refused and continued to refuse to divulge her own political position, and that was clearly not her strategy in all of this. She was not unpolitical, of course, and did mention a politics of "pacification, cowardice and immorality among the ruling elite." A journalist interviewer interpreted those words as a political statement, but of course it should be noted that her statement was about the style of the elites' rule and not its content. This style, she went on to say, was "spreading contempt for them in the population." She decided to write a book about herself and her own politics as well as the events at the University of Umeå. Concernng her supposedly criminal act, she argued: "My responsibility in the network for youth research was to invite people who would be interesting for the researchers. I thought that a Nazi would be an interesting guest."

She said that when she discussed the future invitation with a colleague she was told not to do it because it might ruin her supervisor's career. For that reason she did her best to camouflage it. In this way, she said, she alone would be responsible for the results. She also noted that it would have been better to have a larger forum, but apparently she was wary of the way pre-meeting publicity might affect the situation: "My research is based on how they interpret reality. If one assumes that they are lying, then no discussion is possible. But in fact they believe that history has been falsified. Revisionists really believe that what the history books say about the holocaust is false."

Our object here is primarily the understanding of the discourses that were mobilized around this case, since they provide and extend the consistency of

the argument that political correctness comes with vicissitudes. The supporters of Matti's behavior all stressed the need to preserve open debate, so it is her opponents that are interesting here. Let us extend our textual material somewhat in order to sharpen the focus. (Johansson *Arbetet* 7 1 1998) "Matti is hiding behind terms that have to do with democratic process" (i.e., by declining to answer questions about her own politics)—in other words, we know where she really stands.

Carl Tham, Minister of Education

Here we again find the argument that Nazism is in principle against what is stated in the constitution. "Nazis have, like others, the right of free expression, within the limits set by the law. They also have the right to hold meetings like other organizations, but given their violent and racist ideology it is not likely that what is said at such meetings is legal (*Västerbottens-Kuriren* 01-Oct 1998)." This is an interesting construction of freedom of expression in relation to a particular organization. Nazis may do what they want as long as they don't express what they stand for. The following statement made that clear. After declaring that Nazis have no right to speak on university campuses, Tham continued that "it is likely in such situations that a Nazi would speak his hate propaganda and in such a case the university would be directly implicated in instigating unlawful acts [(of speech) my parentheses]" He went on to say that it is one thing to study a movement and another to promote it, which is just what one is doing when one invites a Nazi. To be sure, this was another argument entirely, one implying that no politician should ever set foot on university campuses. For Tham, democracy, as a cultural phenomenon aside from the simple notion of parliamentary democracy, is not a particular kind of arena of debate but a question of political ideology itself. Those who do not agree are by definition not democratic (this is developed later in the book). Those who believe in direct democracy, for example, might also be excluded.

Tore Frängsmyr

Tore Frängsmyr, a professor of the history of ideas, said that "academic freedom means that the researcher shall formulate his own problem and methods and not be controlled externally by politicians or superiors (överhetspersoner) But this does not mean that anyone who happens to find themselves in the university should be allowed to open the door to propaganda (*Västerbottens-Kuriren* 05-Feb-1998)." But how do we know when we are faced with such evil propaganda? And how do we know, especially as social scientists, to what degree our own assumptions are not, in fact, mere propaganda? Matti invited a Nazi to speak because she thought it was important to hear what his group had

to say for itself. Its official propaganda would of course be transmitted, but in a situation where debate and critique was indeed possible. Propaganda is political ideology, and Frängsmyr's statement implies that it shall not be allowed in research contexts. Yet the reason for this is not clear. Who is being fooled? Who are we protecting? And if propaganda is open to debate, does it not risk being falsified?

B. Rothstein

Professor of Political Science B. Rothstein (GP 07-Jan-1998) complained that some journalists had failed to see the seriousness of what happened in Umeå, which was a legitimation of Nazism. How this had occurred is not stated, but the legitimation apparently consisted in allowing a Nazi to present his political ideology. Meanwhile, people have complained about revisionist historians of WWII for years and even tried to stop their public appearances. In this interpretation, then, N. Chomsky can be recast as a closet Nazi, since he actually wrote a defense of the right of expression in this regard, which was included as an introduction to Faurisson's (1980) scandalous book on the subject.

Krister Waern

Krister Waern, the district attorney of Umeå, claimed in *Svdsvenska Dagbladet* (26 June 1998) that Nazis could express themselves freely but could not express any ideas that are illegal. Why not ban the organizations, instead of making them lie in order to exist? Is this not a form of legal double-talk?

The Convolutions of Paradox

The paradox, of which the actors are aware, is the link between free expression and evil ideology. Should one have the right to express evil ideas in public? Evil here refers primarily to racism and to its association with willingness to act on racist ideas, particularly by visiting death or destruction on one's racial foes. This much is clear. Yet the level of what can be interpreted as nervousness provoked by the affair—which, recall, began with eight people listening to an outspoken Nazi at an afternoon meeting—seems incommensurate with its direct outcome. This is likely due to a number of associations that were made in this debate in an effort to argue that Matti had no right to invite a Nazi to speak to her class:

1. *Students are not prepared for this kind of propaganda*. What does this mean? Can students, as people of normal or more probably above normal intelligence, not maintain their own political convictions when confronted with

this propaganda? According to Tham, it was precisely the liberty granted to Nazis in the 1930s that led to the diffusion of Nazi ideology. In other words, the intellectual elites and politicians must not let ordinary people come into contact with these ideas, as they might be drawn in by their message. Even students are perhaps not bright enough to deal with Nazi rhetoric. Or, from a more egalitarian point of view, and still more seriously: even the minister of education might fall for this rhetoric, were he to hear it in public. There is more to this than meets the eye, as we shall see. This particular minister did claim, while arguing against two researchers who stressed the need to understand how Nazi ideology functioned, that to understand is to forgive (i.e., understanding implies "understanding").[2]

2. *Matti, by inviting a Nazi in her secretive way and refusing to answer questions concerning her own position, was hiding behind the rules—meaning, hiding her own Nazi sympathies*. This is an example of the classical associationism discussed earlier. The obvious content of expressions is merely a cover for more sinister motives.

3. *Nazism is evil, so it must simply be repressed, but not outlawed. It may exist but may not be expressed*. This, strangely enough, is the political message that was conveyed. Don't say the "R-word" (i.e., any word that can be construed as racist) and we can merely dislike you while still tolerating you. It is only when you express your true beliefs that you become an anathema.

Snapping into Nazism

Another aspect of the Umeå affair was that Matti—who had apparently been a militant anti-fascist, ideologically close to the autonomist movement[3]—ended up falling in love with her subject and at least partially converting to the cause. This might appear astounding, but although it is an important turn of affairs, it is not so unusual. This kind of snapping is worth investigating because it says a great deal about the lability of the substrate of identifications that pervade an unstable world. The example described in the early 1930s by Daniel Guérin (1965), a leftist journalist (and father of one of the best-known leaders of the 1968 Paris revolt) who observed the emergence of Nazism at the grassroots level while traveling by foot and staying at youth hostels in Germany, is excruciatingly instructive. At one point he encountered a motorcycle gang of anarchists, who wore leather and earrings, engaged in public orgies, and were openly critical of the decadent, declining civilization of the West. The gang members had adopted North American Indian names, and their leader was named Winnetou after the great Apache chief of the Karl May novel so popular in Germany at the turn of the twentieth century. Several years later, and much to his surprise, Guérin encountered Winnetou in Berlin. He greeted the author,

who hardly recognized the clean-shaven face. He was still a chief, but now for the SS in Berlin.

One of the few intelligent discussions of the issues was delivered by an "anthropologist" of religion who had done research on extreme groups, both black and white, in the United States (Gardell 1998)[4]. He divided the reactions to Berner's lecture into those who demonized them and those who belittled their intelligence. He argued consistently that both of these reactions were self-mystifying and could only lead to disastrous results. The Nazi and racist ideologists he had studied were well informed and intelligent, able to argue their positions. In other words, they had to be taken very seriously if anything was to be done about them.

One of my Ph.D. students at the time carried out an analysis of the texts involved in the Matti affair. His results indicate the way in which the discourse has become structured around themes that I have already stressed (Wells 1998).

Real Motives:
"bisarr medlöpare": bizarre fellow traveller
"kryptoNazist": cryptoNazi,
"befrynad med Nazisterna": friends of the Nazis
"Nazisympatisör": Nazi sympathiser
"Verkar för att ge spridning åt Nazistisk propaganda": aided the spread of Nazi propaganda
"Matti har tydligt visat var hon står": Matti has clearly demonstrated where she stands
"Det är rimligt att misstänka Karolina Matti för sådana avsikter": it makes sense to suspect Matti of such opinions (Nazi)

These associationist arguments, which are based entirely on the concatenation of events, beg a number of questions: Inviting a Nazi to talk = being allied with Nazis = being a Nazi sympathizer = being a Nazi. And then the reaction of fear and loathing (Franke in Saha Västerbottens-Kuriren 1997 12 24): "Jag vill inte att Umeå ska gå till historien som det universitet som gav legimitet åt Nazism"—"I don't want Umeå to go down in history as the university that provided legitimacy for Nazism." The legal argument is to show that it is illegal for Nazis to express their opinions, that is, because they are illegal opinions.

Acts: Calls for Matti's Dismissal

In the wake of the scandal, Sweden's PC establishment found itself confronting the fame problem: "These people are getting too much publicity, and it legitimates Nazism." To write about "these people" in any but negative terms is to support the evil they represent. People who give Nazis such support are entered into the same chain of associations, from mere adventurous flirtation

with Nazism, to becoming fellow travelers, to eventually being identified as Nazis themselves.

Matti was accused of being an accessory to "hets mot folkgrupp"—"Incitement to racial hatred." She was fined and expelled from the university.

This was the first instance of an attempt to create a real debate, from scratch, about the legality and morality of events or pronouncements that had been designated as racist. The debate could not occur publicly, however, because the anti-racist position was entirely predicated on politically correct discourse and the absolute dichotomization of good and evil, so that the content of discourse, as I have insisted, was interpreted only in terms of its sign or indexical value, as connoting a particular associated and essentialized position.

Matti and Berner were a couple for short period, during which time she became pregnant. She then moved to another town, changed her name, and distanced herself from this period of her life. Having dropped out of the public arena, she now(when this was written) lives as a political recluse—a refugee from the dominant political discourse.

Notes

1. This conflation of particular content with the formal representation of democracy is currently very common, in this age of the "end of utopia" (Jacoby 1999). Labeling an opponent undemocratic is a tactic based on the dominance of the associative mode. Thus, if lack of "social solidarity" is defined as undemocratic, then lowering taxes is undemocratic because it implies a lowering of the threshold of solidarity.
2. It is also noteworthy that Nazism attracted many social democrats in the 1930s and that there were clear agreements between Fascist and Social Democratic politicians and ideologists (see chapter 7).
3. The autonomist movement, which is anti-authoritarian and workerist in orientation, is sometimes accused of anarchism because the movement was, in a more recent period, influenced by situationists. It is associated with names such as Antonio Negri and Mario Tronti.
4. It is noteworthy that Gardell since making these statements seems to have become more of an ideologue with strong Islamist leanings (Gardell 2005). This snapping may be a mere outcome of a fascination with extremism.

Chapter 5

Three Years Later

La Lutte Continue

Three years after the incidents that inspired both my course and this book, some people were still making concerted attempts to have KEF demoted or even fired from her position. KEF was asked to be an expert witness in a trial involving the curious murder of an eleven-year-old girl and wounding of a seven-year-old. The trial was unusual because it concerned accusations of witchcraft by a Congolese couple directed against two "children" who had been brought from Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC). The children were relatives but not, contrary to the assertions of the "parents," from the same nuclear family. The police collected a large quantity of data in numerous interviews, and the district attorney was most interested in understanding why a young girl had apparently been murdered, or perhaps died of manslaughter, from being beaten and finally smothered by a Bible pressed over her face. KEF made an effort to understand the incident, as such violent or even deadly episodes had by then become fairly common in Europe and reached epidemic proportions in the DRC. Her report stressed the lived reality of witchcraft for those involved in it. The parents had experienced serious economic and social problems that they blamed on the children, perceiving them as having been sent by a circle of witches in the DRC to destroy or kill them. The experience in which the accusations developed was one of desperation and fear, and the actions that followed obeyed a certain logic as well.

Pursuant to KEF's testimony, Africans who were privy to the case approached her and thanked her effusively for having brought some understanding of their particular situation—or should we say "culturally specific situation"?—into the courtroom. The same could not be said of the media, or at least, not completely. Even though some journalists tried to stick to the facts, certain interpretations gradually took the high ground.

In an article in *Sydsvenska Dagbladet* (17 March 2000) a 53-year-old woman born in South Africa, who had lived in Sweden for twenty years, took

issue with KEF's analysis of the case material of the trial. Murder is murder, even in Africa. The woman in question taught "development studies" and was preparing a doctoral thesis in labor and organizational psychology. She said she had worked in the Congo (which one we do not know) for two years and knew that murder is murder there as well as everywhere and that children are the most valuable individuals in society in Africa as in other places. "Personally I am convinced that this murder is the result of the fact that the family involved has lived in a state of cultural disintegration. The most important cause of this is probably their social isolation in this country." The interviewer then asked, "But even Africans claim that witchcraft beliefs are still very common in Africa. Isn't that true?"

> Yes, it's true in the same sense that many Swedes believe in God and Jesus . . . there is even belief in spirits here and exorcism as well . . . But that on the basis of such beliefs one can accept murder is something completely different. We shouldn't forget that Western style modernization is very much in demand in contemporary Africa. (A26)

This was followed by an accusation: "Statements that the murder of children is acceptable is simply misinformation that reinforces already strong prejudices here" (A26).[1] The article went on to report that KEF had testified that in recent years it was increasingly common for children to be accused of being witches, and that in such cases the police rarely intervened: "This is not the first time KEF has been criticized for what she has said. In 1997 she really got into trouble for saying that . . . etc."

In other words an attempt to explain the logic of a particular practice that led to death, in order to understand the accused—was denounced as racism or at least prejudice since it analyzed a supposed cultural difference that was not necessarily positive. That deaths occurring during such events had become increasingly common in Central Africa and in South Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999) was, of course, related to a situation of crisis, as KEF had always maintained. But to insist that it is simply wrong to analyze such logics on the grounds that they do not exist is quite absurd. It is the expression of an intellectual elite (self-appointed in this case) trying to distance itself from the uncomfortable specificity of a particular practice as an act of social positioning. In Bourdieu's sense, it is an act of distinction, but one fashioned in the space of colonial and postcolonial relations. Moreover, PC resurfaced in the form of accusations that KEF, as someone who had been accused of being anti-immigrant, was not an appropriate witness in such a trial.

The structure of the emergent discourse is as follows: Is it witchcraft that accounts for this kind of murder, or is it poverty and social problems? Of course this is precisely the false dichotomy that is accounted for in most anthropological explanations where witchcraft is the form that social disorder

and conflict may take in particular situations. It implies that whereas the form itself is particular, the intentionalities it contains (B. Kapferer 1998) and the conditions that trigger it are of a more general character. Seeing these as different and opposed explanations for murder is to grossly confuse the issue. It does, however, enable certain people to avoid facing the fact that different structures of motivation are involved, that is, what some would call "cultural differences" that are not covered by the legal system of one country.

Two reporters examined the case material and arrived at the following selection of "facts":

- The accused has a tendency to have violent outbreaks and he has been accused of abuse twice by the community school. His wife openly uses physical punishment to discipline the children.
- Daughter was against bringing the three new relatives to Sweden but admits that it could well be because of jealousy.
- There is clearly quite a bit of violence in the family relations.
- Several mishaps occur, poor harvest in mother's home in Africa.
- Cousin's car stolen in France.

This list was meant to set the stage for the violent action leading to death. One of the women in the drama had recently arrived from the DRC, seemed tense about the whole thing, and was quite sure that it was all about witchcraft. She had witnessed the death of two women accused of witchcraft in her home country. She emphasized that witchcraft can be counteracted with prayer but also by beating. The accused in the case, who had taken on three children, one of whom he killed, was said to have screamed at the children, blaming them for trying to destroy him.

> "I who brought you here to help you . . . and this is what you do to me!" "Beneath the surface, many Africans believe in spirits, even evil spirits," said an African women interviewed by the police—but in everyday life they are not so significant.
>
> No. Perhaps not more than for many Swedes who believe in ghosts, UFOs and reincarnation.
>
> But in an isolated family in Skogås, evil spirits came to be the only explanation for all the misfortune to which they thought they had been subject. And soon this explanatory model spread to the "objective" Swedish media. (*Sensual Dagbladet*. March 24 2000: 18)

The argument, then, is that the conditions of marginalization and family violence were the cause of this death and maiming, and that witchcraft had nothing to do with it except perhaps being a way of rationalizing it: the child was killed because the stepfather was in a rage. Now, of course the anthropologist, KEF, did not deny the centrality of material conditions, but the conditions of violence do not account for particular acts of violence, so if the particular motivations were witchcraft (not evil spirits), or aliens or whatever, they need

to be taken into consideration, unless one can demonstrate that they are mere lies to cover up some more immediate form of aggression, hate, or insanity.

Why must the real complexity of motivated murder be surgically separated into two entirely different phenomena? Perhaps there is a need to eliminate the kind of cultural difference that cannot be contained in the world of consumable culture inhabited by the journalists and, I suggest, the audiences they purport to represent. Difference is admissible only if it is easily comprehensible. It can be called senseless, superstitious, fanatical, or whatever, but it must be part of this conceptual world. Almost all anthropologists see witchcraft accusations as a set of practices embedded in particular cosmological schemes that are constitutive of certain culturally specific forms of sociality. They are not simply craziness or excuses or mere trivia. But accepting the existence of such (not so) extreme differences—differences that many Westerners see as reducible to individually held beliefs rather than forms of social relatedness—is fraught with a marked fear of being accused of racism. Thus the "secularization" of this particular case is motivated by a need to repress a real difference that looks incomprehensibly other and thus irreducible, which implies a loss of control over the larger field of interpretable action and cries out for some solution. The latter takes the form of accusations of racism, paradoxically mimicking the witchcraft logic it denies.

The strength of this vivid categorization of social events was further demonstrated on a radio program that invited KEF to present her explanation of this case. Her opponent was supposed to be a Congolese living in Sweden who represented a national organization of Africans. The journalist was the most interesting of the interlocutors. He began by defining the situation in terms of a choice of explanations: "traditional witchcraft" or "social desperation." After KEF had presented her analysis, he introduced the Congolese by saying that "there are clearly differences of opinion here." Note that with the word "opinion" the journalist erased the status of the research results. The Congolese agreed in large part with KEF but stressed that the accused were very religious and that Westerners also have some strange beliefs. But murder is still murder! KEF reminded listeners that her job had been to explain the situation as understood and experienced by the parties to the crime, and not to argue for the validity of any particular legal system. Nonetheless, the journalist then asked: "But does that mean that you believe that the cultural facts warrant a reduced sentence?" KEF answered in the affirmative, but added that a reduced sentence was not an argument against the law but merely an acknowledgment of the special conditions in which the murder occurred. Some of the difficulty here clearly lay in the journalist's seeming inability to grasp that reality can include both conditions of action and forms of action, and that the latter can vary substantially and lead to different results in different cultural contexts. Here the issue of understanding seems to have been conflated with the issue

of acceptance, a pivotal conflation in PC discourse. If one understands, so the PC line goes, then one agrees and even shares the Other's view of the world, whether the others are nationalists or Congolese.

Moreover, and as noted above, political correctness had again appeared when KEF, having been accused of being anti-immigrant, was for that reason considered unsuited to provide expert testimony in such a trial. Such strange inconsistencies are part of the nature of the culture of fear that generates PC classifications. In this case a presumed anti-immigrant should not be permitted to be a witness in a case of sorcery accusations because she is too sympathetic to their own understanding of the events.

It should also be noted that the vehement denial of cultural difference here is a classic case of cultural imperialism that formally suppresses the possibility that there might be other ways of constructing reality than one's own. It is a quite vulgar assumption that our world is not equally as specific. A more recent and spectacular example was the hysterical denial exhibited by a number of the cultural elite and some intellectuals regarding the much discussed murder of a young Kurdish woman, Fadime, by her father in 2002. Her death was classified as an "honor killing" in the press, and some anthropologists defended it as such; others, though, and especially several authors and sociologists, refused to accept their colleagues' stance. So although a huge demonstration was held in Paris in honor of Fadime's bravery in resisting familial pressure, and despite calls for increased protection of women so threatened, a large number of articles denied the specificity of the action, claiming that it was a simple example of male chauvinist dominance of exactly the kind found among ordinary Swedes. It was also insisted that this was merely a way of racializing crime and thereby depicting all immigrants from the Middle East as potential honor killers. Unni Wikan, a Norwegian anthropologist and specialist on the Middle East who wrote an entire book about the case that was published in Norway and even the United States, had great difficulty finding a publisher for the book in Sweden.[2] As suggested above, in more recent years the arena of debate has opened somewhat, but there remains an atmosphere of repression that is quite astonishing for outsiders.

The Second Time Around

KEF's promotion to a professorship early in the spring of 2000 provoked a renewed reaction. In a speech at the promotion ceremonies, attended by a large number of professors, the student union leader Lars Larsson began by stating the need to protect academic freedom but then continued on to say that what was most important was to struggle against racism and for a multicultural society, and that it was the duty of professors to adhere to this goal! In combination

this with the first part of his statement, his claim seemed to be that academic freedom entails an obligation to struggle for such ends. This followed a more innocuous statement by the chancellor, who explained that Sweden now had a changed position in the world: with increased migration and globalization, Sweden was now of necessity a multicultural society whose new colors (like those of Benneton) could be an advantage in international competition. This implied that the university ought to be a center for the cultivation of multiculturalism, and that this was simply a fact of life that could not be denied. This is clearly a rendition of state ideology within the confines of the university, which is, after all, a state institution.

The same head of the student union now went on to publicly attack KEF for her past deeds, deemed to disqualify her as a professor. Some of the leaders of this organization had apparently planned a political action with the express purpose of having KEF relieved of her position. In conjunction with her promotion, the student newspaper *Lundagård*[3] printed an article attacking her as well. The large headline ran, "Professor Accused of Racism Is Promoted!" which seemed like an attempt to return to the initial situation. The university had rejected the same accusations three years earlier, of course, but that was no impediment in this case. The article contained an interview with Larsson, who now said that his remarks were indeed directed at KEF.

The use of language in the article featured an exemplary suggestiveness based entirely on associations. In Swedish, "accused-of-racism" is a single word that carries emotive force. Meanwhile, the main thrust of the article was that KEF had been accused of having racist opinions and having lent scientific legitimacy to anti-immigrant tendencies in society. The article's paraphrasing of the piece KEF had published in *DN*, discussed in the conclusion, took the form of quotations like, "multiethnicity is disastrous for social solidarity," "multiethnicity has always implied serious problems," and that "Western Europe is on the decline . . . former homogeneity is being broken up by tentacles from outside." Abstracted from the context of the article, these paraphrases could be painted as the major themes and the core of the problem.

Larsson's article contained a number of scandalous mistakes. Among them, it stated that twenty-seven students from the Department of Social Anthropology had sent a letter to the faculty questioning her right to a professorship. In fact, no anthropologists were ever involved in that letter, which was discussed in chapter 3. The Lundagård article continues:

> "In spite of all the criticism, KEF was promoted to professor on March 3rd of this year [2000] . . . During the installation ceremony, Lars Larsson, head of the student union held a sharply toned speech stressing the need to stand up against undemocratic, intolerant and anti-immigrant ideas."
>
> He states openly that this was directed against KEF. "I now expect of her that she accepts her responsibility and understands what an important position

> she has." This case should have led to a discussion of our most general values. No such debate is necessary according to the Vice Chancellor, Boel Flodgren. Nor was she willing to discuss the critique of KEF's opinions. "There has already been a discussion and there is no more to say. We have discussed this and found that she is worthy of her position."
>
> Are there limits to the opinions a Swedish professor should be allowed to have? "Obviously. We have a constitution in Sweden where there are clear limits for freedom of expression, among others, 'hets mot folkgrupp,' i.e. defamation or incitement to racial hatred." *Lundagård* tried to contact KEF for a comment, but she was out of the country.

The language here resembles that used three years previously, but this time it elicited different reactions. Students of anthropology were furious about the accusations, and the editorial staff of the newspaper received numerous calls from irate students. Some of the latter sent a critical article to the student newspaper attacking both Larsson and the newspaper itself. The regional/national media launched a typically frantic attempt to find something like news to publish in all of this.

The students were invited to participate in a local radio program on the issue. In introducing the program, the journalist again structured the space of discussion:

> In the most recent issue of *Lundagård*, there is an article on KEF who is a newly installed professor in the department of Social Anthropology . . . and in the article incidents from three years ago are taken up . . . Kajsa then said things at a meeting of an organization, Folkviljan och massinvandring . . . that have been interpreted as being anti-immigrant and which naturally caused an emotional reaction, and even her appropriateness as professor was questioned. And we on this program wonder whether there should be a limit for what opinions professors should be allowed to have.

The program began with a separate interview with KEF. Despite the usual stereotyped questions, this journalist was surprisingly understanding: "Three years ago you did say some pretty powerful things, such as that multiethnicity was devastating for social solidarity. No need to repeat the discussion of what multi-ethnicity really refers to here nor to the question of whether it is a racist statement." Nevertheless, KEF was forced to restate the issue of the simultaneous existence of several different, potentially conflicting social projects within a single society, especially a nation-state that defines itself broadly in terms of a unified national project.

> Lars Larsson: "The talk I gave concerning what I expected of the newly promoted professors . . . I stressed, as previously, anti-democratic and anti-immigrant attitudes . . . where is the limit of academic freedom, how important it is that professors do not legitimate anti-immigrant ideas with their scientific research. No one was accused in my talk. The speech was directed at all professors."

When asked whether he had consulted the students or anyone else in preparing his statements, he answered that he had primarily consulted his closest associates. He had not consulted his constituency or the student body as a whole.

The journalist asked the students whether or not they felt they were represented by Larsson they answered in the negative and that they should certainly have been consulted. He then intervened to point out that Larsson had said he never attacked anyone personally but simply said that professors should not abet anti-immigrant ideas and attitudes. Don't you agree with that position? If he made his statement only against anti-immigrant attitudes then wouldn't you agree that he was representing you?

The student replied, somewhat confused by this tactic, that of course she did not support anti-immigrant ideology; rather, the issue was the personal attack. At this point she referred directly to the interview in the student newspaper in which Larsson had referred to KEF as his principal target. When questioned by another student whom Larsson thought he was representing with such statements, Larsson had said: "Of course I represent the views of all students at the university. The opinions I express are the opinions of the students. My opinions are those of 100% of the students!"

After this Larsson was asked whether he thought KEF had expressed anti-immigrant attitudes. "I can't say that I have any opinion about that. I wasn't even here in that period. However I do know that there was a heated debate concerning what professors should be allowed to say."

"What do you say about it?" the students were asked. "Do you think that she expressed anti-immigrant opinions?" The following discussion ensued.

> M (a Central American Ph.D. student in the department): "Absolutely not! What is so horrible in what she has said? First I think that a professor should be primarily a researcher, teacher, supervisor . . . and publicly divulge her research results. KEF had not said anything racist. People can think that she was wrong or right in what she said. What surprises me is what Lars Larsson said in the newspaper. If he wasn't even present in that period why does he say . . . [here she read from the newspaper interview, citing his statement of the need to stand up against anti-democratic, intolerant and anti-immigrant opinion in which he bluntly states that it was directed at KEF]?
>
> Larsson (L): "The reason for my remarks were that . . . today the structure of the university has changed. Professorial positions were formally chairs, but today they are designations of rank and status only. When this came up, that KEF was to be designated as professor, I knew what discussions had gone on earlier and therefore it was necessary for me to insist on my expectations of her, but I also meant this to be taken seriously by all the other professors as well."
>
> Journalist (J): "Do you think that a professor must be politically correct then?"
>
> L: "Not politically correct, but democratic!"

Students (S) intervened:

S: "Professors should be good opinion producing machines!?"

They criticized Larsson for connecting KEF with other debates concerning members of nationalist parties in the student union.

S: You talk about democracy . . . but if the union is to represent the students why didn't you ask us in our department about this . . . don't you understand that it is we who are affected by your opinions . . . now without a professor who feels that she cannot work in such circumstances."

L: "There are two discussions here. First when I write my speech whom shall I consult . . . there are 37,000 students . . . I can't consult them all. Second, no matter what reason KEF cannot fulfill her duties, it is the responsibility of the department to replace her hours, obviously . . . I doubt that anything I or *Lundagård* said could have been the cause of this, since it was so vague. It is more likely the national press coverage of the talk that played the main role."

Citing the interview, M accused Larsson of assigning himself the right to decide what other people should think. This was, she said, an expression of an attempt to limit academic freedom.

L: "I stand one hundred percent behind my own speech . . . I hope that all professors understand what a heavy responsibility they have."

J: "But you still believe that she can think what she likes?"

L: She can have whatever opinion she likes as a private person, but as a professor, a title that she has gotten from us [meaning, from the students? Students are not part of the process at all . . . is this a curious sort of hubris?] . . . what she can do and say as professor [is limited].

J: "But if one in one's research comes to results that are unpleasant (*ubehagligt*) and do not conform to the dominant beliefs in our society, what does one do then? Shouldn't one have the right to take up these uncomfortable issues?"

L: "That is a very good question. Yes, where is the limit between academic freedom and the necessity of supporting democracy . . . as it is stated in the university rules? That discussion has not been taken up. That is what I have said. I am surprised that there hadn't been a discussion earlier."

J: "But now I think KEF has been caught in the middle of all of this. According to what you said here, your speech was directed to all professors. But in the media the focus has been on KEF, resulting in her decision not to teach. Do you think that you have done anything wrong?"

L: "Absolutely not! I stand for what I said, one hundred percent, in my speech."

S: "You say that someone can take over her courses. But she is my supervisor as well. It is not as easy to simply change at the end of a course paper or thesis. No matter what you say here, you are part of this process because of what you said in the interview in *Lundagård*."

At this point the journalist broke in with a new question, and the issue remained undeveloped.

> J: "Has there been a discussion in the department concerning KEF . . . concerning her appropriateness as professor?"
>
> S: "No, never! She has our complete support . . . all the students that we have been able to contact support her."
>
> M: "We have learned in all of this that certain things are taboo. But if we don't discuss them, if we put the lid on . . . then we demonstrate an intolerance that permeates the whole society. What then is the use of research?"

Several Logics Emerge from These Discourses

KEF was accused of racism. This was based on:

a. spatial contiguity: she spoke at a meeting of an association accused of racism and/or anti-immigrant sentiment;
b. semantic contiguity: she wrote that multiethnicity leads to the disintegration of social solidarity (in specific historical conditions that are not part of the association involved here);
c. questioning of her academic credentials (an approach rejected by both the university and other academics) on the grounds that she had been accused (three years earlier) of racism.

Relying on these associations, her detractors determined that she evidently should not be made a professor. The chain of associations that produced this reality is as follows:

> KEF is accused of racism
>
> ∴ KEF is a racist

But there are others as well:

> Being against multiculturalist policy is being against democracy,
>
> ∴ multiculturalism = democracy
>
> If being pro-immigration = multiculturalism
> and multiculturalism = democracy,
>
> then being pro-immigration = being pro-democracy

This includes a further chain of association:

> Being against current immigration policy ⇒ Being anti-immigrant
> Being anti-immigrant ⇒ Being racist
>
> ∴ Being against current immigration policy ⇒ being racist and anti-democratic.

Thus, if freedom of thought generates conclusions that imply that immigration in current circumstances is dangerous for the maintenance of social solidarity, then freedom of thought can be anti-democratic. And if people vote in free elections for anti-immigration policies, then they are both racist and by implication anti-democratic.

Democracy, then, becomes more than a system of government based on one or another form of free elections. It becomes a system with a definite moral content, in which all individual subjects can be redefined as either pro- or anti-democratic based on how they vote. It may be true that people vote for racists or fascists or communists. But instead of pertaining to the system in which such voting occurs—in this case, a system of free elections provided for by a constitution—the issue of democracy is now transferred to the opinions, values, and ideologies of those who make "democratic" choices.

Not Over Yet

As the student politicians and their associates at the student newspaper, and even at southern Sweden's largest newspaper *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, were clearly having trouble pigeonholing their enemies, they had to change their tactics. This is perhaps an old technique, but I had seldom been party to it. In the emergent situation, it appeared to many that both the press and the student leadership were attempting to apply censorship to university teachers. The next step would be to reverse roles. A journalist from *Sydsvenska Dagbladet* hunted me down in Paris and phoned me to ask what I thought of the article in *Lundagård*. I said I thought that publishing an article that assumes that accusations imply guilt is an old-fashioned yellow journalistic tactic that ought to be controlled at the editorial level. This is common in places where, unlike in Sweden, people can profitably sue for libel and the like. She asked whether I had requested that the social science[4] student union censor the newspaper. Astounded, I replied that this was absurd, not least because I was unaware that there was any relation between the union and the newspaper, or that the student union owned the newspaper. My answer was ignored, and the article appeared on the first page of the newspaper with the following headline: "Professor Demands Censorship of Student Newspaper." There is nothing new about this behavior, but it is worth noting that the associative logic is of the same nature:

> X says there should be control over the logical consistency of language use by journalists
>
> ∴ X demands censorship of journalists

The semantic overlap lies in the word "control." Control of political and moral content is not the same as control over formal aspects of language use such as misrepresentation, lying, and insinuation. The latter terms do not harbor a specific ideology.

Having apparently had lost a good deal of their credibility with their latest move, the student politicians and their journalist colleagues next resorted to a very underhanded and confused attempt to destroy the enemy. Not only was it claimed that it was not prejudicial to insinuate guilt on the grounds of there merely being an accusation, but KEF was now further accused of having entertained "strange relations with her students" by inviting them home to parties or attending parties that they themselves arranged. It was as if this were a major brainwashing scheme. Moreover, it was again stated that my own goal was to censor the student newspaper. This came in response to a direct attack that anthropology students leveled at Larsson's antics and those of the journalists, accusing them of extreme prejudice in their association of the fact that KEF had been accused of being a racist with the suspicion that this was indeed the case. Both the newspaper and the journalist involved replied to this critique, and their replies were printed in the same edition. Larsson denied saying what the student newspaper had reported in print, that is, that he had in fact directed his critique at KEF on the basis, as we have seen, of what he had heard from other people. But this reply was apparently not convincing, as the newspaper continued the gratuitous attack.[5]

The Founding of *Salt*

Salt was a short-lived journal started by people who identified themselves as radical conservatives, a designation that needs some clarification. The editorial staff and contributors came from very different positions and backgrounds. Many had been leftists during the 1960s and 1970s. One journalist, whom I have already mentioned, who had written for this journal and was himself an editor of *Svenska Dagbladet*, the largest national conservative newspaper (liberal by U.S. standards), was a former leader of the leftist intellectual association Clarté. Well-established intellectuals had been prominent in the student movement but by then had certainly changed (see the conclusion). They now rejected their former communist ideas, but they were not simply neoliberal nor just plain ordinary liberal in the more generalized sense. Instead they had joined the *Neue Mitten*, the Blairites who combine neoliberal globalization ideology with a mystified jargon of social democracy. To varying degrees, the journalists involved with *Salt* were nationalists, or at least sovereigntists, primarily because they believed in the importance of the nation-state. Even social solidarity was now considered "conservative" if it did not imply solidarity with

strangers. In this sense they represented a common juncture that links left and right. But this is not the link between the power center's left and right parties. The latter are the new progressives. The former were former radicals, mainly on the left. As supporters of social solidarity in the sense of shared goals and shared values, they were against multiculturalism in principle because they found it divisive (which of course was also a common liberal position in the United States). But above all they were direct in their approach and extremely critical, not least of state and other elites, cultural, political, and royal. In this sense they were close to the tradition of early American populism. The latter it should be remembered, was classified as left-oriented (even when it sported racist elements) until mid-century, when it was reclassified as right-wing by the new American middle, a Democratic/Republican (liberal) coalition.

Salt was immediately and roundly attacked and condemned in the press as representing a dangerous Fascist tendency in Sweden. The fact that the first number of the journal had a Swedish flag on the cover was proof for some that this was indeed the return of the 1930s. The most striking characteristic of the journal was what might be called a "refreshing" clarity, but this is certainly a sign of its dangerousness as well. Later attacks on *Salt* became increasingly systematic. A substantial fear of contagion meant that interest in the journal was clandestine and indulged in utmost silence. One email from a person connected to the newspaper world declared that everyone read *Salt* but no one would admit to it.

The leadership of the publication had a clear position, but it was clearly not drawn to censorship. One of the two principal editors was a conservative Catholic who had left his former post at the journal *Black Flag* because of a disagreement with the editor-owner with respect to the publication of Mapplethorpe illustrations. He was apparently a supporter of the Society of St. Pius the Tenth, an organization that opposed the liberalizing tendencies of the Second Vatican Conciliate of the 1960s. But given his general attitude toward mind control, it was doubtful that he supported the brainwashing techniques allegedly used by this society. In an all-out attack on the later issues of the journal, it was claimed that its true colors had now emerged. Many of the "respectable" well-known authors who had written in the first issues were no longer inclined to publish there. This was a complex issue. The editors never hid their own political ideologies, however strange they might have seemed. They were primarily interested in provoking real discussion of important issues in Swedish society, as was obvious in the early critiques of Swedish elitist multiculturalism and official anti-nationalism. And, as stated above, the early critiques were of the same type as the subsequent attempts to thoroughly map out the emergent Evil.

Suddenly headlines such as "*Salt* Begins to Appear More Like a Sect" (*Dagens Nyheter* Sunday 31 July 2000: B1) began to appear. One problem was that the earlier association with the Nazis had become more difficult to main-

tain. Nazism and Catholic conservatism were not really the same kind of ideology, even if there were, as always, some convergences. The attempt at linkage was now reduced to the existence of communication between one of the editors and representatives of other more extreme right organizations. Though the first attack had been general, the new critique was based on the fact that some early contributors no longer felt at home in the journal. One of them, a former leftist, disagreed with the positions taken by the editors but said it was good that such positions could be aired publicly and that the compact attack on the journal was certainly unwarranted. He was, in turn, attacked by other journalists (*Aftonbladet* 8-2-00: 2) for being utterly irresponsible.

These incidents concerned the publication of an uncritical interview with David Irving, a historian charged with anti-Semitism and revisionism. While disagreeing with the article, the former contributor emphasized that anti-Semitism was a much broader problem than the liberal press portrayed it to be. It was, he said, to be found in the "best" of families. The critical journalist expressed fury at this remark! No! *Salt* could not go free that easily. Interviewing Irving was clearly a risky thing to do, but it was part of a more general critique of the contemporary exploitation of the Holocaust that *Salt* had subjected to its evil eyes. Many contributors to *Salt* were quite upset by what they saw as an absurd political maneuver by the editor. Irving had just lost a major trial in which he had sued Deborah Lipstadt of libel in her book, *Denying the Holocaust* (1993). The trial had clearly established that Irving was a revisionist who denied the existence of gas chambers in German concentration camps. And whereas some of Irving's ideas might have been worth follow-up, a great deal of evidence supported the accusation that he was a revisionist and holocaust denier, even though he did not deny that the Nazis killed a large number of Jews. This itself might have been an outcome of a protracted conflict in which his position, which initially was merely to question Hitler's role in the holocaust, moved successively to a more clearly revisionist stance.[6] On the other hand, there is also ample evidence that Irving had anti-Semitic tendencies, however mildly (as he put it himself), in his early work as well. In other words, Irving may well have been a person altogether deserving of criticism.

Regardless, this is not sufficient cause to repress all discussion of the issues being raised. The only solution to such conflicts is clear historical assessment, however debatable. Irving was hardly the only one with this problem. Leftist intellectual Norman Finkelstein,[7] erstwhile professor of history at the City University of New York, published a controversial book entitled *The Holocaust Industry* that dealt with many of the same problems and was scheduled for review in *Salt*. The issue, clearly stated, was not the denial of the Holocaust, as with Irving, but the specifics of its postwar history and the way it had recently been turned into a gigantic Hollywood-financed campaign (see below). Finkelstein had co-authored a book with Noam Chomsky, another renegade who,

on the left, has been associated with controversial views on Israel. To be sure, one might take issue with the theses these authors proposed. I would do so myself. But to associate them with the Evil of Nazism = racism (in the new PC) equation was to make discussion impossible. Such a discussion was certainly possible and well under way in other countries, but Finkelstein was denied tenure at De Paul University.

Salt proved to be such a thorn in the side of the establishment that the attacks spilled over into several television talk shows, on which the editor in question had to defend himself against accusations of the "worst kind." He did so rather well, and the journalists who interviewed him were not unimpressed. His success may have been due partly to his mastery of the journalists' own form of communication, "fastthink" (Bourdieu), which he was able to deploy in an argumentative mode that stunned his opponents.

In the later critiques, backbiting increased among the group of former contributors mentioned above. One—cited earlier as saying in an interview that the ethnic situation in Sweden was explosive, six months after KEF had been attacked for saying the same thing—was now accusing his old cronies on the left of having supported anti-Semitism. In a sweepingly associationist article (Dencik, *Dagens Nyheter*. 5-8-2000: B2), he claimed they were dangerously anti-Semitic because, among other things, they supported the nation-state, were associated with a journal that had interviewed David Irving, and most of all, had lent their names to a publication that was clearly representative of the worst racist tendencies. This former contributor also implied that the participation of his onetime associates was part of a growing fungus that had spread to not only the new radical conservatism but even the old Maoist left of Jan Myrdal. These positions were then fused and attacked for the same thing: anti-Semitism.

Two figures who had once been central to the journal distanced themselves from it in varying degrees. One considered the editors guilty of a certain lack of judiciousness; the other opined that *Salt*'s editorials had become politically too extreme. The latter was the cultural editor of the major national newspaper noted above and a historian as well, and it might be suggested that he had to save his skin. *Avbön*, a word that combines the meanings of apology and confession, was demanded from these writers. On one talk show, this demand was compared to Chinese political confessions of the past. But despite a campaign aimed to inspire fear, attempts at political ostracism faced clear resistance.

I agreed to write for *Salt* partly to see what would happen. So far there has been no response, only the usual compact silence. The editors and other writers were attacked harshly, but I was never put on the firing line. My own contribution concerned the mediocrity of the Swedish discussions, the lack of real debate and the tendency to do what is described above. The article, a short discussion, is reproduced here.

The New Respectability, or Don't Write Anything for *Salt!* You'll Be Classified as Fascist and Racist!

This was the advice of a nervous intellectual friend on learning of my intention to write for this magazine. I thought that this was a distasteful piece of advice. After all I have never been associated with the right wing, at least not until a few years ago when my wife was accused of abetting racist tendencies and was accused by some of being a racist, and I was accused of trying to whitewash the whole affair by teaching a course on the anthropology of political correctness, a course that has become so popular that its literature list has been sought after in numerous places in Europe and even in Sweden (where it may not have been used). This classification was perpetrated at first by the media but swallowed whole by intellectuals and used in a politics of exclusion of those who do not share the same ideology. This ideology, multiculturalism, does not come from the grass roots. It comes from the state and its associated cultural elites. These elites who produce the discourse of multiculturalism and more recently of hybridity, are what Gramsci called organic intellectuals, i.e., intellectuals who serve the dominant power elites. And it might be added, they do so of their own free will. They are not forced into service but find such service exemplary, correct and satisfying. The most interesting and frightening aspect of this new situation is that as Suzanne Brøgger has suggested, intellectuals are no longer oppositional, no longer critical. The state has become the locus of the progressive, *dem anständiga*, *der neue mitten*. And everything critical of this structure is thereby classified as dangerous, populist and marginalized, whether on the right or the left which are fused in a new opposition of good vs. evil.

Many intellectuals of the left have been taken by surprise, but they have demonstrated an amazing incapacity to reflect on their situation. Those who once thought of nationalism as a means of social unification and the formation of a collective project for the betterment of conditions of life for the working majority and the enforcement of democracy are now convinced that national identity is a reactionary fantasy that is the very core of racist violence. But of course, any collective identity harbors such boundary enforcing violent potentials, so why only attack the nation state rather than the ethnic minorities, diasporas, transnational groups that have already demonstrated their violent potential. In a recent book, *The End of Utopia,* Russell Jacoby, leftist sociologist from UCLA states, "The rise of multiculturalism correlates with the decline of utopia, an index of the exhaustion of political thinking," (33) which follows on his discussion of the current progressivism that he characterizes as follows: "We are witnessing not simply the defeat of the left, but its conversion and perhaps inversion." (11)

Such remarks would undoubtedly be classified as dangerously reactionary in Sweden and there are certainly multiculturalist liberals in the US who express the same opinion. What is important is the inversion of positions in all of this. Noam Chomsky, who criticized the bombing of Kosovo was

re-categorized by many as dangerously reactionary, just as he was so categorized when he wrote the preface to the revisionist book on the holocaust by Faurisson. His most recent book, *The New Military Humanism* (1999) is an exposé of what he sees as a new power elite politics which allows the United States and its allies to bomb countries that are deemed undemocratic and not truly humanitarian. That the fantasmatic exaggerations of Serbian-murdered Albanians announced by the Pentagon as part of its NATO bombing campaign turned out to be totally fallacious has not been discussed by those public intellectuals who linked themselves to this global militarism in the name of humanitarianism. Ah yes, both communists and Nazis killed millions, but then the United States governments have had their very large share of killing in the name of democracy. Is it really so simple as our new politically correct humanitarians would have it?

Yes there are some major ideological changes in our world. Same people, opposite ideologies. But all defined as progressive, as the way forward, and basically, as the only way forward. And since there is only one way forward today, we can safely divide the world into the respectable and the others who do not accept or understand the correct path in the present and to the future. In order to shake up this picture we shall offer some strange happenings and interpretations from people who have suddenly to be reclassified. The respectable are the Swedish equivalent of the Neue Mitte and this position is opposed to both the former and still extant left and right. In London, a new mayoral candidate emerged in 2001. His name is Ken Livingstone, "Red Ken" famous formerly for having openly and directly criticized the policies of Margaret Thatcher and more recently infamous for having done the same, from within the ranks of the Labor party, to Blair. This left leaning laborite was ousted from the ranks of the party and subjected to a politically obscene campaign since he chose to oppose Blair's own hand-picked candidate for the mayoral post. He has been successful, however, not least because he does not try to represent himself as respectable in a period when politicians can gain no loyalty from the "people." In an interview, Livingstone said that when he was a student he stole a lexicon from a bookstore. It made him feel such guilt that he decided that he could never become a criminal . . . so, (next best) he became a politician. This denigration of his own category is one of his most endearing traits. He may have very unorthodox ideas but his depiction as the incarnation of all that is dangerous and even savage is an expression of the unease of the power elite. On the right there is the continuing case of Jörg Haider. The exclusion of the Austrian government from the club of Brussels on the grounds that Haider's party was allowed to join that government after winning 27% of the Austrian vote in 2002 was a symbolic act of bullying, not just of Haider himself and his party, but of those who voted for him. This man was deemed undemocratic and those who voted for him were also undemocratic. The marginalization of 27% or more (35% in polls) of the electorate ought to be seen with a different

kind of alarm. Why are so many people abandoning social democratic labor parties? According to another intellectual usually characterized as leftist, this is because the left itself has abandoned the people it once represented:

> significantly, it is the Rightist option that addresses and attempts to mobilize whatever remains of the mainstream working class in our Western societies, while multiculturalist tolerance is becoming the motto of new privileged "symbolic classes" (journalists, academics, managers). (Zizek 2000: 37–38)

In Sweden this has taken one of its most extreme and agonized forms, one that consists in a nervous fusion of equations: multiculturalism = democracy = globalization which generates an adversary: nationalism = racism = Nazism = anti-democracy. These clusters are used to classify individuals and not to characterize situations or social arenas. Thus democracy is no longer a question of the constitutional organization of government, but of the attitudes and even essential qualities of persons. Thus if people democratically decide against continued immigration (significantly more than 50% of Swedes, similar to statistics in the rest of Europe including Southern Europe which have been and still are exporters of migrant labor, are against continued immigration in polls) they are not democratic. Those who argue against multicultural politics are stamped as racist and therefore undemocratic. Never mind that the single most anti-immigration group in the US is African Americans (as much as 70% against in polls). Never mind that in California until the 90s it was the Christian Right, including Pat Buchanan who were pro-immigration while the Democrats the Unions and even Chicano activist Cesar Chavez were against at least illegal immigration.

Much of the talk of boundary crossing and transcending the nation state, which has become a favorite target of blame for everything that is wrong with people nowadays, has rather strange origins. It is not simply a modern or perhaps postmodern discovery. In fact some might be shocked to know of the author of the following:

> Nationalism can be looked on either as an inescapable part of the human outlook, or as the ossification of a political principle that has served its time. In the latter aspect there comes a time when it acts as a hindrance to the general advance of civilization. (Bottai 1943 reprinted in de Felice 1978)

Yes and who was the gentleman so forward looking as to have said what many globalists propose today? None other than Guiseppe Bottai, Minister of Education under Mussolini and editor of *Critica Fascista*. But for those who would try ever so hard without doing any research to link fascism, Nazism, nationalism and racism into a single concept there is clearly a problem. If one defends oneself with, "but Italy was not Germany, after all" we can serve another quote: "I am convinced that, in fifty years' time, people will no longer

think in terms of countries" (Goebbels 1940—speech to Czech intellectual workers and journalists in Lipgens 1985)

It is also noteworthy that this speech is reprinted in a recent collection, on the history of European Integration (Lipgens 1985). Nazi ideology was profoundly anti-national, of course, and for strictly evolutionary reasons, i.e., the nation state was simply obsolete. True biological racism, like capital, of course, knows no boundaries and anyone who has followed certain of the more fanatical developments on the extreme right will be quite amazed by the imaginative combination of New Age, Green-health "apocalypsism" in which the true enemy is the cosmopolitan Jewish and then Catholic and even Washington-World Bank conspiracy to establish a planetary government of evil and which thus requires a global Aryan alliance of resistance.

Why write all these things and mess up some people's preconceptions? Because this is the job of the critical intellectual and all intellectuals ought to be critical. Otherwise they tend to become tools or even extensions of prevailing ideas and ideologies.

To be critical is simply to demystify or deconstruct as we say nowadays, to discover the underlying structures of the obvious in order to demonstrate that the obvious is not so obvious. But it is precisely critical thinking that has come under fire, as it must do when only one set of ideas is tolerable in the public arena. And there is a clear hysteria about it, one that is perfectly understandable when an elite becomes nervous about its status. And, as we suggest here, this nervousness is due to the fact that the elite has shifted its position, even inverted that position. If, as Zizek argues, the right has moved in to fill the vacuum created by a left that has "transcended" the working class, i.e., those who belong to the "old industries," then defensive tactics are in order. This is because this left-gone-right still needs to feel that it represents some "people." The very shift orchestrated by the new elites from poor vs. rich to nationals vs. immigrants leaves the shifters in a fragile position. This is where both the Livingstones and the Haiders come in. But what is the problem, some say, the economy is growing like never before, we are in a New Economy. But what of the 22% below the poverty line in Britain and similar statistics for France and even the United States where one political scientist put his estimate at 28% (Hacker 1997). There are more jobs out there but there are also more working poor. So there are plenty of people who don't feel good, who feel even desperate in this age of increasing polarization. But this is something that the new elites and accompanying factions of the middle classes would rather forget even in the precariousness of their own positions. Academics who have got tenure are doing better than in many years and journalists and other cultural elites sense a new reality and this may indeed be true for many of them, but it is not adequate as a description of the world. Bourdieu's recent critique of TV journalism, a critique that has been extended to journalism in general, was ill received by the self-congratulatory segment of the core of journalists, one

that inspired some to re-categorize this sociologist as a conservative if not a reactionary. His argument, which is in our view cogent and reasonable, is that the political field, as he calls it, consists in the varying concentration of the "access of the means of legitimate manipulation of the representation of the world (of reality) (1996: 16). He claims that the concentration of this access has increased markedly in recent years and that centrally placed journalists tend in fact to become part of a closed group of the political elite and thus an extension of that rather small and isolated world.

"Et les journalistes qui se pensent les observateurs du champ politique sont en fait les agents du champ politique" (Bourdieu 2000: 37)

One might add to this that in one of the few newspapers that is usually recognized as being extremely critical of the way journalism ought to be, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, and which also regularly publishes articles, not just opinions, by researchers, there are dozens of articles saying exactly those kinds of things that in Sweden would be seen as dangerous. In the last number a media researcher refers to the current state of "freedom of the press" as "freedom to do 'the correct thing'" (Accardo in *Le monde diplomatique*, mai 2000:4) and we are immediately brought back to the motto engraved into Uppsala University's aula, "Free thought is good, correct thought is better."

P. Bourdieu's and L. Wacquant's article "The new planetary vulgate" (*Le monde diplomatique*, mai 2000: 6–7), harshly critical to multiculturalneoliberal-globalist ideology as expressed in the "Third Way" of Blair and his organic intellectual, A. Giddens,[8] would certainly reinforce Swedish suspicions of reactionary racism with all it implied, if it were not written by one of the (now perhaps former) heroes of the cultural elite.

In this way they become the principal instruments of the enforcement of one vision of the world which becomes "the truth." The legitimate control over the representation of reality is just as applicable to politics as it is to religion. It produces a division of the world into truth and falsity, good and evil, responsible and irresponsible. When this control is not attained or in jeopardy, political correctness is one of the principal means of defense. The Others are irresponsible, racist, fascist etc.

Nervous elites on the rise reclassify the world, often without thinking about what they are doing. They are not necessarily manipulative when they say that X is a racist because he or she has spoken to a group that has been so classified because it is against immigration policy, not "immigrants" . . . as if the latter were a kind of people or ethnic group. Immigrant refers to position and not to culture, but in Swedish discourse it has become culturalized, even racialized. Otherwise the above accusation would be impossible. The construction of X is a racist is done by pure association in space, not in terms of what X actually said in her presentation (she might have in fact been an "anti-racist"). Once the association is made it triggers a chain of new associations that reinforce the original association into a hard and fast

classification. Similarly if one says that there are serious problems with multiculturalist politics it is immediately associated with being anti-immigrant, racist and undemocratic. The immediacy of this classification is the expression of the nervousness of the classifiers. Otherwise the association which is completely lacking in logic would not be made.

The same nervousness applies to our writing for *Salt*. It is most probable that many will be confirmed in their opinion that we are racists, fascists or fellow travelers because of this article. The association is simple. If the magazine has already been categorized as racist, then anyone associated with it is also racist, contagion by touching and a nervous intellectual is always characterized by his or her *berührungsangst*. It is this that may have silenced the majority of Swedish intellectuals in the 30's and 40's. How does it work: Zygmunt Bauman in "Hereditary Victimhood: The holocaust's life as a ghost" (*Tikkun* July/August 1998: 33–38) provides a critical analysis of the way in which the Holocaust has been turned into a syndrome providing a discursive field in which second generation victims compete for a position in the scale of suffering, and reminds us in discussing Goldhagen's[9] version of Germany as a nation of murderers,

> That is why it is so tremendously important to accept and remember that many declared anti-Semites stoutly refused to cooperate with the perpetrators of the Holocaust, while the ranks of the executors were full of law-abiding citizens and disciplined functionaries who happened to be free of any particular grudge against the Jews. (*Tikkun* 1998: 38)

Many Jewish intellectuals have expressed their disgust and even fear at the way in which the holocaust has been turned into a global media event. If Bauman can write of such things in a Jewish journal (*Tikkun*) what is it that makes it a sacrilege for others? How much hypocrisy is involved in avoiding both the critical issues of the present and the real politics of the Swedish state in WWII by staging emotion-packed spectacles in Stockholm?

Salt was immediately attacked and condemned by the rest of the press as a dangerous fascist tendency in Sweden. The fact that the first issue of the journal had a Swedish flag on the cover was proof for some that this was indeed the return of the 30s. The most striking characteristic of the journal was what might be called a "refreshing" clarity, and humor, but this is certainly one of the signs of its dangerousness as well.

Student informal interview:

Student: Do you read *Salt*?
Journalist: Never, it's a racist/fascist publication.
Student: Have you ever read it?
Journalist: No!
Student: Then how do you know if it is fascist and racist?
Journalist: I read about it in *DN*, and they said it was fascist and racist.

This is truly the world of political correctness, a world of closure, and conformity of opinion, even if it defines itself as multicultural, which is, of course, in no way paradoxical. This is a world in which democracy is quite superfluous since all true democrats have the same ideas and the rest are by definition anti-democrats who must be excluded. We have heard this kind of discourse before in its different guises. Its comic absurdity and even stupidity, the stupidity of associationism, hides the real tragedy of the suppression of debate, the closing of the public arena. This is a world in which democracy is itself a political position.

A member of the conservative party was in the headlines, Saturday, June 3. He had signed a call for an open discussion concerning immigration policy. The group announcing the call was *Blågulafrågor* and the periodical in question does state that the petition was quite open to all positions on the issue. However, many of the people who signed the call were of the extreme right. When asked, the person who published the call for discussion said that he was sorry about the unfortunate fact that extreme rightists had signed the call, but both he and the well-known politician declared that this was an inevitable result of democratic action. In the newspaper article the announcement itself took back seat to the association with the right by the fact of signatures being present on the same document. What is the connection here? If x and y are both signatories to a petition and y is of the extreme right and x is of the extreme left then x has compromised himself even if he himself does not partake of the views of y. This is so only by the association to the same petition, i.e., by co-presence. But it might be added that the publication in question has already been identified as right wing so the association is not merely to the right-wingers who signed the petition, but to the organ which produced the petition itself. *Blågula frågor* is certainly a controversial publication. It has openly criticized immigration policy and taken up some of the nastier sides of immigrant criminality, the costs of immigration etc. It is openly anti-racist and nowhere does it attack any particular ethnic group as being dangerous or evil. But it is argued that this is just a cover for a real racist attitude. The latter is evident in the kinds of issues that are taken up. As we have stated above the set of associations here is important to take into critical consideration:

To be against immigration policy is to be against immigrants. This is linked by way of statements to the effect that, if one is against immigration policy one is per definition against having immigrants come to this country which implies that one is somehow negative to immigrants as such. Otherwise why be against immigration policy? This is a conflation of categories. To argue, for example, that mass immigration in conditions of a contracting public sector puts undue strains on the welfare of the entire population is not an argument against immigrants who are just people but on the structure of a situation. Immigrants we stress are not a kind of people but people in a kind of situation, a

situation that has economic and social consequences. The fact that large-scale immigration in a declining welfare state such as Sweden also leads to increasing social segregation which has reached record levels in this country is not to say anything about particular people. To say, finally, that social segregation leads to marginalization, criminalization, increasing violence and aggressive ethnic attitudes in many quarters is not to say that immigrants as such are criminals, aggressive and violent, but that their social condition as people, like the rest of the population, places them in situations that lead to these problems. It may be that the periodical in question is racist but this cannot be determined from what is printed and stated in the periodical. The associations are based on categorical demonization rather than rational argument. They are based on a self-assured and authoritative belief in the evil intentions of a categorized group. Those who oppose continued or increasing levels of immigration are simply anti-immigrant and therefore racist. This eliminates the possibility of discussion of the issues.

In the logic of anti-racism, no questions are asked as to the origin of mass migration and no interest is expressed as to how, perhaps to end the plight of those who seek to emigrate. Instead there is a celebration of immigration as such, primarily for its cargo of diverse cultures.

> Diversity is linked with immigration. If immigration is stopped, diversity is jeopardized. Policy-makers should reassess immigration policy. Diversity should not be seen as a means to handle what is perceived as 'problematic immigration'. Rather, immigration needs to be seen as the positive means to achieve the goal of diversity. All Western countries have ageing populations. If welfare systems are to be maintained immigration of labor power will soon become an economic demographic necessity (Westin 2000: 734)

Does this imply that if people didn't choose to migrate we would have to force them to do so, all in order to maintain our cultural diversity? And of course we not only need diversity, but cheap diversity at that, in order to fill the service jobs necessary for a growing population of senior citizens.

Notes

1. Here again, the use of the word "acceptable" is an association that completely obfuscates the argument. The issue is whether children can be witches or not in a particular world of representations. To claim that it is all-impossible because it makes no sense to us is simply absurd. Understanding demands more than mere moral righteousness.
2. Significantly, after a number of large publishers turned her down the book was finally published by a leftist press known for its iconoclasm. It is also significant that no Swedish anthropologist or sociologist has ever taken up this issue.
3. This was the newspaper that had interviewed me when I first gave the course on the anthropology of political correctness.
4. The journalist asked about the social science student union. In this text I refer to the student union which is an overarching organization including separate faculties such as the social science union. This is irrelevant for the argument but indicates that the journalist was in contact with this particular union representative.
5. A formal legal complaint could have been made about these activities, but such accusations rarely lead anywhere in Sweden, where they must be sent to a board of journalists who oversee the ethical standards of the press, i.e., to people who by and large share the interests of the journalists concerned.
6. It should be noted that Irving was himself attacked by revisionists for his non-denial of the murder of millions of Jews (Faurisson 1984). He was in fact explicitly opposed to the revisionist school until after 1988 (Stauber 2000: 3)
7. Finkelstein was referred to as the most dangerous kind of anti-Semite by the editor of the Swedish magazine *The Jewish Chronicle* and fared similarly in the U.S. debates.
8. Professor Anthony Giddens, formerly of Cambridge University, today chancellor of the London School of Economics, is Britain's most prolific sociologist. He has authored *The Third Way* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1998).
9. Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners* is a well-known historical rendition of the Holocaust.

Chapter 6

Changing Places

A Curious History of Swedish Political Culture

Heroes, Memory, and Morality: This Shall Ye Tell Your Children[1]

In trying to understand the conditions of political correctness in Sweden, I have had to take up questions of memory and the politics of memory. Sweden is, as I have suggested, primarily interesting because of the extreme nature of the way elites have dealt with their own political identity. This identity has been challenged on numerous occasions. It is a commonplace that the formation of nation-state projects involves a selective reorganization of history, but in Western societies it is rare that the elimination of the past is so flagrant. This is most interesting in relation to recent events in the country. Some years ago in a major newspaper (*Dagens Nyheter*), a journalist and self-identified philosopher published an article on the quite extensive sterilization program carried out primarily in the 1930s as part of the eugenics movement that has been studied in many other Western countries as well (Zaremba 1997-08-20). The fact that Sweden sterilized 50,000 people in a matter of several years might in itself betoken the extreme efficiency of the state, but it says relatively little about the specificity of the ideology. The Myrdals, for instance, historically key social democracts, were fans of eugenics.

This program and the broader movement were part of the ideal of creating a new humanity for a new society, in part by eliminating both physical and mental "defects." (Drouard 1999) The extremes of modernism were strongly embodied in the Swedish model, from bodies to buildings. The history of sterilizations was fairly well known and certainly documented, yet not only was it not discussed (or at least hadn't yet been discussed), but it also appears to have been repressed or at least banished to silence. The appearance of the above

newspaper article led to an explosive discussion, accusations, and compensation for victims and families of victims. Many intellectuals experienced the article as a painful fact, not something of the past, but very much of the present. Similar discussions occurred in several other countries but without the intensive, if short-lived, drama in Sweden.

Red Cross Hero

More recently it was "discovered" that the aristocrat hero Folke Bernadotte, famed for having rescued Jews from German concentration camps with his caravan of white buses, was not exactly what Swedish official history had made him out to be. He was apparently pro-Nazi, and it was his good connections with top German officials that led the Swedish government to entrust him with the mission of rescuing Scandinavians, not Jews, at the end of the war. This caused great consternation among many. In the contemporary situation when it came to the attention of school officials, in the form of a "discovery" that young children knew next to nothing about the Holocaust, it was decided suddenly to produce a small book to be distributed to all families in Sweden. The prime minister presented copies of this government book to both Blair and Clinton. Blair nodded in approval and Clinton applauded. Nowhere does the book explore the relation between Sweden and Nazi Germany—the entire drama occurs across the Baltic. The fact of Sweden's neutrality and friendly relations with Germany until the latter began to lose is not discussed, though it is common knowledge among Sweden's Scandinavian neighbors.

All of this could certainly be discussed in neutral terms. None other than the World War II historian John Lukacs (1976) has suggested that Sweden probably did the right thing by keeping out of the conflict. But there is more to this, since Per Albin Hansson, the country's social democratic prime minister in the 1940s, was a pen pal of Mussolini and agreed with many of the tenets of fascism. A thesis discussing their relationship has been emphatically ignored by the cultural and political elites (see below). On the other hand, as suggested above, the similarities between fascism, communism, and socialism as corporatist movements has only rarely been openly discussed. The astonishingly short memory of Swedish modern history is vital to understanding the maintenance of elites represented by this process.

Ways of understanding the 1930s have been debated in numerous historical writings but have not been taken up systematically as a public issue in the recent past. This is especially clear in the textbook literature. In the following I rely very much on the radio documentary discussed below by B. Lindquist (1998) who I would like to thank here for sending me the English

1998 transcript of his documentary as well as helping with references throughout and with his excellent advice. It is rarely discussed but not a secret that Prince Gustav Adolf, the father of the current king, was a core member of the pro-German contingent of the royal family. As part of this contingent, Count Folke Bernadotte was a negotiator acceptable to the Nazis because of his family connections. He was involved in the Swedish-German Association and served as a member of its board in the 1930s. Princess Sybilla, Bernadotte's aunt, was an active supporter of the Nazi military effort. King Gustav V "assisted in decorating Göring" and told the German ambassador that "he hopes, by God, that Nazi Germany will win the war" (Lindquist 1998 transcript 6). The family connections on Princess Sybilla's side of the family are interesting in this respect as well:

> Gustav Adolf also had more personal bonds to Nazism. Princess Sybilla's brother and her father, the Duke of Coburg, joined the German Nazi party at an early stage. The Duke was a member of the German parliament and also the chairman of the German Red Cross which was Nazi influenced right up to the end of the war. (Op. cit. 7)

Bosse Lindquist, a major TV producer and writer of documentaries referred to above, who produced a substantially researched radio series about the famous "white buses," investigated many of these connections. It seems clear that Gustav Adolf was close to the Nazi group associated with Sven Olof Lindholm. Vera Oredsson "who was the vice chairman of 'Nordiska Rikspartiet' and who was married to Lindholm claimed that he was on the list of subscribers" (8) This is hardly earth-shattering news, as the royal house was known to be politically divided in its loyalties.

The White Buses

The White Bus Project was a major historical event associated with Folke Bernadotte's heroic effort to save the concentration camp Jews in 1945. The Swedish government granted Bernadotte permission to negotiate with Berlin in February 1945. He first obtained permission for "Swedish women with German connections resident in the Third Reich to be assembled and driven back to Sweden" (9). This was put into action immediately. Among the first to be able to leave Germany was Vera Oredsson, "A member of the Hitler Jügend, born in 1928 and who as indicated above, in Sweden became a leader of the Nazi 'Nordiska Rikspartiet'" (9). Bernadotte was on good terms with Himmler and his closest subordinate Walter Schellenberg, head of SS espionage. The latter impressed him, and it was decided that this charming character would be offered refuge in Sweden after the war.

The second roundup was to include Danes and Norwegians who were prisoners in German concentration camps. But as for Jews, not even Scandinavian Jews were on the list.

> Kerstin Gustavsson, a research student at the University of Gothenburg discovered in the archives at the Foreign Ministry in a memo from a meeting between the SS and Swedish representatives . . . present: SS inspector Franz Göring, Count Folke Bernadotte and diplomats Torsten Brandeland, Marc Giron . . . First item. *Concerning the Jews* (Scandinavian citizens): *the Jews should be fetched last.* (10)

By April, all non-Jewish Scandinavians had been evacuated, and there was apparently some concern as to whether the surviving Jews, most of them in Theresienstadt, should be liberated. An interview with a Dane, Dr. Johannes Holm, indicates that Bernadotte was told not to fetch the Jews because it might jeopardize the Scandinavians' journey home. In any case Bernadotte refused to authorize any attempt to fetch the Jews from Thereseienstadt. It was Dr. Holm who pressed the situation and essentially bribed the Gestapo to allow him to fulfill his mission, sanctioned by the Danish government, to evacuate the Danish Jews without the consent of Bernadotte and the Swedish government. All other Scandinavian Jews were also given permission to leave and were transported to Denmark. Part of this deal was to secure refuge in Denmark for the SS Obersturmbahnführer Dr. Rennau. Strangely enough, the Swedish Foreign Ministry quickly extended permission to come to Sweden to Rennau.

At the very end of the war, the World Jewish Congress appeared to have convinced Himmler to allow many of the 25,000 Jewish women in Ravensbrück to be freed. Himmler gave this permission personally to Bernadotte. An officer, Axel Molin, expressed the desire among Swedes to free all prisoners and his guilty feeling about the strict preferences previously imposed. But the orders apparently were still not to take Jews and others of "non-European" background (16). Even after Hitler's death, the orders appear to have stood, and they clearly came from the Swedish side alone (Lindquist: 16–17): "Everything was over and Hitler was dead. In spite of there being enough room on the boat and there weren't even any Germans in sight, sixty Poles were taken back to their guards in the concentration camp" (17).

A paradox of this situation was that German SS men and soldiers were transporting six thousand women from Ravensbrück and Hamburg by train to Denmark. Most were Polish but there were a few Jewesses as well (17). Trains to transport concentration camp prisoners were arranged by the SS police officer Franz Göring, who was Schellenberg's representative for the white buses. In the situation just after the war's end, when German citizens had no access to transportation, many German officers managed to escape this way. But Göring and Schellenberg, along with their families and girlfriends, were granted immediate entry into Sweden. Schellenberg was flown over the sound to Sweden in a Red

Cross plane and stayed first in Bernadotte's residence in Stockholm, and then with other SS men and their girlfriends and secretaries. Eventually this crowd of guests became embarrassing for Bernadotte, so he moved them to the large estate of his friend Captain Ankarcrona. The latter had also been involved in the white bus expeditions and was a member of the pro-Nazi Sweden-Germany Friendship League. When Schellenberg was later handed over to the Americans for trial, Bernadotte spoke in his defense. Schellenberg was imprisoned for six years for killing prisoners of war, among other things.

There was plenty of discussion of this issue in the late 1940s, much of it quite polemical, which in itself is noteworthy in relation to the long silence that followed. In 1945 the vaudeville artist Karl Gerhard, one of the country's most outspoken anti-Nazis, published the book *I skuggan av en stövel* (In the Shadow of a Boot), which contained the texts of his reviews from the 1930s on. One of the reviews, "Om jag inte minns fel" (If I Remember Correctly), pointedly quotes pro-Nazi remarks from newspapers while recounting the way official Swedish institutions and their representatives opposed and rebuffed Gerhard for his critical outspokenness. He leveled a serious attack at the Red Cross and Bernadotte, accusing them of being all too close to the Nazis. Bernadotte and Princess Sybilla felt very much offended by Gerhard, who was officially reprimanded. One of his songs from that year goes as follows:

> Röda Korset gjort sin plikt
> fast det förstås är mera chickt
> av ett rojalistiskt folk att ära greve Folke.
> Han hör nämlingen till dem, som 1945
> Blev antinazister fast de för dom dansat polke
>
> The Red Cross has done its duty
> even though it is more chic
> for a royalist people to honor count Folke.
> He is one of those, after all who in 1945
> became an anti-Nazi, although he not long ago danced to their polka
> (Nilsson 1998)

Bernadotte, whose credentials were challenged as well, gave his own version of his activities at the end of the war, but it was all officially buried in the mid-1950s. The famous British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, who wrote a good deal about the end of the war, authored an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* (Trevor-Roper 1953) and an introduction to the memoirs of Felix Kersten, the captive doctor to Himmler, in which he criticizes Bernadotte's attempt to take all the credit for saving Jews at the end of the war. He argues that it was Kersten, together with a Swedish government worried about its credentials, that engineered the famous white bus expedition. Bernadotte, Trevor-Roper claims, had been a mere symbolic accompaniment to the rescue operation but attempted to monopolize the affair immediately following the end of the war,

succeeding in making life miserable for Kersten, who as Sweden's secret envoy to the Germans had engineered the operation that Bernadotte claimed as his own. Kersten, an Estonian masseur who had worked for the Dutch royal house until he was stranded in Germany following the aggression against his former homeland, was a significant figure during the war because of his real (or at least claimed) power over the feeble Himmler, whom he managed to convince to spare many lives.

Having forced Himmler to allow him to flee to "neutral" Sweden, Kersten applied for citizenship but found that his request was denied, apparently at Bernadotte's behest. After publishing his mytho-maniacal book *The Curtain Falls* (1945), Bernadotte did everything in his power to keep Kersten's version of the events from seeing the light of day. Bernadotte's own book—likely ghost-written, in part at least, by Himmler's chief of intelligence Schellenberg, who lived in Bernadotte's residence after the war—suppresses all mention of Kersten and even of the Swedish foreign minister, Günther, who planned the white bus action. Kersten was at first classified as a Nazi, but an intervention by the Dutch ultimately led to his exoneration from all accusations. He obtained citizenship in 1953, but only after extensive debate in the parliament.

There was likewise no lack of discussion and debate about Bernadotte's status during this period, but the controversy eventually became an embarrassing burden. Finally, in 1956, the Swedish Department of Foreign Affairs published a *White Book* that can be interpreted as an attempt to put the controversy to rest. The book confirms that the first phase of the evacuation was concerned only with Scandinavians, but adds that as of 27 March 1945, Bernadotte could, "if he deemed it suitable and it did not jeopardize his mission referred to above (i.e., to evacuate Scandinavians), ask to evacuate a number of Jews" (1956: 25). Today, in the midst of Holocaust fever, Bernadotte once again was honored as the driving force behind a manifestation of Sweden's heroic role in World War II, glorification of which was toned down considerably for fear it would seem absurd. At a spectacular international forum hosted by the Swedish government in Stockholm in 2000, where representatives of almost fifty countries attended exhibits, speeches and workshops, much was made of Raoul Wallenberg's heroic rescue of tens of thousands of Jews in Eastern Europe. Bernadotte was mentioned in the same vein, but in a rather more muted fashion. One exhibit did include the white bus expedition.

It might be suggested that the above activities are related to the sociality discussed earlier in this volume. The collective side of that sociality is one in which the subject is very much dependent on social or personal recognition. This is a structure of "narcissistic" dependence upon the "gaze of the other." It leads to very weak egos among those who represent the society in the larger arena—that is, a specific elite, rather than the population as a whole. "Weak ego" here refers not to self-assuredness, but to the need to define one's self in a

recognized and already established social space. Being a global good guy is part of the recent history of Sweden, a country that one French commentator cast as the "world's mother-in-law." But association with Nazi Germany was also a possibility in another set of circumstances. Recently, as detailed throughout this book, a number of cultural elites have shifted from strongly nationalist to anti-nationalist positions. This phenomenon is characteristic of the more general inversion of ideology I have already referred to, which is the subject of chapter 7. Its Swedish variant involves the repression of the history of differences that has led to the present.

For the narcissist, being able to shift allegiances and identities is part of the normal adaptation to external gazes. This generates extreme discontinuity, since at any one time the content of political identity is entirely encompassed by the larger arena in which it is positioned. To avoid being embarrassed by former decisions and associations, it is necessary to repress the pasts that do not conform to the present. And it is understandable that the most dangerous pasts are recent pasts that are contiguous with the present and peopled by the living and their identifiable descendants. This mindset is reminiscent of Groucho Marx's penetrating understanding of political practice: "Those are my principles, and if you don't like them . . . well, I have others."

The more recent anti-nationalism of Swedish elites might also be understood as a form of covert nationalism in which anti-nationalism is proposed as a superior form of national identity. But it seems more likely that it is limited to the identity of the elites themselves. In any case, anti-nationalism implicitly reconfigures the nation-state into a state with many nations. The recent self-definition of the state as a multicultural and somewhat anti-national or anti-racist actor has been accentuated for the international public in a quite extraordinary way. More recently, the state took it upon itself to recognize the importance of the holocaust in such proportions that it became a state ritual. This began several years ago when it was revealed that schoolchildren knew little or nothing about the holocaust. This lacuna is not unusual, if we do not lose sight of the fact that young children know little of any history, a subject that has moreover been severely curtailed in Swedish schools in the past decades.

Nonetheless, media reports on the event triggered a massive campaign to rapidly produce a book for distribution to all families in Sweden with school-age children. It was titled *Tell Ye Your Children*, a translation of the book's original Swedish title, *Om detta må ni berretta* (Bruchfeld and Levine 1998). The book is a short historical survey of the Third Reich and the fate of the Jews. It makes little or no mention of Sweden's role in the war, or of the connections between Swedish political elites and Nazi Germany. This was partially corrected in the 2009 re-edition of the book after this text was written, but it does little more than acknowledge Sweden's relation to Nazi Germany. More recently a TV film was made about the several hundred Swedes who

volunteered to fight in the Waffen SS (https://www.svtplay.se/video/17590634/hitlers-svenska-soldater/hitlers-svenska-soldater-avsnitt-1, 2, 3), primarily on the Eastern front, but it still divulged nothing about the role of the politicians. This film might even be interpreted as an attempt to displace the blame for Nazism in Sweden onto the ordinary youth who went to the front, often with no clear ideology. Finally, Prime Minister Göran Persson hosted a highly publicized international colloquium on the holocaust in Stockholm (1999), at which he acted the role of leader in the collective ritual of culpability. Such spectacles were of course not limited to Sweden. Holocaust museums and celebrations were springing up all over the Western world in ways that appeared to be orchestrated. That this was occurring just then on such a broad scale is itself a topic worthy of analysis. It co-occurred also with the condemnation of racism among "the people" of right-wing, that is, nationalist party politics and with a tendency, discussed elsewhere to use the word democratic to characterize persons rather than political regimes.

Social Democracy

In 1995, a thesis in history at Lund University (Carlomagno 1995) detailed the relations between the Italian government of Mussolini and the contemporary Swedish government of Per Albin Hansson. The latter is a central figure in the ideology of the Swedish social democratic model. As prime minister, Hansson introduced the notion of a "people's home," taken from the conservatives but reconstituted as the purely social democratic core of the welfare state. Citing documents of the 1930s retrieved from Italian archives, the thesis details the more than cordial relations between Swedish social democracy and fascism. The links between socialism and fascism are well known to historians of course (see Sternhell et al. 1989). These movements all pursued an anti-capitalist, corporatist solution to the plight of crisis-ridden European society, starting at the turn of the twentieth century. After the Nazi era, however, things had to be reclassified, which meant that any connection to Mussolini was completely suppressed. The thesis documents not only that relations with the Italian leader were cordial, but that Hansson himself was quite positively disposed to fascism and saw his own social democratic project as belonging to the same basic scheme. Back then, of course, social democracy was understood as a national project.

Before writing the thesis, the author was interviewed in the regional newspaper and an article appeared associating the great Swedish hero with fascism. The same day his supervisor summoned him and angrily announced that his scholarship was being revoked.[2] What he had done was apparently seen less as a disgrace than as a revelation, an opening of the chasm of history, and the very association with fascism was not something to understand and analyze but a

kind of pollution to be avoided at all cost. The student historian also presented a paper on the subject at a department seminar. It was met with compact silence. Once the thesis was finally completed, there were virtually no reviews of it, even though it should have created something of a scandal. His later book dealing with Swedish businesses' ties to Spain's Franco was reviewed in dozens of newspapers and received with enthusiasm. So the state and the party were off limits, but the capitalists were not. I have met very few people who know of this important thesis. It was met with total silence—banished to the oblivion of that which could not be allowed to happen.

Sweden emerged from World War II as an intact, highly industrialized country poised to take an important place in the world market. This was due in large part to its "neutrality" during the war. The social democrats, having changed sides in 1944, managed to make themselves into part of the Allied effort, and the white bus expedition was instrumental in symbolizing that newly attained position. Sweden quickly became known not just for its experiment in welfare-based social equality, but also for free sex; the "third way," which combines high levels of social services with high employment and high levels of consumption; and a strong bond of representativity between politicians, who were not particularly well paid, and their constituencies. This began to change rapidly after the 1970s.

The Great Transformation: First Take

Contemporary Swedish cultural and political elites are markedly post-nationalist—especially on the left, where positions are a far cry from the old nationalists' heavy emphasis on socialism—but the composition of these elites has changed, as has their position with respect to their "nations." The transmutation of modern state society is to be the subject of subsequent chapters, but on the basis of the above discussion it makes sense here to suggest some of the characteristics of this change, as they relate to the re-identification of political elites.

The Swedish state of the first half of the twentieth century had a strongly national character, and over forty consecutive years of social democratic rule this relation was greatly reinforced. During this period Sweden benefited from a rapidly expanding industrial economy based primarily on exports. Volvo, Saab, Ericsson, Electrolux (which moved out early), and a huge mining sector and specialized steel industry were a formidable industrial base for a population of eight million people. The transmutation that occurs in nation-states, which is part of the same global systemic shift that produces globalization, is of a double nature. First, the considerable weakening of the centripetal force of the state causes *fragmentation*, leading to a proliferation of minority political

identities. Second, there is a *vertical polarization* that, though sculpted by the movement of capital, is elaborated by those elites who emerge in or identify with globalization.

In the Swedish case this amounts to a complete reversal of the formerly strongly nationalized state that I have elsewhere described as the "captured state," a state that is represented as an extension of the people, one where there is strong social solidarity and high level of trust in political leadership, and where the state is literally equated with society. The nature of nationality can be understood in terms of a continuum of increasing identification of people and state, a relation that is supposed in principle to be reciprocal. Swedish nationality was a very potent structuring force. Statements concerning taxes, for example, name society rather than the state as the recipient, and many have been shocked by Swedes' willingness to pay very high taxes. Opposition to high taxation is often described in terms of disloyalty and selfishness, and tax planning as a way of increasing the amount withheld from the state is described in terms of "taking" or even "stealing" from society, as if it were a question of wealth that already belonged to society, that is, the state.

National elites became increasingly internationalized as of the late 1970s.[3] This was a process that affected most Western elites in the form of the new ideology and identity of transnationalism. When one young minister exclaimed, just before being accused of misusing her government credit card, that she thought it was "cool" to pay taxes, she was met with a certain sense of disbelief. Throughout the 1990s there had been a growing contradiction between taxation at 30 percent in even the lowest bracket, and the enormous increase in the salaries, expense accounts, luxury travel, and financial privileges of what is today termed the "political class." These developments came to a head in 2005 in a new situation: the social democratic prime minister was in the process of building a large, stately manor, something no prime ministers had previously engaged in—especially not social democrats, who tended to live in the most modest of circumstances. The project raised quite a few eyebrows, of course, but the head of state countered this with the following statement:

> Jag tror att man ska vara glad över att man kan skapa något som är vackert och bestående, säger Göran Persson. (*Svenska Dagbladet* 10-9-2005)
>
> I think that people should be happy that it's possible to create something that is both beautiful and lasting.

The relation between this transformation and the introduction of multiculturalist politics is significant and not a mere correlation. In Sweden it is related to a devaluation of national culture, and to its replacement with a multicultural and multiethnic definition of the country. The movement from assimilationism to multiculturalism involved interesting political discussions, including the notion, shared by certain industrialists and politicians, that Sweden was largely



Figure 6.1. The Prime Minister's new manor. *Translation:* Persson's new manor—350 square meters, three tile ovens, view of the lake, 60-square-meter garage, sauna, and guest house with kitchen and fireplace—this is Göran Persson and Anitra Steen's new house.

an empty territory that could easily contain 50 million people or more. Higher social costs loomed as the population aged and the share of potential workers in the population declined. The notion that Sweden could easily accommodate millions of newcomers, rings untrue in an age of jobless growth. There is no clear relation between Swedish policy and the above discussions, of course, but it is interesting that such a well-established discourse refers to people in terms of their economic functions alone. Especially noteworthy in this respect is the apparent assumption that Sweden would be much richer and more powerful if its population multiplied tenfold. Clearly the state would gain from such growth, but there is, of course, no functional relation between wealth, in the sense of the standard of living, and population size. This kind of discourse also reflects the political elite's unambiguously managerial relationship to its constituencies, in which the latter are reduced to mere pawns in a larger strategy. More significant is that this discussion took place despite an obvious economic slowdown in which real demand for labor was exhausted.

Official multiculturalism was introduced in 1975 when it was decided that immigrants ought to have the right to maintain their language (and culture)

at the state's expense. The most recent period of mass immigration to Sweden, unlike the previous period, was not a time of high demand for labor. Quite the reverse: unemployment was high, reaching 12 percent and higher in the 1990s and multiples of that figure among immigrants. Yet a politician thinking in conjunctural terms could still suggest that these people would be important for the Swedish economy in the future. Swedish policy had become a concerted corporate effort to establish a multicultural social order. It included a strategy of redefinition of the nation-state that officially denied its common history, a usual prerequisite of the nation state. The process was complex, and the way it was carried out was not at all in concert with the majority persuasions of the population.

The vertical split dividing political and cultural elites from the nation transformed the latter into a mere territory, a place whose minerals, land, and people can more reasonably be understood as resources or problems rather than as part of a larger unity. A recent scandal symbolizes this new relationship in concentrated format. The government had decided several years earlier, and without a more general national discussion, to make Sweden's underground mineral wealth available to the world's large mining firms, allowing them to search and dig on any person's private property. The relation established was between the state and the firms involved. There would be no taxation, only fees. An advertisement went out across the world inviting multinational firms to start digging. One such firm arrived and proceeded to prospect on the properties of a Catholic monastery and a well-known "socialist" landowner who discovered to their astonishment that they had no rights. Despite TV coverage and a great deal of local agitation, there was no comment from the government itself.

In 1997/98 a new government act, the "integration proposition," explicitly stated that because of large-scale immigration to Sweden, the country's citizens were no longer united by a common history and therefore needed another sort of integrative solution. It further stated quite clearly that Swedish nationals were now to be understood as an ethnic group like all others. This placed the government of Sweden above the former nation-state in an interesting way. Not even the United States, a country entirely defined by its immigrants, has denied its common territorial history. European nation-states, unlike nation-states founded on immigration, are associated with a national population. When the national population is converted into an ethnic group like all others, the political ruling group is no longer an extension of the nation but something above it. It becomes a kind of *primus inter pares* oriented to the larger world. In a situation where representatives of the state already tend to identify with external networks on the same world-political level of organization, this shift in orientation separates the state from the nation.

Swedish elites have for many years been involved with UNESCO and other UN organs, and it is really quite enlightening to compare their pronouncements

with those of UNESCO, such as that of the World Commission on Culture and Development and the Programme for Culture. Like the UNESCO documents, the government proposition founders on a fundamental contradiction. Both state that individual rights shall be maintained and that cultural identity is an individual matter. Meanwhile cultures, which are collective in the sense accepted by both these organs, are to be the foundation of the new multicultural world. This invites questions about the relation between individual and collective identities. If one is to claim a certain number of rights of equality, for example between the sexes, then how are *purdah* and bridewealth systems, and control over marriage in general, to be handled? These issues have provoked much conflict. In fact much of the violence within certain ethnic groups stems precisely from the divergence of nationally defined individual and ethnic collective identities and their assumed rights. Even as individual rights are clearly articulated, cultural identities display little tendency toward disintegration in this era of declining growth. On the contrary, ethnicization and enclavization have both increased, and the boundaries between groups have thickened and hardened. In other words, while fragmentation abounds at the lower levels of the social order, the new cosmopolitan elites are busy redefining a multicultural world that sanctions this fragmentation, at the same time as they themselves seem to have left it all behind within their "hybrid" experiences of global travel.

The cosmopolitan elites lead an insecure political existence because the places they come from are becoming increasingly nationalist and ethnicized. In such a context of vertical polarization, the notion of "*classes dangereuses*" surfaces once again. In Sweden the concept of the "political class" appeared ever more frequently, clearly demarcating the lack of representativity associated with this new elite. Increasing conflict over accountability and what appeared to be an expansion of family politics into government, and of political corruption generally, became everyday fare. As loyalty to the *folkhem* dried up and the political elite distanced itself from the obviously pedestrian, redneck working and lower middle classes, which suffered a relatively steep economic decline as of the late 1980s, a new political and social world was born. It has been suggested that the increasingly endogamous political elites have become something of a family company (Isaksson 2006) that secures spouses' and children's advantageous placement within the various social arenas and clubs of the higher echelons of society. The elites' reaction to this change is rooted in fear of exposure but also in an apparent dedication to bringing forth a new world (have we heard *that* before) where the new, post-socialist catchwords, according to some social democrats, are democracy, globalization, and multiculturalism.

Those who opposed the polarization and cultural fragmentation and saw multicultural politics as a way to divisively segment the territorial population

of the nation were quickly stamped as racists. The minister of immigration proclaimed that all who were against the state policy of immigration should be criminalized as racists. A government publication (Sander: 1995) on racism suggested that the definition of the word be broadened to include all representations based on "extremely positive evaluations of one's own cultural identity," since such evaluations could be used against immigrants. This is interestingly similar to the issue broached by Lévi-Strauss when, against the wishes of UNESCO, he refused to conflate ethnocentrism and racism.

In a publicity brochure the "City of Stockholm" affirmed its determination to become "the only city in the world to break the trend toward increasing social and ethnic segregation." What is interesting about this is the recognition that immigration had not led to multicultural society in a favorable sense, but to segregation. The brochure was designed to resemble a quilt composed of the colors of various ethnicities—not least the Swedish flag, which was clearly not represented in proportion to its political weight or demographic preponderance. Here society was redefined as a kind of shell, a residence hall inhabited by members of different groups who had to find a way to share the larger space, one that was no longer Swedish. Society and state become empty spaces to be filled with cooperating ethnicities. This drastic shift in principle separates today's Sweden from the former, culturally defined nation-state. The change had been under way for some time, as manifested in schools' prohibition of typical Swedish activities like celebrating Christmas or serving pork in order not to offend "other" groups.[4] These changes were orchestrated from above and were experienced as highly provocative by many "ordinary" Swedes.

A book with the edifying title *Creole Love Call* draws an unusually clear connection between neoliberalism and multiculturalism (Rudebeck 1998), singing the praises of a world of free trade, migration, and cultural mixtures. The prime minister of Sweden, irritated that relatively poorly paid engineers tended to emigrate from Sweden, declared that they could certainly leave if they so desired, as he could always import a hundred thousand Polish engineers to replace them. Though not explicitly multicultural, the separation of the elite from the nation effects a de facto postnational positioning in which the origins and identities of a country's inhabitants lose their relevance while their labor power gains importance; meanwhile, their multiple origins offer a way to break the bonds of representativity and accountability that are specific to the kind of nation-state exemplified by Sweden. It is thus unsurprising that cultural pluralism was an invention of the colonial order, an order based on segmentation. Its major theoretician, J. S. Furnivall, was quite clear about its nature:

> In tropical dependencies there was no common social will to set a bar to immigration, which has been left to the play of the economic forces. The plural society arises where economic forces are exempt from control by social will. (Furnivall 1948: 306)

In the language of multicultural elitism, the most common metaphor is that of cultural enrichment. An identical discourse observed in Australia (Hage 1998) expresses an understanding of the territorial state as a container of many different peoples and things, instead of boring similarities. Some even understand this to be cosmopolitanism. This is wonderfully exemplified in the Australian children's book *The Stew that Grew*, a story about immigrant minors of different ethnic origins who get involved in cooking a common communal stew, a "eureka stew," in which their different ingredients create a rich and wonderful dish that is better than the original "Anglo-Celtic" potato stew, just as the nation is a creative result of a combination of ingredients. Even the Aborigines join in the act by throwing in a "yam and a Kangeroo tail," and the white chef rejoices,

> "Now there's the taste of Australia," said Blue,
> "That's sure to make it a fair dinkum stew." (121)

The metaphor of the container and the contained recurs throughout this narrative: the stew in the pot is a mixture of all nationalities, the pot is Australia, and the chef is, as Hage insists, a white Australian male. This latter interpretation certainly makes sense, although as class configurations change, other ethnic groups could move into dominant positions without changing the basic structure. As it stands, however, this metaphor clearly models a hierarchical ethnic diversity. It is associated with notions of "managing diversity." This phrase, featured in the title of a report on ethnic integration (Niland 1992), represents a concept that emerged in Europe (Guibernau-Berdun 2001) and is not uncommon in the managerial ideology that characterizes political machines as well as academic ones (Daun, Ehn, and Klein 1992), to say nothing of global organizations such as UNESCO.

The enormous pressure to redefine Sweden as multicultural is accompanied by an equally strong tendency to redefine ordinary nationals as dangerously nationalist, which explains the documentary, referred to above, on the young men who went off to the Russian front to fight for the Germans in World War II. Yet no mention was made of the very cozy relationship between social democracy and the corporatist right on the continent, the alliance with Hitler, or the story reported above, any of which ought to be the subject of some serious soul-searching. Silence is the primary instrument of confrontation with such revelations—that is, the primary instrument of official memory loss. As recent political discourses on the holocaust, racism, and openness have shown, historical fact cannot be allowed to threaten Sweden's playing at moral leadership. The consequent social amnesia is instrumental in inverting the identity of elites who wish to retain their status.

Why the silence? It is generated by the same kind of associationism that is dominant in the re-identification of the elites. Once upon a time it would have

been possible to discuss the nature of social democracy in more open terms. Issues of corporatism were of course often debated in the past. And my references to major historical works provide some evidence that such issues ought to be available for discussion. Social democracy was a tendency within a larger socialist movement that sought a more reformist solution. The imperative to avoid unacceptable associations renders the party unable to deal with the fact that this tendency had fundamental characteristics in common with fascism and even Nazism. If social democracy were to be associated with Nazism or fascism, it would immediately be subject to classification as a racist ideology. This may be nonsense, just as Fascism was not inherently racist and Nazism was not so until rather late in its development. On the other hand, there is clearly a logical relation between nationalism and social democracy insofar as it is a movement for a national working class's control, or at least imagined control, over its conditions of existence. But this cannot overcome the silence of censorship in a period when the party and its elites are becoming neoliberal and attempting to dissociate themselves from any notion of peoplehood.

Thus a double disassociation is operating here. It is based on a double association, one logical and the other based on a mere metonymy. The chain of associations that must be suppressed is as follows:

1. The social democratic government was in fact, if not formally, allied to the German Nazi government in World War II.
2. Social democracy and fascism shared important traits with all socialist movements, and this fact was once explicitly acknowledged and debated.



Figure 6.2. Social democracy and fascism compared

The paradox here is the silent abandonment of the social democratic model—both the abandonment of the ideals that were perfectly separable from racism, and the abandonment of a former constituency that has, in the absence of leadership, moved to the nationalist right, sometimes even the extreme right (see Zizek 2000). The major enemies of the new party, those who are categorized as Nazis and racists today, are precisely those who once were loyal socialists. There is certainly plenty to forget here, but much of it happened in the past decade and not fifty years ago. This distancing from the socialist component of the ideology is achieved by making its link to nationalism an instrument of exclusion and social distancing. The logic of this shift in elite identity is taken up in the following chapters.

The Discreet Charm of Historical Amnesia

Lest this text be misused at some later date to castigate Swedish elites, let it be remembered that structural amnesia is not an unusual phenomenon and is in fact a very common mechanism in the maintenance of elite status. It may well explain what many experience as the shock value of a historical revision like that of the population of colonial America, even though, again, these revelations hold nothing new. For example, it is usual in contemporary postcolonial discourses in the United States to describe the world in terms of white power (be it national or colonial) and a subaltern Other. Yet things are not nearly so simple. Though the position of African-Americans is often represented in terms of a long history of enslavement assumed to be a simple expression of the racism of Euro-American civilization, it is seldom mentioned that the first "enslaved" population in the American colonies consisted of whites—some indentured, rented slaves; others convicts or lifelong slaves, many abducted; still others sent away, mostly because they were poor. In the seventeenth century, the terms servant and slave were interchangeable, and in real terms the former were owned and sold just like other slaves. As was true for African slaves, a large proportion of these whites died in transport, and a large proportion also died during the first twelve months of labor service. They were even cheaper than African slaves, although changes in these relative costs in the eighteenth century were an important factor in their replacement with blacks in the long run. In the nineteenth century these white servants ranked even lower than African slaves: as one of them recounts, "My master is a great tyrant. He treats me as badly as if I was a common Irishman" (in Wakin 1976: 4).

The gradual expansion of African slavery on the plantations led to the expulsion of white slaves, some following their periods of indenture. In any case, 80 to 90 percent had neither land nor adequate means of survival. This is the origin of the population that became the poor Southern whites. They led lives

of extreme poverty, subsisting in ways that lent themselves to typically colonial categorizations spiced with terms like primitive, barbaric, incestuous, stupid, and so on. There were even subcategories such as mountain whites and plains whites (simply poor whites). Urban American intellectuals portrayed these, their white primitives, as ambivalent beings: stupid yet honest, colorful yet dangerous. After their post–World War II migration to cities, they were among the most despised of the new urban immigrants (Killian 1970).

The ambivalent status of poor American whites disappeared in the 1970s, when they came to represent pure evil, xenophobia, violence, and rape of the most extraordinarily perverse kind. Multicultural discourse regards them as the embodiment of a racism represented in the most essentialist of ways, that is, as a built-in propensity. In this situation, the facts of their historical trajectory pose a severe disturbance to the self-identification of new urban elites. Their historical parallels to African-Americans must be vigorously forgotten. In a world where class is a forbidden term, all explanation must be cultural. If the United States is a "racial formation," then "white trash" is certainly one of the races and subject to a great deal of racism. The decisively unrespectable but impressive author Jim Goad (1998: 32, 100) argues that the trashing of white trash is nothing but a displacement of white elites' guilt onto their own marginalized fellows, an act of distinction and segregation:

> For it isn't the Ivy League multiculturalists who serve as cannon fodder in our wars, it's the niggers and rednecks. It isn't the condo-owning East Village social theorists who die of black lung, it's the West Virginia miners. (32)

In the anti-war film *Easy Rider*, the truly moral heroes are murdered by rednecks, who for the cultural left symbolize the evil racist imperialism of the war machine. This strategy of self-identification repressed real history and the social complexities of the present in order to preserve its own moral purity. Even in the 1970s, cultural identity was the principal means of political practice on the left. What is flagrantly repressed is the continuing relation between white elites and their historical role in creating the white trash category it is so convenient to hate. The revolting rednecks', perhaps equally simplistic, response is revealing:

> For most of America's history, they [white elites] worked at getting the rednecks to blame the niggers. For the past thirty years or so, they've encouraged the niggers to blame the rednecks. (32)

This observation reveals a common structure in which social power is the main force behind cultural identifications. The transformations in elite identities are of the same kind in much of the West, although there are, of course, significant variations. Continuity of elite control requires suppression of historical realities. Yet these have not been eliminated; nor can they be, in societies where freedom of expression exists in formal terms. The history referred to here is

commonly available in standard works (Genovese 1971, 1974; Killian 1970; Shapiro 1986; Zinn 1980; Nash 1970). But it is not part of the official history of the country as presented in school texts.

In what might be taken as an ironic twist on Geertz's paraphrase of Weber, Ingmar Bergman in his 1972 film *Cries and Whispers* recast "webs of meaning they themselves have spun" as "a tissue of lies." Indeed, what is this tale but a vast tapestry of denial, repression, destruction, and misrepresentation of resurrected historical memory? Does this betoken a culture of lying, one so deeply ingrained that it goes unrecognized? Is this the fragile identity of elites? This is not fodder for WikiLeaks. Rather, it is the story of a reality that is just beneath the surface and easily accessible. Might one characterize the political elite of Sweden as practitioners of a Freudian state? Its greatest danger today is that its own repressed libido is the people over which it is losing control.

Notes

1. *Tell Ye Your Children* is the translation of a book about the Holocaust that has been distributed without cost to all families in Sweden and which recounts the history of the Holocaust in Germany and the occupied lands.
2. This recounting is based on an interview carried out with Carlomagno in 2001.
3. One argument against the European Union that emerged from these quarters was not that union contradicted the autonomy of the nation-state, but that Europe was an all too parochial political unit. Global meant really global.
4. A large percentage of the new immigration is Muslim.

Chapter 7

Aspects of the Inversion of Ideology

In chapter 1 I briefly introduced the issue of ideological inversion as a basic mechanism in the emergence of PC-saturated social fields, arguing that it creates a strong sense of positional insecurity because the content of dominant representations of the world has to be radically overhauled in order to gain or maintain power. This issue is fundamental to our analysis and needs to be further explored.

Ideological Inversion and Globalization

Understanding the emergence of transnationalist ideology requires a grasp of the massive ideological inversion that occurred in the past decade. Globalization—understood as the dispersal of capital accumulation, the movement of investment to East Asia in the 1970s and 1980s, and the establishment of a new Asian economy as a new third of the world economy—has been accompanied by a series of crises in "the West." These include the decline of the welfare state, where it existed, and a more profound decline of modernism, a loss of faith in the modern future. Downward mobility and mass immigration have been central elements of this transformation. The decline of modernism has led multiple alternative identities like indigenous, minority, or national to emerge as forms of survival as well as resistance to larger, inclusive modern identities.

The inversion of the space of Western cosmology is marked by the following kinds of shifts in dominant ideology:

1968		1998
The national		The postnational
The local		The global
Collective	→	Individual
Social(ist)		Liberal
Homogeneous		Heterogeneous
Monocultural		Multicultural
Equality (sameness)		Hierarchy (difference)

The dynamics of this inversion indicate a shift in values that seems quite extraordinary when seen in a larger perspective. Let us explore the oppositions themselves.

National/Postnational

My aim in this chapter is to trace the social transformation of Western identity space that is entailed in the process of hegemonic decline. I am largely focused on the transformation of the parameters of national identity itself and their relation to the emergent ethnicization of both minorities and nationals, and to multiculturalist and hybrid discourses. But before exploring the logics of this transformation, it is necessary to discuss the structures of national identity production. National identity is a product of an expansive global hegemony, and it is crucial to my argument that even this apparent localization/nationalization of former imperial representations of the world was a global process—as is the current inversion of that process of expansion.

Nation-State and Identity Production

The project of the nation is a complex component of many different political positions. Here the history of the nation-state itself is less interesting than its later manifestations. I would insist, however, that similarities exist between progressive and reactionary ideologies that are today assumed to be irreconcilably contradictory. One important aspect of the national project of the late nineteenth century was a project of reform and control in which working-class movements attempted to domesticate capital and its elites in the name of the people and their "transparent," democratic representative body, the state. The logics of the national state are treated separately. Suffice it here to note that the national can be reduced to a number of common elements:

1. "The people's" control over their conditions of existence
2. A control that can only be exercised by a state
3. The establishment of a national state whose function it is to see to the best interests of its citizens
4. As part of that function, a continuum of control over the production and distribution of wealth ranging from total control over both, as in the Soviet model; to combinations of private capitalism and public control of the redistribution process, as in the welfare state; to mere control over legal and political conditions of a set of defined freedoms and rights.



Figure 7.1. The continuum of identification in the nation state

In all of this, the nation is a project of its nationals, the citizenry of a territory whose goal, as suggested above, is control over its conditions of existence and reproduction. This project emerged long after the establishment of the nation-state itself, which of course was primarily an elite project that, in combination with the massive social transformation generated by industrial capitalism, created the conditions for strongly individualized political identification with the nation-state by reducing the significance of or dissolving lower-order communities and sodalities.[1] The notion of citizenship is central to this project, and the most variable axis of the political concerns the degree to which citizenship is more or less abstracted. Thus in one ideal type the nation-state is

constituted by individual members whose relation to the state is based on a set of rights and duties to an abstract entity. In another ideal type the nation-state is composed of individuals who share a historically based cultural identity. These constructs are both produced by the same political process of state formation, but they represent a continuum of variation that can account, in turn, for a broad spectrum of political variation.

What I seek to accentuate here are not the particular categories or points on a continuum, but the polar structure of the identity space itself. Many of the post–nineteenth-century social movements in Europe were located in the left part of the continuum between nationalist and indigenist forms of state identity (see Figure 7.1). Both socialist/communist and fascist/Nazi movements emerged in this period, a time of severely repetitive economic downswings, intensified struggle over the colonial world, the decline of England as world hegemon, and increasing competition among the nation-states of Europe. Rapid and massive displacements took place within nation-states, and between them there was mass migration. Class polarization and conflict increased as well.

In this situation a number of ideological transformations occurred. They have been examined in a number of important studies (Sternhell 1994; Griffin 1991) that analyze and compare the emergent ideologies of fascism, socialism, and syndicalism. The notion of national socialism as "reactionary modernism" (Herf 1984) is an important key to understanding the ways in which these ideologies are part of a larger family or even cosmology of Western industrial capitalism and the identity space of modernity (Friedman 1994: 94). Whereas modernism in its extreme form combined strong individualism with strong developmentalism in a kind of revolutionary anti-traditionalism, both socialism and fascism were reactions to the social disintegration that ushered in a particular form of modernism. Strong individualism entailed a liberal stance, implying a non-interventionist state and a free market, maximization of free choice, and a contractualization of citizenship. Democracy in the practical sense of universal suffrage was only just emerging at the end of the century, and those who were most victimized by class exploitation were excluded from the formal public arena.

Socialism combined several different tendencies, some more modernist than others. The Marxist notion of class, of course, was entirely modernist insofar as it was defined in abstract positional terms, that is, as a relation to capital and the means of production. The modernist version of socialism was essentially a collectivist (but not anti-individualist) movement predicated on usurping control of the social conditions of existence of the working class as a whole, understood to be the sole producer of wealth. Its Leninist version implied total state interventionism and elimination of the capitalist class. Other forms of socialism were more strongly cultural, which only makes sense in terms of the existing social institutions of the nation-state itself. In these ver-

sions, the people were equivalent to a wealth-producing class dominated by certain clearly defined enemies, that is, the masters of international capital (this was, as I said, a period of massive globalization). This tendency took a number of related forms. In the personal trajectory of Georges Sorel we can trace the transformational logic linking socialism and fascism. But although the Marxist movement eventually split into the two major branches of Leninist dictatorship and parliamentary socialism, it was throughout steeped in a basically materialist and modernist determinism (Sternhell 1989) in which all social actors were abstract, defined essentially by their social positions. Sorel and others transformed the critique of capitalism into a spiritual or perhaps cultural critique of modernity, democracy, rationality, and individualism. This might be understood perniciously as the first cultural turn in Marxism. Marx's analysis of capitalism was considered inadequate due to its economistic reductionism, but capitalism was accepted as an expression of a natural dynamic of wealth production.[2] However, the purpose of production was to serve the people, as defined by national identity in all its cultural specificity. The nation was the core of the state, which would become its true expression after the revolution. And since democracy would only lead to compromises and thus decadence, revolution was the only way this nation-based socialism could be achieved.

The publication of Marinetti's *Futurist Manifesto* in 1910 cemented this tendency, which existed in the revolutionary syndicalism of Italy as well. Futurism combined a revolutionary modernist worship of technology and speed with a violent patriotism. In these quarters, belief in the revolutionary nature of the proletariat generally shifted to that of the nation. Here is the core of "reactionary modernism": combining developmentalism and indigeneity with a belief in the necessity of violence as the great purifier that is the condition of existence of peoplehood. Thus socialism and fascism share the same foundations, though their variants differ significantly. In the fascist version, conditions of existence are dominated by culture or ethnic/national identity, while in the Marxist version they are simply a question of class.

The shared matrix of these "opposing" ideologies spawned many recombinations in practice. National Bolsheviks were ethnic in the extreme, while Nazis on the left were closer to a more abstract version of the socialist ideal. The fluctuating conflation of peoplehood and class characterized the entire history of the Soviet experiment. It must be remembered that these movements emerged in a period of increasing competition in Western Europe and heightened nationalism and nationalist conflict in the wake of the breakup of the Habsburg Empire. This was an era of collective identity crisis, which had an enormous effect on the formation of revolutionary identities. The logic linking the two factors is also quite clear, the core notion of social security being the felt need to secure the people's conditions of existence. And it might be suggested that, very much like the rampant ethnification in the contemporary



Figure 7.2. Oppositional structures of ideology

period, this occurred in an era of massive globalization of capital, migration, and the decline of a major hegemon (Britain).

In the opposition that emerged, it should also be noted that a significant proportion of Marxist revolutionary and socialist intellectuals were of Jewish origin. The fact that their discourses were abstract and universalist could be taken as a sign of real alienation from the nation-states in which they dwelled, but even more so they could be symbolized as representatives of the internationalist, cosmopolitan, and therefore elite classes, so that they were themselves associated with the world capitalist classes. These oppositions form a series:

people ≅ nation / cosmopolitans ≅ Jews
local production / international finance
community ≅ *gemeinschaft* / individualist ≅ *gesellschaft*
mystical forces / rationalism
technological revolution / tradition

In previous work I suggested that in structural terms such ideological forms should be intelligible as specific variations on the more general properties of modern identity space. J. Herf (1984) discusses at some length what might be interpreted as a combination or fusion of the opposed terms of such an identity space:

> In the country of romantic counterrevolution against the Enlightenment, they succeeded in incorporating technology into the symbolism and language of *Kultur*—community, blood, will, self, form . . . and finally race—by taking it out of the realm of *Zivilisation*—reason, intellect, internationalism, materialism and finance. (Herf 1984: 16)

In our terms it consists in joining the two poles by folding the diagram (Figure 7.3) into itself, thus combining apparent oppositions but in a specific articulation where modernism is incorporated into primitivism, where the rational (non-nature + non-culture) is made to serve the postmodern (nature + culture) which is itself joined by the unity of primitivism (nature) and traditionalism (culture). Thus the Volkswagen and the *autobahn* become expressions of German culture, which is itself the expression of German nature.

These variations can be understood as the bricolage of modernity under the duress of capitalist crisis. The structures are of the same family, which explains the commonality of the different reactive formations. The place of Jews as representatives of the international and the cosmopolitan—and their association with world finance and the eventual dominance of a world conspiratorial government—is an invariant representation in what became both left and right versions of socialism. It was invoked at the turn of the century in the cultural expressions of socialism, among both communists and fascists. But the logic is the same. Because world power is understood as a usurper of local control, it can be equated with all who identify with control by "the people." This extends even to the oppositional structures of the movements themselves.



Figure 7.3. Identity space of modernity



Figure 7.4. Modern identity imploded

The above chart (Figure 7.2) is meant to depict the pervasive character of the oppositional structure involved in movements for social self-control and self-reproduction. The orientation of the chart distributes oppositions between more or less rooted identities along a single continuum. It should be noted that significant overlap is involved in the oppositions. As indicated above, there were left and right versions of both fascism and Bolshevism. For example, quite a few Jewish intellectuals were involved in the founding of the Fascist movement in Italy. Also noteworthy is that in its more nationalist versions, Southern European socialists criticized their Northern comrades for coming under the sway of Jewish intellectuals who were too economistic or materialistic (understandable in terms of their cosmopolitan lack of attachment) and had no grasp of the importance of the nation.

The Emergence of the Postnational

The political projects that dominated most of the twentieth century were oriented to the national. They invested themselves in the transformation of national spaces, even though change often occurred across national borders. In other work I have argued that the ongoing transformation of the global system via the rapid decentralization of capital accumulation has significantly weakened the nation-state as a tax/redistribution machine, and that this is itself

part of a larger process of decline of Western modernism. As modernism has declined, people have turned to their roots, particularly their ethnic and religious identities, which have begun to replace or compete with the project of national identity. This has had repercussions on national identity itself, which has tended to become ethnicized as well. The transformation of identity is integral to the transformation of the global system that has entailed a new phase of globalization of capital and a general disordering of former political arrangements. Disorder in its turn has caused mass migration, and the combination of migration and the rise of cultural identity politics has led to increasing and often explosively ethnicized conflicts. The postnational has emerged from this as a particular identification, but as already suggested, it is nothing new as such. What has changed is that cosmopolitan identity has become increasingly associated with the progressive rather than with the conservative. This process is complex, but it is clearly expressed in the transformation of intellectual cultural politics.

In the United States, the seeds of a certain inversion were sown in the development of the anti-war movement. Protests against U.S. policy in Vietnam managed to bring about (1) a patriotic anti-war stance, and (2) an anti-American stance based on the United States' association with imperialism as an essential characteristic, or at least a structural characteristic. Such an association implies that the United States can do no good, and that war against imperialism is war against not just America but also, by further association, all manifestations of American society and culture, from hamburgers to Hollywood, and from the U.S. flag to the American Museum of Natural History.

The inversion emerged from this second orientation of the anti-war movement when it became an intellectual war against Western civilization in general. The chain of causality starts with identification of the West with imperialism and extends outward to other aspects of what is assumed to be Western culture—anthropology, literature, history, and the like. But in the move from left politics to cultural politics, this linkage became disembodied and took on a life of its own. The shift was not merely a drama within the belly of the beast: similar phenomena appeared throughout Europe. They combined a search for roots, a proliferation of minority identities, and an inversion of the representation of the nation-state's relation to its segments, now fragments. Properly speaking, the onslaught was not directed at just the United States but at Western civilization in general.

A whole array of intellectual modes began filling the vacuum left by modernist materialism. They were not necessarily consistent answers to the latter, but they strongly influenced the transformation of elite interests. A proliferation of writings attacked materialism and Marxism in particular. Culture came to the fore, primarily as that which we all lacked, that is, as identity. The

ascendance of the work of Geertz, referred to as a radical by some (Marcus and Fischer 1996), was soon followed by the rise of cultural studies in its different forms. British cultural sociology, the Birmingham School, moved from Marxism, via a culturalist version of Gramsci, to ethnic and now hybrid discourse, or as one insider critique put it, from "class struggle to the politics of pleasure" (Harris 1992).

In the United States, the work of Edward Said (1979) had the same kind of effect, this time developing within literature departments in crisis. Its import lay in its general critique of Western values and culture as an expression of male bias, white bias, and imperial bias all rolled into one. This thesis expanded quickly into a more generalized critique of the nature of all Western categories. Essentialism was and still is a core target, for it is itself the core of "ethnic absolutism," the basis of the homogeneous assimilationist nation-state. The struggle would now move on to introduce or reintroduce difference, both conceptually and socially. And of course there was real multiculturalism outside the classroom, at least in the United States, although by the 1980s it had appeared in Europe as well, especially Britain. The logic of this transformation was as follows:

1. The West is the home of the nation-state.
2. The nation-state is the origin of imperialism.
3. The nation-state produces closed, bounded categories of people, things and ideas.
4. The intellectual politics of upending of the nation-state implies its opposites: the transnational and diasporic, the multicultural, the cultural fragment extended in global space, and the hybrid defined as the non-essentialist replacement for homogeneous identities.

Jacoby, in his book *The End of Utopia* (1999; see chapter 5), describes what he quite simply sees as an inversion of left ideology. Having reflected on the rise of multiculturalism and its politics by going back to Horace Kallen (1970), who was more pessimistic about the idea because he saw mass migration creating so much opposition, Jacoby argues that pluralism has become a substitute for radicalism and an index of the decline of progressive social ideology (Jacoby 1999: 33). The political specificity of this transformation is that it is less a movement between fixed positions within a larger ideological space than a reconfiguration of the space itself. Instead of forsaking modernist progressivism, left-liberal elites simply replace or invert its content, thus maintaining all the while their avant-garde self-identity. This signifies a transformation from oppositional to a self-styled organic intellectual whose interests are in harmony with those of the new rising classes. This actor, having lost a self-generated political project, now becomes structurally adjusted to the dominant ideology

of an emergent elite. This shift informs all of the subsequent inversions: they are transformations of elite identity only. This does not mean they are present only among the elite, but that those who identify in such terms are identifying upwards in the world system. Other identifications, as we shall see at the end of this chapter, characterize lower orders of this changing social world. Here I have made use of anthropological texts, not only because they are the most relevant examples for an anthropology of PC, but also because anthropology—being both local and transnational, and straddling, ethnographically, the border zone between the West and the Rest—is preordained to express such identities.

Local to Global

The social project of modernity was focused on the nation and the control of state power. The postmodern project rejects the nation and thus the local in general, which is understood as a gloss of the national. The orientation becomes translocal, transnational, global, which of course is possible only if the local is maintained. Otherwise, what is it that one transcends when going translocal? Globalism has been increasingly used to criticize the local and to create a political opposition between morally superior cosmopolitans and inferior, potentially racist locals. Thus we are told by globalist anthropologists that the urban is good because it is multicultural, hybrid, and cosmopolitan (Appadurai and Holton 1996; Malkki 1992), that diasporas shall inherit the earth (Appadurai 1996), that indigenous movements such as those of the Hawaiians are reactionary, and that migrants are the real heroes of world history: "People who move inherit the earth. All they have to do is keep up the good work, 'in search for better opportunity'" (Kelly 1995 247).

While sometimes denying that they are simply pro-globalization, most of the texts to come out of this perspective see localization and bounding as the fundamental problem in the world, thereby accentuating the association of local identity with ethnic absolutism and racism. As an intellectual stance it is basically a critique of the assumed existence of local social forms and cultures.

> Debates about globalization have contributed a great deal to the deconstruction of any naive understanding of locality as given and have broadened the scope of investigation towards creole cultures, transnational movements and emerging diasporas. (Meyer and Geschiere 1999: 3)

The intellectual acrobatics involved in this "discovery" are dumbfounding. It is true that a local bias was built into the models of society produced by structural functionalists, evolutionists, and some Marxists, but this has been critiqued by many, from Gunder Frank to my own work and that of Wolf (Ekholm 1975; Friedman 1976; Ekholm and Friedman 1980; Wolf 1982). Meyer and Geschiere

(1999) go to some lengths to summarize this position, which opposes globalization and openness to localization and closedness. And the problem is not merely intellectual:

> Anthropologists' obsession with boundedness is paralleled by the ways in which the people they study try to deal with seemingly open-ended global flows. (Meyer and Geschiere 1999: 3)
>
> Globalization urges us to focus rather on "zones of control or of abandonment, of recollection and forgetting, of force or of dependence, of exclusiveness or of sharing, all taking place in the global history that is our element" (Said 1989: 225). However this is only possible if we leave behind the classic view—propagated by anthropology, but internalized by social scientists in general and by the people concerned—of the world as a conglomerate of separate and internally homogeneous cultures, each with its own essence, so that intercultural contacts are understood in terms of loss of authenticity. (Meyer and Geschiere 1999: 4)

So anthropologists are mistaken, and the people they study are, too. What a pity! There may be something to be said for this argument. It is one thing, as we argued decades ago, that global-local articulations were the source of particular historically engendered social forms and cultures (Ekholm and Friedman 1980). But this is not the same as saying that the local is a mere reaction, an imaginary construction in relation to more real global flows. The tendency to deny historical continuity, however transformed, and to argue that all social phenomena are produced in and by the contemporary situation, leads to a rejection of historical continuity, that is, the continuity of structured relations in transformation. But then contemporary witchcraft becomes entirely a product of the here and now, and any reference to continuity is suddenly condemned as dangerous (Meyer and Geschiere 1999: 8).

A creeping political correctness is embedded in the use of words like "dangerous" in reference to any suggestion of cultural continuity. Instead of argument we are offered moral judgment. The latter is an argument against the notion that culture is some kind of fixed substance—but who has maintained this notion? Is this not a confusion of culture and identity? The maintenance of a collective identity does not depend upon on the maintenance of an unchanging culture. Recently the Comaroffs have admonished one or more anthropologists, unnamed but quite ostensibly Marshall Sahlins, for retreating into the local:

> This move is typically rationalized by affirming, sometimes in an unreconstructed spirit of romantic neo-primitivism, the capacity of "native" cultures to remain assertively intact, determinedly different, in the face of a triumphal, homogenizing world capitalism. Apart from being empirically questionable, this depends upon an anachronistic ahistorical idea of culture. Of culture transfixed in opposition to capitalism—as if capitalism were not itself cultural to the core, everywhere indigenized as if culture has not been long commodified under the impact of the market. In any case, to reduce the history of the here and now to a contest between the pa-

> rochial and the universal, between sameness and distinction, is to re-inscribe the very dualism on which the colonizing discourse of early modernist social science was erected. It is also to represent the hybrid, dialectical historically evanescent character of all contemporary social designs. (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: 294)

One of the natives who seem so dangerous to people like Geschiere, the Comaroffs and Kelly, who attacks them directly, was already forthcoming in a debate with debunking inventionists (as in the invention of tradition) some years ago, who argued in very similar terms (Trask 1993). Kelly admonishes Hawaiian nationalist intellectuals for their essentializing of the local, that is, themselves, but sings the praises of Japanese immigrants to Hawaii who, despite Kelly's veneration, have not been known in the islands as oppressed indentured heroes, but as dominant and equally essentializing players in some of the most corrupt real estate operations and machine politics of past decades. One such apparently "redneck" intellectual replied to earlier attacks as follows:

> But what constitutes "tradition" to a people is ever changing. Culture is not static, nor is it frozen in objectified moments in time. Without doubt, Hawaiians were transformed drastically and irreparably after contact, but remnants of earlier lifeways, including values and symbols, have persisted. One of these values is the Hawaiian responsibility to care for the land, to make it flourish, called *malama'aina* or *aloha'aina* . . . To Linnekin, this value has been invented by modern Hawaiians to protest degradation of land by developers, the military, and others. What Linnekin has missed here—partly because she has an incomplete grasp of "traditional" values but also because she doesn't understand and thus misapprehends Hawaiian cultural nationalism—is simply this: the Hawaiian relationship to land has persisted into the present. What has changed is ownership and use of the land (from collective use by Hawaiians for subsistence to private use by *haole* and other non-Natives for profit). Asserting the Hawaiian relationship in this changed context results in politicization. Thus, Hawaiians assert a "traditional" relationship to the land not for political ends, as Linnekin argues, but because they continue to believe in the cultural value of caring for the land. That land use is contested makes such a belief political. This distinction is crucial because the Hawaiian cultural motivation reveals the persistence of traditional values, the very thing Linnekin claims modern Hawaiians have "invented." (Trask 1993: 168)

The local-to-global transition is not the product of a *prise de conscience* regarding the way local realities are created in larger arenas. It is a denial of their validity and even their moral right to exist. They are simply dangerous errors perpetrated by ignorant essentialists and racists and natives. Of course it is true, as many have understood, that a view of the opposition between tradition and modernity as one between civilization and primitivity is an elaboration on the structures of Western and earlier imperial representations or cosmologies. But to assert that the historical continuity of cultural forms is a mere reflection or aspect of this opposition is a gross misunderstanding that is itself an expression of another ideological opposition, that between cosmopolitans and locals.

This intellectual change has its parallels, of course, in the media, and in the language of the World Trade Organization and the World Economic Forum. It is a discourse of transcendence of the nation-state that has a long history in the ranks of multinational financial capitalists. The infrastructure for this transformation is found in the real emergence of global elites with a global project that today seems to be quite practicable. The transnationalization of elites has created a social space within which globalizing intellectuals can easily produce their own parallel discourse. Using the anthropological literature here is a way of bringing the issue home to my own discipline. Meanwhile, the process described is characteristic of a sea change in elite identities.

Collective to Individual

Whereas modernist movements were focused on collectivities and the formation of collective projects, the era of globalization has promoted a new individualism. Identity politics is ultimately reducible to individual issues, since groups depend on the intentionalities of their members. When modernism was dominant, projects were abstract and universalist. They were class-based or based on movement-oriented projects of social transformation. With the decline of modernism, such future-oriented projects/projections have also declined. This transformation has not gone unnoticed. Among the most prolific researchers to have analyzed the phenomenon is the sociologist A. Touraine (1977, 1981), who quite a few years ago discussed the decline of modern class-based politics and its replacement by New Social Movements of a more fragmentary nature (see also Wieviorka 1996. This was a complex change, however, and it should be remembered that the increasing focus on self and subjectivity is primarily an (upper) middle-class and elite phenomenon. The postfeminist and much of the postcolonial is about liberating ourselves from the tyranny of social categories. The return of the actor, with the focus on the subject and the body, signals the importance of the individual in current thinking, but this does not imply an ideological inversion. Rather, the clearest indicator of the shift is the sudden dread of the terror of the collectivist 1960s, and the ransacking of authoritarian regimes among formerly consenting leftists. This is also reflective of a general shift from issues of development and the transformation of society as a whole to issues of human rights and the protection of the individual or of minorities against the power of the larger collectivity and, more often, the state.

If minority culture is understood as a substance borne by the individual subjects of such populations, then minority rights can only be understood individually. This, however, quickly translates into a notion that ethnic minorities are "communities of choice," which is rarely the case. Ethnic groups are often

hierarchical organizations that are oppressive to their individual members, not least at such minimal levels as the extended family. The identifications that proliferate in the lower reaches of the system are quite at variance with those at the summit. They are collective but not modernist; instead, they are based on particular cultural identities and often produced among populations that have not experienced the extremes of modern individualization. Such identities are simply food for thought or collectors' items among elites. And utopia-exhausted intellectuals see minorities essentially and essentialize them as actors. This individualism is not necessarily, then, the liberal individualism associated with the past, despite its catchwords "free choice" and "freedom." An early variant consisted in a longing for strong cultural identities, but such an identity took the form of the establishment of precisely those "communities of choice" referred to above. The latter is a collective identity that may indeed absorb the individual in a collective project. Movements may, at least temporarily, erase the projects of the self, but these often return as the movements cool. The weaker form of such identification, based on shared interests or lifestyles and common to the elites referred to here, is mere role play rather than a real transformation of identity. All such identification is typically modern. It is based on a fundamental existential alterity, a dichotomized self, in which identity is a variable that is taken on by a more permanent subject.

In any case, such fixed cultural identities were quickly replaced by a focus on hybridities that coincided with elitists' position above a world of increasing differences. This itself is derived from the logic of individualism itself, which generates both a built-in fear of ascription and the possibility of appropriating the cultural by means of consumption, the consumption of diversity. It creates the potential for misunderstandings of significant proportions between elite identities and those at the lower end of the social spectrum. For the elite, identity is very much a question of roles played by individuals who consume these roles, rather than being consumed by them. For those on the lowest rungs, identity is deadly serious and can become seriously deadly, as in turf wars and ethnic cleansing.[3] Thus the elite celebration of cultural difference is limited to objects and displays, and tends not to extend to the more intensely emotional social side of things. Culture as practiced in its full existential context ways is quickly understood as dangerous, nationalist, and racist. But the culturalist terminology's lack of attention to differences in real cultural experience leaves enormous room for ambivalence. I have mentioned already that contemporary individualism, as a cultural phenomenon, is imbued with narcissism rather than the strong autonomous ego of the not so distant past. The contemporary subject lives in a world in which the "gaze of the other" is dominant, in which one has to "do the right thing," in which fear and precarity are fundamental to human action. The conditions of action are marked by the potential of sorcery, certainly not the world of modernity.

Socialist to Liberal

The socialist-to-liberal shift is a logical consequence of the disintegration of collective identification with the national project. It is embodied in the current political debates concerning multiculturalism and the struggle for culturally based rights. Liberal is not to be conflated with the rather special usage it currently has in the United States, where it is associated with the Democratic party, pro-labor policies, the welfare state, and even the adjective radical-liberal. Liberal here is used in the classical European sense of a strongly individualist and liberal market philosophy.[4] In Europe it is a moderate centrist ideology, in principle to the right of labor parties, social democrats, and socialists. The liberal project includes such a struggle for rights based on difference, even if this leads to the potential misunderstandings and conflicts discussed above. It has become a major, if not the major form of post-socialist politics in which rights to existing advantages take precedence over the transformation of the world. The change is clearly expressed in the fact that someone like Todd Gitlin, former head of SDS (the left-wing Students for a Democratic Society) is considered a conservative today while Stanley Fish, a multicultural liberal, is defined as a radical. Conservatism has become associated with the protection of the working man while liberalism is concerned with the morally central issues of racism and culturally specific rights. Liberalism in Sweden is represented by works such as *Creole Love Call* (Rudebeck 1998),[5] which celebrates a combination of individualism and free-market, that is, non-state-interventionist capitalism (neoliberalism). It interprets migration in terms of individual freedom of movement and in cultural terms stressing the enriching nature of the confluence of cultures and castigating all politics aimed at restriction of immigration as reactionary. This celebration is made possible by ignoring, even repressing, the social issues involved. As collectivist ideologies are redefined in temporal terms as "of the past" and therefore conservative and/or reactionary, individualist liberalism becomes their progressive replacement. The next chapter discusses the increasing hegemony of this ideology as it relates to the formation of new globalized elites.

Homogeneous to Heterogeneous

The transformation from homogeneity to heterogeneity overlaps considerably with the above. But it also expresses a particular aspect of the change. If the notion of a collectivity controlling its conditions of existence is interpreted in cultural terms, it becomes an issue of shared goals, shared strategies, and to

a large extent shared public culture. The language of the opposition between homogeneity and heterogeneity is a powerful expression of the process of social fragmentation on which the inversion is based. In intellectual discourses this is the core of the critique of the national as essentialist. Homogeny is precisely the culprit in all of this. It is interpreted by many as cloning, the production of a population of identical individuals without any cultural differences. This categorization has been used as a major weapon in postcolonial critiques of anthropology in general, described as an essentialization machine in the service of imperialism (itself an extension of the national project) in which real heterogeneity has been reduced to homogenized difference, the mosaic of cultures. The neglect of internal heterogeneity was indeed prevalent in the work of some anthropological approaches such as the "culture and personality" school, and it was part and parcel of the tendency to characterize populations in terms of their specific cultures, as in, the French are thus and such. It was not nearly as dominant in British anthropology, where culture was not a primary concern. On the other hand it is strikingly prominent in the work of Clifford Geertz, often seen as the prophet of a new anthropology. His textual reductionism is glaringly essentialist in his characterizations of the Balinese or the Moroccans. And much of the revolt against "ethnographic authority" (Clifford 1993) might best be understood as a revolt against this latter-day extreme essentialism in which whole cultures might be read "over the shoulder" of the people being studied, in their products, social institutions, technologies, et cetera, all by way of the authoritative interpretation of the anthropologist. Multivocal reforms, verbatim anthropology, and the more systematic critique of the nature of the cultural starting with the work of Keesing (1997) and Barth (1982) have indeed raised important issues, but the lingering question of whether there are population-specific differences in ways of going about life has been ignored in the political proclamations of transcendence of a colonial past.

But much more important ideological processes are also involved. In the larger and more politically salient arenas of postcolonial studies and postcolonially influenced anthropology, there has been a revolt against homogeneity in general, understood as a form of control. This is related to our next topic, the emergence of multiculturalism, but it manifests a much more general change. From the vantage point of an emergent *ultra-individualism* it consists in the negation of, or rather the struggle against, all categorization. This is expressed in the post-feminism of Judith Butler, for whom gender is not merely constructed, but an expression of political power. There are, in reality, only acts, sexual and other, and formations of power collect such acts into essentialized categories like male and female (Butler 1993). Much of the new discourse may be said to be ordered into a core schema:

1. The homogeneous is imposed by the powerful, ultimately by the state.
2. The nation-state is the product of the homogenization of state-controlled populations. The homogeneous is thus the result of imposed identity.
3. This identity is an essentialized identity.
4. Essentialism and homogeneity are related as effect and cause.
5. The central figure of essentialism is the nation-state.
6. The nation-state is thus the source of homogeneity, which in its turn is the social basis of essentialism.
7. The notion of culture as homogeneous is thus a product of the nation-state organization of the Western world.
8. Essentialism, as a product of homogeneity or rather homogenization, is in its turn the basis of racism, whether biological or cultural.

The ultimate enemy is thus the nation-state. It must be criticized for what it is, a mere construction. But as a major source of evil, it must be dissolved into a heterogeneous world of lesser but also of more globalized identities, all of which have been cloistered within that artificial construct where they have been forced to assimilate. The discourses of heterogeneity have taken on various forms in the academy and in real politics, but as an elite discourse the schema consists largely in a celebration of the global manifold of differences. Is this not reminiscent on the nationalist movements at the end of the Hapsburg Empire and the ideology of the League of Nations? Heterogeneity is nothing more than a lower-level homogeneity. Let a thousand cultures bloom! What is not considered in this discourse is whether heterogeneity does not fashion reality in a more pernicious way, as Balkanization. As noted above, this is a serious problem for an elite position that would maintain the harmlessness and enriching character of cultural diversity.

If the above heterogeneity defined only in opposition to the larger nation-state is a weak version, there is also a stronger version. The latter, if followed to its logical conclusion, in which all culture is essentialization, leaves nothing, in principle, but individuals with their own specific micro "cultures," if this term has any use here. And if there are only individual subjects in the world, then we have returned to modernism via the back door, and the modernist nation-state again looms before us as the container of all individual differences, but now without any shared cultural or social spaces. This is the ideal type of *gesellschaft*, in which all relations are contractual. This paradox is never faced head on since it contradicts the very argument for heterogeneity as recognition of difference against the homogenizing power of the state. Here the multicultural position reveals its neoliberal bias in its assumption of the autonomous individual making identity choices.

Monocultural to Multicultural

The emergence of multicultural ideology is a complex matter related to a real fragmentation of larger identities in the process of dissolution of the nation half of the nation-state. This indigenization or rooting is a powerful social process in periods of declining hegemony, one that occurs primarily at the lower end of the social scale. But as an elite discourse, it is also clearly an aspect of a general strategy of heterogeneity and the attack on the nation-state.

A real social process is involved here, one that I and others have written about extensively. The process of fragmentation of larger nation-state identities began in the mid-1970s and continued with the breakup of the Soviet empire and the explosive increase in regional, ethnic minority, diasporic, indigenous, and national cultural politics, as well as the proliferation of sexual, religious, and other politicized identities. I have argued that this is itself an expression of the decline of modernist identity. As a real political phenomenon tied to the real decline of the integrative power of the state, it is not about enrichment of a larger whole, but its dis-integration. It is logically entailed by the critique of a homogenization understood as the erasure of cultural difference. But the real politics of this process is not exactly what elites may have had in mind. The world's indigenous movements, for example, have argued for First People status, and for exclusive access to territory that was previously confiscated by states in their very formation or expansion. For other ethnic minorities, the argument is not territorial but is nonetheless formulated in terms of varying degrees of political and cultural autonomy. This means smaller units but not necessarily identities that are somehow more open and flexible; in fact, most evidence points to the contrary.

The issues raised by cultural fragmentation are, of course, complex. Was the nation-state ever monocultural? It might well be argued that this was indeed the tendency until recently, even if homogeneity was always a partial phenomenon. The homogenizing projects of emergent nation-states have been based on creating common histories, common languages, and common public institutional usages, but these are only a small fraction of the specificity of any social existence. It might be argued that cultural homogenization occurred in a more powerful way in the local forms of sociality and communication that emerged within state territories. Much of this homogenization depended upon the acceptance of common interests and goals—a kind of shared set of intentionalities that formed a resonance base for national identity. The same kinds of processes occur in any interacting population that tends to develop common projects and common ways of going about life. This means that in terms of collective action, important emergent similarities between separate ethnic groups resonate with the national sphere, at least during periods of strong nationalization.

The state version of multiculturalism tends toward a containment model, in which cultural enrichment is paramount. It is highly selective, appreciative of some cultural differences but not all. It does not cherish indigenous movements, since they do not aim to be encompassed by the nation-state, even if, as objectified primitive cultures, they were once and still are serious collector's items. Diasporas, on the other hand, may be truly treasured as representatives of the new globality, though once again as objectified difference. Diasporas may even be aggressive toward the nation-state, in accord with the cosmopolitan ideal of transnationalism. They are indexes of the schema presented above, metaphors of openness and heterogeneity with respect to the nation, and bearers of a global future (Appadurai 1993). The elite discourse further accentuates the notion of hybridity and cosmopolitanism as ways of easing the real social burden of sociocultural differentiation. Hybridity is a result of openness and trans-culturality. Transnationality and cosmopolitanism, or "cosmopolitics," is the mode of existence of this form of multicultural identity, quite unlike life on the streets, as I have argued (Friedman 1999).

Hage (1999) and others have trenchantly maintained that multiculturalism is an elite project, a way for national elites to deal with, and even organize, mass migration. Hybridity is an excellent expression of this strategy. It is very much based on the metaphor of container and contained. The multicultural society is hybrid because it contains so many differences within its borders, and its elites can savor this richness while themselves being able to travel the world, filling in what their local "collections" might be missing. In "the stew that grew" described in the last chapter, the container is enriched by the ever augmented mixture it holds. But what is the fate of the ingredients?

Equality (Sameness) to Hierarchy (Difference): A Hidden Agenda?

Two notions of equality are at issue in the transformation from equality to hierarchy. Equality is a relation to some object: wealth, opportunity, the law. Equality is also a relation of identity, of sameness. Recent elite discourse has tended to conflate the two. The link here is the liberty of liberalism. In a previous ideology, equality was a natural state distorted by society that had to be re-established by political means, whereas the current ideology views equality not as a natural state but as a socially imposed condition of sameness that has to be transcended by increasing the degree of liberty in the world. The conflation of the two notions of equality is crucial in this transformation. The new progressive liberal can remain agnostic with respect to the naturalness of equality, even if some liberals, like Hayek, have insisted on the naturalness of inequality. Equality is associated with ideologies of socialism and with the identical-ness implied in the second notion of equality, in that the nation-state aims

to transform its population into identical subjects who think in the same way, act in the same way, and have the same goals. Here equality links also to the notion of homogeneity. Nation-state, welfare, and homogeneity are thus linked with equality, defined as a cultural phenomenon of being all the same—"being all equal," as Australian ideology would have it (J. Kapferer 1996).

It is important to note that the semantics of equality is especially strong in the countries of Scandinavia, which have robust traditions of egalitarian social control. In ways paralleling the peasant ideology of "limited good," or in the "crab antics" of Caribbean rural society and related forms of sociality, equality as sameness may take on an extraordinary force. The Swedish noun *likhet*,[6] for example, means equality in the senses of equality before the law and of equal value, but also equality in the sense of equivalence or identicalness. English does not maintain the same set of usages, but the same kind of sociality is represented in the notion of Australian mateship (B. Kapferer 1998) (J. Kapferer 1996), which occurs in a particular interacting social group, usually men, that maintains an egalitarian sociality based on the experience and representation of shared identity—being of the same type, and not merely belonging to the same group. Social democratic states in Scandinavia have capitalized on this kind of identity, which calls forth loyalty and willingness to sacrifice for the larger society by successfully equating the local with the national and defining the state as "society." This has not occurred in Australia, where the nation, as the index of mateship, is instead opposed to the state in important ways—and for good historical reasons, since the state is understood as a foreign imposition.

In contrast, difference, in the sense of not being the same, can be linked to the potential for hierarchy, which is merely the "natural" result of liberty itself. The notion of hierarchy has reappeared in political discourse in Europe in various ways. Some, like the Swedish-European politician Carl Bildt (1991), have suggested that the EU could best be constructed to resemble the Habsburg Empire, rather than a nation-state. This is because there are so many differences in the Union, with its differing cultures, kinds of politics, and levels of economic existence, that a real homogenization is an impossible and even dangerous idea. Meanwhile it is also argued that a new European managerialism is a positive contribution to European political life. This is partly expressed in an increasing superiority complex among Europe's nervous politicians. The rise of the right in several countries whose right wings are primarily populist and against the "corrupt" power of new political elites, but also xenophobic for reasons that follow from the logic explored here, is becoming a general threat to the emergent power structure. This trend, which I first observed in the late 1990s, has been reinforced by developments in the years since then. These movements have been dealt with by labeling right-wing and now some left-wing politicians (e.g., Red Ken Livingstone, mayor of London) as dangerously irresponsible populists.

Yet the fact of their popularity seems to imply that the fault lies with the voters themselves. The unanimous EU attack on J. Haider, who received 27 percent of the Austrian vote, reflects exactly this situation. Haider, and by implication his constituency, were attacked primarily for being undemocratic, as evidenced in his connection to Nazism and racism (assumed to be identical phenomena). Actually, though, one need not support Haider's political ideology to concede that he has functioned in a democratic manner. The only tangible argument against him is a long-range association with the emergence of dictatorship in the Third Reich. The fact is, or should be, that democracy is a way of organizing a political arena via a set of formal rules governing access to political power. Nowadays in EU discourse, individuals can be categorized as democratic or undemocratic as though democracy were a personality trait, an embodied essence. Thus if the wrong people win the election, both they and their constituencies are undemocratic, and the election results ought to be in some sense null and void. As Slavoj Zizek (2000) put it:

> The two-party system, the predominant form of politics in our post-political era, is the appearance of a choice where there is basically none. Both poles converge on their economic policy—recall recent elevations, by Clinton and Blair, of the "tight fiscal policy" as the key tenet of the modern Left: the tight fiscal policy sustains economic growth, and growth allows us to play a more active social policy in our fight for better social security, education and health . . . The difference of the two parties is thus ultimately reduced to the opposed cultural attitudes—multiculturalist, sexual etc. "openness" versus traditional "family values." And, significantly, it is the Rightist option that addresses and attempts to mobilize whatever remains of the mainstream working class in our Western societies, while the multiculturalist tolerance is becoming the motto of new privileged "symbolic classes" (journalists, academics, managers . . .).

Is this the ranting of a right wing politician? No; it is the thinking of a well-known left-wing psychoanalytical critic of European politics. But how can it be possible:

> They [the new elites] are the negative common denominator of the entire center-left liberal spectrum. They are the excluded ones who, through this very exclusion (their unacceptability as the party of the government) provide the negative legitimacy of the liberal hegemony, the proof of their "democratic" attitude. In this way, their existence displaces the TRUE focus of the political struggle (which is, of course, the stifling of any Leftist radical alternative) to the "solidarity" of the entire "democratic" bloc against the racist neo-NAZI etc. danger." . . . The participation in the government of the far Right is the price the Left is paying for its renunciation of any radical political project, for accepting market capitalism as "the only game in town." (Zizek 2000)

The racism of the emergent right is a disfigured form of its egalitarian republicanism, the growing dominance of "lemon" nationalism (Turner 2003). Pitted against it is an emergent dominant liberal position that harbors a low

level of tolerance for real political conflict and debate. Does this represent a re-emergence of an absolutist order of governance, an eventual convergence with China, or a new form of political order—liberal authoritarianism or authoritarian liberalism? The actual positioning of this liberal identity would seem to be literally "above it all": let the world be multicultural, don't let the nationalists take power, and let us all be cosmopolitan, each in our own way. The threat to this position is not the nationalist right as such, but any politics based on a model of a people's control over its conditions of existence, whether it be fantasy or not. The threat of Ron Livingstone, left Labor candidate for mayor of London, evoked the same kind of hysteria in Blair headquarters as Haider did for the EU, and for similar reasons.

The logic of this transition is one that fractures equality by attacking the "equivalence" aspect of the concept. In extolling difference, difference in incomes, difference in access to power are combined and even conflated with cultural difference, the liberation of heterogeneity from egalitarian homogeneity. The liberal discourses that have appeared in Scandinavia and Britain are increasingly associated with differential incomes, along with certain forms of affirmative action. The successive disengagement of the welfare state occurs simultaneously with the stress on the right to cultural difference. And of course the new liberal differentiation is managed by an increasingly wealthy and powerful political elite. It might be tempting to see this as an emergent logic of holism as Dumont identified it, the core of the caste system: difference, separation, purity. Caste is an excellent way of organizing translocal relations within groups sharing characteristics other than locality. In India it provides regional and even national classifications that enable the operation of political and even kinship relations.

While the current ideological inversion does not harbor anything like a caste ideology,[7] it might be said to include certain interesting caste-like potentials. Difference has become accentuated via the heightened respectability of power and to the tendency to exclude the non- respectable from positions of power. Real economic difference is increasingly acceptable, as are the cultural privileges generated by economic differentiation. This is obvious in spatial and residential segregation, ethnic division of labor, and ethnic unemployment. It is explained away by reference to economic conditions, cultural origins, and racism, and requires massive educational programs to promote tolerance, without addressing the paradox of difference itself. And of course, the principle targets of this new differentialist identity are those quarters of the social world that produce egalitarian-based intolerance and racism. In this way cultural egalitarianism may hide a rapidly increasing hierarchization. Though primarily concerned with the logic of representations here, I shall argue in the next chapter that this logic is itself connected to and established by real vertical polarization and the formation of transnational class relations.

The Articulation of Personal Trajectories and Ideological Inversion

There are many personal changes of position that should not be understood as ideological inversions. Individuals who convert from "left" to "right" have been common fare in modern Western history. In such cases the categories themselves remain more or less stable even if persons move among them. Things can become more complicated when persons and categories are shifting simultaneously.

The biography of David Horowitz is interesting in this respect. Horowitz, a son of Stalinists who as a student moved even further to the left and for years was editor of the Maoist magazine *Ramparts*, made a radical change based very much on his new understanding of what he came to see as the core of Marxism and socialism. Having once become hard-core, Horowitz continues to maintain this status today, although from a conservative position. He has moved from Stalin to Hayek in a turbulent life trajectory marked by crisis and trauma. He describes his move from his parents' Stalinist generation through all the debates of the 1950s, up to the distancing from the Soviet model that led ultimately to the formation of the New Left, which maintained the general principles of Marxism while repudiating its Stalinist escapades. Horowitz believed deeply in all of this and was active in his different ways but increasingly ill at ease with what he felt was a greater problem with the left.

His career as a leftist ended dramatically, first with the murder of a white activist by the Black Panthers, and then with the murder of a very close friend in her bed by a young unstable youth in a community that she had dedicated her life to supporting. "In the winter of 1974," he wrote, "the Panthers murdered Betty Van Patter and ended my career in the Left." This occurred after Horowitz had opened a community learning center in Oakland and the Panthers had persuaded him to let them use the facility, as they intended, they said, "to turn it over to the community as a model of what good intentions could do . . . looking back afterward, I could see that my intentions were not modest at all. Every aspect of what I did was informed by the revolutionary Idea. That was the bond that connected me to the Panthers in the first place" (65). He then realized that they were just a street gang but much worse, because they were legitimized by the left. "The legacy that I had tried so hard to leave by joining the New Left had now become the very center of my life" (1997: 66).

He recounts his final conversion in relation to his very close friend Ellen Sparer, a "missionary to the people" (66) who struggled to the end to help the victims of the horrible system of capitalist exploitation, especially in its racist expressions and forms. She named her son Martin after Martin Luther King. As a university teacher, she fought for black and Puerto Rican rights. She had lost over a thousand dollars by co-signing a loan for a student. She helped blacks take over her own SEEK program by publicly confirming that the program was

racist. After the takeover she was herself fired because they didn't "want any troublemakers around" (67). Though she lived in an insecure neighborhood and had three children, she always left her door unlocked. She was killed in her bed by a local psychotic kid—all for an idea. Local blacks always locked their doors. To them, she was crazy.

His analysis is the emotionally charged product of a person who conceives of himself as self-deceived for most of his youth. He traces what he sees as the religious-millennial content of Marxism and traces the problem not to Lenin or Stalin but to the movement for social revolution that emerged with the Jacobins in the French Revolution, and the idea that Man must be remade, reconstructed, by those who understand that a wonderful utopia can be achieved on earth if such plans are followed through. He sees two revolutionary movements emerging at the beginning of the nineteenth century, one French and Jacobin, and the other American and libertarian. Both argue for a new social order, but the second is focused on individual liberty while the first concentrates on equality and the need to force its implementation.

The revolutionary zeal for total transformation is the terror that leads to the modern gulag. Nazism and Communism are similar in practice, the major difference being that for the Nazis, the revolution was based on the *Volk*, whereas for the communists it was based on the working class. And the two could even share their politics, as in their joint attack on the failing Weimar republic. It might even be argued that the communists thereby divided the left in a way that made Hitler's march to power inevitable. All of this transfers the opposition between right and left into an opposition between managerialism and libertarianism: those who would order our lives via their utopian visions, whether or not we understand the promise implied in the vision, versus those who maintain that individual liberty, in the sense of individual subjects' capacity to determine their life courses, is the most important value. Horowitz does not deny the problems cited by left revolutionaries, but he employs Madison to critique their way of going about solving the problems. For Madison in the *Federal Papers*, the problems of social conflict (race, class, ethnicity) are best solved by regulating their effects. For the descendants of the Jacobins, the solution lies in eradicating the causes, that is, by intervening in the constitution of the subject to correct behavior and create the socialist individual.

Still faithful to Marxist-inspired discourse and even analysis, Horowitz attempted to understand the demise of the movement itself:

> For a long time, the tribal ethos of socialism was concealed in the universalist membrane of the Marxist movement and the liberationist impulse of its proletarian myth. But the collapse of Communism has disintegrated the Marxist idea and fragmented the culture of the international left. The result is a proliferation of post-Marxian theories and identity politics that no longer base themselves on the universalist category of economic class but on the particularist identities of

> gender, ethnicity and race. The class struggle has been replaced by status conflict: the universalist idea, by quasi-fascist doctrines of racial solidarity, group rights and antiliberal political agendas. (1998: 153)

This is an important insight into the disintegration of the world to which he belonged, one that I have also discussed, but as part of the broader decline of modernist identity. However, he does not analyze the relation between cultural specificity and universal socialist values in any depth. The conflict between culture and universalism is, of course, a permanent feature of the debates of this century's Communist Internationals, from the "Asiatic mode of production" to the question of national liberation and distinct national roads to socialism. What Horowitz sees in all of this is a constant attitude or disposition to divide the world into a past and a future where the future is what mankind must achieve via direct intervention by an elite or vanguard (even if this is not clearly expressed). This is the authoritarian millenarianism that he seeks to attack, but he opposes it to notions such as democracy, the market, and liberalism, where the core issue really concerns the problem of control over conditions of existence. On top of this he throws in his version of Hayek's ultra-liberalism:

> It is just not true . . . that human beings are born equal . . . if we treat them equally, the result must be inequality in their actual position . . . thus the only way to place them in an equal position would be to treat them differently. Equality before the law and material equality are, therefore, not only different but in conflict with each other. (183)

How are we to interpret this inversion? It is true, as he states, that the question of right and left is a question of context. Eastern Europe has tended to reverse the Western terms: democracy and capitalism are progressive, while socialism is the traditional or even reactionary position. If the complex democracy-capitalism and the complex dictatorship-socialism are seen as two revolutionary strategic outcomes of the revolutions of the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, then his analysis of conservativism is quite logical: "To be conservative within a revolutionary tradition simply means to conserve the paradigm peculiar to that revolution" (143).

The different historical directions taken by East and West define two quite distinct versions of conservatism. Horowitz identifies his own trajectory in relation to this historical divergence, but a deeper issue remains. Though I have no direct access to Horowitz's life history, other than his own description, when seen in a larger context the latter does provide an interesting source. His conversion from authoritarian Marxism to liberal capitalism occurred at the same time as a number of other major ideological shifts. He says at one point that "I never allowed myself to explore what it might mean to have a real sense of myself as a Jew, just as I never really felt myself to be an American, or to identify with any community less extensive than humanity itself" (118). Such

realizations seem to occur in periods when many suddenly begin to discover their roots. Horowitz, of course, opposes cultural politics, but his solution is compatible with the shift to cultural identity strategies, one that he associates in his own life with the decline of Marxism: "America is the unique crystallization of an idea of nationality residing in a shared commitment to universal principles and pluralistic values" (154).

This is the liberal version of a multiculturalism in which "values" may not be conflated with universal principles, whatever that might imply. It combines the notion of a strong nation-state with a cultural pluralism that does not accurately describe the highly racialized and fragmented society to which it refers. Horowitz expresses an unmistakable aversion to the universalism of the Marxist variety. This was a modernism that sought to create a new subjectivity in which cultural difference was absent. If cultural differences were recognized, they were seen primarily in evolutionary terms. Yes, one could develop socialism from numerous cultural origins, but the trajectory was proof of the equifinality of socialist development. Cultures could be maintained as folklore, but not as life in a more general sense.

The personal life cycle of David Horowitz can be said to be expressive of the general sea changes described above. But his is an inversion within the inversion. As the left became multicultural, universalism became particularism, and social solidarity became ethnic identity and then individual cultural hybridity. This was the shift from modernism to postmodernism. But this ideological transformation was part of a social mobility in which the part of the left that could identify with the multicultural, transnational, democratic and silently neoliberal global elite rose itself to elite status. The former was already established in a number of global organizations and the media, where liberal multiculturalism had replaced working class politics as the foundation of "the progressive."

Horowitz is more serious about his transformation. He consciously rejects his past engagement but instead of identifying with a new elite, returns to an older conservatism. And his position contains a perspective on the problem that makes it impossible for him to simply invert the content of his own ideology. Though he is now a proponent of cultural identity, he would, I think, see such identity as a private matter rather than a bone of political contention, as is has become in the area of minority rights, which he abhors. His perspective is one that asserts a primary contradiction between the people and state power. In a more serious study of American populism (Horowitz 1998), he shows in very interesting ways how populism began as a movement against both the state and capital, that is, against all dominant factions in society, and how it was only later divided into left and right by party-union political alliances and ultimately transformed into the enemy of democracy in the eyes of an emergent liberal consensus. Horowitz's choices have systematically maintained his outsider status in this major transposition of values.

Inversion in Practice

The California immigration debate is interesting in the way memory and ideological inversion seem to be intertwined. It is noteworthy in the contemporary situation to recall that California had a relatively small percentage of ethnic minorities until quite recently (i.e., the 70s and especially 80s). The entire state was carved out of the Spanish American empire, and while pockets of descendants of these earlier Spanish speaking populations remain, the *Californios* have begun now to find a new existence following mass immigration and the transformation of the demography of the state. Even blacks were only 7 percent of the population following World War II. But by the 1990s, Latin Americans and East Asians made up 40 percent of the state's population, and this occurred in a period of increasing identity politics.

What is often forgotten is that the right, even the Christian right, was a major supporter of immigration in this initial period. Patrick Buchanan, known today as an eccentric leader of the Christian Right, spoke out against all forms of legal limitation of immigration as a mean-spirited attack on hardworking, entrepreneurial immigrants with strong family values. He was supported by such figures as Bob Dornan, Republican leader of the extremely conservative Orange County, and the right-wing radio commentator Rush Limbaugh. And whereas the right wing was pro-immigration, the left was essentially anti-immigration, or at least for strong controls. Working-class and environmental left organizations worried about how large-scale immigration would impact jobs and wages. Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers union, which had fought a long battle for rights for immigrant workers, urged a crackdown on Latino illegal immigration. Blacks also generally opposed any increase in immigration. Reimers (1998) details this situation, which many intellectuals often either forget or ignore. In the United States a clear majority of Blacks (73 percent) in the 90s a period of increasing immigration were against continued immigration (Reimers 1998: 34):

> Another extensive poll was the Latino National Political Survey carried out in 1989 and 1990 . . . the survey looked at three of them (groups): Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans. Immigration was only one of a number of issues explored. Not unexpectedly, Mexicans and Cubans proved to be more pro-immigrant than were Puerto Ricans. Nonetheless, more than 65 percent of all three groups either "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that the nation was accepting too many immigrants . . . The recent poll commissioned by NPG found that 52 percent of the nation's Latinos wanted fewer immigrants, even though Hispanic organizations were making liberal immigration a major issue. (Reimers 1998: 33)

Who was and continued to support continued immigration in the 1990s? Business, especially big business. When Democrat Dianne Feinstein supported the idea of introducing a national identity card, complaints of police-state tac-

tics were heard. When the Smith Bill, which set a maximum limit on immigration, was passed in 1995, the National Immigration Forum issued a public alert. The economic crisis in California was over.

> 300 immigrants lobbied Congress not to cut family unification (siblings). A New York lawyer representing companies such as I.B.M., Procter and Gamble, and Walt Disney cited worries about their freedom to hire foreign-born workers. "When Congressmen think of immigration" he declared, "they typically think of the Polish-American Alliance coming to eat them up. They never had any idea business was interested in immigration." Actually, businesses had been interested in immigration for years. Attacking the Jordan Commission's suggestions, an attorney for Microsoft said, "The commission has missed the fact that to succeed in foreign markets, you need foreign personnel." (137–138)

Jeff Joseph, vice president of US Chamber of Commerce, issued the following statement to the National Association of Manufacturers: "This country is not producing the workers we need to be globally competitive" (138).

It is important to keep the structure of these discourses in mind, since its transformation is the expression of a power shift. The right wing and business were pro-immigration for overlapping reasons. The right advocated immigration because it meant importing good, hardworking cheap labor with strong family values that might replace the dissolute American working class, especially its "lazy" black contingent. Capital was interested for the same basic reasons, but also because of more technical labor market considerations. Why move to Mexico if Mexico can move the United States? This was a significant moment in the destruction of the union movement, and perhaps the real secret of the economic boom that followed. The people against open immigration were the ones engaged in protecting the economic standards of workers and potential workers already resident in the country.

Something happened in the early 1990s. In the midst of the post-Reagan crisis and mass immigration to California, Los Angeles became host to increasing numbers of Asians and Latinos, who settled into already existing ghetto areas. Koreans had taken over many of the stores, and Asians were providing cheap labor on a large scale. There was bound to be conflict, in a situation where jobs were disappearing and Asians were taking over significant trades while people who had illegally entered the country and other immigrants were perceived as taking over black jobs. And conflict there was! In 1992, following the brutal beating and arrest of Rodney King, the policemen involved were acquitted of all charges. This sparked large riots featuring extreme violence against property and people. What is not often stressed is the fact that most of the violence was between blacks and other ethnic groups. The great fear of ethnic violence had begun. But a mobilization of ethnic groups had also begun. In this confusion, the Republican governor Pete Wilson switched to an anti-immigrant position, as witnessed in "proposition 187," which appeared

to severely curtail the rights and conditions of illegals. Democratic leader Feinstein, who had initially supported Proposition 187, grudgingly changed her mind.

As all this activity stigmatized the Latino population, and to a lesser degree Asians, a new configuration, one closer to the already established academic opposition between multiculturalists and nationalists, began to emerge. The economy was turning around at this point, and even President Clinton, who had considered immigration reform, suddenly shifted in 1996 following attempts to further control immigration:

> According to reports uncovered by the *Boston Globe*, Clinton switched his position as the result of a fund-raiser in which Asian Americans donated over one million dollars to the Democratic cause. John Huang, the Democratic National Committee vice chairman, told the President in a briefings memo that Asians were opposed to eliminating the sibling preference of the immigration law. "Brothers and sisters are considered part of the 'immediate family' in the Asian Pacific community," (Reimers 1998: 139)

The polarization of ethnic politics became increasingly linked to a new distinction between progressive and reactionary. Now, however, the progressive was essentially neoliberal and multicultural while the reactionary was associated with monoculturalism and the protection of working people. One analysis of this emergent situation, produced by a former pro-immigration liberal Republican, runs as follows:

> A future America in which both whites and all other ethnic groups see themselves as minorities will be far different from our traditional majority-white / minority-black society. Since the 1960's, the deepening ideological decay of the American melting pot, especially among the journalists and intellectuals who shape our thoughts, has transformed our official self-image from that of a nation of individuals living in a common culture into that of a nation of groups arrayed against one another in an ethnic spoils system. Under this framework, the rise of a similar ethnic-grievance movement among America's emerging white minority is likely, perhaps inevitable. (Unz 1999: 27)

And of course, "White student clubs, and white firefighters associations and European-American pressure groups are forming in California" (27).

Polarizing Identities, Polarizing Discourses

Globalizing and localizing identities represent poles in the contemporary transformation of Western ideology. They are complementary, insofar as they depend upon one another for their self-definition. While the moral space is irrevocably fractured into opposing representations, no understanding of one or the other can be gained without understanding their complementarity. Thus

the new cosmopolitanism is a moral discourse on the evils or even non-reality of the local, and the local is a moral diatribe against global power. There is something of a *longue durée* in this relation in the history of European discourse, and it might tell us a great deal about the representations of ethnicity, nationality, and cosmopolitanism during the past centuries. Still, it is primarily at critical junctures that polarization comes to the fore.

The Transnational Core Schema of Elite Identity

Is there a core, experientially based scheme to all of this? I think that such an argument can be made, and that it can be localized in the current social transformations of the global arena. I suggested above that there is a relation between the trans-ethnic, transnational agenda and the postfeminism expressed in the work of Judith Butler (1993). The common core lies in the abhorrence of categorical confinement. The tropes involved in this revolt include territory, nation-state, self, and locality, but the schema is generative and might just as well apply to body, gender, or subject. All of this confinement is countered with prefixes such as trans- and post-, hence transnational, postnational, translocal, trans-ethnic, post-ethnic, et cetera. Meanwhile the general term for the product of the transcendence of categories is hybridity itself. These prefixed terms define a new age to come, when "we shall all be free" ("culturally free," at least; see Appadurai 2000) and the translocals—the border-crossing hybrids—shall inherit the earth. Or at least their representatives will, it might be surmised, close on the tails of transnational capital and the global political classes.

The political content of this discourse consists in debunking the national and the local by demonstrating, or at least asserting, their constructed nature and vicious outcomes. Thus one need only move beyond such erroneous constructions, which have done no more than produce racism and chauvinism in the world. Moving beyond then is moving to a postnational world, but what will this look like? Will there be government? Will there be order? Will there be democracy? How will it all be organized? How much of this is mere fantasy, however useful it may be in the constitution of new identities?

In anthropology as well as other disciplines, and among media and other cultural elites, there is a convergence toward a kind of globalist consensus that is very much based on this schema. In the work of Appadurai (1996), Bhabha (1994), and others, and then increasingly the work of authors like Comaroff and Comaroff (1999) and Meyer and Geschiere (1999), and editors like Rapport and Dawson (1998), attempts were made to redefine all true identity in terms of cultural flows and hybridity. For Appadurai, the Comaroffs, and Geschiere, identity is a form of closure that is primarily a reaction to globalization. Here

they occupy different positions within the same space of discourse. Appadurai is a transnationalist who argues normatively against the closure of the nation-state and for its transcendence by transnational organizations such as diasporas, whose function is to free us from the prison of the national. The Comaroffs are more traditional and perhaps more realistic, seeing locality as an attempt to secure a safe existence in a world of globalizing commercialization. Geschiere is ambivalent, understanding closure as a logical reaction to globalization but criticizing this reaction, both among the people we study and in our own models of understanding.

Many anthropologists and other colleagues also have a tendency to translate local phenomena into epiphenomena of the global, which is the case for all of the above. The Comaroffs, for example, accept the historical basis of much of modern sorcery but nonetheless see the latter as a modern phenomenon that must be understood as modern. This echoes Geschiere, who goes further by insisting there is a radical discontinuity with the past in modern sorcery: the latter is truly modern, produced as part of a modern process of globalization and unrelated to "tradition" (apparently a dangerous word), even if it makes use of the same categories. Such terms as locality itself are seen as constructs, or simply ideas, which circulate around the world and sometimes settle, generating locality out of the general matrix of the global and turning the former into a mere figment or extension of the latter. But crossing borders and becoming generally trans-X contains within itself the seeds of a higher order of encompassment that appears only partially in the writings referred to here. The great container is the global itself, understood as the global world of culture. Only in this way can the local be understood as a global product. In the globalized world, the higher unity remains implicit, though ever present, as an absolute position above it all; further, it is consummately spatial, defining the locus where differences are combined into a hybrid identity.

The primary characteristic and weakness of this discourse is its implicit culturalism. The global is reduced to the movement of things and ideas, that is, culture, represented as meaningful substance (which is why it can flow) or rather meaning-as-substance. If everything is included in this global stuff, then all forms that are in any way localized, from a village to a nation-state, are mere illusions whose reality can only be understood as a subsumed aspect of the New Global Absolute. Thus the relation between local and global is a gloss on Hegel's version of the relation between the particular and the Absolute Spirit: the former is a mere aspect of the latter but unconscious of this fact. For Hegel, development consists in the increasing consciousness of Absolute Being as the only true Being. The transnational becomes a container filled with cultural substance that may take on various inferior forms such as locality, identity, or specificity, and a whole host of false absolutisms that deny the only real

absolute, which is the higher unity. The global, as a vantage point, is a perfect match for this New Age vision of the world culture. And it might be worth considering why this should be the case. It is this logic that may account for the prophetic style among globalizers.

From Trans-X to Global Encompassment

The pervasive power of this schema can be demonstrated by illustrating its configuration within certain religious discourses such as New Age and the New Managerialism. Here too is a notion of inclusion of the many within the One. It is typical of hybridity and some forms of liberal multiculturalism, but can also be found in other tendencies that have played a role in elite circles. One of them is related to the spirituality of New Management philosophy and to the strong attraction to New Age beliefs among many adherents of elite identity. In an excellent set of papers, Karen Lise Salamon (2000) analyzes various aspects of this phenomenon and argues for a parallel between New Age encompassment and the structuring of management identities. This, of course, is also quite evident in actual statements found in the literature.

One aspect of the use of management spirituality is the concerted attempt to fuse the private and the public so that a person's entire life is encompassed within the life of the company. Meanwhile the latter is itself linked to a higher purpose that goes beyond the company to serve all humanity and even the cosmos:

> Now a new kind of humans is developing on planet Earth. A Universal Human. A co-creator. Emerging from every faith, culture. You come from the traditions that nurtured you . . . you express a unique being connected to the whole, motivated from within, leading you to creativity. Once you step into that you are no longer an American, a Buddhist, a Jew and so on . . . We are part of cosmo-genesis. We are the Universe in Person. (Salamon 2000: 27)

This vision implies the existence of visionaries—those who, as the enlightened, can lead the others to this new understanding but also to a new existence. And the core unit of this transformation is the firm itself:

> Organization and business policy are thus inferred as matters of evolving individual "consciousness" and social (and natural) reform is made dependent on the practice spiritual techniques amongst a small group of privileged professionals. Civic, ethnic, religious and other social bonds are replaced with individual, spiritual transformation-projects and the development of greater cosmic consciousness in the business community and the universe at large. In this vision, the only intermediary social space between individual and greater cosmos seems to be that of the work-place as a temporary mobile "container" in which transformations can take place. (6)

This is the vision of globalism as well. Consultant Cynthia Barnum, whose work Salamon also analyzes, puts it clearly:

> Awareness of global interconnectedness is the key. Most globally aware individuals can tell you about the gradual process they experienced or the "aha" moment when they suddenly realized "it's all one world." From Earth Day to the Amazonian rainforest, it may have been their interest in ecology and the environment; for others it may have been actual travels, or exposure to international organizations like the United Nations or humanitarian relief agencies, even the Peace Corps. Space exploration has also contributed to the "one world" realization. Whatever the source, being able to think and feel interconnected on a global level is what's causing the paradigm shift here. The world is borderless when seen from a high enough perspective, and this has all kinds of implications: socially, politically, economically and even spiritually . . . Regardless of how the awareness began, it generally culminates in a sense of global citizenship. The best approach is to develop a sense that "I belong anywhere I am, no matter who I am." (Barnum 1992: 142)

Salamon discusses the common rituals involved in the formation of new elite visions. For example, circle dances such as "Dances of Universal Peace" integrate a plethora of world and "folk" religions in a celebration of cosmic interrelatedness. During her research on one such meeting, she was told by the organizers that "they felt ecumenically global and in respect of cultural hybridity" (Salamon 2001: 166).

The New Age aspect of this higher holism scorns "nationally or ethnically differentiated modes of being" (Heelas 1996: 27). Thus the holism of the New Age, as a model, is truly compatible with global rule, as if it were made for the latter. The encompassing of the world as a form of identification is the link between the two. It is also conducive to various forms of globalist discourses. For example, the notion that the local is really an aspect of the global is a principle form of such discourse: all differences, local resistances, indigenous movements, and the like are in fact articulations of the global, and thus powerless in themselves. They are at best absurd and at worst evil, but this is the evil that mistakes the local for real, a considerable error of thought, unworthy of the enlightened.

The unenlightened, for their part, are the new excluded class of the New Age. Of course local specificity, cultural difference, and other such notions exist, but they are merely manifestations of something more encompassing: culture as World Spirit. The transgression of boundaries as a principle is also an ascent toward the global. The New Age is a new order—a new social and cultural order. I suggested above that Dumont's (1977) analysis of the logic of holism as a hierarchy of encompassment might afford us some insight into current developments. Globalist identity in the managerial New Age can be seen as generating a hierarchy of enlightenment that legitimizes elite positions

in terms of a rank order of true knowledge while it demonizes the local as the postmodern equivalent of the untouchable.

The Other End of the Scale: Inversion and Strange Bedfellows

Several years ago, Paul Piccone, editor-in-chief of the leftist journal *Telos*, published several texts by the French leader of the New Right (not to be confused with Le Pen's right), a sophisticated form of radical conservatism that has grown markedly over the past decade. Piccone was struck by the similarities he sees between this movement and the leftist ideology of the 1960s and 1970s:

> Three principles: self-determination, radical democracy (direct), federalism unite the new right with the left . . . a proposal for a more tribal structure . . . and all of this is in opposition to the "Universalizing New Class seeking to impose an abstract liberal agenda on everyone." (Piccone 1993: 21)

Let us take a closer look at this phenomenon. De Benoist, a major spokesman for the New Right movement, directs his critique against all forms of universalizing cosmopolitan ideology. His position is rooted in the emergent culturalism of the 1980s and in the same multiculturalism that is expressed in left discourse:

> A plurality of cultures can coexist without either destroying or absorbing the one another only if embodied in organic communities, not merely isolated individuals. In the latter case, the outcome is not only the gradual erasure of cultural particularity but the very decomposition of individuality, which explains the inextricable connection in the US between cultural homogenization through the culture industry, the rise of the therapeutic industry, and the progressive disintegration of communities. (De Benoist: 16)

Taguieff analyzes the logic of this ideology in terms of the following series of oppositions:

> paganism vs. monotheism
> difference vs. uniformity
> freedom vs. slavery
> particular vs. universal

De Benoist adds significantly to that with the following pronouncement:

> Given this situation, we see reasons for hope only in the affirmation of collective singularities, the spiritual re-appropriation of heritages, the clear awareness of roots and specific cultures . . . We are counting on the breakup of the singular model, whether this occurs in the rebirth of regional languages, the affirmation of ethnic minorities or in phenomena as diverse as decolonization . . . [whether in the] affirmation of being black, the political pluralism of Third World countries,

> the rebirth of a Latin American civilization, the resurgence of an Islamic culture etc. (Elements 33 Feb–March 1980: 19–20, in *Telos* 119)

This is an identification that rejects all the universal properties of a formerly dominant modernism. It is multicultural in a clearly ethnic sense insofar as it claims for each culture the right to a territorial and political base. This kind of multiculturalism is clearly at odds with the elite model which fears precisely this form of strong localized identity.

Piccone himself makes the case for viewing the New Right and the New Left as similar. His interpretation is based on an opposition to imperialist, monocultural uniformity and capitalist universalism. But this should not be confused with the orthodox left, which was equally the enemy of this more anarchist position that itself played an important role in the New Left. This variation on the leftist theme is quite significant, for it represents the link between leftist progressive modernism and its transformation into radical cultural identity politics. The specificity of the project remains that of self-determination, but no longer of the former national population; rather, the national fragments themselves become the subjects of the same politics of autonomization: hence the shift from nation to black, red, and other power movements. I have previously raised the issue of the similarity between the New Right and the logical structure of the discourse of indigenous movements, which is also directed against the larger polities that stole their land and forced them to assimilate to their state-based identities.

But what is it that defines the overlap between the New Right and the old New Left if not their common opposition to emergent global power elites. This logic links these ideologies to populism and simultaneously accounts for the change in the valence of populism as it moves from a progressive to a reactionary connotation. This is possible because it is the people themselves, the masses, that have become redefined as reactionary. While anarchism and syndicalism remain modernist in their rejection of cultural identity, the New Right, like indigenous movements, adds common culture to common projects.

The New Populism: The Logic of Indigenization and the Alliance of Strange Bedfellows

The inversion discussed here accounts also for other interesting phenomena that might seem strange at first. The Washitaw Indian movement, which sometimes calls itself the Washitaw Empire, has an empress, passports, license plates, guns, and claims to territory in three Southern states. The Washitaw are black and claim to be descended from the original American Indians who settled the New World when Africa and the Americas were still joined. They are also forthrightly self-identified fascists and ultra-nationalists allied with

the Republic of Texas militia. The Washitaw combine a claim to aboriginality and its inherent rootedness with its logical consequences: opposition to the non-rooted, the cosmopolitan, the global conspiracy—the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the World Economic Forum, the U.S. government, the Vatican, the Jews, and all other participants in the project of world domination and the destruction of "peoples." This explains the alliance between black Indians and white racists: they share the same enemies. This is the kind of phenomenon that elicits laughter among the globalizing cultural anthropologists, for they can only perceive such an alliance in terms of matter out of place. "How can African-Americans identify as Indians and as fascists as well? This must be an archetype of hybridity."

The reality, though, is precisely the opposite: indigenization is a practice of fusion in which only a single identification emerges. It is the very opposite of a celebration of diversity and the encompassment of diversity. The head of the KKK in Saint Petersburg, Florida, is an ex-member and former official of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). He sports a poster of Che Guevara in his office but has also organized joint demonstrations with black power groups (Gardell 1998). In all of these cases, the alliance is based on withdrawal and resistance to the larger societal-political hegemony. It exudes localism as well as a populism that brings groups with apparently opposing identities into alliances with one another.

The logic of this coalition is the logic of populism itself, in the older meaning of the word. Populism is a movement that pits the people, self-defined as those excluded from both economic and political power, against the elites. Those at the top of the social order define precisely these groups as dangerous classes and rednecks. These positional definitions form a complementary opposition. The local is the indigenous and rooted, representing a striving for autochthony, self-production and self-reproduction, self-maintenance, and control over one's conditions of existence. This is the closure that implies xenophobia, racism, essentialism, and all of the epithets heaped upon potential locals to marginalize such positions.

But the redneck reaction is very real and not so easily dismissed. It has become an issue of self-identification among those who increasingly understand themselves as an oppressed class that is being used in a new elite strategy of multiculturalism. *The Redneck Manifesto* (Goad 1998), discussed in the previous chapter, is a product of a *prise de conscience* at the bottom of the social order. Goad makes a plea for a new ethnicized identity: white trash, equivalent to the identity of African Americans—the white historical underclass of the United States. He notes the inversion in representations of the redneck, from the rather benign image of Li'l Abner to today's image of the "murderous crackers in Easy Rider and the ass-fucking genetic disasters from Deliverance" (16).

These are the new dangerous classes, depicted by the liberal media as the embodiment of white power, racism, primitive habits, and general vulgarity. His analysis accentuates the class division that culturalizes or even racializes the difference, based on a long history of oppression and exclusion:

> The shame of white-trash behavior . . . is neither a delightful plastic flamingo on the front lawn of American culture nor a glimpse of existential freedom. True trash is unsocialized and violent. True trash is one long boiling tantrum, primed to explode. True trash is the terrible twos forever. (Friend in Goad 33)

The social structural basis of this categorization is rooted in a social polarization that is repressed in liberal representations:

> I tried living in the big-city multicultural thingie for twelve years, only to realize that most of multiculturalism's proponents—rich white people—didn't want me. So I moved to a neighborhood that is redneck, blue-collar, white trash. Low rent. Low class. Lowlife. Truckers, welders, meth dealers, pit bulls, rotted picket fences. (Goad 1997: 35)

In Goad's Portland neighborhood, the polarization of reality becomes clearer:

> St Johns is most notorious for its high white-trash quotient. Yet more blacks and Mexicans live here than in most parts of the city. For economic reasons, the trash—be it black, brown, or white—have always lived side by side in America. It's the Gold Card whites who've always paid to segregate themselves, leaving the rednecks, niggers and spics to fight over day-old cookies. (35)

The past decade has witnessed a massive inversion of ideology that is felt not merely by the elites with their newly won identities, but also by the victims of those identities. The inversion is part and parcel of a new, potentially violent polarization in which the celebration of a globalized world for some is the onset of *Blade Runner* society for others.

Notes

1. The forms and degrees of individualist reduction unquestionably vary enormously, but the process entails certain common tendencies in need of emphasis here. It implies that where such tendencies are not present, the word "nation-state" refers to a political formality rather than a social process.
2. Note that the culturalization of the working class, via their transformation into a nation or people, is accompanied by a naturalization of the capitalist process itself. Here Marx can be said to be a true cultural relativist who from the start understood the arbitrary nature of capitalist reproduction.
3. To be sure, nationalist elites can be quite engaged in ethnic cleansing. Here I am referring to the population segments in centers of declining hegemony, where the more elite groups tend to be cosmopolitan.

4. This as opposed the use of the word "liberal" in the United States which has increasingly become associated with the democratic party and the NY Times, i.e., some kind of new Left.
5. Rudebeck is editor of a series published by Timbro, an interesting publishing house that represents business interests in Sweden, although here there are clear differences between conservative and liberal positions. Rudebeck himself represented the neoliberal position, although this may have changed since then.
6. The Swedish word *likhet* (with equivalents in Danish and Norwegian) has the same root as the English "likeness, alike," that is, being similar, although in the Scandinavian languages this word can express not only similarity, but identity. Equality also entails likeness, although not in a global sense; in any case, it must be assumed that the two concepts are differentiated by this particular socially specific usage.
7. Which for Dumont (1977) was an impossibility in an ideology of *homo aequalis*.

Chapter 8

The New Respectability

I have touched on the issue of new elite formation several times in the previous chapters. The logic of respectability is crucial for understanding the way that new representations of reality become hegemonic. It is difficult to trace the connection between hegemonic ideology and elite formation without treating it historically and working out the logics that transform propositions about the world into self-evidences. Some of these transformations can be seen in slogans often used today in elite political circles to point the way forward. Globalization, democracy, and multiculturalism are three of the major words that dominate political discourse in Sweden.

Globalization is understood to be a natural phenomenon, whether blessing or menace, that has fallen upon, the nation-state. The proper response to natural phenomena is adaptation, or in this case, structural adjustment. The nation-state must adapt to the pressures and necessities imposed upon it by this external phenomenon, just as it can harvest its riches. Globalization is basically a good thing. It unifies the world, brings people closer together. It increases economic competition, perhaps, but this will only lead ultimately to a better life for everyone, because competition promotes creativity. One of the key words in this jargon is flexibility, translated from the realities of easy hiring and firing, increasing part-time employment, and decreasing worker security. It also implies speedup, an intensification of labor including not only the multiplication of simultaneous tasks, but also the lengthening of the workday for many, even as unemployment becomes permanent for some.

Globalization is also presented as a New Age toward which we are evolving. We may have to make some sacrifices, but in the end it will mean happiness for all. Anyone who disagrees with this is probably a crypto-nationalist, reactionary at best, fascist or Nazi at worst. In any case, resistance to the

ineluctable forces of globalizing progress is understood as dangerously radical in the worst sense. Democracy, one of the great slogans of this era, is perhaps the term that is most mystified in political discourses. It is associated, in the associative mode, with human rights and humanism in general. It is used to criticize a host of Third World regimes and even some on the European periphery. Two aspects of the relation between democracy discourse and political reality are crucial here: the development of new strategies of governance, and the new self-definition of the elites themselves and its implied definition of the surrounding world.

The past decades have witnessed the emergence of "new public management" (NPM) discourse, not least in Washington and London think tanks. New Managerial philosophy is linked into international networks referred to as transnational discourse communities, like the Network for Better Local Government, financed by media giant Bertelsmann. The strategies developed are carryovers from private-sector strategies of effective administration, which use techniques of marketing in the reorganization of government. This implies the replacement of such clumsy practices as voting and political debate based on a plurality of ideologies with more efficient market-based mechanisms. Governance, in this approach, is no longer an issue of specific political goals but of mere practical solutions to immediate problems:

> NPM discourse is constantly confronted with a powerful counter-discourse of "public sector values" stressing democracy, equality, accountability, participation etc. In NPM discourse, the contradiction does not exist; management techniques are said to provide the same benefits as classical democratic institutions: to be responsive to customers is equivalent to democratic control, measuring performance is the essence of accountability, choice is pluralism, etc. (Bislev, Hansen, and Salskov-Iversen 2000: 27)

All of this is occurring in an era of declining real participation in the process of government and increasing alienation of the governed. A major empirical study of the U.S. political situation has suggested that contact between politicians and their constituencies has declined catastrophically since the 1970s, a pattern that has developed more recently in Europe as well. And the public, contrary to the way many politicians see it, is not just a mass of unformed opinion waiting to be structured by an elite implementing "crafted talk" (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). The latter is a deliberate manipulation of communicative media and forms of expression to form public opinion. But the people, our contemporary *classes dangereuses*, are not so easily persuaded by the elites and often fall instead into extremist hands: "Government officials, in the view of Americans, not only fail to listen and attend to the public's wishes, they also attempt to deceive them. Widespread polling by politicians and the press is interpreted by Americans as evidence of policymakers' efforts to move (rather than to follow) public opinion" (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000: 317).

They cite a recent survey that suggests that the "proportion of Americans who believed that government was run by a 'few big interests looking out for themselves' rather than for the benefit of all the people" rose from 29 percent in 1964 to 53 percent in 1972 to more than 70 percent in the 90's" (317). It stands to reason that if the "people" are not interested in being represented, then they can be governed in new and perhaps more effective ways. The new public management is thus a product of the increasing distance between governing elites, who may be becoming a class-for-themselves, and the governed.

Such a portrayal of reality inverts the relation between "the people" and their representatives, who are transformed respectively into customers or "users," and providers of political "goods." In other words, what we understand as democracy, based on public arenas of debate and a strong if variable relation of representativity, is simply an encumbrance to what really has to be done. Such discourse incorporates a neoliberal stress on the market as the most efficient economic mechanism and a politics that, of course, facilitates the operation of the free market. Politics requires representation, so those who govern need to be much more than efficiency experts: they need to convey a sense of authority and legitimacy for their activities. But if governance is reduced to a *pensée unique*, a single best way of doing things, then politicians need to identify themselves with this "best solution." This eliminates the need for democratic process as such. A political class emerges that is increasingly defined as having the right to govern because it possesses the correct knowledge of the world and is also morally exemplary. Morality has come to play a central role in the definition of rule itself, verging on a new Absolutism of the state (see EU Green Paper on governance below). If the state is classified as "the good" then it gains inordinate power to control "the people," who need to be socialized into "the good" or excluded because they are evil. The Third Way is an excellent example of this kind of development. Blair has, on innumerable occasions, taken on the role of moral exemplar in the face of evil.

This he sought to do during the wars of fragmentation in the Balkans, especially in the Kosovo confrontation in which he took on the role of personal adversary of Milosevic, who was designated as the incarnation of evil. Thus in the name of humanism Blair could, together with the other humanists, of the NATO alliance, launch a massive bombing campaign that was both a disaster and caused much greater destruction than it was meant to counteract. The term military humanism has now been coined to designate this kind of action, which is gaining acceptance among elites. Bombing for humanity, against ethnic cleansing, and in support of democratization has become a new form of progressive politics. Those in power in the "right" states represent democracy; therefore, those who are critical of state policies become undemocratic or even anti-democratic. This new relation between the political center and the periphery has gradually begun to replace the old opposition between left and

right. But this relation is also analogous to the relation between "the political classes" and "the people." The people unified are a dangerous obstacle to deal with, of course, so they need constantly to be reduced to minors incapable of self-governance. Those who once represented the people to themselves in the sense of being an extension of the latter now represent what is right to the people. This is an interesting parallel to the inversion of power in the evolution of theocratic polities where the chief, representing his society before the god, becomes the king, representing the god to his society. In both cases the transformation involves a polarization of political power in which the political class becomes an absolutely autonomous category—not a representative government, but a celestial bureaucracy in which the former commonality of governed and governors is obliterated.

Multiculturalism is part of the logic of the same transformation. The government's transformation into a project whereby the political class separates itself from the people severs the foundational relation of representativity in the public sphere. Those who govern become essentially different from those governed. This can and has been expressed as a difference in origins. In Europe royal families were often defined as ruling foreigners or direct descendants of the gods, as in previous eras and other places. The divine right of kings was based on this basic difference in kind. The redefinition of ruling elites as different in kind from "the people" is more than compatible with multiculturalism: when rulers share nothing in common with the ruled, "the ruled" becomes indeterminate, turning the people into "peoples." The implication of this indeterminacy is realized in a multicultural or multiethnic polity where the former "people" have been converted into just another ethnic group in the larger territory. This considerably lightens the burden of management, especially where democracy, in the old-fashioned sense, is no longer relevant. The relation between rulers and ruled becomes more of a colonial relation than one characteristic of the nation-state as such. The process of transition to multicultural rule is most enlightening in this respect. It makes use of precisely the mechanisms inherent in the changing positions of the elite. All criticism of the new pluralism is immediately interpretable as racist, anti-democratic, and backward-looking insofar as it is a part of the globalization process itself. The harrowing and often violent disorder that leads to mass migration is inverted in this ideology to represent an enrichment of the host society. Immigration is thus completely positive, and the multiculturalization of society is expressed in evolutionary terms. In much of the discussion "the people" are represented as dangerously racist in their attitudes and in dire need of re-education. School programs are used to teach children tolerance, and there is an intensive preoccupation with the question of racism. Significantly, racism and democracy are bundled together so that to be critical of multiculturalism is to be undemocratic as well.

A Swedish Cosmopolitan Elite?

The recent transformation of the Swedish polity includes the formation of a political class that identifies itself as essentially democratic, along with a fragmentation of the population into a vast array of ethnicities, including Swedes. The political class defines itself in increasingly cosmopolitan and multicultural terms. Here is it worth noting that a minister of integration, when asked if he considered himself to be a Swede, replied with a definitive "No!" A government bill passed in 1998, referred to briefly in chapter 6, includes the redefinition of Swedish as an ethnic category, a major step in this transformation:

> Vidare utgår regeringen från att en persons etniska bakgrund eller etniska tillhörighet kan vara svensk likaväl som t.ex. samisk, finsk, kurdisk, muslimsk,[1] etc.
>
> Further, the government has decided that a person's ethnic background or belonging can be Swedish as well as Sami, Finnish, Kurdish, Muslim, etc.

This is followed by a global statement to the same effect except that it defines a plural society:

> Utgångspunkter för en ny politik Regeringens bedömning: Samhällets etniska och kulturella mångfald bör tas som utgångspunkt för den generella politikens utformning och genomförande på alla samhällsområden och nivåer.
>
> The point of departure for a new politics according to the government: Society's ethnic and cultural plurality should be the basis of the formulation of general policy and its implementation in all the domains and levels of society.

This statement implies a significant restructuring of the Swedish political arena:

> Som proces handlar integration om hur skilda delar kan förenas i en större helhet.
>
> As a process, integration concerns the way in which different parts are united in a larger unity.

Finally the most extreme statement in the proposition is that regarding Swedish history as a basis of common national identity:

> Ett lands historia fungerar ofta som en förenande länk mellan människor. Eftersom en stor grupp människor har sitt ursprung i ett annat land saknar den svenska befolkningen en gemensam historia. Den samtida tillhörigheten i Sverige och uppslutningen kring samhällets grundläggande värderingar har därför större betydelse för integrationen än ett gemensamt historiskt ursprung.
>
> A country's history often serves to integrate individuals in a larger unity. As a large group of people originate from other countries, the Swedish population now lacks a shared history. Contemporary membership in Sweden and support for the society's basic values has, therefore, greater significance for integration than a common historical origin.

Here it is stated clearly that Sweden no longer has a common history and that integration needs instead to be based on support for the society´s basic values, but there is also a great deal of ambivalence (see below), since support for common values is also the basis of assimilationist policy. The lack of a common history lies in the presence in the country of so many people of different ethnic origins. Their different histories are thus co-mingled in Swedish territory in a bundle of differences (including the Swedish difference). The notion of history assumed here is one that implies that the latter is always and permanently associated with a particular origin. Now the usual notion of national history is one of the history of a territory, not of an ethnicity. This transformation implies, then, an ethnicization of the state, the transformation of a population inhabiting a territory into one or more ethnic units. Now the proposition as a whole is replete with logical contradictions, assuming that all of this multicultural policy is only applicable to the first years of immigration, which in turn assumes that integration takes place, but on what grounds? Difference is maintained at the same time as individual choice is stressed. The overarching image, however, is one that clearly approaches the classical definition of a plural society, much more so than anything to be found in the United States, where tolerance is much more about individuals, where discrimination is a question of individual origins, not one of how to integrate different culturally defined groups, and where history is still the history of the country and the population is still defined as "the people." Adherence to the American nation-state is based on assimilation to a set of goals and values defined as the *American Way*. It has often been contested in ethnic and cultural politics, but it remains state policy. U.S. identity is thin compared to the notion of nationality in Europe, but it is still based on the assumption of transfer of allegiance and willingness to become part of the host society. This is not the case in Sweden. The ideological core of the above government proposition is one that is strangely racialist in its assumption that history belongs to peoples of different provenance rather than being an issue of the production of representations of state defined territories. The academic discourse of multiculturalism is thoroughly pervaded by such conceptions. Thus the director of the policy-oriented Center for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations in Stockholm stated, in a comment cited at the end of the article reproduced in Chapter 5 and repeated below, regarding the equally pluralist Parekh Report, *The Future of Multiethnic Britain*:

> Diversity is linked with immigration. If immigration is stopped, diversity is jeopardized. Policy-makers should reassess immigration policy. Diversity should not be seen as a means to handle what is perceived as "problematic immigration." Rather, immigration needs to be seen as the positive means to achieve the goal of diversity. All Western countries have ageing populations. If welfare systems are to be maintained immigration of labor power will soon become an economic demographic necessity. (Westin 2000: 734)

The underlying premise in the above argument is that migration implies the migration of culture, a means of creating a diverse society. But this can only occur if cultural identities are maintained effortlessly over time, a strongly essentialist assumption about the relation between culture and population. Even more interesting are the implications of the conversion of diversity into a goal, so that if people did not need to immigrate but chose to stay home it would be a disaster for the potential host society. Perhaps then we should force people to immigrate—an old imperial solution, especially with respect to the import of labor. No consideration is given to the conditions of massive displacement, impoverishment and warfare that are the crucial driving forces of emigration. Such consideration might damage this project of celebration.

The goal of creating a multiethnic society is an expression of a top-down managerial strategy that replaces the *demos* with a plurality of peoples, heedless of the democratic deficit of such a proposition. The problem of representativity is expressed by the very institution of a Ministry of Integration, which the government's proposal defines as a ministry whose project is the integration of all ethnicities, including Swedish ethnicity, into the state order. Thus the social and cultural unity of the territory is redefined as the relations, to be established, between disparate groups. There is no common past, common language, or common culture. The ruled population is defined in terms of fragments, and unity can be achieved only via the state—a state that integrates difference, and in the end also mediates difference.

Structural Discrimination and the Multicultural Transition

Recent developments in Sweden, since the 1990's, bear witness to the nature of processes that are only partly in evidence in government documents like the government proposal cited above. The emergence of a network of multiculturalist academics, some of whose leaders are themselves immigrants, produced several publications and discourses that have become closely associated with government policy. Since the 1980's, government-sponsored investigations into political power have been a periodic activity, and the most recent investigation (from 2000) extended this activity into the study of the distribution of power and discrimination in relation to ethnicity. The investigation was, as usual, headed by a Swedish political scientist with a history of organizing such studies in the past. However, under the leadership of sociologist Masoud Kamali, a number of other participating researchers, primarily from non-Swedish backgrounds, publicly left the commission. They explained in a newspaper article that the project was misdirected, led by incompetent people, and discriminatory with respect to themselves. They claimed that they, as immigrants and immigrant researchers, were better qualified to deal with the issues at hand,

which they defined as "structural discrimination," a category that overlaps significantly with, or is even identical to, "structural racism." The outcome of this protest was that the integration minister, Mona Sahlin, decided that the political scientist heading the project would be ousted and replaced by Masoud Kamali (2004). As a recent Ph.D. from Uppsala University, Kamali's record was unavoidably thin, but after a brilliant career in the university system he had rapidly landed a professorship at a small university. Whether or not this was itself a case of structural discrimination (positive) has not yet been discussed in Sweden, but it does express the strategy of the state. Kamali himself has argued, harking back to Linnaean biological classifications and the overt racialism of the turn of the last century, that structural discrimination or racism is part of the very organization of Swedish society and culture. Racialism, which is not identical to racism, was part of the ideology of European society during much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but whether it was structural or not—that is, whether it was part of the very organization of everyday institutional praxis—is not discussed, but merely assumed. The following extract illustrates the kind of reasoning Kamali engages in:

> In one of the Swedish most popular Radio programs, "Ring P1" (Call P1) in P1 (Program 1) November 22, 2001, one listener who identifies himself as Jonas Dahlgren wants to express his opinion about the Danish election, which has been infected and dominated by xenophobic and racist attitudes. He says:
>
> > *Jonas Dahlgren:* I agree with Kent Andersson . . . we cannot pamper (*dalta*) the immigrant question. You want to come here, you must one: get a job and not live on social welfare, and two: adjust yourself completely to the values and traditions of the new society.
> > *Reporter, Nina Glans:* Jonas, I know that you are yourself an immigrant.
> > *Jonas Dahlgren:* Yes, I myself come from Iran, when I came here, I tried to adjust myself to Swedish society, learned the language and . . . yes, simply, adjust myself completely to Swedish values and traditions (*tar seder dit man går* when in Rome do as the Romans). I have changed my name and after that I have never had any problem to get job, I get a good response from everybody, have my own apartment and so, I get scared when I hear that the man . . . what is his name, the man from abroad [an immigrant], who said that they are going to take over the Swedish society little by little; he misunderstood the thing with adjusting to Swedish values and traditions.
> > . . .
> > *Reporter, Nina Glans:* Have you ever thought to return to Iran?
> > *Jonas Dahlgren:* Sometimes . . . but I do not like the . . . that they [Iranian government] oppress women, accept just one religion, and what is the name . . . yes, fanaticism.
> > . . .
> > *Reporter, Nina Glans:* You have become completely Swedish, is it possible for everybody to become like you?
> > *Jonas Dahlgren:* Maybe not . . . but it is impossible to make Turks of all Swedes.

> . . .
> *Reporter, Nina Glans:* Apparently, what you did was to show that all immigrants can become completely Swedish.
>
> The example shows how discriminatory ideas about immigrants that are a part of the Swedish society's discursive structure can be reinforced by immigrants. This is not only an isolated example, but an inseparable part of the Swedish media culture and structure. Using immigrants and immigrant organization in order to preserve the racist power structure in society is an integrative part of Swedish structural/institutional racism. (Kamali 2001: 11)

Now, whatever one might think of a particular person's attempt to adapt to his host society—and such cases are well known in the assimilation literature—the assumption, unexplained by any analysis, is simply that this Iranian who has tried to become a Swede is an immediate expression of Swedish "structural/institutional racism." Kamali claims that the reaction to honor killings in certain families of Middle Eastern origin is also racist in its assumption that all Kurds or Palestinians behave in a particular way, but he does nothing to establish his argument. He takes up the fact of spatial segregation, especially in urban areas, but does not investigate the mechanisms of this segregation, most of which appeared in the period in which the state became multicultural. In the end Swedish racism becomes the equivalent of being Swedish and doing things in a Swedish way, which is, therefore, discriminatory in itself.

Of course it is true that social institutions are culturally specific, which of necessity implies a certain amount of discrimination against those who do not "fit in," or so goes the argument usually invoked in favor of assimilation. The other solution, implied by Kamali, is the pluralism discussed already, one that eliminates any notion of a "people," nation, or population with the same shared basic framework of reference. This model is common in empires and colonial regimes, and indeed, others associated with Kamali have said as much. A "green paper" prepared for the EU (Burns et al. 2000) on the future of parliamentary democracy has suggested that the "*demos*" is best eliminated and replaced by a more "organic democracy" in which the major actors are NGOs, business corporations, and special interest groups such as ethnic corporations. This political model of pluralism parallels the ethnic model implied in Kamali's paper.[2]

In the first years of this century, anti-discrimination became an institution that was increasingly elaborated into a bureaucratic structure. In 2005 the Center for Anti- discrimination, a free-standing organization founded by the government, came under fire for using enormous amounts of its funding, among other abuses, to hold meetings in Stockholm in expensive hotels when the organization's offices would have been perfectly adequate. Internal critique was also extensive. Among the organization's few activities was a concerted attack on a licorice ice cream pop called the "Nogger black." Nogger is the

brand name and black is the color of the pop (there are plenty of other Nogger variants in Sweden and in Europe, but somehow combination of the two, by provoking an association with the term Negro or even Nigger, was enough to set off a media storm, at least for a few days, until it totally backfired. Shortly thereafter another ice-cream pop, the "88," was attacked as Nazi because 88 was a covert code for "Heil Hitler" (Lidén in *Aftonbladet* 04-19-2005). There must be more important cases of discrimination than that. Another noteworthy development has been the proliferation of anti-discrimination bureaus that function something like NGOs but are essentially profit-making organizations that seek out discrimination for money. They are privately run but largely state-funded.

A book about Swedish culture by ethnologist K. O. Arnstberg (2005) addressed the issue of PC in a serious way for the first time. One of the cases he describes concerns the editor of the magazine *blågula frågor* (*Blue-Yellow Questions*, blue-yellow referring to the Swedish flag), which takes up issues of immigration and immigration policy, criminality and violence, and Swedish immigration politics. The magazine has been associated with far-right racism and condemned. Arnstberg argues that this classification of the magazine is a typical case of PC politics replacing real argument. Arnstberg himself got his first taste of PC after publishing a book on the relations between Roma and the Swedish state and society. Although it was primarily remarks by his informants that were at issue, he was attacked as a racist by various organizations, not least the Swedish Roma association. Among the objectionable features of this book are Romas' own remarks explicitly describing their predatory relation to Sweden, a relation in which the country is understood as a hunting territory and as distinctly unclean and thus of lower status. So whereas Swedish discrimination against minorities does exist, the activity goes both ways, although, according to the immigration bureau, in Sweden racism can only be practiced by ethnic Swedes .

Further evidence of the elimination of the demos is found in the seemingly unlikely establishment of a Ministry of Democracy (1998). The woman delegated to lead this ministry, who was the daughter of another well-known social democratic minister (Justice minister 1987–88), explained that she did not consider herself an expert in such matters and had gotten the job through her mother—hardly a sure sign of democracy! The person in question also explained that her salary, which had been raised to $12,000 per month, was important to her as she could now afford her monthly living standard. Another minister, who had just bought a hat for almost $6,000, was asked if a government representative should publicly flaunt such luxury and replied that a representative of the people must be elegant in public. It should be noted here that politicians' salaries, regulated by themselves, have risen very much faster than those of any other group in society, that Sweden's prime minister now

takes home a larger paycheck than the prime minister of France, and that the media were riddled for years by a spate of governmental credit card and other financial scandals.[3] What is significant here is the relative change involved. Sweden was once characterized by a pervasive egalitarianism in which the relation of political representation was such that politicians ate in a government cafeteria, accepted rather low salaries, and practiced an explicit equality with those whom they represented. The notion of equality in Sweden is strongly weighted toward the sense of being similar, if not identical.

The same kinds of representations are often more clearly expressed on the official liberal-right. Could this be because it is the true origin of the following cluster of ideas? In a recent editorial in the nation's major conservative newspaper, *Svenska Dagbladet*, a vehement opposition is drawn between globalization, free markets, and multiculturalism on the one hand, and both leftist and right-wing nationalism on the other. The merging of left and right centrism is evident in core ideas lifted out of the major propositions of the EU itself: "The four freedoms: free movement across borders for people, capital, commodities, and services" (*Svenska Dagbladet* 2000-14-8: 2). But, "as the growing debate on globalization has demonstrated, this open state of affairs is not self-evident. On both the right and the left, there is a growing resistance" (2). For the editorial's author, this evokes the worst forms of nationalism, but

> even anti-Semitism and movements against immigration policy [*invandringsfientligheten*, which differs from "anti-immigrant"] pour (öser) out of the same source of ideas, fear of the "foreign." The more vague critique of multiculturalism is a younger cousin. (2)

Yet these ideas were not products of the extreme right. In this discourse, right and left merged into a single reactionary nationalism opposed to the openness of cosmopolitanism, especially the new form this reaction was taking as expressed in organizations such as ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions and Citizens' Action) and other anti-globalist forums:

> In anti-globalism, left and right can become unified in a new nationalism—against America, EU, EMU, NATO, free trade, migration, market economy and finally democracy.
>
> For younger generations who have grown up with disdain for politicians, Encouraged by populist leaders on the left and right, the struggle against globalization a new front has appeared. (Ibid.)

ATTAC was chosen as a major target. This leftist organization had the audacity to oppose the cultivation of genetically modified plants, fight against privatized pension systems, and attack major world trade and finance organizations while enunciating a general resistance to Third Way politics. ATTAC's proposal to tax "capital transactions" was characterized as a terrible thought that, like the organization's other proposals, simply threw a wrench into the machinery of

global commerce. This was of course a reference to the Tobin tax, a proposal to tax international financial transactions whose author is not easily associated with the left as it is usually understood. But of course both times and categories have changed.

The group was described as a motley bunch. The initiative to establish ATTAC came from the "politically correct" newspaper *Le Monde Diplomatique* and was apparently also connected to names on the American left such as Noam Chomsky and Susan George. Also listed were Commandante Marcos of Chiapas fame and, worst of all, José Bové, said to use violence and acts in the name of nationalism though in reality it is all in his own interest. Certainly there was more to discuss here than met the eye of the author of this editorial—who, on the other hand, faithfully reflected an attitude that was rapidly gaining strength among the new elites.

Third Way / Neue Mitte

The doctrine established by both Blair and Schröder in 1999 has been referred to several times here. The outlines of the doctrine have been embattled, primarily on the Left, which produced a whole series of critiques, from "this is old hat" to "Thatcher without the handbag." Giddens, called the "messenger of the prince" by sociological colleagues (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2000), was prompted to write a sequel to his *The Third Way* (1998) with the necessarily defensive title *The Third Way and Its Critics* (2000). Both books were published by his own Polity Press, which sped up the publication process substantially. This advantage was less important than the work itself, which, in answering critics, has had its formulations refined and categorizes its adversaries more strongly than previously. Following a concise rundown of major critiques presented with utmost clarity, even fairness, Giddens begins an elaborate response. He limits his discussion to left critics, since they are the most important constituency to be converted.

Stuart Hall, in one of the most damning critiques, claimed that the Third Way was a massive sellout to Thatcherism and a program for structural adjustment to a globalization that is treated as a fact of nature. Giddens uses Hall's own writing to defend himself. The latter had, over the past decades, also claimed that we had crossed the threshold into New Times in which class conflict was replaced by identity politics. But as Giddens suggests, this is exactly what New Labor was responding to, and the old left or welfare-state response was no longer adequate. Hall, of course, saw no contradiction between identity politics and continued welfare, but one might surmise that the decline of class politics necessarily entails a decline in the modernist strategies that were the core of that period.

Without detailing all the arguments, I can nevertheless try to present their ideological contours. First, the argument that social democracy in its classical format is no longer adequate to deal with new global conditions is a response that exonerates the state from any active role in the creation of contemporary globalization. Giddens affirms that the state can indeed play an active role in dealing with globalization, but he says nothing about the state's role in establishing globalization. In his formulation of the new program, the word "radical" undergoes a fundamental redefinition:

> "Radicalism" cannot any longer be equated with "being on the left." On the contrary, it often means breaking with established leftist doctrines where they have lost their purchase on the world. (Giddens 2000: 39)

Now of course, radical can be right or left, and its meaning has never been particularly clear, but it has usually meant extreme and moving away from accepted centrist doctrine. Giddens, however, uses the word to describe movement from social democracy to liberalism, terming it radical centrism. This must be important, since it allows New Labor to maintain a progressive image of itself while completely transforming its politics to accommodate the changing world. A center coalition between right/liberal and social democracy becomes a new standard measure of the radical and progressive. Such a statement appears after a discussion of the irrelevance of the right/left distinction that argues all the same for leftism conceived anew as a concern "with reducing inequality" (39). His description of the new political culture, close in some ways to Hall, informs his argument against the kinds of left welfare politics produced by such a culture.

The movement from industrial to *information* society becomes the basis of the argument for a new politics. To that end "technology" is stressed as a natural developmental phenomenon. Globalization is central to Third Way policy, and the new technology has made it at once the cause of the new world order and the bearer of the promise of a better world. Meanwhile the "old" left, which was once internationalist, "has become isolationist, sometimes opposing every aspect of the global economy" (54). One interesting quote in the book comes from a Swedish-Chilean economic historian and former communist who was a consultant for the Swedish Conservative and then the Liberal party. Now a diehard neoliberal, he sees global liberal market mechanisms as a road to prosperity for the whole world:

> What the past 30 years have shown is that our new global economy has an enormous potential, that there is an alternative to poverty and underdevelopment, that the thing now is to transform more and more countries into dynamic parts of this expansive economy. (Rojas cited in Giddens 2000: 125)

The reference indicates the degree to which right and left have become fused in the new centrism. Combining an unmitigated neoliberal vision with

statements acknowledging the profound inequality of world development, he evades any serious analysis of the possible relation between the two. Although East and Southeast Asia have become the fastest growing and today the second major economic region of the world, polarization has increased rather than decreased, and not due to any lack of globalization.[4] Giddens, following recent political analyses, argues that the problems of poverty in the world are the result of corrupt, undemocratic governments (2000: 129) rather than globalization itself. This point is well argued with respect to the usual demand that such problems be remedied by direct transfers of wealth. But to divorce the existence of vampire regimes from the global circumstances that fostered their origin and development is also to methodically avoid making systemic connections that are in dire need of recognition. Such regimes today are established and supported by the activities of transnational networks of military investment and often through direct intervention, from actions by mercenary billionaire firms such as Executive Outcomes to direct, often secret intervention by Western states (Verschave 2000). The discourse entailed by the attitude "of course there are problems, but look at the bright side as well" therefore mystifies the more important connections that undermine its political conclusions. It reflects a truly politicized view of the world that proposes an all-encompassing yet piecemeal solution to both national and international issues.

Most of the critique of the Third Way has dealt directly with policy issues, assessing whether or not the Third Way was truly new, really socialist, or treacherously inimical to the cause of working people, but not whether it embodied a new elite formation. I propose here that while these two questions are not incompatible, it is important to note certain properties of the discourse. The way in which neoliberalism and social democracy are combined is structurally more than compatible with the elimination of differences between the two major power blocs. The logic of the argument tends to preclude alternatives and defines a single best—if superficially plural, because fragmentary—approach to social and political problems.

Significantly, a recent collection dealing with globalization, edited by Hutton and Giddens and bearing the enticing title *On the Edge* (Hutton and Giddens 2001), is organized as an ecumenical council of global experts. Its contributors range from sociologists focused on the technological basis of the new network society to Richard Sennet and his important critical analyses of "corrosion of character" in the new labor market, to pundits such as Paul Volcker, former head of the American Federal Reserve, and George Soros, global financier. The message of the book is a general one. It offers nothing new in terms of research, but the ensemble of bankers and sociologists is equivalent to a kind of forum of wise men for the new millennium. Yes, the world-in-globalization faces plenty of problems, all of which *We* can solve, but, more important, there is also a promising future, a new and challenging world that is most welcome.

Throughout, the discussion assumes that globalization is a natural evolutionary phenomenon and cannot be analyzed as something that might disappear, reverse itself, or be totally transformed in some hopelessly, even dangerously radical strategy. Instead the message is the same one that has echoed through decades of World Bank talk: structural adjustment. If globalization is Nature, then our only chance of survival is to adapt to it.

The Polarization of French Society: *Analyse de texte*

France has usually been left aside in discussions of globalization on the assumption that the French would never accept any major change of the kind implied above, especially in relation to issues of welfare and multiculturalism. But—and this is central to my argument—France is characterized by the same kinds of social polarization documented elsewhere, a transformation that began as early as the 1970s. My brief comparison here is meant to highlight the broader, globally driven nature of the polarization process, which is articulated to different state policies and ideological elaborations yet is nonetheless a reality that cannot be deduced from the discourses themselves.

The kind of transformation of social and political positions outlined above for the United States, and implicitly for other countries such as the UK and Sweden, was studied in some depth in France as well, and quite a bit earlier. The fact that Bourdieu, starting in the 1990s, wrote primarily about a political situation that would be frightening for academic elites in Britain and Sweden is related to the structural violence of the transformation in France. In no uncertain terms, Bourdieu attacked Third Way, globalization, and multiculturalism as new forms of power talk, much of it originating in the United States at the center of what he saw as a new imperialism. In his characterization (noted above) of Anthony Giddens, who has published translations of much of Bourdieu's work, as "the messenger of the prince," the latter being Tony Blair, Bourdieu is more radical than Giddens's British critics. He views Giddens quite simply as a state intellectual whose job it is to socialize other intellectuals into the Third Way. Indeed, as chancellor of the London School of Economics Giddens was perfectly positioned between government and the university system. Bourdieu also took it upon himself to criticize France's new cultural elites, including the media "fast thinkers" who sold out the potential of critical thinking to the flash and fame of the limelight. Bourdieu can be said to represent a new French populism, and other intellectuals accused him of doing so.

Compared to Britain, France is more similar to Sweden in its centralism and the idea that the political representatives of the people ought to steer the latter to the promised land. In Sweden, the tie of representativity is more powerful than in France, where elitism is much more apparent and accepted.

Swedish egalitarianism in the post–World War II era tended to reduce political elites to mere instruments of their constituencies, whereas in France elites were instead supposed to be dedicated representatives of a superior project that often is "the people" (this is clear in the "republican" tendency in politics). The ENA, Ecole Nationale d'Administration, was established to produce highly competent bureaucratic rulers in a project that, though clearly elitist, was nonetheless conceived in terms of the well-being of the nation. In France the expression "political class" is commonplace and thought to be self-evident. Still, though, there is a certain supposed union between "the people" and certain of the elites, not least the cultural elite. The very notion of a "front populaire" is a favorite expression of class alliance for the good of the exploited. And the term for the welfare state itself, *L'Etat Providence*, is clearly royal in content: the term "providence" combines the notion of providence and the strictly practical notion of provision. This welfare model, like that of other countries, has begun to fracture. There is a decreasing lack of confidence in elites as well as a differentiation into two different kinds of projects, one oriented to the world and another oriented to the national territory (Julliard 1997).

The fracture in France came in the 1970s, quite early indeed and quite markedly as well. The factors involved were similar to those in other places, although their valences may have been different. France was struck by massive and rising unemployment. To highlight the fracture in the former alliance between elites and the masses, which had been rooted in the notion of a common enlightenment project, Julliard focused on parallel changes in attitudes to three issues: capital punishment, the EU, and immigration. In the 1960s the large percentage of the population opposed to capital punishment grew until the 1970s, hitting 58 percent while those in favor dwindled to 33 percent. This was quickly reversed in the 1970s, and by 1985 supporters were at 65 percent while opponents languished at 29 percent. The trend eventually leveled off at the same percentages. More interesting is that these attitudes, which previously prevailed on the right, had become markers of the left, and that the principle shift was by left voters moving rightward on this position. In 1991, 64 percent of communist voters were for capital punishment—a rate of support almost as high as the 71 percent for members of the center-right UDF (1997: 90).

The same relation was reflected in differences in education levels: 76 percent of those with only primary education were for and 19 percent were against, while the proportion was the inverse among citizens with secondary education, 56 percent of whom were against and 37 percent for capital punishment. The same inversion characterized fear and the will to take action against criminal violence, as well as attitudes to the EU and immigration. Those most "afraid" of growing danger and insecurity in French society were also supporters of the Front National (76 percent in 1993). A survey in 1992 indicated that 61 percent of the population was against continued immigration. Broken down,

this stance was held by 84 percent of peasants, 72 percent of workers, and 50 percent of the professional and bureaucratic middle classes. Those with the most education typically favored immigration most, but even here the level was only 48 percent. In this same period, 83 percent of the population was against the idea of children being allowed to wear veils to school (school uniforms were still an established custom at the time).

This fracture was most significant in its cleavage of the left itself, which Julliard designated as a separation between the moral left and the sociological left, the elite and the populace. On this matter the political elite was (and still is) itself split between a more republican and assimilationist, and more multiculturalist and even cosmopolitan position. The 1977 *loi Debré*, which imposed stricter controls on immigration, sparked a counterdemonstration, and the newspaper *Libération* published a list, classified by professional category, of the signatories to a petition against the law (108). More than two-thirds of the listed people had at least two years of university education, and half had university diplomas equivalent to the MA. Only 4 percent of the signatories were workers. This, it can be argued, represented a massive change in political identity, with the lower end of the population sinking into nationalism/localism as the upper end became increasingly liberal and cosmopolitan. This interpretation is reinforced by the voting statistics for the Front National in the late 1990s, when upwards of 30 percent were workers.

Juillard's interpretation fits the model I have suggested here. France underwent a vertical polarization. Elites consolidated around a set of representations of reality that were directly contrary to the views of those whom they once thought they represented. Elites can be said to have switched constituencies in this period:

> Aux ouvriers elles ont substitué les immigrés et ont reporté sur ceux-ci le double sentiment de crainte et de compassion qu'inspire généralement le prolétaire. Or l'immigré n'est pas seulement victime de l'exclusion sociale, mais aussi de l'exclusion ethnique, autrement dit du racisme. (105)
>
> They have substituted immigrants for workers and transferred the double feeling of fear and compassion that characterized their sentiments with regard to the proletarian. And the immigrant is not only the victim of social exclusion but also ethnic exclusion, that is racism.

His argument also implies another, more general shift from the social to the cultural question: "It is this epoch which is the origin of the fusion of the 'social question' and the 'racial question'" (C'est donc à cette époque que remonte la conjugaison de la question sociale et de la question raciale) (105). Here again the inversion of social representations exemplifies dichotomies that relate to our other examples.

The shift can be said to increase the social distance between the left elite and the masses of the nation. This distance also entails a culturalization of class

identity: oppression is no longer a question of economic exploitation, but of cultural exclusion, or rather the social exclusion of specific cultural, primarily ethnic groups. For the liberal right the convergence is less problematic, as such values are already prevalent in this ideology. The formation of a new left-right center is also a French phenomenon. But the situation is complicated by the strength of the marginalized left and right, which have become the loci of social protest. It must also be noted that the elites are themselves quite split between nationalist-republican ideals and the newer cosmopolitan identities. The dichotomization is similar to that described for other Western nation-states.

These oppositions are more complex than they appear here. At the core of the specificity of the French situation is the presence of a strong republican ideology. The latter has always been associated with "the progressive," socialism, and welfare, but the majority of the right is also strongly republican. It is also openly assimilationist and anti-multicultural, for the simple reason that the nation is understood as a civic project descended from the Enlightenment. It is neither for nor against immigration but insists on a popular engagement in the national project as a social project based on shared values with respect to a future society based on equality, democracy, and welfare. Rightist nationalism is a product of the culturalization of the republican ideal, which vitiates the possibility of assimilation when identity becomes cultural, and thus ethnic. This nationalist outcome is what has sometimes been referred to as cultural racism. It has been criticized as the foundation of both racism and anti-racism in the seminal work of Taguieff (1988). Culturalization of population categories generates exclusionist republicanism not only in the ideology of the nationalist right, but also in many quarters of the left. It is interesting in this respect that SOS Racisme, which had tended to take a differentialist approach to multiculturalism (although spiced with a youth culture–based notion of *métissage, i.e., mixture*), was forced to abandon it for a more republican integrationism when the nationalist right appropriated the same discourse. And of course the culturalization of population categories is a product of the general decline of modernism, which affected the context of identity politics in France as much as in other countries. A hotly debated demographic category, "*français de souche*," was proposed by certain demographers to distinguish ethnic French from other French. It caused a certain furor among those who, as staunch republicans, refused to accept ethnic categories.

Julliard noted that after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the liberal left drew closer to the liberal right, and that this tendency was strongest among social democrats: "The acknowledgement of the exhaustion of the social democratic model transformed the militants of the revolution, then reform, into militants of cultural liberalism" (Le constat de l'épuisement du modèle social-démocrate a transformé les militants de la révolution, puis de la réforme, en militants du libéralisme culturel) (1997: 201).

And the rhetorical question concerning "the people" today emerged in the following terms: "Should one go further and ask . . . whether the 'people' is not the natural enemy of democracy, seduced by authoritarianism, accomplice of tyrants and inclined to acts of violence?" (Fallait-il aller plus loin et se demander . . . si le peuple n'est pas un ennemi naturel de la démocratie, séduit par l'autoritarisme, complice des tyrans et enclin à la violence ?" [204]). Here it should not be forgotten that in the nineteenth century the left had been the foremost bearer of nationalism, often of a quite belligerent nature, while the right was cosmopolitan and pacifist. This becomes a key consideration in an era in which left and right are associated with particular, highly essentialized positions, and political categories, like other categories, have become entirely "ethnicized" as the respectable versus the dangerous classes.

Contradictions

Many intellectuals are taken with cosmopolitan discourse, which occurs in a situation in which other discourses are rampant as well. Most obvious are the discourses of nationalism, ethnicity, minority rights, and indigenism, which were discussed in the previous chapter. These discourses come from very different positions. They start from the middle and descend to the bottom of the Western sector of the world system. These are discourses of localized identity—identity constructed for the access to and defense of space, whether the social space of identity or the socially identified space of geographical territory. These discourses and representations are not hybrid, but select certain characteristics that create commonalities of collective identity. These are the Canadian Indians who refuse to accept the status of ethnic minority, the Australian Aborigines who refuse to join in the mongrel project Creative Nation (1994), and the nationalists, regionalists, and locally oriented identities, as well as sexual, religious and other cultural identities, that strive to create localized homogeneity. The identities expressed in such discourses, contrary to cosmopolitan rhetoric, are not encompassing of otherness. They need not be exclusionary either, but in such cases they are strongly assimilationist: "If you want to be one of us you have to conform to our way of life."[5]

The identities produced in these positions tend to be more than objectified texts to be consumed. They are instead anti-texts based very much on the changing configurations of power. As texts, they also reveal strange similarities in positions. Thus the so-called New Right in Europe displays many traits that are typical of indigenous discourses. For those interested in dichotomizing politics along simple left/right lines, such coincidences must seem highly problematic. But this is an effect of another, perhaps stronger dichotomy, vertical in nature, that pits the people against both political and economic elites. This is the core of

populism, whose history in the last century is revealing of the structural shifts referred to here. At the turn of the twentieth century, populism was understood as progressive—the project of the impoverished, marginalized, exploited classes, rural and urban alike. This changed substantially over the course of the century as the political division between left and right became directly linked to state organization via unions and the emergence of the welfare state itself. Populism became increasingly associated with anarchistic, localist, and finally rightist tendencies. Throughout the past decade, "populist" has been used to slander all those who fall outside accepted political ideology; usually it is linked to definitions of reaction. Thus, while the *Neue Mitte* moves in the direction of *la voie unique*, implying that political ideology is passé, the former division into right and left is transmuted into one based on the following oppositions:

Progressive	Reactionary
Democratic	Undemocratic
Multicultural	Racist
(Neo)Liberal	Conservative-socialist
Globalizing	Localizing (nationalist)

The association of terms within each of the two sets is systemically salient. The progressive assumes that democracy is now seen to imply multicutlturalism, neoliberalism, and globalism, while the reactionary assumes an undemocratic position implying racism, conservatism (a welfare state), and localism or nationalism. The latter set represents a major shift in which liberal and neoliberal values formerly associated with American power and the worst of capitalism have today taken center stage as progress itself. This was very much the self-understanding of the "Society of the elect" envisioned by the great colonialist Cecil Rhodes, but it was not shared then, as it is today, by both the official right and left parties.



Figure 8.1. Diametric to concentric dualism

In a well-known article on the dialectics of dualism, Lévi-Strauss (1957) suggested that dual organizations possess the curious logical capacity to represent both egalitarian and hierarchical relations of opposition. The former were the most commonly known; they divided societies into moieties, two equal halves of a divided circle. The latter type of dichotomy divided the social world into inside and outside—center and periphery, chiefs and commoners. Lévi-Strauss argued that there was a transformational relation between the two, so that one could become transmuted into the other over time. I would suggest that a similar transformation can be said to have occurred in this era of globalization, one that moves our representations from left vs. right to elites vs. commoners, which is equivalent to the "good people" versus the "dangerous classes."

This is the result of the formation of new, cosmopolitanized elites who are upwardly mobile and "progressive," while those who are downwardly mobile are "backward-looking and reactionary." The left-right dichotomy is here verticalized into up = progressive and down = reactionary. No clear hegemony is established as yet in this transformation, and all such shifts are fragile. It might be noted that the world is populated by populist as well as cosmopolitan representations, and that they are quite irreconcilable. In previous publications (Friedman 1998, 1999), I have argued that the proliferation of discourses of indigeneity, ethnicity, religious identity, and all forms of localizing cultural identity are expressions of the fragmentation that accompanies de-hegemonization in the global system. Discourses of globalization, multiculturalism, and hybridity are simultaneous products of this process that are linked by the co-occurrence of real globalization and fragmentation. To oversimplify, one might say that de-hegemonization in the world system is an expression of the decentralization of capital accumulation, which takes the form of globalization of capital. It leads to the decline of old centers, their fragmentation and ethnicization, as increasing competition in the rest of the world gives rise to new centralizations and national consolidations in emergent hegemonic zones. The globalization of capital is accompanied by increasing class polarization, resulting in the globalization of elites as they come to identify increasingly with the larger world rather than with their own declining countries. In such quarters of the system, a discourse linking neoliberalism, global humanism, and hybridity begins to emerge, vying for a hegemonic position in the way the world is represented.

In the previous chapter I discussed how transnationalism developed into an ideology of global encompassment. The logic of this development also applies to the way elites identify themselves in relation to their supposed constituents. The inversion of the world transforms elites into sovereign actors separate from and superior to those whom they represent. The process of centralization described here combines with that inversion to reconfigure the nature of the notion of democracy. The stronger the centralization, the stronger the embodiment of "democracy" within the political class itself. Thus when the Swedish secretary of

state Anna Lind was murdered in Stockholm, it was reported that she had been assassinated in her democratic activities. In fact, she was merely shopping at a high-end department store. But an emergent property of these reports and their discussions is the tendency to identify particular politicians as incarnations of democracy itself. If elites already contain democracy within their bodies, then there is no need for formal democratic procedure—they *are* democracy! This embodiment of what was previously the formal property of a political arena is closely linked to centralization. The people are no longer the source of sovereignty but a problem, a "dangerous class" that threatens the exemplary moral project of the elite. This development tends to return citizens to the status of subjects.

Since the 1990s a new concept has been adopted in relation to the transformation described above. The word *värdegrund*, which translates as "fundamental values," is used to capture the content of democracy. It includes the specific ideologies discussed here, multiculturalism being one of its core aspects (Boström 2000). This makes it possible to equate anti-multicultural sentiment or opposition to increased immigration with an anti-democratic stance. It transforms democracy, which is formally about political representation, into a set of fixed moral-political values that include ethnicity, sexual preferences, and sometimes even global warming. In its very logic, *värdegrund* introduces the possibility of absolute rule: what is democratic is no longer represented by such trivia as voting, but by the values that are considered "good," that is, morally and politically correct.

Room at the Top

It should come as no surprise that this discourse is powerfully lodged within liberal global organizations. UNESCO's series of World Culture Reports are important instruments in the diffusion of elite ideology. By enlisting multiple intellectuals, often of quite different persuasions but adept in crucial areas of the new ideology, it can be said to have established or at least actively struggled for a new interpretation of global reality. The first reports celebrated diversity and hybridity; the most recent report addresses issues of potential and real conflict as well. The summary statement of the report announces in no uncertain terms that globalization has brought forth a new world, a new cultural landscape. The term millennium is central to this discourse of newness, in which the world is moving toward an ultimate blending of differences:

> The world is hearing a magnificent overture of cultural possibilities. People everywhere, however, are repositioning themselves in this vast global commons in order to preserve part of their traditions, while at the same time engaging in cultural exchanges and redefining their relationships with neighbors on this tiny planet. (UNESCO World Culture Report 2000: 8)

Still, cognizant that new conflicts abound, the report reiterates the need to find solutions to discord that has taken the form of cultural conflicts. Yet even conflicts like these are potentially good for the future of cultural development (8). The major driving force of cultural change is globalization itself:

> At present, globalization, telecommunications and informatics are changing the way in which people identify and perceive cultural diversity. In particular, the outworn metaphor of the "mosaic of cultures" or "the global cultural mosaic" no longer describes different people's cultural preferences as they enter the world of the twenty-first century. Cultures are no longer the fixed, bounded, crystallized containers they were formerly reputed to be. Instead they are transboundary creations exchanged throughout the world via the media and the Internet. We must now regard culture as a process rather than as a finished product. (8)

Here, this textbook cultural globalization discourse is no longer a suggestion but a higher Truth. A magnificent future based on constant cultural trafficking, as though it were a new phenomenon in world history, is described as the future to come. Before, we were separate beings in a larger mosaic of differences. Now, after globalization, we are finally mixed and fused. Unfortunately, this all involves a lot of conflict; hence culture is also "a site of contestation" (9), to invoke another popular anthropological term. But even it needs refurbishment, since contestation is no solution. Instead culture is translated as a "site of negotiation," yet another key concept, not least among hybridization "theorists." And the people at the center of our world's power structure have the last word:

> If cultural diversity is an irrepressible manifestation of the inventiveness of the human spirit, the creation of difference is equally inexorable. No attempt should be made to stifle or repress it. Yet it is the manner in which such difference is defined and acted upon by governments and social custom that determines whether it is to lead to greater overall social creativity or else to violence and exclusion. (9)

This extraordinary statement calls for intervention in a supposed process of differentiation that is not supposed to be occurring, as we are all considered to be busy transgressing cultural borders and creating new hybridities. Culture is okay as long as it doesn't get self-centered and vicious. Could this mean that culture is acceptable only when it is not implicated in political identity? Apparently it does, although that is not explicit in the statement that the "celebration of diversity, while it does not imply relativism, does imply pluralism" (10). Similarly, when faced with the real conflicts implied by what I have referred to as cultural fragmentation, we are told that "the right approach is not to confront cultural fragmentation with globalizing economic forces but rather to synthesize identity claims and globalization" (10). The real fear here is that differences might run too deep to deal with in any simple globalized market. The solution is to flatten out difference, leaving us with "structures

of common difference" (Wilk 1998)—culture commoditized and objectified for exhibition in the global diversity market, much like the high-end craft fair set up for the UNESCO meeting in Copenhagen where this report was first presented. Culture is further refined in its section on cultural heritage, where "the leading chapter proposes that treating heritage as capital assets will lead to better decisions regarding the allocation of resources for its preservation and protection" (10).

The concentric dualism described here is in one sense a latent structure, but in another sense it is a structure that is perpetually available. It is in fact the form that cultural hierarchy assumes, though in periods of globalization it tends to become generalized. The very concept of a *Neue Mitte* expresses this hierarchical centricity. The words new and middle combine a temporal and a spatial centricity. "The respectable" includes those who are centrally located in the current process of social polarization at the local, national, and global levels. The global elites, however culturally heterogeneous, form a kind of inner circle; meanwhile, they are paralleled and reinforced by the very structure of global cities, whose financial centers, surrounded by circles of diminishing ranks of consultants, services, and flexible proletariats, replicate the same kind of concentric organization—a dualism that, as Lévi-Strauss insisted, is open-ended and can extend outward, and in this case downward, to ever new levels. The new respectability is a fundamental expression of a pervasive set of concentric tendencies in the contemporary transformation of Western social space.

Notes

1. Interesting that the presence of "Muslim" as an ethnic label in this statement suggests the kind of category confusion that one would expect from a strong associationist mentality.
2. This makes sense, since the principal author of the green paper, Tom Burns, was Kamali's thesis adviser.
3. This refers to, and was written during, the "reign" of social democrat Göran Persson from 2000 to 2006.
4. In statistical terms it might well be argued that poverty has decreased worldwide, but this is almost entirely the result of China's development of its economy and the emergence of its large middle class, which in mere quantitative terms significantly alters global demographic proportions with regard to consumption. The same process has occurred in India. For the rest of the world, however, polarization has clearly increased significantly, and this major trend is ongoing in most countries of the world. In our terms, the transfer of capital to East Asia has had the effect of rapid development; meanwhile, poverty has worsened in most of the world, including the West.
5. This is the political model expressed by Pauline Hanson's strongly assimilationist One Nation party.

Conclusion

Understanding the Context and Logic of Contemporary Political Correctness

In the original version of the *Current Anthropology* article reproduced in part in chapter 2, I suggested that political correctness could indeed be an interesting research subject. Below I offer a summary of this book's main arguments with some additional examples that have constantly caught my attention since the original was completed. The heightening of the valence of language in PC is one of PC's principal characteristics. Acts of naming, of classifying, of differentiating self from other are highly emotional practices in situations of PC. This is why I suggest that the signal and identifying (indexical) functions of communication override its content.

This is not unlike Freud's notion of dream work itself, in which displacement and condensation combine to create universes of associations driven by anxiety and fear. The conditions under which it occurs are, I suggest, conditions of sociality. The signaling function of language provides metalinguistic information about interlocutors' nature and intentions, which are indexes of position. Indexing becomes all-important in situations of insecurity, but it can also be a normal situation in social organizations based on mutual social control. Below I shall explore the continuum of such control, which, I suggest, differs in different social contexts, even where historical tendencies are similar. It is often suggested that Americans have a relatively free relation to language use because the latter carries relatively little social force, enabling varieties of excuses like "Nothing personal!" or "I didn't mean it." This has changed, but then the issue of political correctness has also become a major topic.[1] It might be that PC becomes a recognized phenomenon only in politically heterogeneous situations, and that it went unrecognized in Sweden because there has been only one, rather centrally organized, political discourse—a national doxa.

I have argued that an anthropology of PC needs to focus on PC as a form of communication and control of meaning, but I stressed that understanding the

conditions of its emergence is of utmost importance. PC emerges in situations of hegemonic crisis, in which old and new elites compete for the establishment of new or re-establishment of old hegemonies. The results, in terms of communication, are similar even where the conditions are very different. The focus of this work is the formation of globalized elites and the emergent ideology of globalization, which is their identity. Any opposition to this ideology is a threat that evokes both fear and hate. The local, the place-based, and the indigenous are de-classified as reactionary and dangerous.[2] This core schema generates, as I said earlier, a vast array of associations used to classify the concrete world into the good, the bad, and the ugly, the ugly presumably being the fellow travelers. In a previous publication (1997) I suggested that the new ideology is itself an inversion of a former modernism and this is the primary focus of chapter 7.

Globalization, multiculturalism, hybridity, border-crossing, and migration are all seen as revolutionary forces. Yet this vision seems to embody a class-bound vision for a new, mobile cultural elite and the "revolted" elites of the political, media, and capitalist classes whose aura they reflect. This statement requires filling out but cannot be discussed in any depth here (see also Friedman 1998; Dirlik 1997; Julliard 1997; Conan 2004). It might suffice to suggest that until very recently, neoliberalism managed to look progressive in relation to a backward-looking, conservative socialism. The progressive is, quite simply, identified with the inevitable future. The rational is real and the real is rational.

The Sociality of Fear and the Generation of Political Correctness

Political correctness is an important area for anthropologists to explore. Besides the interesting comparisons that can be made with phenomena such as witchcraft and sorcery, understood as states or fields rather than as mere practices, it offers, via a still more interesting logic, insight into the role of forms of communication and levels of communication that has been touched upon but never integrated into the mainstream of anthropological thought (but see Kapferer below).

The conditions in which PC appears provide a kind of hypothetical model of what to search for. The components of increasing fear and anxiety are embodied in the sociality of specific social fields, so they may not necessarily be manifest outside an institutionalized setting such as the university or the political elite. The degree to which these feelings become generalized depends on the organization of larger social spaces, their degree of centralization, and how relevant particular issues become to larger populations via centralization. Unni Wikan's "answer" to Geertz's suggestion that Balinese personhood consisted of masks with nothing underneath is instructive. Wikan demonstrates

effectively that when people laugh in response to danger and tragedy, they are acting as subjects entrapped in a situation of extreme danger to their well-being. In these conditions any sign of weakness, such as crying openly, enables the forces of sorcery to successfully penetrate the self. The mask, then, is a form of defense in a situation infused with sorcery. And this situation is not a momentary phenomenon but a stabilized state of affairs, a veritable structure of existence. In circumstances of this kind of social fragility, the subject is under constant threat and must ultimately find mechanisms of survival or succumb to something closer to panic. Shifting focus away from the semantic value of communicative acts toward their social sign value—defined as the meta-semantic properties of communication that can be used to categorize the person—is part of the process of orientating oneself to such situations.

The semantic and the social indexical categories, which I have brought up several times, might be understood as related inversely to one another. Both forms exist in all social communication. In normal situations the semantic content of communication is dominant and the indexical less marked, but in periods of stress or in institutional situations of strong horizontal social control, the social indexical outweighs the semantic. Thus there are differences in structure as well as in historical situation that come to bear upon the invocation of PC as a form of control. The latter is then a question of historical conjuncture in which a certain potential mode of communication is realized.

"Modernity" and Witchcraft: Contiguity Disorder

African history features quite marked periods of so-called witchcraft epidemics that have been amply described and analyzed. One of the classical explanations, which in fact is more of an empirical correlation, links witchcraft to major social turmoil, the breakdown of social order that was most often triggered by massive European intervention, especially at the end of the nineteenth century (Ekholm Friedman 1992). Ekholm Friedman's (1994) work on the Congo and Geschiere's on Cameroon (1995), convincingly demonstrate the modern transformation of witchcraft. In Congo-Brazzaville, witchcraft surged dramatically following the economic crisis of the 1980s. It became generalized to all areas of a socially transformed life as disorder and insecurity accelerated. Today, the arenas of accusation have extended beyond the lineage and alliance network to invade the workplace and, increasingly, the political arena. It is not merely a question of accusation, however, since the use of magic and sorcery in the search for economic, political, and sexual gain is an expanding reality.

Clearly, enormous differences distinguish what I have designated as PC from witchcraft in the Congo. Yet there is also an area of similarity: in both

cases, a critical disordering of what is conceived of and experienced as normal, moral, and secure prompts a reaction in which changes in life situations are accounted for in terms of forces controlled by relevant others. Further, the world is ever more intensively transformed into to a catalog of signs. These indexes of associations in time and space generate a classification of relevant people: the accused. Associational "logic" is pivotal in this process. Accusations are established by categorizing the accused in terms of contiguities and overlapping semantic categories. In societies that practice witchcraft, such associations exist in everyday life; however, they are mobilized only in crisis situations. The similarity between witchcraft accusations and PC lies in the triggering conditions and the kinds of logic involved. There is, then, a "family resemblance" between PC and witchcraft accusations. But one could take this further and suggest that the fundamental mechanisms are of the same order.

This argument seeks to distinguish the structural properties of a very general kind of social phenomenon from its particular cultural manifestations. The recent and sometimes polemical writing on the apparently explosive increase in sorcery is itself quite ensconced in a culturalist understanding of the world (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Geschiere 1997; Ekholm Friedman 1994, 1999; Falk Moore 2008). The key question concerns the experience of the strange and the irrational. Witchcraft is not like the modern, because the modern is based on rationality and hence the denial of magic. This is especially true of the many who have insisted on the very modernity of witchcraft (Geschiere 1997; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999) when they argue that the contemporary proliferation of such practices should not be seen in terms of cultural continuity, which they interpret as the promulgation of a false traditionalism. The ensuing argument is that the appearance of sorcery is a contemporary phenomenon (of course) that these authors interpret as a reflexive discourse on modernity and, more specifically, a reaction to globalization. The latter threatens the human and social integrity of people's lives, and sorcery is an attempt to control the situation. Thus modern sorcery is an expression of modern disorder.

All of this is well taken, with one exception: it does not treat sorcery as an encompassing condition, but as a particular activity, thus reducing the argument to the question of what people are upset about: non-payment of bridewealth, sickness, death, insufficient cash to buy globalized consumption goods. That last situation is enough cause for them to claim that modern sorcery has nothing to do with the past, which prompted one critic to exclaim, "The idea that the contemporary configuration of these phenomena is attributable to present forms of capitalism is to turn contemporaneity into cause, general context into particular explanation" (Falk Moore 2008: 306).

The treatment of sorcery as an activity that links specific objects tends to instrumentalize the phenomenon simply as a kind of practice and not an embedded structure of experience.

> The same frame of mind would claim that if Kwakiutl performed potlatches with sewing machines and other modern goods rather than coppers and blankets (sic!) they were doing something completely modern, not just completely contemporary.

Although the Comaroffs in particular acknowledge the personal terror and human destruction involved in the new "occult economies" and often state explicitly that historical continuities are involved, they do not attempt to understand why sorcery and related phenomena are not reinventions but normal and immediate reactions to lived situations. Their approach replicates the older functionalism in witchcraft studies, which considers sorcery a functional expression of social disorder. This is evident in their comparison of witchcraft phenomena with Western examples of Satanism and other cultic activities. A more systematic comparison would have to find similar parameters of social relations, and in this sense the PC phenomenon seems much more relevant, despite its lack of cult-like or magical connotations.

PC—including both discourse and practice—differs considerably from witchcraft accusation in its specific contents and specific conditions of existence. It occupies a different locus, a social reality unlike that described for kinship and other "non-modern" organized social worlds. The phenomenon of PC is common to a modernity understood as a structural phenomenon, not as mere contemporaneity. This social world is configured into individualized subjects (a matter of degree, of course) by an open public sphere in which a plurality of ideologies are in competition, an institutionalized dichotomy between the private and the public, and an overriding principle of alterity in which the relation between the subject and any particular cultural scheme is one of objectification. But there are interesting zones of overlap as well. The utilization of language, the discourse of associationism, and the social sign value of contiguities that occur in a situation of fear produce effects analogous to those in witchcraft. Both cases entail a practice of including a specific subject in a particular category designated as dangerous and evil via associative thinking, and in both this practice is a means of social control. But witches often have no self-control, the evil they perpetrate being only one of the elements of their being. Victims of PC accusations, on the other hand—like many sorcerers and others who use magic to attain specific ends—are willful and responsible for their own actions. Even here, however, there is a gradient of responsibility ranging from poor judgment to fellow traveling to the real thing. In any case, no denial is possible: whether conscious or not, the true nature of the categorized individual is apparent to the accusers, and all expressions to the contrary can be understood as lies and cover-ups.

One might suggest that these cases also exhibit strong similarities in the experience of being accused. The accused person may feel paralyzed by the gaze of the other, unable to mobilize the internal will needed to function nor-

mally. Those who are themselves ensorcelled often recount such an experience, but it can be said to extend to all parties to such relations. Kapferer's discussion of the role of intentionality as a foundational aspect of sorcery is instructive here. The penetration of another subject's intentionality is a subversion of the self, because once the project of the other is subsumed, the self is paralyzed as an autonomous subject. PC and sorcery/witchcraft situations have in common a social field characterized by fear of the intentionalities of others, fear of the "gaze" of the other. Under such circumstances, social maneuverability is severely restricted and rife with taboos.

Witchcraft and Narcissism

Narcissism, as we have discussed it, can be formally understood as a kind of social dependency whereby individual subjects are not autonomous beings responsible for their own actions in the operative sense, but subjects that are part of a larger set of relations and depend for their existential wellbeing on the "gaze of the other," which either guarantees their continued being or negates their value as worthy members of a larger collective. In modern capitalist societies, where such collectivities are not produced within the institutional order of the nation-state, narcissism may take the form of a subjective disorder, a desperate hunt for recognition by the other that usually fails, insofar as such recognition can almost never be maintained on a constant basis in an individualized world. The common solution to narcissistic disintegration in the contemporary world is the formation of new collective identities, the most minimal of which is "falling in love" (Friedman 1992; Alberoni 1979).

The desire for belonging is a desire for a kind of security-in-recognition that is difficult to maintain in a world of disintegrating ego structures. Alberoni's little discussed but impressive work on social movements (1982) offers a useful way of integrating the larger social context and subjective practices of sodality formation. His notion of the nascent state describes the end point solution of a process of withdrawal of libidinal energy from formerly cathected objects. In Freudian language this is another way of describing the trajectory of depression. The detachment of the self from the other is the core of depression, and its converse is the act of falling in love, the minimal *nascent state*. The latter consists in the reinvestment of libido in a new object of desire, but this is not merely a question of desire. It is a question of partaking in the other, of fusion of projects and of selves, of formation of a unity, at least in the imagination. But it is to be noted that the imaginary is lived reality. It is the armature of social experience. The particular way in which social movements are constituted, according to Alberoni, must be further specified in anthropological terms as a specifically Western kind of phenomenon. In this collectivization of individual

projects, the group project is substituted for the individual project, which in lived experience is one in which the two become identical. Thus I become an extension of the group, its true expression. This is not to be construed as a mere agreement, a strategic arrangement as in a contract or a political alliance in which the separate projects are merely bound by common interests. In the nascent state there is only one interest, and it requires a massive psychic investment by the individual, which explains the lack of movement longevity.

In tracing the various forms nascent states take as they cool off and become institutionalized or even extinct over time, Alberoni describes a kind of collectivity that is interesting here. The nascent state is a situation of fusion of selves, a practice of submission to a higher purpose in which the impermeable boundaries between bodies disappear. It is this aspect that can be said to resemble the way in which sociality is constituted in many kinship-based and holistic societies. The difference, of course, is that such societies cannot be characterized as nascent, although they may contain many practices that create and maintain such states. What is crucial, however, is that such societies are characterized by an interpersonal dependence that is not based on an agreement, but instead inscribed in forms of sociality. A society in which subjects interpenetrate one another is susceptible to witchcraft accusations. In such a society morality and health are often identical, and misfortune is always perpetrated by the "other." The logic of witchcraft is a subset of a more general logic of sociality in which the subject is dependent upon the larger group for his or her very existence. In kinship-organized societies this can be a highly structured relation, despite a great deal of variation. The collectivity is a community constituted by the political practice of alliance and descent in which the former actively constitutes selfhood. Such is not the case in the contemporary world, where communities of this type do not exist institutionally and sodalities need to be created ex nihilo. In the former case the larger community is constituted by relations of political authority within the kinship organization itself. In the contemporary nascent state, the community is a direct outcome of the voluntary engagement of its members.

If narcissism is understood as I have defined it, this common potential situation can be structured differently in different social contexts. I have suggested that certain forms of sociality are directly constituted by a basic interpenetration of subjects. This is often represented and interpreted as the "partible person" divided into separate categories that are in their turn integrated directly into a larger social world and cosmology (Strathern 1988; Héritier 1977; Ekholm Friedman 1992, 1994). The person might also be constituted in a more concentric model in which the subject is encompassed by a series of categories of spirits, for example, that represent and are experienced as the social and cosmic order (Kapferer 2012). In such worlds the subject is

always defined by the larger array of others whose "gaze" is the guarantee of social order and personal existence. In individualist forms of sociality, no such larger world of signification exists and the self is constituted as an integral self-driven organization, a state in the body. Where this organization disintegrates it can only take the form of clinical narcissism, and the only ordering "gaze" is that of the medical profession or the church.[3] But the relation is of the same type: dependency and a profound desire for subsumption. This is not merely a cognitive phenomenon. As an engagement with the world, it is filled with an implosive sense of loss and insecurity. The subsumption of the self in a collective identity creates in its turn a need to maintain categorical boundaries, since the latter are neither obvious nor institutionalized. Only by moral imposition can categorical order be maintained.

"Clinical" narcissism is not the only context in which moral control becomes mandatory. In periods of reconfiguration of social control, rivals for positions of dominance use moral discourse in situations where there are no other means of maintaining their positions. In arenas of ideological reconfiguration where new elite discourses are on the rise, opposition can be countered by acts of exclusion and marginalization. Witchcraft accusations work in similar ways. As noted above, when the major mechanisms for identifying culprits are based on the associative mode, certain similarities are striking. These resemblances link to the issue of narcissism as follows. In modern forms of individualized sociality, any disintegration of individual subjects' subjectivity should lead to an increasing valence of associative thought. The similarity to narcissism lies in the increase of personal vulnerability that accompanies such changes. The argument suggests that in such periods, ontological security decreases because social identities are no longer clearly fixed within a larger scheme.

What might this mean in terms of "modern society"? I have discussed this elsewhere (1994) in terms of the decline of the modernist pole within modern identity space. Modernist identity can be said to be based on continuous alterity, where the subject invests in new identifications understood in terms of self-development. Inability to realize this self-development leads to a crisis of identification, one I discuss in terms of reversion to traditionalism (roots, religion, cults, ethnicity), primitivism (personal liberation cults, satanism, pro-nature movements, paganism, urban Indians) and postmodernism (primarily intellectual cynicism; opposition to science, rationalism, and the modern] (Friedman 1994: 93; also see figure C.1 below). Such reinvestment of the self is both a response to decreasing ontological security and a solution to the narcissistic disintegration of the self. This is a period in which identity instability has been on the increase and new identifications are therefore on the rise. Non-negotiability is a crucial property of cultural identity that renders it an ontological phenomenon that is not available to debate. But this should not

be taken to imply that identities do not change. On the contrary, the contemporary period demonstrates exactly the opposite—extreme lability of identity. But identities do not change as a result of talk any more than neuroses are overcome by "talking cures." Just as individuals belonging to indigenous movements are unconvinced by statements of their non-existence or artificiality, many of those who self-identify with postmodern cosmopolitanism are not readily susceptible to intellectual argument.

It is probably the case that contemporary cosmopolitan identity is not an entirely conscious phenomenon, although there are many who have explicitly made it their own. It more often takes the form of a project or an ideal. This, I suggest, is precisely the nature of an encompassing elite identification. Cultural elites, who are in the very center of discourse production for the larger world due to their social position,[4] subsume the rest of the world within their own self-construction. They are in this sense the self-evident avatars of a new and better world. They are the good, the humanitarians and the representatives of righteousness, the voice of God rather than the voice of the people. The self-evidence of this identification with such lofty ideals hides the fact that it is a particular cultural identity, just like those of the nationalists, indigenes, and rednecks. While particularist identities identify against and are culturally exclusive, cosmopolitan elite identification is directed upward, oriented vertically rather than horizontally. It is not oppositional in appearance but inclusive. Inclusion, however, implies hierarchical order: some are more cosmopolitan than others, some better suited to represent the world than others. Identification upward in the world system is not a collective practice at all but an individual act of social mobility, like joining a country club or the Society of the Elect, as Cecil Rhodes called his exclusive club of global capitalists at the turn of the last century (Quigley 1981).

In earlier publications I have suggested that there is a systemic relation between cycles of hegemony in global systems and changes in cultural identification (e.g., Friedman 1994). I suggested that the escalation of cultural politics as of the mid 1970s was related to the decline of Western hegemony in the global arena, a decline that was part of a process of world systemic pulsation—of expansion and contraction, geographic concentration and dispersal of capital accumulation. In the case of Western society, the relation between cultural identity and the hegemonic cycle is constituted by shifts within the identity space of modernity itself. Hegemony implies a strong modernism, developmentalism, rationalism, and individualism, whereas decline polarizes identity toward the divergent poles of traditionalism, primitivism, and postmodernism, the most statistically significant being traditionalism expressed in cultural politics: the search for and practice of rootedness, whether in ethnicity, communalism, nationalism, or religious identity (see Friedman 1994 for a full



Figure C.1. Hegemonic cycles, social positioning, and cultural identification

discussion of this process). My argument proposed narcissistic dissolution as the triggering mechanism in the formation of new identifications. What was conspicuously absent from that discussion was the reconfiguration of social positioning and class identity in these transformations. The model in figure C.1 seeks to illustrate the relation between the cyclical processes and the transformation of social positioning by locating two models of class configuration at the two ends of the cycle. The inverted curves represent the inverse relation between hegemonic expansion and decline and the accompanying integration/assimilation and fragmentation/cultural identification. In periods of expanding hegemony, the political center functions as an assimilation machine. The nation-state is itself organized very much in terms of nationality, and its elites are instruments in the formation of the state's cultural identity.

The era of expanding Western hegemony is one of violent dislocation of countless populations and their re-integration into the projects of the capitalist state. Slavery, colonization, and large-scale labor migration have been parts of this process. But these populations on the move or on the run were "integrated" into the political structures of the Western world system, not least by the formation of stigmatized ethnic minorities whose strategies were channeled by states and by their own leaders toward increasing identification with the new territories or with the elites of the colonial world. I use the word homogeny in the model, but it is meant only as a tendency. The real result was, of course, a

hierarchy that distributed populations along a continuum leading to European/White civilization, generating an evolutionary scheme of classification and saturating all aspects of modernist developmentalism. The dominant pole became modernism itself. Rational and progressive, it could easily transcend the nation-state itself in various cosmopolitan projects, from art to socialism to the elite associations of global capitalists. Modernist cosmopolitanism embodied rationalist and universalist ideals. Rather than an encompassment of the world's differences, it was oriented to the transcendence of all forms of particularism (i.e., Kantian cosmopolitanism). Rather than transnational, it was truly global in the sense of one-world of similar individuals. It was, in other words, a non-cultural union.

In periods of declining hegemony, the assimilation and nationalization process is reversed. The identity of the nation-state becomes increasingly weaker, and its subpopulations begin to reassert themselves. New migrants and former immigrants that were once ethnic minorities develop increasingly diasporic relations, just as nationals and indigenous groups embark on a rediscovery or reinforcement of their roots. This occurs in situations where modernism is no longer hegemonic and is often rejected. The "evolutionary" future becomes a thing of the past, and the past becomes a model for the future. What is called "indigenization" in the model is meant to capture the pervasive nature of these different strategies, and the re-rooting of "the people(s)." At the top of the system, former national and cosmopolitan elites are drawn increasingly into the emergent field of globalization. The modernist cosmopolitanism of the expansionist phase also delineates a global field and a regular process of globalization, but all under the sign of modernism. The postmodern global field is a transformed homology of the indigenization that occurs in the declining bottom of the social order. It is a globalization of cultural identity, one that encompasses the world's diversity within elite identity itself. It is possible only in the "consumptive mode." It is not, of course, about living as the others—or still less with the others—but about consuming their products in the form of objects and texts that furnish the living spaces of the elites, from public arenas to private homes. It is this identity that "naturally" generates discourses of flow, movement, and "routes"; and it has a strong tendency to celebrate precisely these "enriching" aspects of globalization. This is how such discourses have entered anthropology.

Logics of Sociality, Individuality, and the Associative Mode

Narcissism is not, in the usage adopted here, a psychological problem, nor even a psychological state. It refers to a mode of being in the world, a form of communicative and practical action, an aspect of a form of sociality. Thus,

PC is not a product of narcissism in some clinical sense. On the contrary, I have tried to characterize a kind of intersubjective dependence in which the "gaze of the other" becomes a more or less determinant structure of the social arena. While the cultural forms of this variation can be innumerable, I suggest that there is an underlying continuum from individualization to collectivization of the social field and that sociality can vary historically along this continuum just as it varies spatially. If this analysis is accepted then my account of the rise and spread of the PC phenomenon is related to a historical decline in modernist individuality and a tendency to narcissistic disintegration, an increase in the susceptibility of individual subjects to the mandates of the larger social fields of which they partake.

The cultural specificity of any real existing form of sociality distributes the different zones of vulnerability in this larger process. A population does not experience ontological insecurity as a general phenomenon; rather, this problem can be said to arise in specific instituted arenas. The only commonality is the basic characteristic of the problem itself: insecurity in one's identity, an experience of vulnerability and fear, and a need to classify the threatening others by association and to exclude them by essentialization. In the Western world this applies equally to racist discourse and PC discourse. It is a mode of sociality that develops in the arenas of structural reconfiguration. These are the hot zones that must be investigated.

The zones are comparable, if not identical, in much of the West to the extent that the social transformations are comparable. In Sweden the issue of immigration/multiculturalism has been such a zone because of the explicit re-identification of Swedish elites in a period of increasing polarization. In France this is not the case, although this may be changing, but it might be suggested that the country's continuing colonial politics in Central Africa was one such area of increasing paranoia in the late 90s and early years of 2000. The actual hot zones are determined by differing configurations of power in the elite even if there are similar overall tendencies. Thus I have argued that although the same kinds of elite discourses and identifications are being generated in France, they have not achieved the monopoly that is so apparent in Sweden despite being clearly very significant in academic circles. Moreover, hot zones can disappear and re-appear in new guises elsewhere as configurations of power change over time. The reason for this difference is that in Sweden, the state and its "organic" intellectuals entertain a dominant ideology of multiculturalism, while in France the state and its "intéllectuels du gouvernement" entertain an ideology of republicanism (Noiriel 2005). PC discourse might be said to be similarly structured in both cases, but the conditions of its use are different. And French republicanism is a state identity that seems relatively stable compared to the complete reversal that characterizes the Swedish case (but see Conan 2004 and Guilluy 2010).

The Continuum of Individuality

The continuum of individuality is illustrated by three loci that are meant to be understood as locations and not as types. This is not a typology but an attempt to explore the relevant parameters of variability.

I. If individuality is very strong, then the role of language context, or indexicality, is reduced, and nothing I say is directly relevant to my social context because almost all *faux pas* can be corrected. If something I say insults or even hurts you, I can take it back by saying, "I didn't mean it that way" or "I'm sorry." The expression "sticks and stones may break my bones but words can never harm me" is the core of this form of sociality. Politeness may be crucial, but only in characterizing an interlocutor as civil or not. This means that verbal combat is acceptable without damaging the relations among those involved. We can have vicious debates about issues and then go out to lunch together. Nothing personal! We can make ethnic jokes about one another and laugh about it without being hurt. Jokes are just jokes in this mode. Here the associative mode exists in a subordinate position, as gossip and as the usual construction of categories of everyday experience, but they cannot play a dominant role in the public arena.

II. As individuality weakens, what is said becomes increasingly important to the maintenance of interpersonal relations. This is what I referred to earlier as the ratio of indexicality, that is, the associations that emerge that relate what is said to the larger context, in both time and space. This escalation in the valence of language can be contained by silence and repression of course, but the intentionalities of those involved are always present somewhere in experience and potentially explosive. Politeness is marked in a different way here, as a crucial form of social competence. Debates are more difficult to maintain, and they must not become too aggressive, if people are not to be injured by them and thus seek revenge or nowadays, legal action. Loss of memory is also strategic in this form of sociality, especially loss of historical memory. It is a way of evading connections that may be incompatible with current self-identifications. Ethnic jokes, or jokes about any cultural identity, become increasingly difficult and can be the source of accusations of racism by those offended. Jokes are no longer just jokes. The associative mode gains in significance here. It may still rank low as a form of gossip, but it can easily be invoked when the level of vulnerability reaches a critical level. And as language is the expanding locus of potential transgression, it is here that political correctness is invoked in the classification of the dangerous. In this form of sociality, the favorite anthropological concept of "shame" becomes relevant. What will the neighbors say? Can I really be associated with X or Y without fear of classificatory contagion? The sign value of language predominates over

what is said. What is said must conform to the latent network of associations within which it is socially embedded.

III. As an ideal type we can consider the extreme in which individuality is practically non-existent. In this social field the subject is entirely defined in the social imaginary, that is, by external relations: one has no traits or desires that originate within oneself, and one's will is configured by the larger web of social relations. This individual is a mere locus of larger socio-cosmic forces.[5] Though the ideal type does not exist as such, it designates a set of tendencies that are present in many societies. The most extreme examples of the negation of the self can be found in certain Melanesian and African polities (Mosko 1985; Strathern 1988; Ekholm Friedman 1991; Héritier 1977; Augé 1975) where the self is conceived of as constituted by a number of elements that are all external to the body, which is a mere container. Among the Mekeo of Papua New Guinea, for example, these elements are returned to their donors at death. In examples from West Africa and India, the individual self exists but is understood as evil and placed under strict surveillance lest it create cosmic chaos by carrying out its selfish desires. And even here, external demons produce these desires by misleading the individual. In none of these cases are individuals clearly responsible for their own actions, even when those actions are punishable. What is said is institutionally defined as part of the social relations themselves. In this context language becomes a material force. Cursing my relatives or neighbors means that I have invoked real material powers to act upon them. If I say something about someone, I cannot simply take it back without performing an equally powerful negation of the former act. I certainly can't say I didn't mean it—that would be like removing an arrow from my victim after having shot it at him. And what is it, it will be asked, that drove me to this act?

The notion of the ethnic joke loses its obvious meaning here, not least because cultural identity is constituted differently in this form of sociality. There is plenty of humor, of course, and some of it might be quite nasty, but there is usually an officially instituted joking mode, a special meta-framing of speech that neutralizes its usual impact. Ethnic characterizations[6] may be common, but they are part of people's identification of the real social world and not just fun, nor even exaggerations. Jokes and ethnically demeaning statements are facilitated when ethnicity is only relevant outside the field of everyday sociality, but where there is intermarriage and social intermingling, such utterances may only be possible to the extent that the groups involved are ranked or otherwise clearly categorized with respect to one another. In such forms of sociality, the associative mode not only gains the upper hand but can be said to virtually encompass the semantic content of all communication. Language is primarily a mode of material practice, and the semantics of

communication is always contained within this practice. Thus what I say and whom I say it to are not mere events susceptible to interpretation and even gossip; rather, they are acts that are always already signifying. Here it stands to reason that accusations of witchcraft or sorcery are perfectly rationally deduced from the already established networks of contiguity that organize the cosmos.

Individualization and Narcissism

The rhetoric of neoliberalism and other liberalisms is usually associated with increasing individualism, in the sense of the autonomous ego and the decline of social dependence. This might seem to contradict my argument, but that is not exactly the case. The individualization of the person in the contemporary situation is not necessarily a sign of a strengthening of the individual self. On the contrary, I have suggested that it may be accompanied by a situation of extreme loss of autonomy. Narcissism as a concept captures quite precisely the paradox of the simultaneous presence of individuality and dependence, and the clinical diagnostics involved are generated by this paradox. Individuality and dependence become functions of one another in the state of narcissism.

An apparent increase in narcissistic disorders, recorded over the past decades, was noted quite a few years ago in a work dedicated to the subject (Lasch 1979. This could be contrasted with the prevalence of hysterical disorders, primarily among middle- and upper-class females at the turn of the twentieth century. Whereas the latter disorders were related to a high level of repression—a sign of ego dominance over the self—narcissistic disorders are, conversely, related to the disintegration of that dominance. In plainer language, this is the difference between a subject in strict control over his or her desires and intentions as originating in the self, and a subject whose self is beginning to lose its sense of autonomous self-control.

These are not absolute categories, but points on a continuum. If the psychological bias in Freudian language is eliminated, all of this can be referred to as the continuum of sociality described above. Insofar as this discussion has made use of temporal change within that continuum, it is essential to understand it as a more generalized field of variation. My three examples of kinds of control present on the continuum of individuality in the Swedish context stress the co-presence of strong individuality and strong interpersonal or collective control, as well as the conflict that co-presence creates. Not wishing to anger those who hate being categorized, I must stress again that the following remarks are suggestions based on material collected over at least a decade and are not about cultural essences or cultural personality, but about forms of sociality.[7]

If the strongest tendency in urban U.S. middle classes is toward category I, Sweden is somewhere between I and II. A highly monitored sociality is accompanied by a yearning for solitude as a liberation from the implicit demands of such sociality. The demands involved can be devastating to the point of personal disintegration, especially when the individual is subjected to moral attack. Examples of this kind of control are common in social movements, but they are not ubiquitous in ordinary social life. However, the collective control in some forms of sociality is comparable to such movements. As noted, ostracism within movements bears some similarity to witchcraft accusations in some of the classical anthropological literature. In both cases, fear of disintegration and disorder are paramount, and communication is short-circuited in a way that brings the formal features of political correctness into play.

This is no mere contest between the power of the collectivity and the strength of the individual. Despite yearning for liberation, the subject is dependent on the group as the primary source of recognition. The gaze of the other is therefore both life-giving and destructive. The logic of this form of sociality varies in the old-fashioned relativist sense. I have suggested that the tendencies in U.S. middle-class sociality contrast significantly with those in the Swedish case. In the former, individual autonomy is much stronger and the subject is relatively free of the "gaze of the other." Swedish society, however, tends toward the other end of this continuum. Using cultural representations as an index of this relation, one can observe that American films often thematize the desire and the search for community, whereas Swedish films thematize the desire to escape the stifling control of "community" or simply the "other." Still, I would stress that these are variable states of sociality that are more or less stabilized in particular historical circumstances. In other words, the contrast is possible only when historical process is strongly underestimated.

Individuality in Decline and PC Discourse

An excellent illustration of the larger context as it relates to the changes outlined here is the changing debate about ethnic humor, which is documented in a specific case. Frank de Lima was for many years the foremost ethnic comedian in Hawaii. His standup shows were very popular among locals in the 1980s, and his style was quite openly insulting. He would begin his shows by asking his guests where they were from. "Oh, I am Chinese-Hawaiian," said one fellow. The reply—"Funny you come to my show. We got one cover charge here"—prompted an explosion of laughter, whereupon the comedian continued in an avalanche of Chinese jokes, and then on to the next, always, of course, including his own Portuguese ethnicity. Hawaii is the most multiethnic state in the United States and has advertised itself, primarily for the tourist

industry but also as a state identity, as a successful instance of the melting pot or at least of multiculturalism. De Lima presented Hawaii in ways that would certainly seem shocking in many European societies, especially those where silence has become the only solution. De Lima ended at least one show with a couple of gibes that the public also loved: "why do you all laugh like crazy at my jokes? Because they're true!" and finally, "Why haven't we got a Yugoslavia here? Because of me!"

In the 1990s de Lima took his act to California. After a couple of shows for upper middle-class audiences, he was accused of racism and even taken to court. He returned home shocked and depressed, and decided to tone down his language even in his home state of Hawaii. Later he was attacked by some citizens of Hawaii who thought he should not be allowed to do shows for public schools, even though these particular shows were about how to be good students and get along with others. It has been suggested that his humor is dangerous because it insults people. The main response to this was to deny that Hawaii is subject to the same ethnic sensitivity syndrome that troubles the mainland, but this may be changing. What once seemed a striking difference between multiethnic Hawaii and culture war–ridden California has now become a situation of convergence. It should also be noted the ethnic situation has itself become increasingly polarized, as the following quote demonstrates:

> Comedian Frank DeLima has felt the forces of political correctness gathering in Hawaii for the past 10 years. He still trades in ethnic humor, but won't go near some of the jokes he used to tell. (*Honolulu Advertiser*, 98-03-09: A8)

The intensifying danger of language is part of the increasing fragility of the new configuration of multicultural identities. Hawaii, as a former plantation society that maintains some of the older forms of sociality and even social structures, has not yet entered this kind of reconfiguration, although there is strong evidence that this is beginning to occur, as in the extensive public discussion about a comedian's right to engage in ethnic humor. In the United States this change has been amplified in the legal system, where ethnic libel is a massive issue for the courts. The legalization of language liability is an important difference to note when comparing multicultural politics in the United States and Sweden(although this has begun to change), and it modifies the content of the above model of accusation. The litigiousness of the issue of ethnic slander partially removes it from the sphere of moral politics and permits the development of a more cynical or at least distanced view of the issue: "I really think that this joke is hilarious" but I won't use it since I don't want to be taken to court. This is part of a development in which backlash is never far off, and cynical comedy like Saturday Night Live can destroy the original moral force of practically any issue, although that too might be changing. In Sweden, where the issues remain in the political sphere, the very

presumption that a particular joke might be hilarious could easily be used to categorize a person as racist, regardless of whether the joke was uttered in public or in private. There is a crime defined as "*hets mot folkgrupp*," which translates with some difficulty as "incitement to racial or ethnic hatred," or defamation, that has been difficult to apply legally because of its extreme generality; nevertheless it has often been generously applied politically to attack adversaries. The existence of a moralized public sphere of course, strengthens the de-individualization process insofar as it negates the division between private and public.[8]

It is noteworthy that being applauded by the wrong people is what makes ethnic humor so fitting as an index of evil and danger. The self-identified radical redneck is most explicit:

> Hopefully, all this racial hypersensitivity will one day be appreciated for its rollicking camp value. Uptight horror is the foundation of the best comedy. Fuck racial pride, let's have racial satire. There'll be peace when everyone's so tired from laughing, they're too tired to be angry. We'll all be able to get along when we can all laugh about it. (Goad 1998: 230)

This is similar to the point of view expressed by De Lima. Goad also underscores that in the 1970s, comedians Mel Brooks and Richard Pryor were "doing work which would bring anti-defamation lawsuits today" (230), referring to the same change mentioned above. For some this shift is a sign of enormous progress, but in the structural terms I have suggested it is nothing but the outcome of the nervousness brought on by the emergence of new multiculturalist elites. This interpretation was confirmed in discussions with a Norwegian psychologist, a student in my PC course at UCSD, whose own work indicates a decline in humor, especially the sharper kind that might be seen as provocative. Individuals have grown more afraid of doing the wrong thing and tend to avoid confrontation at all costs. This, he said, is not good for the production of humor. As an index of the broader change, it is noteworthy that much Swedish humor in the 1960s and 1970s was quite sharp and would certainly be banned today. The famous sketches and songs of the very popular team of Hesse Alfredsson and Tage Danielsson were notable for occasional ethnic humor, including a gypsy twist to the national anthem.

Class Configuration and PC

In the graphic C.2 below, the formation of cosmopolitan elites is the source of PC discourse. This was not so in the past, when on the contrary, cosmopolitan identities were simply the identity of a certain category of Western society with historical parallels with the aristocracy. The latter were not national but

transnational. Their identities were tied up in kinship and interfamilial relations that cut across state boundaries. One might speak of the cosmopolitan elite position as a kind of *longue durée*, for it is at least as old as the late middle ages. Meanwhile, cosmopolitan consciousness has increased throughout the centuries. The history of the Freemasons exemplifies the phenomenon. In earlier publications (Friedman 1997, 1999, 2004a, 2004b, 2012a, 2012b) I have suggested that the double polarization process characteristic of declining hegemony produces simultaneous horizontal opposition in the form of cultural fragmentation, and vertical opposition in the form of increasing class polarization. This is manifested as the cosmopolitanization of elites and "indigenization" of declining working classes.

The transformation process is complex. It includes ideological inversions in which, as discussed in chapter 8, values that were once associated with the liberal-right spectrum are adopted by the left, whose former ideals, nationalism, sovereignty, and collectivism are re-designated as reactionary. This inversion points to a shift of focus from class to culture, in which the former working class is replaced by immigrants. And in this shift to culture, Occidentalism or self-identification as anti-West becomes increasingly prevalent. What emerges is a situation in which self-identified progressives become a new dominant elite whose primary enemy is the working class or its remnants. The working class, having been extensively dismantled and dispersed during the flexibilization processes that began in the 1980s, became increasingly indigenized and fearful of the globalization that moved their jobs overseas and flooded their neighborhoods with immigrants who were seen as either cheap labor or welfare recipients. Whether or not this is globalization as such, the processes and experiences are real enough. These disempowered workers are the new "dangerous class," the new racists who must be re-socialized or socially marginalized. So much for the working class, then!

Unfortunately for the new progressives, the dangerous class is a substantial population, and their shift toward such nationalist parties in Europe has recently shaken the establishment into nothing short of panic. Here, as in all the processes I have discussed, there is a propagation of paradoxes, or rather seeming paradoxes. The Maoist Jan Myrdal, who even supported Pol Pot (along with a number of high-ranking social democrats who today deny having done so, even in the face of documentation—something that seems to be easy in Swedish political culture), has recently voiced his understanding for Marine Le Pen(Myrdal 2014), that is, the Front National, as the only representative of what remains of the old left ideology with its republicanism, nationalism, anti-Americanism, and secularism. He also claims, as have others such as Slavoj Zizek, that this startling change involves a marked inversion of left and right.

Vertical Polarization

Even as cultural and social fragmentation is ongoing with various degrees of confrontation and violence in the former hegemonic regions of the world system, another process has also been discussed widely: class stratification is on the rise, often in quite astounding proportions, and not least in the old centers of the world system. To be sure, this is not a simple process, and it is definitely not limited to a combination of impoverishment and the enrichment of a capitalist class. The stratification process elevates influential elites connected to public institutions, international bureaucracies, and the professional classes, all of whom depend in varying degrees on tax funds, their speculative growth, and other sources of income that have been transferred to the public sphere in one way or another (Friedman 1999b, 2004). I have referred to this before as a global pork-barrel phenomenon that plays an important role in consolidating global class identities and novel cultural discourses.

The economic parameters of this process in the world's old centers are well known through variations on common themes. Countries with varying levels of class differentiation, whether low as in Sweden or much higher as in the United States, have experienced the same transformational vectors in the past decade, vectors that are common properties of a global dynamic. In early 2000, when this text was originally composed, the ratio of richest to poorest in Sweden was 2.7, as opposed to 5.9 for the United States, and similar vectors have operated since.[9] These are the economic vectors discussed in the first part of the chapter: the combination of global shift, speed-up, and the changing composition of capital. The downward mobility experienced by workers in the United States since the 1970s is the clearest example of this kind of change; indeed, it has been a common denominator of the era. The expansion of flexible labor regimes has led to a larger proportion of working poor. Incomes have stagnated or declined, and mobility has become increasingly limited. In Europe unemployment has reached alarming proportions. In Sweden it was above 10 percent in the mid to late 1990s but has now declined, aided by public-sector spending and make-work programs. Despite current evidence of a slight reversal of these trends, they in no way match the economic growth rates of 2–4 percent that are their basis. In other words, there appears to have been a structural shrinkage of the work force that is offset only in countries with large-scale low-wage service sectors.

The general tendency described here therefore varies by political regime, especially in relation to the public sector. The actual situations of populations vary significantly according to the degree of welfare transfers. And the latter are very much products of the way in which the various national public arenas are constituted. At one extreme is the minimal social state, which is approximated

in the United States, where individualism and a sacred private sphere have entailed a certain disinterested tolerance for cultural difference as long as it is not politicized. U.S. levels of state intervention and welfare transfers are low. In continental Europe, by contrast, the nation-state has a much stronger cultural character and multiculturalism appears to be a graver threat to the former social contract.

The varying economics of this phenomenon are clearly expressive of the differing structures of nation-states. In Europe the percentage of the population that was raised above the poverty line by government transfers in the 1980s was between 40 and 60 percent, with the Scandinavian countries approaching 100 percent. The equivalent figure for the United States was 0.5 percent (Mingione 1991).[10] In the 1990's the U.S. as a whole had an official poverty rate of over 15 percent, and in some states it jumped to considerably more than 20 percent. If one raises the threshold of subsistence adequacy to an income of $25,000 for a family, then the figure rises to 28 percent (Hacker 1997: 229). In both Europe and the United States, the rate of ghettoization has been extreme, and the formation of underclasses has meant the formation of marginalized minorities whose unemployment rates are often several times higher than those of the native-born or, more commonly, those identified as "real nationals." Here, of course, I must mention the significant difference between polar extremes such as Sweden, where unemployment is at least four or five times the national average in the relatively well-off welfare-supported ghettos; and states like California, where entire industries depend on the influx of undocumented immigrants.

Downward mobility and de-industrialization have been accompanied by upward mobility in the higher echelons of society, reflected in reports of enormous incomes among the financial elite as well as increasing incomes among political and cultural elites. Such reports express the intimate attraction between economic, political, and cultural capital in this period. The spate of scandals over politicians' credit cards, double salaries, long vacation-like trips, and visits to night clubs has led to a generalized crisis of confidence in political elites. This crisis of accountability expresses an increasing rift between the "people" and the elites. The latter—along with capitalists, who were always in such a position—have been assimilated into a global circuit of relations with similarly high-placed people, so that elite interests have become equivalent, forged into a kind of elite class-for-itself.

The European Union has become a kind of supernational, weakly accountable political apparatus whose decisions increasingly affect national-level political arenas. Real salaries are considerably higher than those at the national level. Lack of a clearly defined social project has made careers-in-themselves the modus vivendi of this massive reorganization of Europe. This is process is not merely specific to only a few localities, but generalized throughout the

West. In France the clearest example is the transformation of the former state elite, that is, the so-called énarques: graduates of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) and highly educated administrators of a centralized economy and polity who have increasingly become the vanguard of privatization from the top. The most famous example is Jean-Pierre Messier, who left his government position to become the leading figure of the water company Vivendi's transformation into a global media giant.

> L'objectif du néo-énarque, ce n'est plus l'exercise de responsabilités éminentes au sein de l'État ou d'une de ses dépendances, c'est la direction d'un groupe coté et mondialisé. Son langage, ce n'est plus le français sec et élégant des notes administratives et l'exposé de synthèse soumis au principe du "balancement circonspect," tenant, l'équilibre entre efficacité économique et ouverture sociale, c'est la récitation en anglais du catéchisme universel de l'argent roi. (Joffrin 2001: 101)
>
> The objective of the neo-énarque is no the exercise of eminent responsibilities of the state or one of its sub-units. It is the management of a highly estimated and globalized group. Its language is no longer the dry and elegant French of administrative reports and synthetic exposés submitted to the principle of "balanced circumspection" maintaining an equilibrium between economic efficiency and social open-mindedness. It is the recitation in English of the universal catechism of "money is king."

This kind of development at the regional and international level has produced new kinds of experiences for those involved. A person with a career like Messier's is very bound to his or her equivalents in the system. Representativity becomes less important than position itself, and the position may take on a new moral posture. The cosmopolitan is promoted to a new kind of legitimacy by being increasingly associated with a series of agendas that may contradict those of the nation-state itself. Recent expressions in Sweden have stressed a complex of multiculturalism, democratization, and globalization as the new goals of world society, and of course of Swedish society. The very notion of having control over the conditions of one's social existence has begun to take on a negative connotation. In interviews from the late 1990s on the concept of peoplehood, or *folk*, in Sweden, I discovered a certain inversion in values. The notion of *folk* in *folkhem*, or people's home, was actually borrowed from the conservatives by the social democrats in the 1930s, but it eventually it became associated with ideas such as the people's will, plebiscites, concepts and symbols expressing the notion of the "captured state" or the "captured elite," and ordinary working-class people's domestication of a dominant class. Such terms, just like "nationalism," were associated with the progressive in the 1950s through the 1970s.

Today, however, an inversion of values is evident. The notion of "people" is associated with reaction, and that of nationalism, with essentialism. In my interviews, "plebiscite" was understood as dangerous, the concept of *folkhem*

was highly suspect, and the combination "people's will" "smelled" of the 1930s. Meanwhile the nation-state was viewed as an obsolete object destined for the junk heap or at least a serious face-lift. The New Age is the age of democracy, multiculturalism, and globalization, all straitjacketed by the necessities of survival in the world—by *la voie unique*, the Third Way, the *Neue Mitte*. It is interesting to consider the inversion of perspectives in which a formerly nationalist elite, which may have seen "the people" as a motley mixture of local cultures, today identifies itself as hybrid/multicultural and views "the people" as dangerous purists. This is partly the result of the historical homogenization process initiated by the nation-state and subsequent new cosmopolitanization of the elites. As a form of governance, this hybrid right-left is often referred to as purple, meaning "red + blue." It is a new centrist alliance in which the politics of ideals is replaced by a managerial view of politics, so that consultants both left and right of center espouse an identical model of New Public Management. In such a world voting becomes superfluous unless it is for the more extreme parties, which are increasingly defined as non-democratic.

Cosmopolitan Discourses and Ideological Hegemony

The formation of new globalizing elites is instrumental in expanding the hegemony of the ideology of celebratory globalization. Most Western societies today are characterized by vertical polarization. It unites some political and cultural elites and links them to an economic project of transnational solidarity among those same elites, who sometimes mistake themselves for the "international community." This is the much flaunted "revolt of the elites" discussed by Lasch (1995). The former implicit relation of representativity that united elites and the category "people" began to fracture as early as the 1970s in some countries, that is, during the very period when the nation-state began to weaken financially and multiculturalism began its contemporary career—"Le constat de l'épuisement du modèle social-démocrate a transformé les militants de la révolution, puis de la réforme, en militants du libéralisme culturel" (Julliard 1997: 201)—whereupon the notion of *classes dangereuses* was reborn (204).

The elite, who can be said to have been "captured" in the earlier phase of the welfare state, have now been liberated. This freeing up has produced a new set of discourses, that of multiculturalism and hybridity chief among them. The latter is a logical product of a real experience of the world from the top. A "we are the world" encompassment of humanity is not a new perspective but can be found in the proclamations of the Freemasons and various representatives of the British Empire, as well as in the more recent discourses of the Mont Pelerin Society and the World Economic Forum. The logic of this discourse is one that reduces the national population to an ethnic group among many and that seeks

to replace national identity by pluralism. This is the pluralism referred to earlier and promulgated by J. S. Furnivall (1948).

A similar argument has been made about the relation between the cosmopolitan faction of the European bourgeoisie and its national subjects in the early nineteenth century:

> The cosmopolitan bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century came to adopt a perspective own society as if it were a foreign one, a target for "colonial" exploitation. Freemasonry provided a cover for developing the new identity on which the exploitation of members of one's own community is premised. By entering the Masonic lodges, merchants and those otherwise involved in the long-distance money economy such as lawyers and accountants, realized the primordial alienation from the community that is the precondition for market relations, exploitation of wage labour, and abstract citizenship. (Ravenstock-Huessy 1961: 364, cited in Van der Pijl 1998)

Cosmopolitanism in this sense implies the capacity to distance oneself from one's place of origin and to occupy an exalted space over a world in which indigenous, national, and migrant populations all inhabit an "enriched" cultural territory. Consumed in the form of cultural products, from cuisine to art, this cultural difference is, of course, the stuff of innumerable festivals. The difference that is consumed in the lives of the elites becomes a kind of furnishing or interior decoration for their existences. The embodiment of the world's diversity becomes a new kind self-representation.

This same logic of social distancing fosters the embodiment of democracy as an inherent attribute of the new elites. Thus both Haider in Austria and "Red" Ken Livingstone in London were accused of being somehow basically undemocratic, despite their large constituencies. Recently in Scandinavia the increasing popularity of right-wing political leader Carl E. Hagen in Norway and the vote against the EMU in Denmark met with the same reaction. One Norwegian social democratic politician exclaimed that it was time to find a new population for the government, since Norwegians were no longer democratic. Politicians, members of the cultural and media elite, and others became increasingly explicit about the undemocratic nature of the people. In this discourse, populism came to mean racism, Nazism, and socialism/communism. The prime minister of Sweden stated that he would not allow a plebiscite on the EMU in his country for several years after an educational campaign (more than 60 percent of the population was against the unitary currency in the early 2000s). Alas, only the elites really understand what is best for everyone. Only they, by definition, are true democrats.

Politicians, who set their own wages by vote, have had the fastest growing incomes in the country in the past few years. Sweden's Gini index, the measure of economic stratification, increased by a record 25 percent in the first few years of the 1990s (only the United Kingdom had a greater increase). When

a press reports accused a social democratic prime minister of using a government jet in order to travel to party conventions, he replied that he was the prime minister no matter what else he was involved in, and that unlike other candidates, he had to be available for quick trips. His being prime minister no matter what activity he is engaged in implies that state and party are curiously fused, so why not private life as well? This took place around 2002, an election year, so it can all be interpreted as political slander; still, it is interesting that the rules established by the government in 1998 clearly state that high state officials are engaged in affairs of state, even if they are party affairs. The prime minister was accused of using the jet for a vacation in Italy. All of this may seem like useless palaver from the press, but the fact remains that it expresses a loss of legitimacy for the emergent political class.

To the extent that such representations resonate with a particular segment of the populations of the West, they become naturalized and self-evident. This has been the case for many of those for whom they make immediate sense. Academics, artists, media "intellectuals," and others who identify as travelers have been instrumental in the production of discourses of transnationalism, hybridity, and border-crossing, and are also a prolific source of anti-essentialist representations of reality that have been employed extensively, sometimes in political projects like those of self-proclaimed multicultural states. In Australia, one of the most immigrant-dense countries in the world, the government launched, in 1994, a multicultural policy program and a government pamphlet referred to earlier, entitled "Creative Nation" that was the cornerstone of a policy to re-create unity out of increasing diversity. On one occasion a representative literary scholar went to talk to a group of Aboriginal artists and intellectuals, presumably to entice them into the new multicultural project. He went on for some time about how racially and presumably culturally mixed the Aborigines were as a population and that any other view of themselves was tantamount to *essentialism*, that favorite word of cultural studies. When he was through, an older poet rose, looked the hybridist straight in the eyes, and unambiguously declared himself an essentialist.

"I'm an essentialist mate, and if you don't like it you can bugger off!"

A clear conflict emerged in Australia between hybridizing elites and those who identify as indigenous. Canada, another state that has declared itself multicultural, has faced similar opposition from Canadian Indians who refuse to be classified as just another ethnic minority. They are the First Peoples, and this, of course, is more than cultural distinctiveness. It is about rights to land and political autonomy.

One of the most important sites for the production of the new hybrid cosmopolitanism is in university departments, where postcolonial cultural studies has gained more than a foothold. Bruce Robbins is among those who have contributed most to arriving at a balanced picture of the issues involved. His analyses of postcolonial cultural studies are clearly very sensitive to these problems. He is one of the few scholars who have sought to provide a larger, more complex perspective on the emergence of such elites, who are clearly elites in his discussions. In several excellent chapters of one publication (Robbins 1999) he takes up the critique of such elites as tendered by Dirlik (1992) and others. Despite accepting a good deal of what they say, Robbins heads to the middle, pointing out that their position, representing as it does a vociferous critique of Western values and dominance, is not all that well established. And while clearly sensitive to changes in orientation, his perspective does not attempt to place this change itself within the global context, as I suggest be done. If this is applied to his analysis, things fall into place. The discourse on the West and the Rest has truly changed. The Western self-assured, imperial representation of a rationalist center surrounded by concentric circles moving outward toward the limits of primitivity has today been replaced by an inverted perspective that associates the center with the national, with racism, with white male dominance, all clothed in the language of scientific rationality; meanwhile the rest represent a true humanism, holism, and wisdom that Western dominance has purged. This inversion has been critical in the restructuring of Western elites, but it is equivalent in content to the emergent postcolonial ideology that has become increasingly prevalent in the academy. In chapter 7 I discussed this process in terms of an ideological inversion, one that might be said to be the imaginary of a real declining hegemony. And if, as Robbins correctly notes, this position is indeed fragile and faces a potential backlash, especially from the bottom of society, this in itself might explain how necessary it is to produce a moralized image of the world, a new political correctness. The latter is an excellent means of controlling communication in insecure moments.

Robbins's essays reveal a marvelous openness toward positions he disagrees with, and he bears down in veritably Talmudic fashion on the internal inconsistencies of the authors he engages. He impresses me as someone who would like to be a cosmopolitan in the total sense, incorporating much of what is usually reserved for the kinds of engagements typical of the national or the ethnic, as well as the empathy for the "other" that seems so at odds with the empathy for or within the collectivity. In his defense of Martha Nussbaum[11] he valiantly argues against categorizing her, as some critics have done, as a representative of a cosmopolitan globalizing elite. He cites her worries about global inequality in the distribution of wealth and in life expectancy, which

is 78.2 in Sweden and 39 in Sierra Leone (154), and the need to consider the transfer of wealth from richer to poorer nations. But all of this is a mere moral reflex, precisely what one hears officially in United Nations official statements. To my mind it neatly avoids the complexities and even some of the simplicities of the situation. It is clear that plenty of global exploitation, especially of raw materials in Africa, is occurring, but this is made possible by some of the richest local political elites, of course, with support from the West and now the East. And despite enormous transfers of wealth from the rich to the poor, the rich reclaim much of the wealth in the form of flight capital located in huge Swiss bank accounts.

The moralists would simply increase the transfers and then perhaps complain about corruption afterwards, when people starve and need yet more transfers. Obviously the wealth of any center depends largely on the formation of a periphery; this is as true of the West as of the East, and of all empires, be they of the Arabs, Ottomans, Han, Assyrians, Romans, or Greeks. The issue is systemic and not moral, and Robbins seems clear about this as well, except when he discusses the issue in terms of "restitution," which to my mind is impossible unless politics has got a firm grip on the workings of the system. Robbins certainly poses the right questions in his discussions, but it is unclear whether there is a cosmopolitan solution to the closed, essentializing rivalry of nations. This is because his argument frames cosmopolitanism as requiring the same kinds of identification as smaller sodalities that would combine Tobin taxes with reform of child labor practices in poor countries, worker rights, a union-green alliance, and so forth (Robbins 1999: 174). The answer leads back to the issue of common goals and thus to common values and shared identity. The joker in the deck here is the configuration of interests, not least class interests. Thus in a meeting between unions and academic leftists at Columbia University in 1996, a clear divide opened up on union nationalism versus academic internationalism (173). This is the divide that I have sought to explore in my own discussion, and I return to it now.

Although hybridity flourishes in academic texts, there is little evidence that it works on the ground. Attempts to establish "biracial" identity in the United States have taken an interesting course. The biracial movement is primarily a middle-class activity, and it harbors a robust strategy of distinction in which class mobility leads to attempts to separate oneself from a former, in this case lower, status identity. The attractor in this is "whiteness" and its relation to class. The logical contradiction in this kind of identification lies in the interstice between individual and collective identification. Every individual has a specific genealogy and is thus a very particular mixture.

Ethnographically documented creole identities have always been and are still closed ethnic identities, just like non-mixed identities. Attempts to over-

come closure have often ended in divisiveness, as in the case of the biracial movement in the United States, which split when Asian bi-racials objected to the dominance of African-Americans. The new fraction took on the title *Hapa Forum* (*hapa* being the Hawaiian word for "half"). This is a normal product of the above contradiction. Any attempt to form a collectivity must also create boundaries and raise issues concerning the particular constituents of that identity. Hybrid identity works only as a discourse or as an individual identity, or in those rare and temporary situations where the specificity of the hybridity can be ignored. It is thus most suitable for elite identities, which share but a single feature, that they are positioned above the fragmenting multiethnic world below. And in such cases we still find a large degree of ethnic segregation despite the presence of a strong ideology of the encompassment of differences. Indeed, it should also be noted that such high-end identification is also accompanied by class segregation and even endogamy.

PC occurs within the frame of reference that emerges in the transition from the nation-state to the new plural society—a variant of a former colonial society, in which the ruling elite were of foreign extraction or, today, identify as belonging to the larger world. This was documented in chapters 7 and 8 as part of a shift of sovereignty from the people to the representatives of the state, that is, the political class. This is possible if the mass of commoners do not protest too strongly so as to interrupt the transition (something that has not been forthcoming as can be seen in recent elections in the US and perhaps now Europe). Cosmopolitan identity is secure enough as an identity, but when it becomes an ideology of rule in contrast to a former rule of the demos, it is bound to create friction. But the framework of rule is only part of the story: class mobility is also involved—more accurately, mobility within the hierarchical space of cosmopolitics.



Figure C.2. Hierarchical cosmopolitics and mobility

The logic of this mobility is the logic of the space itself. Moving up is equivalent to becoming more cosmopolitan, which implies that hybridity, openness, and world citizenry are valued as the highest ideals. This is as true for the Freemasons as it is for contemporary Western and postcolonial elites. The hierarchy of the space itself is what transforms the political culture of the national into the postnational. It is furthermore what links the political and cultural elites (or at least a segment of those elites) and lends hegemonic status to the new cosmopolitics. One of the trendiest districts of Stockholm, Södermalm, is home to a great many journalists living in owner apartments. The quarter is sprinkled with green restaurants where progressive elites sip ecological beer (imported from the Czech Republic and delivered in large tank trucks that create enormous amounts of pollution) and café latte, celebrating the organic contents of a green lifestyle, for of course the latte is made with organic beans. Average salaries in this district are almost double the average in the country. The population votes break down to about 70 percent for the parties of the left, including the Left Party (19%), the Green Party (19%), Social Democrats (16%) and feminists (14%) (from Caesar http://snaphanen.dk/2014/06/08/sondagskronika-soders-olyckliga-overklass/). Residents of Södermalm are thus a left-leaning, high-income group.

A majority of journalists in Sweden are leftists, but what is the content of left ideology today? It is certainly not the class politics of a previous era. It is rather what has already been discussed here, particularly the replacement of the working class by immigrants, itself an expression of the decline of modernism and the rise of cultural identities. The left, then, is simply a liberal bourgeoisie that shares the same values as other liberal segments of the population. Yet it represents itself as the core of progressive ideals, in what is essentially an inversion of the left ideals of the 1960s and 1970s. The dual process of polarization discussed in this volume implies a logic of transformation of elites in which cultural cosmopolitanism generates diversity below, converting formerly national populations into mere ethnic groups. The vertical metaphor here is very real. Eliminating the nation leaves only a collection of ethnicities to be governed. But what has this to do with the left, one might ask? In all of our discussions, the fate of intellectuals such as leftists Russell Jacoby of *Telos* and Todd Gitlin of *SDS*, who were re-categorized as reactionaries by the new progressive elites, is the product of the massive ideological inversion that we have detailed. The new witch hunters are a mix of older leftists reborn as liberals and new liberals who have never before belonged to a leftist movement. And they do sip their lattes and complain triumphantly about the racism of White people.

The same story is recounted in some detail in Eric Conan's *La gauche sans le people* (2004), which describes and analyzes the complementary bourgeoisification of the French left and the increasing Le Pen–ism of the working class.

It is significant, as I have suggested, that the polarization I hypothesized more than twenty years ago as a general phenomenon in Western social orders is indeed a real and powerful social transformation.

This new elite position is fragile, and its inconsistencies are enough cause to make its bearers highly nervous about it all. This particular nervousness comes with membership in the new cultural classes—a bourgeoisie dependent on the financialization of a declining hegemony, that is, on the transition from industrial to financial accumulation—and what it implies for the emergence of rising non-industrial elites, from Hollywood to academia. Millionaires cannot represent themselves as extensions of the working class. It is simpler to reconfigure the notion of the progressive as liberal, democratic, multicultural, post-national, and postcolonial. And in this reconfiguration the working class comes to be associated with the nation, homogeneity, collective will, and sovereignty redefined as reactionary, even as all these terms are equated with essentialism and thus racism.

Notes

1. Jacoby (1994) has elaborated on the relationship between political correctness and the increasing danger and sensitivity surrounding language in the United States. In Sweden in 2016, public radio is seriously discussing words that should be banned from on-air use, for example, the word suburb, because it is associated with immigrant-dense areas. Such bans are not restricted to the media. The official Swedish Academy dictionary, *Svenska Akademiens Ordlista*, has likewise been eliminating words that are deemed offensive.
2. A recent radio broadcast on food styles attacked the notion of "local food" as an expression of nationalism and racism, in other words products of a "closed" mind (SR 06-13-2015)
3. There are equivalent functions of reintegration in other societies, of course, but there is also a relatively fixed cosmology defining not only the fact of integration, but also the specific cosmological framework of the latter. Psychotherapy, on the other hand, is more experimental; it re-integrates the person into a state without any explicit cosmology other than the self-organizing "autonomous" individual.
4. Of course this varies from society to society, depending on the roles and positions of the different cultural elites. In Europe their role may be somewhat more central than in the United States, but the media elite, such as those working for CNN, play a role that is, in terms of globalization, cosmopolitan values, and multicuturalism, quite similar to that of many European elites. The relative weight of globalized versus nationalist elites also varies substantially in both time and space.
5. It is important to note that the reality of the individual subject is not about biological or psychological constituents but about the immediate interpretative framework to be found in a social world. This can be referred to as the imaginary structure of social reality. It is not, of course, about the existence of individual experience, nor of individual action as such.

6. As suggested, ethnicity is not unproblematically applicable in this kind of social field except in its most general sense of essentialized cultural identity. It is often applied to former political units that have dissolved in postcolonial states leaving only a population associated with the name of the former unit.
7. Here I seek to avoid a crucial misunderstanding in an anthropology that construes all generalizations concerning populations as essentialism. The misunderstanding, which is based on the confusion of the aggregate and the collective, is to assume that all generalizations are the sum total of individual representations and behaviors rather than social forms within which individuals live. It amounts to a denial of social structures because it reduces them to a sum of individual activities. This misconception's return to anthropology is a true expression of the postmodern acceptance of liberal ideology.
8. The ethnic humor that is sanctioned in Sweden is mostly self-referential and always mild. In general, humor of this kind is highly insulated by metalinguistic bracketing. But as is evident in much of his text, this varies greatly over time, with periods of increasing sharpness of tone. This tendency is present today, several years after this chapter was completed, for reasons that are discussed above.
9. It should be noted that Sweden has had one of the fastest growing Gini indexes since the early 1990s. Sweden is ranked third, after the United States and Australia, for the share of total national income received by the richest one percent. In 1980 Sweden was one of the most egalitarian countries in the OECD, so much of this reflects a "catching up" to other countries' inequality levels. http://www.oxfam.org/sites /www.oxfam.org/files /bp-working-for-few-political-capture-economic-inequality-200114-en.pdf.
10. This was the situation in the late 1980s and 1990s when this chapter was first written. Things have not improved since then.
11. Martha Nussbaum is a famous political philosopher who among other things has strongly defended modern internationalist liberalism against postmodernists and postfeminists.

Postscript

Weekend Update

The first draft of this manuscript was completed in 2005. Since then it has been empirically modified more than a few times as new material has become available. Has the political correctness that I described in 2000 disappeared? Can it be said to have been nothing more than a chimera? Probably not, for the reasons suggested in the conclusion. In regimes of social instability, politically correct discourse finds fertile ground in which to cultivate parallel regimes of rigid controls over communication. In Sweden there were signs of reaction to this state of affairs quite early on, although those so engaged were subjected to brutal ostracism and campaigns of symbolic repression. Commenting on my 1999 article in *Current Anthropology*, reproduced in chapter 2, Ulf Hannerz asserted,

> I have no wish to engage in any lengthy point-by-point discussion of Friedman's claims about Swedish society or Swedish debate or of his narrative of a brave but lonely couple of public intellectuals turning the tide against the repressive political correctness of the national "moral elite." Taken together I find them bizarre. (1999: 689)

How bizarre are they now, in light of the recent publication of numerous books and articles on precisely this issue (Arnstberg 2007; Arnstberg and Sandelin 2013; Caesar 2010; Tullberg 2014; Sanandaji 2015)? Naturally, their authors might all be dismissed as dangerous people of my own ilk. However, the enormous quantity of examples, cases, statistics, and analyses cannot be dismissed without being in a state of denial regarding the situation that has developed since 2000.

Hannerz and friends also claimed that KEF was being an alarmist about the situation, referring in no uncertain terms to her "shrill globe-galloping catastrophism" (1999: 691). Though there were some problems, they maintained, things were generally alright and there was no need to assert such perilous interpretations of the situation. But since 2008 the globe-galloping catastrophism has surely come home to roost. And then there was that right-wing political party that was not supposed to be a problem since it had not gained a foothold in Sweden: that same party is now in the parliament and, having garnered well over 15 percent of the vote, is the third (today the second) largest party

in the country. Its position, after a great deal of internal cleansing, is basically, that immigration needs to be curbed and accompanied by a strong politics of integration so as not to encourage the formation of separate enclaves within the larger national society, consistent with an image of a previous notion of peoplehood that was common to both left and right—even the conservative right. So intense is the fear of this new party that all kinds of measures have to be taken to avoid communicating with its members. In 2016 the Social Democrats formed an alliance with all other parties except and excluding the Sweden Democrats. This typical ostracism, however childish, liquidates any sense of that sacred notion of "respect for the other." Yet the reasons for the emergence of this party that has recruited from both left and right cannot be understood in terms that are focused entirely on accusations that its members are uneducated, redneck, or racist—since these are all essentialized notions equated to the real racism that exists in the larger society.

Just how bizarre is catastrophism really? How ridiculously exaggerated are the fearmongering interpretations of unserious professors who ought to have known better? How ludicrous was the invocation of political correctness, denigrated as a useless characterization that is certainly inapplicable to the Swedish situation? The publication since 2008 of serious works dealing specifically with Swedish political correctness does not square with this gallant rejection of the term, or with examples of the difficulties of publishing work claiming that a growing conflict in Swedish society is largely being covered up, or with the fact that integration programs have largely failed in Sweden, a country that, while taking in significantly more immigrants than other countries, has undergone a pronounced enclavization of immigrant populations that makes it one of the most segregated societies in Europe . . . all of this is certainly partial proof that Hannerz and some of his colleagues are part of the problem I have tried to analyze.

The well-known Norwegian anthropologist Unni Wikan, referred to earlier, published a book on the honor killing of Fadime Sahindal with the University of Chicago Press (2008) and in several other countries, but it was impossible to get it into a mainstream publishing house in Sweden, where it ultimately was published by an iconoclast leftist press known for disregarding national codes of publishing behavior. Meanwhile, as I have already discussed, the cultural left maintained that no specific cultural form exists for honor killings, and that white men who murder their wives are no different from Middle Eastern men who murder their daughters to protect the honor of their families. All discussion of this is and has been labeled as Islamophobia, although it was once simply anthropology. Some would refer to the publications cited here to claim that there is indeed debate in Sweden, but unlike in other countries, such publications are separate from the mainstream press and debate of the issues is not ongoing, especially not among intellectuals and academics.

The World It Is A-changin'

In the early years of this millennium, it was predicted that we were headed toward a period of increasing ethnicization and conflict. Although my esteemed colleagues interpreted it as scare tactics of the kind used by the extreme right, the prediction seems to have been borne out with utmost precision. Clear tendencies toward enclavization and segregation were evident when I was writing this manuscript, and since then there has been an escalation of what is referred to as "occidentalism" (Buruma and Margalit 2004), which appears primarily to be a strange, largely implicit alliance between the left-cultural elites described here and a global conglomerate of Islamist movements. A number of intellectuals defended Al-Qaeda's attack on the World Trade Center. Some referred to that group as the avant-garde of a new world revolution or at least as a reaction to the injustice of imperialism, notwithstanding the fact that the terrorists themselves, especially their leaders, were upper middle-class or even upper-class.

Events since then have cemented a situation of violent opposition in which certain representatives of Islam have been positioned, and have positioned themselves, against the West. The jihadist attacks in Madrid and London (with so-called home-grown terrorists to boot) are not an individual phenomenon nor the work of crazy loners; rather, they have clear collective contours. The murders of Pym Fortuyn and then Theo Van Gogh occurred in the vortex of the Netherlands' climax of "purple" governance, which boasted a clearly multicultural agenda following the new elite formation in which left and right fused and class was replaced by ethnicity and race. To be sure, both Fortuyn and especially Van Gogh represented a reaction to what they saw as an emergent Islamic and even Islamist tendency. Their murders, in turn, represent a violent revenge on such opinions that is evidence of the horizontal polarization that is a theme in this book and has continued unabated. Then there are the incidents of the Mohammed caricatures in Denmark and later the Roundabout dog in Sweden, which led to a series of violent reactions and, as in the case of the caricatures, to violent attacks on embassies in the Middle East and death threats and attempted murders in both Denmark and Sweden. In all of this, the same elites defended the violence as justified by the racism or imperialist behavior of the West and the lack of respect for Islam. Indeed, a concerted effort at the United Nations in 2012 aimed to criminalize blasphemy in relation to Islam.

Of course this list is incomplete without mention of Anders Breivik's much more publicized and discussed bomb attack on a Norwegian government building and a Social Democratic youth camp shooting that killled 57. Breivik's 1,500-page manifesto—a hodgepodge culled from anti-jihadist pages, Knights Templar, and Christian and European fundamentalism, most of it clipped and pasted—reveals his clear attraction to jihadist terrorism and even suggests a possible alliance for mutual ethnic/religious cleansing. Julius Evola,

the well-known philosopher who inspired the Fascist movement, was likewise a great admirer of jihadism. Breivik's texts can be interpreted as a kind of mirror image of Islamist discourse. His attacks thus represent what I predicted: increasing horizontal opposition or ethnicization of the declining Western sector of the world system. Breivik even cites yours truly several times, which ought to make it possible to classify me as a neo-Fascist according to the canonic PC formula of associationism.

Extremism is always the work of minorities, so the notion that not every Muslim is a terrorist is trivially true. On the other hand, a clear majority of contemporary terrorists are Muslims. The threat of Islamic colonization has been depicted as a mere fantasy typical of extreme right-wing fanaticism, yet the Muslim political scientist Bassam Tibi, no doubt a dangerous character, has stated based on his reading of documents in Arabic, that such colonization is exactly the intention of much migration to Europe today, a phenomenon he goes to great lengths to substantiate. As for violent confrontation with the West, Imam Omar Bakri Muhammed, leader of Al-Muhajiroun, said in an interview in 2004, regarding the issue of the killing of innocent civilians in the World Trade Center attacks, that

> we don't make a distinction between civilians and non-civilians, innocents and non-innocents. Only between Muslims and non-believers. And the life of a non-believer has no value. There is no sanctity in it . . . We are not hypocrites. We don't say: "I'm sorry it was a mistake." We say, "You deserve it." We assume the purpose is to kill as many people as possible . . . (Quoted in Eriksen and Stjernfelt 2012: 318)

A number of important works address the contradictory nature of developments in multiethnic nation-states. Favret-Saada's excellent book (2007) on the Danish cartoon crisis is available in French and Danish, but not in Swedish. French journalist Caroline Fourest's book (2004) on the hypocrisy of Euro-Islam has never been published in Swedish. The important work of Fadela Amara and Sylvia Zappi, so critical to the oppression of women in Muslim suburbs, *Ni putes, Ni soumises* (2003), is available in French and English but its publication in Sweden (2005) has only led to silence although a number of activists have invoked the importance of the book. The list goes on. So it would be nonsense to deny that something akin to attempted thought control is happening in the country. But as we have already indicated, Hannerz lets on pretty clearly that he adheres to precisely the PC whose existence he denies. His general admonishment to us is that "nonetheless, most people would probably recognize that it is wise to be a bit careful with the groupings one chooses to get involved with" (689)[1] and follows with another observation: "As anthropologists, too, we had indications that whatever trust members of the public might have in our discipline risked being seriously damaged" (690). The same might have been said of Marxists twenty years ago. But the tactics are different. For unintellectual

Marxists, those with differing views were simply wrong, but those who disagree with the PC crowd of today are stamped as immoral and dangerous to society. The Marxists were considered radical and were marginalized with respect to power. The new PC in Sweden is an extension of state-talk. It is not simply confusion that since 2009[2] the media have been using the term åsiktskorridoren, "corridor of opinion," to refer to a situation in which free thinking and its expression are severely limited. This might seem astonishing for an anthropologist who might claim to be an independent critical thinker, if such is indeed the case.

Hannerz has been critiqued for a similar brown-nosed strategy in his article on the branding of anthropology, which he thinks is necessary in this day and age, when it is difficult to sell the subject (Hannerz 2010). If this is some kind of progressive perspective on our discipline, one might wonder why "branding" is considered a positive option. He first urges anthropologists to refrain from the "rebellious streak," adding that "I would not have recommended it, in the past or at present, as the best brand to take into negotiations with academic administrators or ministry officials who may nervously maximize order and predictability in their domains" (543). He further suggests that the discipline must adapt to neoliberal conditions by essentially turning "diversity" into "our business." This, of course has already occurred in the multiculturalism industry. Hannerz is without question being practical, but in an academic world where slogans such as diversity and global sustainability are the monopoly of power holders, his strategy consists in a concerted attempt to adapt to such power, as anthropologists have done before for various reasons. In this particular case, however, the strategy merits serious scrutiny rather than wholehearted acceptance. One reviewer states that Hannerz's project to sell anthropology reveals something more sinister: "This might be a winning argument for Anthropology in some quarters; in others, it indicts anthropologists not as 'handmaidens' of imperialism, but rather as imperialists proper" (Forte 2014: 215). I would claim that it is rather an attempt to suck up to global power—that is, nothing so proud as being an imperialist oneself, which would require a courage that is quite the opposite of what is displayed in remarks about anthropology's "rebellious streak" (543).

From Shaming to Violence

Two events triggered massive reactions in the press as well as violent attacks on the part of certain Muslims. The first, in 2005, was the newspaper *Jyllands-posten*'s publication of Mohammed caricatures submitted in response to the union of newspaper illustrators' call for representations of the prophet as a way of exploring the limits of self-censorship. Quite a few declined to participate, but others sent in various illustrations, some containing irony directed more at Western political leaders than at Islam. In any case the caricatures were the

normal kind of fare that abounds in the media in representations of various kinds of fanaticism, or simply as a way of stereotyping an enemy. The Islamic press is packed with caricatures of Jews that reproduce many of the Nazi-era representations. And the representation of Mohammed with a bomb in his turban (Kurt Westergaard, Danish cartoonist) is closer than some would like to think to the earlier, more majestic representations of Mohammed brandishing the sword of a warrior. Regardless, a certain core of Muslims in Denmark supported by a number of leftist intellectuals quickly reacted by labeling the phenomenon as simply racist, and the reactions to the cartoons, which included death threats and violent attacks on Danish embassies in several countries, were seen as legitimate responses. The force of PC here is in the legitimation of violent responses to critical or ironic representations of what is considered sacred. Meanwhile, violence remains an illegitimate reaction to critical representations of Christianity that seem to have nothing to do with the abovementioned cartoons, in which depictions of Jews (not Israelis) as subhuman evil creatures are far more racist than the Danish cartoons. The blasphemy issue raised by the Muslim bloc in the UN Human Rights Council for a decade was aired again during this period but was apparently laid to rest after the assassination of two Pakistanis—Minister of Minorities Shahbaz Bhatti, who spoke out against the law in Pakistan, and then the Punjab governor Salman Taseer, who had defended in court Aasia Bibi, a Christian mother of five sentenced to death for blasphemy. All of this is evidence of a quite violent polarization process. And in the midst of it, certain self-designated cultural leftists do what they can to suppress the issues, even suggesting that blasphemy laws are acceptable, given (as a legitimate reaction to?) the racism of the West.

Jyllandsposten's cartoon issue was a spark, and the worldwide reaction it ignited has left its mark on current politics in the West. Left satirical newspapers like *Charlie Hebdo* were quick to reprint and supplement the caricatures and also found themselves attacked, although in France the government gave no indication that it would bend over backward to please those who were offended. The debate rotated around two poles: freedom of expression and speech at one end; blasphemy and Islamophobia at the other. The cultural left was concerned only with Islamophobia; the others, many of whom were also on the left, cared about maintaining freedom of expression. As is usual in PC situations, the result was that PC people came to see freedom of expression as tainted, insofar as it could be associated with Islamophobia and thus racism. The prominence of attempted assassinations and violent aggressions by people offended by the cartoons did not seem to bother their supporters since they were, after all, only reacting as victims of racism.

The subsequent episode, set off by artist and art theorist Lars Vilks's Mohammed as roundabout dog, largely echo the Danish events but in more subdued form, since the Swedish media and most institutions chose to freeze

Vilks out of the public sphere. Their ploy only backfired, as it led to his becoming the object of planned violence and substantial fame, something that has continued until today. Again, the PC reaction, focused entirely on Islamophobia and on asserting that such representations are expressions of hate that could even be hate crimes, was entirely based on the plethora of associations that can be mustered in the kind of false argumentation I have tried to document in this book. In his comments on the famous honor killing of Fadime, the cultural studies professor Stefan Jonsson stresses that although some general specificity may pertain to these kinds of acts, to identify their specificity is to cater to the extreme right because, as he says, authors of that stripe quote many Muslim women who would defend Fadime against her honor-based fate (*Dagens Nyheter*, December 12 2013). By that logic, if what is defined as an extreme right journal or newspaper cites Marx or Chomsky approvingly, then the latter are by definition tainted by the disease.[3]

Several years ago a Muslim head of the Islamic Association of Sweden, an official member organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected to the steering committee of the municipality of Stockholm. The media discovered that this person, voted in at the last minute without democratic consultation, had in fact invited a well-known anti-Semite and later a homophobe to speak at a meeting of the association, which also explicitly expresses clearly repressive notions about the place of women, as well as homosexuals and Jews. The person in question had stated on Twitter that he thought Sweden should bomb Israel. The embarrassment for the steering committee increased when the person in question refused to recant and had to be nudged out of his position on the committee. His dismissal was attacked by numerous Muslims and leftist Social Democrats, as well as the Christian support group for the Social Democratic Party, as simply Islamophobia. What we have here is an ideal-type example of associationism as a logic. The person was criticized for his particular positions in politics and his association with the Muslim Brotherhood, whose take on all of these issues is quite explicit and published. However, his position was assimilated to the larger category of Muslim, whereupon he was seen as a victim of Islamophobia. The latter term is possible due to the simple association between Islamism and Islam, a connection that is not one of logical necessity but explicitly one of element and set; which is to say Islamism is a subset of Islam, but the reverse is not the case. On the other hand, there are plenty of overlaps and a certain continuity that I have detailed in several places in this book.

In 2013, fifteen years after the events described in this book, one of Sweden's foremost ethnologists, Karl-Olov Arnstberg, and the well-known journalist Gunnar Sandelin published the book *Invandring och mörkläggning* (2013), which translates as "immigration and cover-up." Arnstberg and Sandelin, two prominent figures in both academia and the media, could not

get this substantial text of almost four hundred pages published in the Swedish mainstream press and finally had it published privately. The book deals with the media's and academic elites' suppression of the facts of mass immigration, enclavization, violence, and criminalization over the past thirty years as an exceptionally Swedish phenomenon, given that even Sweden's nearest neighbors, Norway and Denmark, have discussed the problems openly. As I have said, this is what occurred with Unni Wikan's book on honor killing in Sweden, which came out in English and Norwegian before finally finding a willing publisher in Sweden—one that some, interestingly enough, would call a rogue-left publisher. The sole Swedish review of the book in the evening newspaper *Aftonbladet*, dismissed it as propaganda for the racist-nationalist right wing. Predictably, the review contained no analysis; rather, it consisted of a vulgar labeling process, throughout which it was asserted that the authors presented only the usual old nonsense about how much immigration costs "us" (i.e., ethnic Swedes) alongside an assemblage of tedious statistics and more openly racist quotes from a couple of sources already categorized as racist, complaining all the while about cover-ups and falsifications by the Swedish media. The review perfectly exemplified what the book's authors wrote about the media elite's ideological machinery. Yet all along, the reviewer had the option of going in and trying to falsify what looked like a very calm and objectivist analysis of a particular situation, even if, as the book's critics claim, it might itself have been merely a façade for a racist agenda.

In 2013 an advertisement that Arnstberg and Sandelin placed in Sweden's largest daily, *Dagens Nyheter*, created a sizeable scandal in which this liberal newspaper was attacked for supporting the racism of the book's authors. The editor answered the criticisms by stating only that the book had been reviewed and that no inaccuracies of fact were found. As usual, no debate followed this, but the accusations still stood, distilled in questions in the vein of "how could you allow that to happen?" As a result of the critique, the book suddenly climbed to number five on the best-seller list. That this was the outcome of an attempt to crush any presence of the book in the public sphere would seem to indicate that there is indeed a huge gap between the thinking (at least in public) of the country's cultural, media, and political elites and those whom they purportedly represent. The book confirms much of what is set out in these pages and in research done on this subject more than a decade ago. There are other books as well. Arnstberg and Sandelin (2014) published a sequel to their 2013 volume that discusses the problems of causation. Jan Tullberg, an economist at the Stockholm School of Economics, published a critical book (2014) that takes up some of the same themes, including the enormous difficulties of addressing these issues publicly. A former major journalist whose pen name is Julia Caesar has written scathingly about cover-up operations in which facts were altered

and journalistic interpretation was the heavy hand that generated the "truth" about the present.

Another recent book that would seem to support what has been proffered in this work is the thoroughly analytical study of the "democratic" contradictions of multiculturalism by Eriksen and Stjernfelt (2013), which systematically discusses the contradictory relation between individual and collective rights in the discourse of multiculturalism. However, the actual social conditions of the emergence of the issue itself are not discussed in depth but dealt with primarily in ahistorical terms, so in spite of its excellent arguments, the work is surprisingly context-free. Unlike the books of Arnstberg and Sandelin, it attempts to map the basic problems involved in multicultural policies, an undertaking that has been discussed over the past decades in a number of countries, if not in Sweden. It locates the major problem in what is referred to as "culturalism," which essentializes group differences and thus imprisons people in collectivities that, whether or not they really exist, are assumed and, more dangerously, institutionalized. Their argument rests in part on a serious conflation of culture and social identity. The latter, in situations of the politics of indigenous peoples, is less about the content of culture than about political and cultural autonomy, which places Eriksen and Stjernfelt on the side of the cosmopolitan debunkers as opposed to the indigenous, rooted (and as some see them, reactionary) natives.

My own analysis differs somewhat but in no way contradicts Arnstberg and Sandelin, or Eriksen and Stjernfelt. It concerns a major cosmological shift in the parameters of world definition that has been in process since the early 1980s and is detailed in this volume's conclusion as well as in chapter 7. The ideological inversion that generates Occidentalism is the foundational framework that has made the above situation so salient. And although there are dissident voices, there is clearly no open debate about these issues. What has developed instead is a parallel set of discussions: the official one; and the other, public, Internet-based discussion that contains all manner of accusations, opinions, and even very interesting collections of factual information.

In a recent interview and in several lectures, Assar Lindbeck, Sweden's grand old man of economics, voiced his concern regarding the possibility of maintaining the so-called Swedish model under current levels of immigration:

> 60 procent av socialunderstödet går redan till invandrare. Invandrare har fem gånger så stor sannolikhet att leva på socialbidrag som en infödd. Så redan nu har vi problem. Det betyder att vi måste ha en reglerad invandring. (Interview in *Neo* 2013a)
>
> 60 percent of social welfare payments go to immigrants. Immigrants are five times more likely to live on welfare as native Swedes. So we already have a problem. It means that we must have a regulated immigration.

Also,

> Det är fullständigt ofrånkomligt. Redan Gunnar Myrdal insåg det för många år sedan när han skrev att välfärdsstaten är ett nationellt projekt. Med det menar han att de förmåner en nation lyckas skaffa genom att ha en framgångsrikt ekonomisk utveckling under hundra år, de kan man inte erbjuda resten av världen utan att vårt system går omkull. (2013b)
>
> It is absolutely unavoidable. Gunnar Myrdal understood this many years ago when he wrote that the welfare state is a national project. What he meant was that the benefits that a nation attains via a successful development over a hundred years cannot be offered to the rest of the world without leading to the collapse of our system.

and, further:

> Vi är ett rikt land med en välfärdsstat och vi är nio miljoner invånare i en värld där tre, fyra miljarder människor skulle betraktas som urfattiga. Det är klart ett sånt land inte kan ha fri invandring.
>
> We are a rich land with a welfare state and we have a population of nine million in a world where three or four billion people can be classified as living in extreme poverty. It is clear that such a country can not allow unhindered immigration.

Is Sweden still an exception? In terms of immigration, one can definitely say that this is the case. First- and second-generation immigrants make up 20 percent of the country's population—a higher share than in immigrant countries such as the United States. Also quite exceptionally, the lion's share of that one-fifth consists of refugees plus the even larger group of family reunification cases. Of these only 10 percent are refugees according to UNHCR criteria. The per capita rate of refugees to Sweden is unsurpassed. Sweden is home to 60 percent of all refugees to the Nordic countries, which means it has 14 times more refugees than Finland, 7 times more than Denmark, and 5 times more than Norway. At around 45 percent, the unemployment rate is more than significant; such a figure implies enormous costs in a welfare state. And while an increasing share of the state budget was financing this state of affairs, other sectors declined significantly.

This was documented years ago, but it is now approaching an order of absurdity. Sweden is the world leader in immigration, primarily of largely uneducated people from the Middle East who are largely dependent on state-financed welfare. This is not the pattern in the United States, and certainly not in Canada or in most other European countries. Sweden is hardly multicultural, nor is it terribly diverse. Rather it is very much bicultural, primarily Swedish and Muslim (if Islam can be called a culture) from West Asia and Africa. And as suggested in earlier chapters, the relation is antagonistic from the Muslim side, which makes demands on the public arena that limit various

behaviors and practices, from the consumption of pork in schools to the observance of traditional, quite secular seasonal festivities such as Christmas, which is Jul (Yuletide in English), a not particularly Christian holiday. There has been no backlash against Latin Americans or East Asians in Sweden—only against Muslims from Western Asia, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, and to a much lesser extent Iran, as well as African Somalis. Here one may expect an immediate reaction of "Aha! Essentialism, therefore, racism." This is not at all meant to be associated with an essentialized depiction (of course not everyone in the Muslim community is so engaged), but it would be quite inane to deny that it exists as a phenomenon. Therefore, one can still say that Sweden represents an extreme case. Indeed, PC has been extended to absurd extremes, as in the recent rejection of a Sweden Democrat campaign advertisement featuring a graph comparing numbers of asylum seekers in the different Nordic countries over the prior seven months. All the major newspapers declined to run the ad—not because it was false, but on the grounds that it was racist. In other words, simple graphs can be racist even when they are true.

In the suburban district of Hjällbo in Gothenburg, a local politician for the Left Party who was responsible for a local Caritas association got into serious trouble with the local Somali immigrant community. Caritas, a Catholic charity that has undertaken to teach the Swedish language to new immigrants because the local government lacks the capacity to handle so many learners, found itself catering to these new Swedes in a situation that became quite extraordinary. A significant number of Somali men moved in on the local Caritas premises. They had been expelled from a nearby mosque because of their extremist attitudes and were now occupying a center intended for teaching Swedish to immigrants. The local politician complained that the place was being turned



Figure PS.1. Nordic countries' asylum seekers 2014

into a mosque and raised issues of Islamic radicalization. Needless to say, as soon as she raised the issue she was attacked, and her opinion severely censored, both within her own party and by the media (Holmerz 2012; Asmar 2012; Arnstberg and Sandelin 2013: 291-301).

A well-known veteran Swedish journalist who had begun to write for the "anti-jihadist" blog *Dispatch International* received enough threats to cause him to back down completely, issuing a statement to the effect that if he had known what a rag the *Dispatch* was he would never have considered writing for it. It is worth noting that the two editors of *Dispatch* were mainstream journalists: one was chief news editor for the liberal newspaper *Kvällsposten* in Malmö; the other was editor of the Danish left newspaper *Information*.

In a conversation with a young asylum seeker, an elderly woman volunteer who worked for the Red Cross in the north of Sweden was taped saying that it would be better to help refugees in their own areas rather than bringing them to Sweden, which was hard put to employ such people because youth unemployment in the country was already high. The recording was uploaded to the Internet, and the woman was accused of racism by a person who, it turned out, had a substantial criminal record. Red Cross officials immediately intervened, saying that the values the volunteer had expressed were contrary to those of the organization. The usual comments in the media made things worse. She was forced to leave her position and died soon afterward. Was this woman a racist for making such remarks? Is it racism to say that potential refugees are best helped in their homelands? In what sense is this racist?

A representative of the Social Democratic Party in the province of Småland resigned because a colleague purportedly was related to a member of the Sweden Democrat Party.

Berierungsangst? The author of a book critical of multiculturalism (Adamson 2014) was accused of being a closet racist, a fascist, and finally a pedophile. The connections that can be made in the process of essentialization are endless. His job was not: he wound up losing it because of his publications, even though they received excellent evaluations.

The past couple of years have seen myriad such incidents, along with a shocking increase in both claims of racism and violence against those identified as racists. The government has sponsored a movement to deconstruct homogeneous identity and destroy it, *att störa homogeniteten* (2014), and the target is Swedishness: everything about it, from language and history to cultural symbols, folklore, and children's stories, is scrutinized as representing the structural racism that is so prevalent in the country. If one were to proceed in this way with all the minority identities that populate the country, there would literally be no identity left, but this of course has not occurred, since, as one former minister said, Sweden has no culture; only the others do:

> Ni har en kultur, en identitet, en historia, någonting som binder ihop er. Och vad har vi? Vi har midsommarafton och sådana töntiga saker (interview with Mona Sahlin in Tidningen *Euroturk* 11 2002)
>
> You (immigrants) have an identity, a history, something that binds you together. And what have we got? Midsummer Eve and other trivial things.

Case Study: The Origins of a Diversity Agenda at an American University

I have argued that what is happening in Swedish society as a whole is similar to what goes on in some parts of liberal North American university life. The United States, as I wrote, manifests a broader range of debate and especially a strong dose of cynicism and irony that is unusual in Sweden but also quite absent from U.S. university milieus, at least in public. The following events occurred when I was at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD).

In 2011 an organized social occasion called the Compton Cookout sparked a scandal that went to the top of the U.S. media hierarchy. The invitation read as follows:

> February marks a very important month in American society. No, I'm not referring to Valentines day or Presidents day. I'm talking about Black History month. As a time to celebrate and in hopes of showing respect, the Regents community cordially invites you to its very first Compton Cook out.
>
> For guys: I expect all males to be rockin Jersey's, stuntin' up in ya White T (XXXL smallest size acceptable), anything FUBU, Ecko, Rockawear, High/low top Jordans or Dunks, Chains, Jorts, stunner shades, 59 50 hats, Tats, etc.
>
> For girls: For those of you who are unfamiliar with ghetto chicks—Ghetto chicks usually have gold teeth, start fights and drama, and wear cheap clothes—they consider Baby Phat to be high class and expensive couture. They also have short, nappy hair, and usually wear cheap weave, usually in bad colors, such as purple or bright red. They look and act similar to Shenaynay, and speak very loudly, while rolling their neck, and waving their finger in your face. Ghetto chicks have a very limited vocabulary, and attempt to make up for it by forming new words, such as "constipulated," or simply cursing persistently, or using other types of vulgarities, and making noises, such as "hmmg!" or smacking their lips, and making other angry noises, grunts, and faces. The objective is for all you lovely ladies to look, act, and essentially take on these "respectable" qualities throughout the day.
>
> Several of the regents' condos will be teaming up to house this monstrosity, so travel house to house and experience the various elements of life in the ghetto.
>
> We will be serving 40's, Kegs of Natty, dat Purple Drank—which consists of sugar, water, and the color purple, chicken, coolade, and of course Watermelon. So come one and come all, make ya self before we break ya self, keep strapped, get yo shine on, and join us for a day party to be remembered—or not.

This event totally scandalized the black student union. The university chimed in, and the news reached the *New York Times* and the major networks. Was UCSD a racist campus? The organizer was indeed white, although his name was clearly not Anglo-Saxon. A black comic member of the hip-hop scene, Jiggaboo Jones, got involved immediately, claiming that the party was part of an advertising campaign for his new DVD. He stated on his home page:

> Over the next few days some hate mongering black people had told a pack of lies about our event stating that a White Fraternity and several members of the KKK threw a Racist party that made fun of black people. This lie was quickly soaked up by people with some kind of political agenda to spread hate and discontent among people who attend UCSD. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iGfFSZ2kcRg)

Other events, like the hanging of an effigy of a black man in front of the university library, apparently the work of an Asian student, made it clear that those planning to attend the party were not members of the KKK but came from a variety of groups and included a large number of minorities. The Compton Cookout was meant as a provocation—in bad taste, of course, but hardly much worse than Saturday Night Live's old skits on Black History Week. The sensitivity is clearly a university affair, one that pertains primarily to whites who are blamed for the whole situation. Several of my students, who attempted to criticize the more puritan reactions that might themselves be understood as racist, were embroiled in the process. Meanwhile black humor and cynical takes on racial issues proliferated in the United States. The argument comprises a cobweb of associations that go back to slavery and the race laws of the twentieth-century South, even if there was at least as much racism in the North. Of course there was and is racism, and it is a vast, if not totally universal, phenomenon. But when ideology becomes inverted and people are increasingly narcissistic, there is no room for discussion, debate, or even irony. Thus all of the themes I have discussed in this book are as predominant on American campuses as in the larger public spheres of societies like Sweden.

The ultimate reaction to the Compton Cookout was a concerted introduction of "diversity" agendas to each area of university life, all orchestrated from the offices of the vice-chancellors. Course content, new hires, programs: all were stamped in the same terms, in a state where affirmative action had become illegal. Thus, in the anthropology department, a diversity-earmarked hire arrived at an impossible situation: the administration viewed the several selected candidates, all women who dealt with diversity in terms of human and primate species, as unacceptable because they were not diverse enough. After long, arduous discussions, it was decided to drop the appointment and initiate a new round of applications. Months of deliberations were sent down the drain because of the misunderstanding surrounding the content of the term "diversity." It should be noted that the social sciences faculty did not, at the

time, include women as a diversity category. Were the candidates expected to embody diversity, or to study it, or both, or neither? Nothing was made clear in this state that, paradoxically, bans affirmative action.

That associationism is also alive and well in the United States is evidenced by the case of the shooting of a black boy by a self-identified Latino amateur policeman who has been classified as white by the PC media and some organizations. The amateur policeman and volunteer in a neighborhood known for crime, followed a black youth whom he saw as suspicious and tried to apprehend the 18-year-old on his own. The result was a brawl in which the black teenager was killed by the man in question, whose name was Zimmerman and who identified and was identified as a Latino (mother Peruvian, father American). The trial resulted in acquittal, which in turn led to numerous protests against what was identified as blatant racism. The media had a field day hosting a series of debates on racism, and the president cautioned against overreacting to the decision; meanwhile, Attorney General Eric Holder said that the Department of Justice was investigating the case. All this, about an issue of racism between a Latino identified as white by some members of the black community and a young black suspect? Questions that arise about the logic of the issues involved must be taken seriously. Had the amateur policeman been black, what would the reaction have looked like? Had the victim been white or Latino, what would the reactions have been? What is noteworthy is the importance of identifying the perpetrator as a white male: a person from another ethnic group would have lacked impact value. Discussions in Sweden, ideal type for such mystifications, are telling examples of the way in which real events are filtered into politically correct categories. The fact that Zimmerman was half white was enough to shift him into the category white for the purposes of opposing him to black.

There has indeed been backlash. Many are fed up with PC, and increasing numbers of critical texts and statements address what is seen as the stupidity and hypocrisy of the PC regime of thought control. But PC continues to exert substantial power: it has gained ever greater access to governments in which all center-right and left governments have adopted similar positions, and has become part of a process of serious polarization. A recent poll found that a significant majority of the French opposed immigration, and that the Front National had more than 28 percent of the vote in surveys in 2014.[4]

Sweden Again

Sweden has a Dangerous Party, mentioned several times in this text: the Sweden Democrats. The first people I interviewed from this party were originally members of the youth section of the Left Party and claimed that the left they knew

was a sovereigntist left, whereas the very idea of opening the country up to large-scale or mass immigration was not socialist but liberal and was, in their view, against the idea of a We based on common goals and implying a common culture. The rapid rise of the Sweden Democrats, which has nationalist roots, attracted some extremists. Purging the latter generated splinter groups that also became nationalist parties. Occurring throughout Europe, this phenomenon is closely linked to the rapid increase in immigration, even if the Swedish reaction seems subdued given the fact that its immigration situation is a true extreme. This must be understood in light of the material we have presented on immigration politics in the country: the fact that Sweden accepted more Iraqis than any other country in the world, and that they all ended up in the same residential area, which led to ethnic conflicts with the older, Christian refugee community. Little is known of the background of immigrants like these Iraqis. They have access to money to pay for their journeys, yet there is seldom any mention in standard media nor in public statements of the larger migration situation—the millions of displaced people in the world who mostly cannot get out, and the European or Western politics that pursues no substantial measures to reverse the situation.

Sweden Democrats contend that immigration policy has led to the creation of a new underclass. This claim has been dismissed as racism, but it is a pretty accurate description of the situation in a society with constantly high rates of unemployment among immigrants. But this is also the usual Marxist analysis of the situation. Paradoxes galore!? The well-known Marxist economist Robert Rowthorn (2008) argued in a report that labor migration has had a deleterious effect on even the English economy. And as increasing numbers of citizens seem to lean toward an anti-immigration stance, even the government of Sweden concedes that migration has become a very expensive affair that will require tax increases, something this conservative government (2010–2014) has campaigned against for years. At the same time the press, like the so-called left, has warned that such statements (not least by the minister of finance) are playing into the hands of the Sweden Democrats, which may well be the case.

The rising popularity of nationalist parties, some more inclined to extreme positions than others, was clear in the EU parliamentary elections of 2014, which revealed a surge in support for a number of nationalist positions. In Sweden this surge has been driven by a realization that ordinary people are the enemy of the political and cultural elites—a position that has, as we have seen, become quite explicit in the past decade and that is, as I have argued, part of the emergence of a new left-oriented bourgeoisie and a new ideology that has redesignated immigrants as the avant-garde of a new revolution, a new multicultural society. The apparent resistance to this tendency has caused the tone to sharpen. It is no longer a question of shaming potential nationalists and racists, but of reinforcing state politics of "anti-racism"—the same

anti-racism that the French political scientist and philosopher Taguieff (1988) referred to earlier described as a new, mirror-image racism. The new "race" institute, headed by a former editor of *Expo*, referred to above, whose goals are to deconstruct "whiteness" and ferret out all the country's racists, recently defended the maintenance of the concept of race in Swedish legal documents (7 August-2014) on the grounds that its elimination would make the work of antiracism impossible to implement. This of course makes sense to the head of an institute for the study of race. The prior institute for the study of race had been closed decades ago, not least because it represented an antiquated racialist ideology. The new institute's head, Tobias Hubinette, adopted as a child from South Korea with a record of petty and not so petty crimes (including threatening a life, arson, and vandalism), is known for his statement, cited in the conclusion but worth repeating, given his new official appointment: "Let the white race's West go down in blood and suffering. Long live the multicultural mixed race and classless ecological society!" (Låt den vita rasens västerland gå under i blod och lidande. Leve det mångkulturella, rasblandade, och klasslösa ekologiska samhället!) (Creol 1, 1996).

The use of the term race-ified or racialized to refer to all those who have been discriminated in any way in Swedish society (paradox in relation to the apparent need to maintain the concept of race). A constant barrage of radio programs on the problems of racism and an entire school program against racism in public schools have emerged as major projects of the government in 2014, and their tone is very much in line with the postcolonial studies agenda, where the very fact that Sweden is permeated by Swedish culture is evidence of racism. Thus what was discussed in the conclusion pertaining to a single researcher, Masoud Kamali, whose entire agenda was based on the existence of "structural racism" even though the minister (i.e., Mona Sahlin) who appointed him to lead the committee on ethnicity and democracy declared that Sweden "has no culture" has become a pervasive understanding within the cultural elite.

In media discussions of the Sweden Democrats, the point of departure is that they are perhaps fascist, racist, even Nazis. From there, all empirical material becomes mere filler for this categorical interpretation. This is classic PC discourse with its frenzied associations. At the same time, the party seems to be growing. While some would call this evidence that Swedes are becoming racists, others will see it as something more serious that should be taken seriously. Interestingly, many of its adherents come from the left rather than the right, although these terms can be said to lack any meaning today.

So what has happened since the bulk of this text was written between 2000 and 2003? What was predicted—and criticized as racism and even Nazism—was that multicultural Sweden was in for a future of increasingly serious conflicts. This prediction has turned out to be quite accurate. Ethnic conflict has

plainly increased, segregation is among the worst in the OECD countries, there is clear evidence of the formation of a new underclass, and parallel societies, often Muslim, have developed in numerous areas. It is also quite evident that the real conflicts are between Swedes and Muslims from the Middle East. Meanwhile, problems with other immigrant groups from East Asia and Latin America are virtually nonexistent. Increasing numbers of writers and researchers have voiced concerns about this and met with the predictable response: silence, or accusations of racism and now Islamophobia. The kind of reaction one might expect from the postcolonial left on university campuses is now a generalized trend among Swedish political and cultural elites.

The Sweden Democrats, which barely existed when the this book was first being written, are now established with over 15 percent of the vote (20 percent and 26 percent in some polls), which is considerable, given the political pressure to deny this party the right to exist. It is not an anti-immigrant party, but rather an anti-immigration and populist party in the old-fashioned, more leftist sense of being anti-capital and anti-state. Why do they get so much of the vote, when so many are ashamed of their existence? Most analyses chalk it up to a combination of the immediate experience of changing conditions of existence, not least the increase in segregation, and the concomitant growth of violence and conflict. Furthermore, the political and cultural elites are in a state of denial that is primarily directed at their own people, who are conceived as a social libido to be repressed and displaced onto more pleasant attitudes.

I have argued previously that the current trend in Western political culture is engulfment by a double polarization: one horizontal, opposing cultural groups to one another according to ethnicity, religion, or gender; and the other vertical, opposing a self-defined cosmopolitan elite to an increasingly indigenizing lower middle- and lower-class population that defines itself as primarily local, national, or even racial. Much of the past decade has certainly verified this tendency, the manifestations of which range from the vociferous, structurally violent actions taken by that cosmopolitan elite in its desperate attempt to neutralize the rising opposition to current policies, to statistical manipulation, outright denial, and massive cover-up of the problems that clearly exist. This is not to claim that there could not have been such a party if discussions were more open: other countries with more open debate have experienced the same emergence of what they refer to as a new populism. This trend is rooted in more serious structural issues, discussed earlier, that are related to the vertical polarization that characterizes the current transformation of political culture in the West.

Yet certain variations in this transformation are also significant in themselves, as indicators of the particular historical trajectories of different political entities, which in this case are nation-states. Here I envision what might be called a kind of *longue durée*, although I would not insist on a given length of

time. It might account for the extremes of the Swedish case, where the Occidentalist inversion has been taken to heart and instrumentalized as in no other country in Europe or North America, despite the presence of voices that have promoted such tendencies. So as not to sound alarmist, one might turn the tables here and assert that even total war is not total in terms of everyday existence. Most of the 24-hour day is in fact pretty peaceful. Violence is always event-based and sporadic in actual life processes. Even in the midst of full-scale warfare, life usually goes on, and the statistical chances of being killed are small.

After PC

I have shown that PC is an instrument of control in periods when new and more established elites vie for hegemony. The fragility of a newly gained elite position implies a fear of exposure and a need for control over the arena of communication. This control is instrumentalized by avoiding issues of semantic content and instead engaging in a moral discourse of labeling via associationism, based on the indexicality of statements. Associationism can become quite savage in stressful situations, and stress is bound to occur as opposition to the control exercised by the new, contentious elites gradually emerges in force. This has been especially so in the past five or six years. Being PC is no longer merely an issue of shaming those who are categorized as racists, fascists, or Nazis, for these designations no longer stick as well as they did previously. Instead PC has mutated into a more violent war on evil, for instance the physical attacks by certain left groups in Sweden such as the "Revolutionary Front," in which members engage in what they call "house calls" by turning up to trash the households of individuals classified as racists.

The fusion of terms into the racist-fascist-Nazi amalgam is ever more strictly enforced. PC is as strong as ever but now serves to sanction more violent acts, as when its proponents argue that the violent left embodies democratic values. I maintain that the so-called extreme left has become increasingly violent in the past few years, and ample documentation confirms my claim that violence is far more prevalent on the extreme left than on the extreme right. When this consideration was addressed on a well-known television documentary series, the program was criticized, not just for catering to racism and fascism, but for being itself a direct expression of them. The vaguely left-leaning evening paper *Aftonbladet* has condoned extreme left violence:

> Extremvänstern är alltså – enligt statsmaktens egna beskrivningar – extremistiskt mycket emot rasism, nazism och sexism. Man är extremister i sitt motstånd mot miljöförstöring och djurplågeri, och extremt mycket för demokrati och jämställdhet. (P. Larsson 16/12 2013)

> The extreme left is, according to the government's own descriptions, extremist in its resistance to environmental destruction and animal cruelty, as well as being extremely positive to democracy and equality.

As summarized by a critic:

> "Det är skillnad om man slåss för eller mot fascism, om man är för eller emot alla människors lika värde och rättigheter." Och lite längre ned i samma text skriver hon "Här har vi alltså å ena sidan en grupp människor som faktiskt vill något gott – försvara varje människas rätt till liv och existens oavsett etnicitet och en annan grupp som anser att människor har olika värde beroende på sin härkomst . . . (A. Heberlein *Sydsvenska Dagbladet* 20-12-2013)
>
> "There is a difference between fighting for or against fascism, being for or against the equal value and rights of all people." And further down in the text she writes, "Here we have on one side a group that wants something *Good*, the defense of all people's right to life and existence no matter what their ethnicity."

This is what some have referred to as "good" violence. But as a TV documentary series demonstrated, this is not the case—on the contrary, extreme left violence is more than a true mirror image of right violence. However, even this does not correctly depict the phenomenon, because extreme left violence is not based on the violence of the right but is instead a quite autonomous phenomenon. Conservatives, liberals, and nationalists alike, and more recently social democrats too, have been the targets of "house calls" in which homes are

Group Type	Attacks	Dead	Wounded	Hostage	Victims
Christian Extremist	315	3,301	645	2,411	6,357
Environmental/Anti-Globalization	12	0	4	0	4
Hindu Extremist	18	13	117	1	131
Islamic Extremist (Shia)	506	1,251	4,000	390	5,641
Islamic Extremist (Sunni)	17,030	38,059	83,188	11,658	132,905
Islamic Extremist (Unknown)	299	832	4,013	65	4,910
Jewish Extremist	52	6	71	0	77
Neonazi/Fascists/White Supremacists	6	4	8	0	12
Other Religious Extremist	7	7	73	2	82
Secular/Political/Anarchist	16,458	15,862	28,214	59,133	103,209
Tribal/Clan/Ethnic	566	1,948	1,321	1,144	4,413
Unknown	36,058	43,665	96,343	5,240	145,248
Total	**71,327**	**104,948**	**217,997**	**80,044**	**402,989**

Figure PS.2. Violence grouped by perpetrator characteristic, Europol TE_SAT 2014

destroyed, and of other forms of verbal violence and violent physical actions. This violence appears to be much more prevalent than that on the right (see Figure PS.2, above). Existing statistics on such violence on a world scale document some tendencies worth noting. But as I have argued, the question is not one of left versus right or democratic versus totalitarian values. It is about a tribalization of the political arena that has developed into tribal warfare in the public sphere. The fact that this is couched in terms of good versus evil should come as no surprise, as this is the most efficient way of dividing the world into friends versus enemies, us versus them. Because this division concerns identity rather than arguments, it overrides rational discourse and short-circuits dialogue, leaving violence as the only viable solution.

So what, then, is the fate of the PC movement, if movement is the correct word? As the first stage in a polarization of the political sphere in which identity superseded rationality, it could logically lead to an increasingly violent situation: in the absence of rationality, the only possible solutions involve alternative forms of eliminating the other. My argument in 1999 was that PC was part of a shift in political power, the rise of a new elite that, of necessity, is uneasy about its position. This transformation stems from an ideological inversion best summarized by the term Occidentalism, which derives its core support from former leftist elites on their way to cosmopolitanism and class consolidation. It has transformed the left into a bourgeois movement that embraces the basic tenets of liberalism even as it sometimes expresses hatred of what is called neoliberalism.

This latte left is often explicitly the enemy of the former working class, which it has replaced with immigrants, a singularly vague category devoid of clear social content. This shift is itself a reflex of the turn away from class and toward increasing emphasis on culture since the 1980s. The combination generates a virtual hatred of Western culture, its racialization as a White (male) phenomenon, and calls for it to be overthrown by a Third World cultural coalition, the resurgence of the Other. As in previous civilizational collapses, such a resurgence takes the form of what used to be called barbarian invasions, which in reality were actually more complex phenomena in which former peripheral populations became increasingly dominant in declining hegemonic centers while violent attacks from both the exterior and interior increased significantly. One might ask why such terms as world Sharia, world caliphates, and the like are now common fare. It might be suggested that Islamic fundamentalism presents a real alternative to the capitalist world system. This is no joke, but a reality that needs to be dealt with seriously in order to grasp the profundity of the transformations in progress in the world.

The journal *Expo* and its so-called Research Group born of anarchist and anti-racist convictions have not only produced the *Millenium* books and films (one of its founding editors, Stig Larsson, authored the novels) but also

instituted a large complex of activities closely tied to the Swedish state. Ministers and ex-ministers sit on its board of directors. Now a fully fledged organization, Expo is aimed primarily at the problem of the Sweden Democrats' increasing popularity, even if the party is seldom singled out for racist status. Expo maintains databases on subversive rightist activities and offers courses for journalists on racism and how to deal with it. The basic assumption is that racism is ubiquitous and needs to be ferreted out in order to create a better, racially mixed world of intercultural communication. In 1997, a year after the organization's founding, another left-wing journalist and author, Jan Gouillou, wrote in *Aftonbladet* that *Expo* was a kind of anti-racist espionage organization (cited in Arnstberg and Sandelin 2014: 272).

What kind of logic could possibly be involved here? The interpretation implicitly offered by Arnstberg and Sandelin is that there is a collusion between political elites from both sides of an apocryphal aisle (apocryphal because, as I have argued, it hardly exists today), and a more extreme left that has become completely absorbed by anti-racism, often in a highly violent fashion. The fact that George Soros has given millions of dollars to separatist movements in Central Asia and in the Balkans, as well as to "Black Lives Matter" and of course to Expo, points to an interesting alliance between big capitalists and the fragmenting implications of multiculturalism. Does the political elite have an agenda? Such a notion is fodder for conspiracy theory. However, it certainly can be suggested that the old left notion of people's solidarity and the new liberal ideology are absolute opposites. That solidarity is effectively dismantled by mass migration in a situation of decline, where downwardly mobile working-class people find themselves at odds with a new population of welfare-dependent immigrants.

These circumstances foster disengagement from the welfare-state model of solidarity, something that clearly seems to be attractive to both the bourgeois right and the anti-nationalist left. Both are interested in the dissolution of the nation as such, but not the state. In fact, the state has an instrumental role to play in the nation's transformation into an individualized, contractual container of populations with civil rights and obligations, all defined legally rather than via social engagement in a larger collective. The left, of course, does talk about both class and solidarity, but this may represent a cultural lag in separating from an older left. Today the inclination is more toward liberty than equality, universal rights rather than a social project. If this left is identical to the new liberal-left bourgeoisie or latte left (a more accurate term than "caviar left"), then the overlap with the liberal bourgeoisie makes more sense. And if the enemy is "racism," which is very much associated with the lemon-nationalist working class, then the case for an alliance is reinforced. But this is, of course, not a planned conspiracy but the result of a broader ideological inversion whose existence I have defended. It is a structural product of the decline of

Western hegemony. One might observe that in France, where the term *gauche caviar* seems to have originated, the already scandalized president Francois Hollande was accused by his ex-girlfriend of denigrating the working class, which he had referred to as "les sans-dents"—the toothless (Dupuis 2014).

In a recent episode, a journalist going by the pen name of Julia Caesar who has written critically about the new left elitism was harassed by a couple of journalists from *Dagens Nyheter* (where Caesar worked for many years as an editor). Now in her seventies, Caesar used the pseudonym and lived in an isolated rural area to avoid being attacked. The two journalists, who "visited" after finding out where she lived, banged on her windows and doors, trying to get her to come out, supposedly to interview her and thereby expose her as a right-wing racist and representative of a "hate site" (their favorite new term). They also alerted the press to her real name, which she had tried to keep secret to protect herself and her children from undue harassment by precisely the PC crowd. This was not the kind of activity to be expected in the Swedish press where lying and cover-up are more usual activities. It created quite a scandal (Caesar 2015; Orrenius 2015; Hamrud 2015), but it is to be expected in the post-PC era. The major afternoon tabloid *Expressen* has a direct relation to the so-called Research Group linked to Expo, and to the abovementioned Tobias Hubinette, that is essentially oriented to harassing "racists" in Sweden by mapping them and disclosing their names, addresses, and telephone numbers. The TV documentary that depicted this crowd, sometimes called the "left police," making "house calls" also showed them doing their best to intimidate and sometimes physically harm their victims. The Revolutionary Front is one of these groups but it is allied with other, similar organizations whose explicit goal is to struggle against what is seen as racism, which, as I have suggested, covers an ever broadening spectrum of activities and attitudes.

Arnstberg and Sandelin's interpretation of the Swedish situation is almost identical to the model I have proposed for almost a decade, in which a cosmopolitanized elite makes use of multiculturalist ideology to marginalize its own working class. The new political order is best captured by the concept of the "market state," similar to the notion used by Arnstberg and Sandelin when they refer to Lassalle's night watchman state (Lassalle 1884). In Bobbitt (2004), the successor to the nation-state is the market state, a slimmed-down state focused on maintaining order and certain minimal services that are important to sustaining the competitive advantage of the particular territory over which the state rules. Bobbitt does not take a moral stance on this; rather, he sees it as an inevitable product of the social transformations of the past hundred years. This, of course, resonates with the neoliberalism that has been so much discussed and that in Europe was very much put in place by labor/social-democratic governments on the grounds that it was an inevitable result of globalization.

Most important here is the fact that the representations of this change did not come from the right but very much from the left as it transitioned into being a new left bourgeoisie. Only the old-fashioned working class opposed this opening up, and their fears have led them into the "brown" camp of racism, fascism, and even Nazism, now that these terms are seen as equivalent. Some Swedish neoliberals and libertarians have been explicit about the need to abandon the welfare state; hence this objective has become embedded in party ideology across the board. The reaction to this dismemberment of a former solidarity, necessarily based on the construction of a We, is seething beneath the surface, so the new "revolutionaries" see it as crucial to crush this reaction, which they have done by redefining it as racist.

It is noteworthy that this anti-nationalism applies only to the nation-state itself and not to the nationalisms of its minorities, who are handily recruited to fight in wars in other parts of the world, especially the Middle East. Most recently the violent attack on the offices of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*, referred to above, by Islamists who murdered some of its staff and chanted that it was all the revenge of Mohammed, is just the tip of an iceberg of evidence that such terrorist acts are Islamist acts, a phenomenon that the liberal left is not only quick to deny but also absurdly afraid to discuss. In Sweden, children of immigrants who go to join ISIS in Syria should, according to National coordinator against violent extremism Mona Sahlin, be given jobs and therapy on their return because, it is said, they are victims. This interesting inversion is precisely what was predicted by the model I suggested to account for the phenomenon. There may have been a gigantic demonstration in support of *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris, but strikingly, many governments in Europe did not send representatives. Further, in media discussions a great many people said that whereas they of course detested such violence, the magazine was at least partly at fault because it had insulted the prophet. In the Middle East and Pakistan, violent demonstrations against the magazine's subsequent publication of new caricatures were not met with condemnation, but with a fearful self-condemnation with regard to extremes of freedom of expression. In an atmosphere where no-go zones for the police are proliferating and there is no sign of the coming of anarchist communes, it is clear that we are in for an era of increasing collective violence.

Strange Confession

In a shocking column of 12 February 2015, journalist Ann-Charlotte Marteus claimed to have helped to organize the Swedish censure of oppositional political discourse by transferring it to the category of racism/hatred. The above-

discussed term "opinion corridor," or åsiktskorridoren, is precisely that with which he associates her work and in the column she confessed to it as a politically dubious way of controlling other people. She wrote that she had embarked on this work when the first waves of Islamophobia reached the shores of Sweden and the Sweden Democrats appeared on the political map. Fearing Sweden might be headed in the same direction as Denmark, she sought to prevent this by attacking anyone who expressed anything that might be interpreted as support for the new party—in other words, anything that in her perspective could be interpreted as racist or even "tendencies to racism." The latter included texts that questioned whether Sweden could afford large-scale immigration, which, as we have seen, is more than large-scale. Thus texts that might have been run in newspaper sections devoted to the labor market, education, or housing were all shifted to the section on racism. Afterward she began to have second thoughts when a journalist colleague was attacked as implicitly racist for discussing the housing shortage in relation to the massive influx of refugees. She concluded the piece by saying that this massive PC initiative, which led to many people losing their jobs, physical attacks, and the recent suicide of a Sweden Democratic politician, has indeed kept Sweden from becoming like Denmark, but at too great a cost.

Her column did not include the kinds of insights that would permit understanding of why the Sweden Democrats have grown so rapidly (in 2015 they polled at 19 percent in February, 22 percent in June, and 27 percent in September), though of course the polls vary considerably. In any case the popularity of the Sweden Democrats has clearly risen over the past few years, so she might want to reconsider. In any case, how should one react to her admission? Are those who have been most engaged in mystifying reality only now coming to realize that they have indeed been so engaged? When the former prime minister, having flown over his country, announces that it is mostly empty and could use some more immigrants to fill it up, unimpeded change in the political establishment looks improbable. Whatever the fate of the journalist, there is no change in political position thus far, and given the polarization involved it is unlikely that changes will be forthcoming unless new mystifications can be created.

PC is as strong as ever, and boots on the ground have recently taken the struggle to a more violent level. In this situation PC functions to legitimate the new violence against those who would protest this crucial aspect of the destruction of Western social orders. What is this struggle all about? I suggest it is simply an inversion of the power constellations of the past that has only just begun. And of course the real shift in power is much farther to the East than the Middle East, even if this shift might itself vanish in a truly global crisis.

A Culture of Fear in An Era of Narcissistic Regression

The most recent turn in PC is what has been referred to as "trigger warnings." Developed on the Internet but now on campuses, these involve individuals who are so afraid to confront communication that might traumatize them that they have demanded that teachers provide warnings about the literature to be read in courses. This issue has become serious enough to merit address by the American Association of University Professors (2014):

> A current threat to academic freedom in the classroom comes from a demand that teachers provide warnings in advance if assigned material contains anything that might trigger difficult emotional responses for students. This follows from earlier calls not to offend students' sensibilities by introducing material that challenges their values and beliefs. The specific call for "trigger warnings" began in the blogosphere as a caution about graphic descriptions of rape on feminist sites, and has now migrated to university campuses in the form of requirements or proposals that students be alerted to all manner of topics that some believe may deeply offend and even set off a post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) response in some individuals. Oberlin College's original policy (since tabled to allow for further debate in the face of faculty opposition) is an example of the range of possible trigger topics: "racism, classism, sexism, heterosexism, cissexism, ableism, and other issues of privilege and oppression." It went on to say that a novel like Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* might "trigger readers who have experienced racism, colonialism, religious persecution, violence, suicide and more." It further cautioned faculty to "[r]emove triggering material when it does not contribute directly to the course learning goals." (2014) (https://www.aaup.org/report/trigger-warnings)

In the conclusion I referred to the narcissistic foundation for the implementation of PC as a field of sociality. The current turn would seem to be evidence of this progression. If most literature and a great deal of the research focused on current issues has become too painful for individual students, then we have reached the point of eliminating all such communication. The Norwegian psychologist referred to above who took a course with me suggested that humor has been on the wane in his country because of a fear of possibly hurting other people's feelings. The comedian Jerry Seinfeld said recently in an interview that the constraints of political correctness had made doing comedy almost impossible, and that he had stopped playing university campuses (*USA Today*, 10 June 2015,). In this "linguistic Lourdes," language has become so constricted that anything resembling insight can be said to be in clear regression, strongly reinforced by the possibility that a fatwa will be leveled against an outspoken person for insulting the prophet. These checks are combined with a strategy of Occidentalism in which it has been claimed, for example, that "white" people's participation in a project on racism at the University of Gothenburg should be disallowed because they are white. A petition to that

effect was signed by a number of students and faculty, and the list grew in the ensuing debate (*Göteborgs Posten* 14, 16, 17, 19 June 2015). And while activity on the cultural left (not so extreme anymore) is increasingly frenetic, the rise of the right is progressing steadily. Both the level and intensity of hate have increased, even as the discourse of solidarity becomes more shrill among those who are expert at isolating themselves from the reality on the street.

In this world in crisis, structural adaptation entails the silencing of any expression that might question the dominant modes of representing the world, which are increasingly backed by force and violence. The situation is volatile, as radicalization in all directions has become increasingly prevalent. Expressing one's preference for the Front National, the Danish People's Party (now the second largest party in Denmark), or the Sweden Democrats, is no longer shameful, but it has instead become physically and socially dangerous, and incidents of violent acts from all sides involved are on the rise in this emergent post-PC world. What would Hobbes have said?

Now, with the tsunami of new migrants to Europe, a number of governments are finding themselves in a state of panic. Is it Syria that is the issue when, according to the UN refugee agency, only 10 percent of the "refugees" come from Syria proper, and when 70 percent of the migrants are young men? Sweden took in at least 160,000 refugees in 2015. Housing for them is nonexistent, as are clear ideas about how to deal with this wave of people. If they are primarily men, according to the statistics, then family members will follow. The Sweden Democrats have argued for making residency temporary, but the two allied right-left parties reject this proposal on humanist grounds. Obviously a lot of suffering is involved, yet at the same time one can hear such declarations as "I am so glad that you came to us as a doctor" being spoken without any thought of why the doctor actually had to come to Sweden. Perhaps this is the locus of the racism that is so strongly denied, if not repressed, by those who self-identify as "Good." In any case, the crisis-ridden Swedish government, so ready to criticize other countries for building fences, is suddenly arguing for a drastic reduction in refugees while still refusing to concede that the much-despised Sweden Democrats might have had the correct analysis all along. This is truly cause for panic. It is beyond PC, or more precisely, from the frying pan into the fire.

Meltdown?

The recent surge in nationalist parties in Europe and the rise of Trump in the United States are evidence of the polarization I have discussed, but it has led to hysteria among cultural, political, and especially media elites. In the post-PC era, the issue of shaming the enemy by calling it racist has fallen by the wayside, and tactics are now closer to open warfare as nationalist, sovereigntist,

Brexit-like politics gain popularity among large sectors of the disaffected former working class and even middle class. The rise of alternative media and news sites has sharpened the polarization and led to new attempts to control the latter if not eliminate them by exposing their so-called "fake" news. Even Fox News has become part of the establishment relative to Trump, whose campaign promises combined socialist-style protectionism with conservative cultural politics. Many feel quite disillusioned by it all, while others have reacted with increasing hate directed against the rising opposition and its free access to the web.

In one of his latest novels, Michel Houellebecq, the enfant terrible of French literature, has perhaps captured the atmosphere, as he so often has done in the past. The book, entitled *La Soumission* (Submission), recounts the travails of a decadent France in transformation. The Muslim Brotherhood has won the national election, and the alienated, atomized, somewhat cynically sex-obsessed intellectual anti-hero, a professor at the Sorbonne who was previously fired, is recalled and asked to resume his post on condition that he convert to Islam. He snaps from his usual distanced relation to religion into a surprising acceptance of and adaptation to the new regime. It's not so bad, he is told. You can have four wives if you like. He accepts the offer. Long live the intelligentsia! Marx had words for this class.

This book is an attempt to lay bare the logics of a contemporary phenomenon that has grown in intensity over the past three decades, one that holds a significant key to the contradictions of the current era. Avoiding the issues addressed here amounts to escapism. And then we are truly lost: "When you don't know where you are going any road will get you there" (Carroll 1918 *Alice in Wonderland* chapter 6).

Notes

1. As we discussed in chapter 3 the "getting involved with" is an insinuating gloss on "speaking to." But for Hannerz this is no gloss at all since *beruhrungsangst* is at the core of his interpretation of reality.
2. See http://spraktidningen.se/blogg/veckans-nyord-asiktskorridor, which indicates that the term was first used in 2009.
3. Even Wikan (2008) stresses that the specificity of honor killings is the product of a historical situation of marginalization in relation to stronger states, or a situation of living in a weak state where authority is located in the heads of families, clans, or lineages, and where women are not free to do as they please because competition can easily transform them into objects in which the status of the group is invested. This is, of course, a cultural phenomenon, but it bears consideration that in the absence of cultural determinism, cultural phenomena are generated by particular social contexts.
4. Le Pen got 34% of the vote in the election in the second round and Macron 66%. This was due to a large number of abstentions and the support of all the other parties for Macron.

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